Previous research suggests that people may develop stronger causal illusions when the existence of a causal relationship is consistent with their prior beliefs. In the present study, we hypothesized that prior pseudoscientific beliefs will influence judgments about the effectiveness of both alternative medicine and scientific medicine. Participants (N = 98) were exposed to an adaptation of the standard causal illusion task in which they had to judge whether two fictitious treatments, one described as conventional medicine and the other as alternative medicine, could heal the crises caused by two different syndromes. Since both treatments were completely ineffective, those believing that any of the two medicines worked were exhibiting a causal illusion. Participants also responded to the Pseudoscience Endorsement Scale (PES) and some questions about trust in alternative therapies that were taken from the Survey on the Social Perception of Science and Technology conducted by FECYT. The results replicated the causal illusion effect and extended them by revealing an interaction between the prior pseudoscientific beliefs and the scientific/pseudoscientific status of the fictitious treatment. Individuals reporting stronger pseudoscientific beliefs were more vulnerable to the illusion in both scenarios, whereas participants with low adherence to pseudoscientific beliefs seemed to be more resistant to the illusion in the alternative medicine scenario.
{"title":"I want to believe: Prior beliefs influence judgments about the effectiveness of both alternative and scientific medicine","authors":"Lucía Vicente, Fernando Blanco, H. Matute","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2022.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2022.3","url":null,"abstract":"Previous research suggests that people may develop stronger causal illusions when the existence of a causal relationship is consistent with their prior beliefs. In the present study, we hypothesized that prior pseudoscientific beliefs will influence judgments about the effectiveness of both alternative medicine and scientific medicine. Participants (N = 98) were exposed to an adaptation of the standard causal illusion task in which they had to judge whether two fictitious treatments, one described as conventional medicine and the other as alternative medicine, could heal the crises caused by two different syndromes. Since both treatments were completely ineffective, those believing that any of the two medicines worked were exhibiting a causal illusion. Participants also responded to the Pseudoscience Endorsement Scale (PES) and some questions about trust in alternative therapies that were taken from the Survey on the Social Perception of Science and Technology conducted by FECYT. The results replicated the causal illusion effect and extended them by revealing an interaction between the prior pseudoscientific beliefs and the scientific/pseudoscientific status of the fictitious treatment. Individuals reporting stronger pseudoscientific beliefs were more vulnerable to the illusion in both scenarios, whereas participants with low adherence to pseudoscientific beliefs seemed to be more resistant to the illusion in the alternative medicine scenario.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56717106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hajdi Moche, Arvid Erlandsson, Stephan Dickert, D. Västfjäll
This article revisits and further investigates the extent to which scope insensitivity in helping contexts can be reduced by the unit asking (UA) method. UA is an intervention that first asks people to help one unit and then asks for willingness to help multiple units. In 3 studies (N = 3,442), participants took on the role of policymakers to allocate help (motivation to help and willingness to pay) to local aid projects. They underwent either UA or a control condition (in which they stated their willingness to help only to the multiple units). Against expectations, the first 2 studies found a reversed UA effect for helping motivation, such that help decreased when participants were in the UA condition. However, the third study found a UA effect for helping motivation when participants made the sequential assessments within one project (when the individual unit belonged to the multiple units-group), rather than between projects (when the individual unit belonged to another group). Thus, our results suggest that the 2 assessments critical for the UA method should be done within the same project rather than between 2 projects to successfully reduce scope insensitivity. Further, the age of the unit (child or adult), the number of the unit(s), the composition of the group (homogeneous or heterogeneous), and the size of the group did not substantially reduce scope insensitivity with UA.
{"title":"The potential and pitfalls of unit asking in reducing scope insensitivity","authors":"Hajdi Moche, Arvid Erlandsson, Stephan Dickert, D. Västfjäll","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.27","url":null,"abstract":"This article revisits and further investigates the extent to which scope insensitivity in helping contexts can be reduced by the unit asking (UA) method. UA is an intervention that first asks people to help one unit and then asks for willingness to help multiple units. In 3 studies (N = 3,442), participants took on the role of policymakers to allocate help (motivation to help and willingness to pay) to local aid projects. They underwent either UA or a control condition (in which they stated their willingness to help only to the multiple units). Against expectations, the first 2 studies found a reversed UA effect for helping motivation, such that help decreased when participants were in the UA condition. However, the third study found a UA effect for helping motivation when participants made the sequential assessments within one project (when the individual unit belonged to the multiple units-group), rather than between projects (when the individual unit belonged to another group). Thus, our results suggest that the 2 assessments critical for the UA method should be done within the same project rather than between 2 projects to successfully reduce scope insensitivity. Further, the age of the unit (child or adult), the number of the unit(s), the composition of the group (homogeneous or heterogeneous), and the size of the group did not substantially reduce scope insensitivity with UA.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56717963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We assessed the reaction of American adults to scenarios involving explicit types of exposure to live COVID viruses in June 2020, in the first months of the COVID pandemic. Four features of magical contagion are physical contact focus, insensitivity to elapsed time (‘permanence’), insensitivity to sterilization (‘spiritual essence’), and insensitivity to dose. We demonstrated the operation of all four features in a majority of participants. We also report another dramatic demonstration of the principle of dose insensitivity. When asked for the minimal number of COVID viruses that would have to enter their lung to give them a 50% chance of contracting COVID, more than half of subjects responded with ‘one’. Magical contagion should generally function to increase fear and perceived risk of COVID.
