Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009475
D. Mandel, Robert N. Collins, A. C. Walker, Jonathan A. Fugelsang, Evan F. Risko
Individuals often assess themselves as being less susceptible to common biases compared to others. This bias blind spot (BBS) is thought to represent a metacognitive error. In this research, we tested three explanations for the effect: The cognitive sophistication hypothesis posits that individuals who display the BBS more strongly are actually less biased than others. The introspection bias hypothesis posits that the BBS occurs because people rely on introspection more when assessing themselves compared to others. The conversational processes hypothesis posits that the effect is largely a consequence of the pragmatic aspects of the experimental situation rather than true metacognitive error. In two experiments (N = 1057) examining 18 social/motivational and cognitive biases, there was strong evidence of the BBS. Among the three hypotheses examined, the conversational processes hypothesis attracted the greatest support, thus raising questions about the extent to which the BBS is a metacognitive effect.
{"title":"Hypothesized drivers of the bias blind spot—cognitive sophistication,\u0000 introspection bias, and conversational processes","authors":"D. Mandel, Robert N. Collins, A. C. Walker, Jonathan A. Fugelsang, Evan F. Risko","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009475","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Individuals often assess themselves as being less susceptible to common\u0000 biases compared to others. This bias blind spot\u0000 (BBS) is thought to represent a metacognitive error. In this research, we\u0000 tested three explanations for the effect: The cognitive sophistication\u0000 hypothesis posits that individuals who display the BBS more strongly are\u0000 actually less biased than others. The introspection bias hypothesis posits\u0000 that the BBS occurs because people rely on introspection more when assessing\u0000 themselves compared to others. The conversational processes hypothesis\u0000 posits that the effect is largely a consequence of the pragmatic aspects of\u0000 the experimental situation rather than true metacognitive error. In two\u0000 experiments (N = 1057) examining 18\u0000 social/motivational and cognitive biases, there was strong evidence of the\u0000 BBS. Among the three hypotheses examined, the conversational processes\u0000 hypothesis attracted the greatest support, thus raising questions about the\u0000 extent to which the BBS is a metacognitive effect.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42902615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009402
T. Haesevoets, Kim Dierckx, A. Van Hiel
Do people think that there is such a thing as too much money? The present research investigated this question in the context of hypothetical lottery wins. By employing a mental simulation approach, we were able to examine how people respond to increasing envisioned jackpot amounts, and whether there are individual differences in people’s reactions. Across five empirical studies (total N = 1,504), we consistently found that, overall, the relationship between imagined lottery wins and expected happiness is characterized by an inverted U-shaped curve, with expected happiness being highest around an envisioned win of roughly 10 million pounds. Both lower and higher envisioned wins reduced participants’ overall expected happiness. In addition to this overall pattern, we identified three clusters of participants who react differently to expected increases in wealth. These clusters mainly differed in terms of how soon the top of the expected happiness curve was reached, and if and when the curve started to drop. Finally, we also found some interesting cluster differences in terms of participants’ prosocial and proself motivations.
{"title":"Do people believe that you can have too much money? The relationship\u0000 between hypothetical lottery wins and expected happiness","authors":"T. Haesevoets, Kim Dierckx, A. Van Hiel","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009402","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Do people think that there is such a thing as too much money? The\u0000 present research investigated this question in the context of hypothetical\u0000 lottery wins. By employing a mental simulation approach, we were able to\u0000 examine how people respond to increasing envisioned jackpot amounts, and\u0000 whether there are individual differences in people’s reactions. Across five\u0000 empirical studies (total N = 1,504), we consistently found that, overall,\u0000 the relationship between imagined lottery wins and expected happiness is\u0000 characterized by an inverted U-shaped curve, with expected happiness being\u0000 highest around an envisioned win of roughly 10 million pounds. Both lower\u0000 and higher envisioned wins reduced participants’ overall expected happiness.\u0000 In addition to this overall pattern, we identified three clusters of\u0000 participants who react differently to expected increases in wealth. These\u0000 clusters mainly differed in terms of how soon the top of the expected\u0000 happiness curve was reached, and if and when the curve started to drop.\u0000 Finally, we also found some interesting cluster differences in terms of\u0000 participants’ prosocial and proself motivations.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47131781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009451
Hong-Yue Sun, Jia-Tao Ma, Lei Zhou, Cheng-Ming Jiang, Shu Li
According to the positive time-discounting assumption of intertemporal decision-making, people prefer to undergo negative events in the future rather than in the present. However, negative discounting has been identified in the intertemporal choice and loss domains, which refers to people’s preference to experience negative events earlier rather than later. Studies have validated and supported the "anticipated dread" as an explanation for negative discounting. This study again explored the effect of anticipated dread on intertemporal choice using content analysis; that is, having participants identify anticipated dread among reasons for negative discounting. This study also validated the effect of anticipated dread on negative discounting by manipulating anticipated dread. This study adds empirical and direct evidence for the role of anticipated dread in negative discounting.