{"title":"Magical contagion beliefs operate in reactions of Americans to COVID-19","authors":"P. Rozin","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.4","url":null,"abstract":"We assessed the reaction of American adults to scenarios involving explicit types of exposure to live COVID viruses in June 2020, in the first months of the COVID pandemic. Four features of magical contagion are physical contact focus, insensitivity to elapsed time (‘permanence’), insensitivity to sterilization (‘spiritual essence’), and insensitivity to dose. We demonstrated the operation of all four features in a majority of participants. We also report another dramatic demonstration of the principle of dose insensitivity. When asked for the minimal number of COVID viruses that would have to enter their lung to give them a 50% chance of contracting COVID, more than half of subjects responded with ‘one’. Magical contagion should generally function to increase fear and perceived risk of COVID.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56718092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button.
{"title":"Virtual reality for philanthropy: A promising tool to innovate fundraising – CORRIGENDUM","authors":"Nina M. Sooter, Giuseppe Ugazio","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.35","url":null,"abstract":"An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":"280 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135750599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Craig I. Brimhall, David Tannenbaum, Eric M. VanEpps
Commitment contracts are a strategy for binding self-control failures, such as skipping a gym visit or breaking a dieting regime, to monetary penalties. Despite evidence that commitment contracts with stronger penalties improve self-control, they are relatively underused. Across 5 experiments, we find that decision makers are less likely to select commitment contracts with more severe penalties (i.e., anti-charity contracts) for themselves than they are for others. This self-other difference in contract choice arises because decision makers believe anti-charity contracts will be more effective for others than for themselves. Our results suggest that people recognize the potential effectiveness of using more aggressive commitment contracts to overcome self-control problems, but view themselves as an exception to that general rule.
{"title":"Choosing more aggressive commitment contracts for others than for the self","authors":"Craig I. Brimhall, David Tannenbaum, Eric M. VanEpps","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.1","url":null,"abstract":"Commitment contracts are a strategy for binding self-control failures, such as skipping a gym visit or breaking a dieting regime, to monetary penalties. Despite evidence that commitment contracts with stronger penalties improve self-control, they are relatively underused. Across 5 experiments, we find that decision makers are less likely to select commitment contracts with more severe penalties (i.e., anti-charity contracts) for themselves than they are for others. This self-other difference in contract choice arises because decision makers believe anti-charity contracts will be more effective for others than for themselves. Our results suggest that people recognize the potential effectiveness of using more aggressive commitment contracts to overcome self-control problems, but view themselves as an exception to that general rule.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56717372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article reports a series of studies of judgments of satisfaction with salary, manipulating the distribution of salaries of others doing the same work. The experiments were designed to compare 6 theories of contextual effects in judgment, including adaptation-level theory, correlation–regression theory, inferred distribution (ID) theory, decision by sampling (DbS), ensemble (EN) theory, and range–frequency (RF) theory. Manipulations of the frequency distribution using cubic density functions produce a double crossover of curves relating judgments to salaries; this double crossover violates implications of 4 of the theories but remains consistent with DbS and RF theories. ID theory assumes that rank is inferred from the mean and endpoints, so it fails to describe the double crossover. Manipulations of the endpoints produce changes in the heights and slopes of the curves, which are not explained by DbS and are partially inconsistent with EN theory. EN theory implies no effect of the rank of a salary and assumes that endpoints only affect judgments of salaries on the same side of the mean, contrary to the results. RF theory implies that ratings of stimuli holding the same ranks in 2 contexts with differing endpoints should be linearly related, and the data appeared consistent with this implication. RF theory is the only theory that gives a consistent account of all of the results. RF theory can be extended in order to estimate the effective context, which appears to differ systematically between people according to their full-time incomes.
{"title":"Contextual effects in salary satisfaction","authors":"M. Birnbaum, Julien Rouvere","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.26","url":null,"abstract":"This article reports a series of studies of judgments of satisfaction with salary, manipulating the distribution of salaries of others doing the same work. The experiments were designed to compare 6 theories of contextual effects in judgment, including adaptation-level theory, correlation–regression theory, inferred distribution (ID) theory, decision by sampling (DbS), ensemble (EN) theory, and range–frequency (RF) theory. Manipulations of the frequency distribution using cubic density functions produce a double crossover of curves relating judgments to salaries; this double crossover violates implications of 4 of the theories but remains consistent with DbS and RF theories. ID theory assumes that rank is inferred from the mean and endpoints, so it fails to describe the double crossover. Manipulations of the endpoints produce changes in the heights and slopes of the curves, which are not explained by DbS and are partially inconsistent with EN theory. EN theory implies no effect of the rank of a salary and assumes that endpoints only affect judgments of salaries on the same side of the mean, contrary to the results. RF theory implies that ratings of stimuli holding the same ranks in 2 contexts with differing endpoints should be linearly related, and the data appeared consistent with this implication. RF theory is the only theory that gives a consistent account of all of the results. RF theory can be extended in order to estimate the effective context, which appears to differ systematically between people according to their full-time incomes.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56717958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to decades of research, whether negotiations succeed depends on how much of the stake each person will get. Yet, real-world stakes often consist of resources that vary on quality, not just quantity. While it may appear obvious that people should reject qualitatively inferior offers, just as they reject quantitatively unequal offers, it is less clear why. Across three incentive-compatible studies (N = 1,303) using the ultimatum game, we evaluate three possible reasons for why people reject qualitatively unequal negotiation offers (that are 50% of the stake): fairness, mere inequality, or badness. Data across the three studies are consistent with the fairness account. Casting doubt on the possibility that people reject qualitatively unequal offers merely because they are ‘bad’, Studies 1 and 2 found that participants were more likely to reject the same coins when these were inferior (e.g., 200 × 5¢ coins) to the negotiation partner’s coins (e.g., 5 × $2 coins) than when both parties received the same undesirable coins (e.g., both received 200 × 5¢ coins). Supporting a fairness explanation, rejection rates of the qualitatively inferior offer were higher when the proposal came from a human (vs. a computer), suggesting that rejection stemmed in part from a desire to punish the negotiation partner for unfair treatment (Study 3). Nevertheless, some participants still rejected the unequal offer from a computer, suggesting that mere inequality matters as well. In sum, the findings highlight that quality, not just quantity, is important for attaining fair negotiation outcomes.
{"title":"Fairness is based on quality, not just quantity","authors":"J. Zenkić, Kobe Millet, N. Mead","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.20","url":null,"abstract":"According to decades of research, whether negotiations succeed depends on how much of the stake each person will get. Yet, real-world stakes often consist of resources that vary on quality, not just quantity. While it may appear obvious that people should reject qualitatively inferior offers, just as they reject quantitatively unequal offers, it is less clear why. Across three incentive-compatible studies (N = 1,303) using the ultimatum game, we evaluate three possible reasons for why people reject qualitatively unequal negotiation offers (that are 50% of the stake): fairness, mere inequality, or badness. Data across the three studies are consistent with the fairness account. Casting doubt on the possibility that people reject qualitatively unequal offers merely because they are ‘bad’, Studies 1 and 2 found that participants were more likely to reject the same coins when these were inferior (e.g., 200 × 5¢ coins) to the negotiation partner’s coins (e.g., 5 × $2 coins) than when both parties received the same undesirable coins (e.g., both received 200 × 5¢ coins). Supporting a fairness explanation, rejection rates of the qualitatively inferior offer were higher when the proposal came from a human (vs. a computer), suggesting that rejection stemmed in part from a desire to punish the negotiation partner for unfair treatment (Study 3). Nevertheless, some participants still rejected the unequal offer from a computer, suggesting that mere inequality matters as well. In sum, the findings highlight that quality, not just quantity, is important for attaining fair negotiation outcomes.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56717726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper introduces a new software interface to elicit belief distributions of any shape: Click-and-Drag. The interface was tested against the state of the art in the experimental literature—a text-based interface and multiple sliders—and in the online forecasting industry—a distribution-manipulation interface similar to the one used by the most popular crowd-forecasting website. By means of a pre-registered experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk, quantitative data on the accuracy of reported beliefs in a series of induced-value scenarios varying by granularity, shape, and time constraints, as well as subjective data on user experience were collected. Click-and-Drag outperformed all other interfaces by accuracy and speed, and was self-reported as being more intuitive and less frustrating, confirming the pre-registered hypothesis. Aside of the pre-registered results, Click-and-Drag generated the least drop-out rate from the task, and scored best in a sentiment analysis of an open-ended general question. Further, the interface was used to collect homegrown predictions on temperature in New York City in 2022 and 2042. Click-and-Drag elicited distributions were smoother with less idiosyncratic spikes. Free and open source, ready to use oTree, Qualtrics and Limesurvey plugins for Click-and-Drag, and all other tested interfaces are available at https://beliefelicitation.github.io/.