{"title":"Waiting is painful: The impact of anticipated dread on negative\u0000 discounting in the loss domain","authors":"Hong-Yue Sun, Jia-Tao Ma, Lei Zhou, Cheng-Ming Jiang, Shu Li","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009451","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 According to the positive time-discounting assumption of intertemporal\u0000 decision-making, people prefer to undergo negative events in the future\u0000 rather than in the present. However, negative discounting has been\u0000 identified in the intertemporal choice and loss domains, which refers to\u0000 people’s preference to experience negative events earlier rather than later.\u0000 Studies have validated and supported the \"anticipated dread\" as an\u0000 explanation for negative discounting. This study again explored the effect\u0000 of anticipated dread on intertemporal choice using content analysis; that\u0000 is, having participants identify anticipated dread among reasons for\u0000 negative discounting. This study also validated the effect of anticipated\u0000 dread on negative discounting by manipulating anticipated dread. This study\u0000 adds empirical and direct evidence for the role of anticipated dread in\u0000 negative discounting.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44931942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009384
Ravi Shroff, Konstantinos Vamvourellis
Field studies in many domains have found evidence of decision fatigue, a phenomenon describing how decision quality can be impaired by the act of making previous decisions. Debate remains, however, over posited psychological mechanisms underlying decision fatigue, and the size of effects in high-stakes settings. We examine an extensive set of pretrial arraignments in a large, urban court system to investigate how judicial release and bail decisions are influenced by the time an arraignment occurs. We find that release rates decline modestly in the hours before lunch and before dinner, and these declines persist after statistically adjusting for an extensive set of observed covariates. However, we find no evidence that arraignment time affects pretrial release rates in the remainder of each decision-making session. Moreover, we find that release rates remain unchanged after a meal break even though judges have the opportunity to replenish their mental and physical resources by resting and eating. In a complementary analysis, we find that the rate at which judges concur with prosecutorial bail requests does not appear to be influenced by either arraignment time or a meal break. Taken together, our results imply that to the extent that decision fatigue plays a role in pretrial release judgments, effects are small and inconsistent with previous explanations implicating psychological depletion processes.
{"title":"Pretrial release judgments and decision fatigue","authors":"Ravi Shroff, Konstantinos Vamvourellis","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009384","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Field studies in many domains have found evidence of decision fatigue, a\u0000 phenomenon describing how decision quality can be impaired by the act of\u0000 making previous decisions. Debate remains, however, over posited\u0000 psychological mechanisms underlying decision fatigue, and the size of\u0000 effects in high-stakes settings. We examine an extensive set of pretrial\u0000 arraignments in a large, urban court system to investigate how judicial\u0000 release and bail decisions are influenced by the time an arraignment occurs.\u0000 We find that release rates decline modestly in the hours before lunch and\u0000 before dinner, and these declines persist after statistically adjusting for\u0000 an extensive set of observed covariates. However, we find no evidence that\u0000 arraignment time affects pretrial release rates in the remainder of each\u0000 decision-making session. Moreover, we find that release rates remain\u0000 unchanged after a meal break even though judges have the opportunity to\u0000 replenish their mental and physical resources by resting and eating. In a\u0000 complementary analysis, we find that the rate at which judges concur with\u0000 prosecutorial bail requests does not appear to be influenced by either\u0000 arraignment time or a meal break. Taken together, our results imply that to\u0000 the extent that decision fatigue plays a role in pretrial release judgments,\u0000 effects are small and inconsistent with previous explanations implicating\u0000 psychological depletion processes.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45227563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009463
Emil Persson, Arvid Erlandsson, P. Slovic, D. Västfjäll, G. Tinghög
People often choose the option that is better on the most subjectively prominent attribute — the prominence effect. We studied the effect of prominence in health care priority setting and hypothesized that values related to health would trump values related to costs in treatment choices, even when individuals themselves evaluated different treatment options as equally good. We conducted pre-registered experiments with a diverse Swedish sample and a sample of international experts on priority setting in health care (n = 1348). Participants, acting in the role of policy makers, revealed their valuation for different medical treatments in hypothetical scenarios. Participants were systematically inconsistent between preferences expressed through evaluation in a matching task and preferences expressed through choice. In line with our hypothesis, a large proportion of participants (General population: 92%, Experts 84% of all choices) chose treatment options that were better on the health dimension (lower health risk) despite having previously expressed indifference between those options and others that were better on the cost dimension. Thus, we find strong evidence of a prominence effect in health-care priority setting. Our findings provide a psychological explanation for why opportunity costs (i.e., the value of choices not exercised) are neglected in health care priority setting.