{"title":"Comparing input interfaces to elicit belief distributions","authors":"Paolo Crosetto, Thomas de Haan","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.21","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces a new software interface to elicit belief distributions of any shape: Click-and-Drag. The interface was tested against the state of the art in the experimental literature—a text-based interface and multiple sliders—and in the online forecasting industry—a distribution-manipulation interface similar to the one used by the most popular crowd-forecasting website. By means of a pre-registered experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk, quantitative data on the accuracy of reported beliefs in a series of induced-value scenarios varying by granularity, shape, and time constraints, as well as subjective data on user experience were collected. Click-and-Drag outperformed all other interfaces by accuracy and speed, and was self-reported as being more intuitive and less frustrating, confirming the pre-registered hypothesis. Aside of the pre-registered results, Click-and-Drag generated the least drop-out rate from the task, and scored best in a sentiment analysis of an open-ended general question. Further, the interface was used to collect homegrown predictions on temperature in New York City in 2022 and 2042. Click-and-Drag elicited distributions were smoother with less idiosyncratic spikes. Free and open source, ready to use oTree, Qualtrics and Limesurvey plugins for Click-and-Drag, and all other tested interfaces are available at https://beliefelicitation.github.io/.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56717742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Much like other social and nonsocial evaluations, estimates of numerical quantities are susceptible to comparative influences. However, numerical representations can take either a nonsymbolic (e.g., a grouping of dots) or a symbolic numerical form (e.g., Hindu–Arabic numerals), which each produce comparative biases in opposite directions. The current work takes a fine-grained curve fitting approach across a wide range of values to the investigation of their potential nonlinear influence in the context of a numerical estimation task. A series of 3 experiments ( N = 1,613) showed how nonsymbolic standards produce linear contrastive patterns (Study 1), whereas symbolic numerical anchors show a cubic assimilative effect with a leveling off in strength for more extreme standards (Study 2). Sequential contrast from the previous patterns and assimilation to the previous response were found to be present and additive in the presence of both representations but were larger in absence of the symbolic numerical anchors (Study 3).
{"title":"Connecting the dots: Nonlinear patterns in the presence of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical standards","authors":"Roland Imhoff, Paul Barker","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.31","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.31","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Much like other social and nonsocial evaluations, estimates of numerical quantities are susceptible to comparative influences. However, numerical representations can take either a nonsymbolic (e.g., a grouping of dots) or a symbolic numerical form (e.g., Hindu–Arabic numerals), which each produce comparative biases in opposite directions. The current work takes a fine-grained curve fitting approach across a wide range of values to the investigation of their potential nonlinear influence in the context of a numerical estimation task. A series of 3 experiments ( N = 1,613) showed how nonsymbolic standards produce linear contrastive patterns (Study 1), whereas symbolic numerical anchors show a cubic assimilative effect with a leveling off in strength for more extreme standards (Study 2). Sequential contrast from the previous patterns and assimilation to the previous response were found to be present and additive in the presence of both representations but were larger in absence of the symbolic numerical anchors (Study 3).","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134887837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is growing concern about the extent to which economic games played in the laboratory generalize to social behaviors outside the lab. Here, we show that it is possible to make a game much more predictive of field behavior by bringing contextual elements from the field to the lab. We report three experiments where we present the same participants with different versions of the dictator game and with two different field situations. The games are designed to include elements that make them progressively more similar to the field. We find a dramatic increase in lab–field correlations as contextual elements are incorporated, which has wide-ranging implications for experiments on economic decision making.
{"title":"Bridging the gap between the economics lab and the field: Dictator games and donations","authors":"Xinghua Wang, D. Navarro-Martinez","doi":"10.1017/jdm.2023.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jdm.2023.19","url":null,"abstract":"There is growing concern about the extent to which economic games played in the laboratory generalize to social behaviors outside the lab. Here, we show that it is possible to make a game much more predictive of field behavior by bringing contextual elements from the field to the lab. We report three experiments where we present the same participants with different versions of the dictator game and with two different field situations. The games are designed to include elements that make them progressively more similar to the field. We find a dramatic increase in lab–field correlations as contextual elements are incorporated, which has wide-ranging implications for experiments on economic decision making.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":"199 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56717661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}