{"title":"The prominence effect in health-care priority setting","authors":"Emil Persson, Arvid Erlandsson, P. Slovic, D. Västfjäll, G. Tinghög","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009463","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009463","url":null,"abstract":"People often choose the option that is better on the most subjectively prominent attribute — the prominence effect. We studied the effect of prominence in health care priority setting and hypothesized that values related to health would trump values related to costs in treatment choices, even when individuals themselves evaluated different treatment options as equally good. We conducted pre-registered experiments with a diverse Swedish sample and a sample of international experts on priority setting in health care (n = 1348). Participants, acting in the role of policy makers, revealed their valuation for different medical treatments in hypothetical scenarios. Participants were systematically inconsistent between preferences expressed through evaluation in a matching task and preferences expressed through choice. In line with our hypothesis, a large proportion of participants (General population: 92%, Experts 84% of all choices) chose treatment options that were better on the health dimension (lower health risk) despite having previously expressed indifference between those options and others that were better on the cost dimension. Thus, we find strong evidence of a prominence effect in health-care priority setting. Our findings provide a psychological explanation for why opportunity costs (i.e., the value of choices not exercised) are neglected in health care priority setting.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45375031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009438
King King Li, Yingyi Hong, Bo Huang, Tony Tam
This study compares Chinese people’s trust and trustworthiness, risk attitude, and time preference before and after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in China. We compare the preferences of subjects in two online experiments with samples drawn from 31 provinces across mainland China before and after the onset of the pandemic. We test two competing hypotheses regarding trust and trustworthiness. On the one hand, the outbreak as a collective threat could enhance in-group cohesion and cooperation and thus increase trust and trustworthiness. On the other hand, to the extent that people expect their future income to decline, they may become more self-protective and self-controlled, and thus less trusting and trustworthy and more risk averse and patient. Comparing before and after the onset, we found that the subjects increased in trustworthiness. After the onset, trust and trustworthiness (and risk aversion and present bias too) were positively correlated with the COVID-19 prevalence rate in the provinces. Subjects with more pessimistic expectations about income change showed more risk aversion and lower discount rates, supporting the speculation concerning self-control.
{"title":"Social preferences before and after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in\u0000 China","authors":"King King Li, Yingyi Hong, Bo Huang, Tony Tam","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009438","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This study compares Chinese people’s trust and trustworthiness, risk\u0000 attitude, and time preference before and after the onset of the COVID-19\u0000 pandemic in China. We compare the preferences of subjects in two online\u0000 experiments with samples drawn from 31 provinces across mainland China\u0000 before and after the onset of the pandemic. We test two competing hypotheses\u0000 regarding trust and trustworthiness. On the one hand, the outbreak as a\u0000 collective threat could enhance in-group cohesion and cooperation and thus\u0000 increase trust and trustworthiness. On the other hand, to the extent that\u0000 people expect their future income to decline, they may become more\u0000 self-protective and self-controlled, and thus less trusting and trustworthy\u0000 and more risk averse and patient. Comparing before and after the onset, we\u0000 found that the subjects increased in trustworthiness. After the onset, trust\u0000 and trustworthiness (and risk aversion and present bias too) were positively\u0000 correlated with the COVID-19 prevalence rate in the provinces. Subjects with\u0000 more pessimistic expectations about income change showed more risk aversion\u0000 and lower discount rates, supporting the speculation concerning\u0000 self-control.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44386612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009426
Hongyi Wang, Jiaxin Ma, Lisheng He
It is a widely held view that people rely on incomplete information to find a relationship partner, resulting in non-compensatory choice heuristics. However, recent experimental work typically finds that partner choice follows compensatory choice strategies. To bridge this gap between theory and experimental evidence, we characterize the mate choice problem by distinguishing the information search process from the evaluation process. In an eye-tracking experiment and a MouseLab experiment, we show that people display strong value-directed search heuristics in response to all types of cues and that the magnitude of value-directed searches increases with cue primacy. Cue primacy also explains the interaction effect of cue type and participant sex on the extent of valued-directed search. We further argue that value-directed searching does not necessarily lead to non-compensatory choice rules but may serve compensatory decision-making. Our results demonstrate that people may adopt remarkably smart search heuristics to find an ideal partner efficiently.
{"title":"Value-directed information search in partner choice","authors":"Hongyi Wang, Jiaxin Ma, Lisheng He","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009426","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 It is a widely held view that people rely on incomplete information to\u0000 find a relationship partner, resulting in non-compensatory choice\u0000 heuristics. However, recent experimental work typically finds that partner\u0000 choice follows compensatory choice strategies. To bridge this gap between\u0000 theory and experimental evidence, we characterize the mate choice problem by\u0000 distinguishing the information search process from the evaluation process.\u0000 In an eye-tracking experiment and a MouseLab experiment, we show that people\u0000 display strong value-directed search heuristics in response to all types of\u0000 cues and that the magnitude of value-directed searches increases with cue\u0000 primacy. Cue primacy also explains the interaction effect of cue type and\u0000 participant sex on the extent of valued-directed search. We further argue\u0000 that value-directed searching does not necessarily lead to non-compensatory\u0000 choice rules but may serve compensatory decision-making. Our results\u0000 demonstrate that people may adopt remarkably smart search heuristics to find\u0000 an ideal partner efficiently.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48802959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009396
M. A. Lawson, Richard P. Larrick, Jack B. Soll
In this paper, we show that the presence of numbers in a problem tempts people to perform mathematical operations even when the correct answer requires no math, which we term “mindless math”. In three pre-registered studies across two survey platforms (total N = 3,193), we investigate how mindless math relates to perceived problem difficulty, problem representation, and accuracy. In Study 1, we show that increasing the numeric demands of problems leads to more mindless math (and fewer correct answers). Study 2 shows that this effect is not caused by people being wary of problems that seem too easy. In Study 3, we show that this effect is robust over a wider range of numeric demands, and in the discussion we offer two possible mechanisms that would explain this effect, and the caveat that at even harder levels of numeric demands the effect may invert such that much harder math increases accuracy relative to moderately hard math.
{"title":"When and why people perform mindless math","authors":"M. A. Lawson, Richard P. Larrick, Jack B. Soll","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009396","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, we show that the presence of numbers in a problem tempts\u0000 people to perform mathematical operations even when the correct answer\u0000 requires no math, which we term “mindless math”. In three pre-registered\u0000 studies across two survey platforms (total N = 3,193), we investigate how\u0000 mindless math relates to perceived problem difficulty, problem\u0000 representation, and accuracy. In Study 1, we show that increasing the\u0000 numeric demands of problems leads to more mindless math (and fewer correct\u0000 answers). Study 2 shows that this effect is not caused by people being wary\u0000 of problems that seem too easy. In Study 3, we show that this effect is\u0000 robust over a wider range of numeric demands, and in the discussion we offer\u0000 two possible mechanisms that would explain this effect, and the caveat that\u0000 at even harder levels of numeric demands the effect may invert such that\u0000 much harder math increases accuracy relative\u0000 to moderately hard math.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44473986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s193029750000944x
Sumita Mukherjee, P. Mukherjee
We propose the concept of ‘scientific contagion’ — a mental heuristic through which any form of scientific treatment transfers some essence of ‘science’ to the processed substance, thereby affecting its nature and social acceptability. This was tested regarding the potential treatment of water from natural sources before it is used for religious purposes, as many such sources have dangerous pollutants. For an ancient natural well having a religious narrative, most participants judged that the acceptability of water would be reduced for religious purposes but not for drinking if local officials scientifically treat the water. That is not the case if religious rituals are conducted on the water instead (Study 1). If water from a “holy river” is processed scientifically, most participants predicted that it would reduce acceptability for religious use while increasing acceptability for drinking (Study 2). Potential scientific treatment without altering the composition of water from a natural spring also decreased acceptability for religious use but there was no effect on acceptability for drinking or on willingness to pay money for the water (Study 3). A follow-up study comparing acceptability for different kinds of water sources — from a holy well, natural spring, and household tap water sourced from either underground wells or rivers found lower acceptability for religious usage compared to drinking after potential scientific treatment for all these waters, but more so for holy and natural waters (Study 4). These studies establish the phenomena of scientific contagion that could have significant social implications and open future directions.
{"title":"Scientific contagion heuristic: Judgments about the acceptability of\u0000 water for religious use after potential scientific treatment","authors":"Sumita Mukherjee, P. Mukherjee","doi":"10.1017/s193029750000944x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s193029750000944x","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We propose the concept of ‘scientific contagion’ — a mental heuristic\u0000 through which any form of scientific treatment transfers some essence of\u0000 ‘science’ to the processed substance, thereby affecting its nature and\u0000 social acceptability. This was tested regarding the potential treatment of\u0000 water from natural sources before it is used for religious purposes, as many\u0000 such sources have dangerous pollutants. For an ancient natural well having a\u0000 religious narrative, most participants judged that the acceptability of\u0000 water would be reduced for religious purposes but not for drinking if local\u0000 officials scientifically treat the water. That is not the case if religious\u0000 rituals are conducted on the water instead (Study 1). If water from a “holy\u0000 river” is processed scientifically, most participants predicted that it\u0000 would reduce acceptability for religious use while increasing acceptability\u0000 for drinking (Study 2). Potential scientific treatment without altering the\u0000 composition of water from a natural spring also decreased acceptability for\u0000 religious use but there was no effect on acceptability for drinking or on\u0000 willingness to pay money for the water (Study 3). A follow-up study\u0000 comparing acceptability for different kinds of water sources — from a holy\u0000 well, natural spring, and household tap water sourced from either\u0000 underground wells or rivers found lower acceptability for religious usage\u0000 compared to drinking after potential scientific treatment for all these\u0000 waters, but more so for holy and natural waters (Study 4). These studies\u0000 establish the phenomena of scientific contagion that could have significant\u0000 social implications and open future directions.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43864630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009414
A. Banks, David M. Gamblin
How do people make everyday decisions in order to achieve the most successful outcome? Decision making research typically evaluates choices according to their expected utility. However, this research largely focuses on abstract or hypothetical tasks and rarely investigates whether the outcome is successful and satisfying for the decision maker. Instead, we use an everyday decision making task in which participants describe a personally meaningful decision they are currently facing. We investigate the decision processes used to make this decision, and evaluate how successful and satisfying the outcome of the decision is for them. We examine how well analytic, attribute-based processes explain everyday decision making and predict decision outcomes, and we compare these processes to associative processes elicited through free association. We also examine the characteristics of decisions and individuals that are associated with good decision outcomes. Across three experiments we found that: 1) an analytic decision analysis of everyday decisions is not superior to simpler attribute-based processes in predicting decision outcomes; 2) contrary to research linking associative cognition to biases, free association generates valid cues that predict choice and decision outcomes as effectively as attribute-based approaches; 3) contrary to research favouring either attribute-based or associative processes, combining both attribute-based and associates best explains everyday decisions and most accurately predicts decision outcomes; and 4) individuals with a tendency to attempt analytic thinking do not make more successful everyday decisions. Instead, frequency, simplicity, and knowledge of the decision predict success. We propose that attribute-based and associative processes, in combination, both explain everyday decision making and predict successful decision outcomes.
{"title":"Successful everyday decision making: Combining attributes and\u0000 associates","authors":"A. Banks, David M. Gamblin","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009414","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How do people make everyday decisions in order to achieve the most\u0000 successful outcome? Decision making research typically evaluates choices\u0000 according to their expected utility. However, this research largely focuses\u0000 on abstract or hypothetical tasks and rarely investigates whether the\u0000 outcome is successful and satisfying for the decision maker. Instead, we use\u0000 an everyday decision making task in which participants describe a personally\u0000 meaningful decision they are currently facing. We investigate the decision\u0000 processes used to make this decision, and evaluate how successful and\u0000 satisfying the outcome of the decision is for them. We examine how well\u0000 analytic, attribute-based processes explain everyday decision making and\u0000 predict decision outcomes, and we compare these processes to associative\u0000 processes elicited through free association. We also examine the\u0000 characteristics of decisions and individuals that are associated with good\u0000 decision outcomes. Across three experiments we found that: 1) an analytic\u0000 decision analysis of everyday decisions is not superior to simpler\u0000 attribute-based processes in predicting decision outcomes; 2) contrary to\u0000 research linking associative cognition to biases, free association generates\u0000 valid cues that predict choice and decision outcomes as effectively as\u0000 attribute-based approaches; 3) contrary to research favouring either\u0000 attribute-based or associative processes, combining both attribute-based and\u0000 associates best explains everyday decisions and most accurately predicts\u0000 decision outcomes; and 4) individuals with a tendency to attempt analytic\u0000 thinking do not make more successful everyday decisions. Instead, frequency,\u0000 simplicity, and knowledge of the decision predict success. We propose that\u0000 attribute-based and associative processes, in combination, both explain\u0000 everyday decision making and predict successful decision outcomes.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46076261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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