Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions最新文献

Consumer protection authorities are vital for domestic markets and the smooth functioning of the EU common market. Established several decades ago, these authorities have different institutional designs in different European countries. This paper aims to identify them and assess their main variations. Based on the literature at the intersection of consumer protection regimes and regulatory governance, we propose a theoretical distinction between enforcement-focused authorities and service delivery-oriented authorities. Specifically, we suggest these principles lead to either a supervisory model, which disciplines market actors, or an empowering model, which gives citizens the keys to prevent market abuses. To empirically test whether these two models capture the variety of institutional designs and practices consumer authorities may adopt, we have identified four different dimensions that characterize their connections to politics, business, and citizens: political autonomy, social accountability, administrative enforcement, and consumer awareness. We begin by discussing which dimensions are associated with which model and then examine the presence of the two models across Europe. Our analysis is based on Bayesian factorial analysis and a Ward.D cluster construction grounded in an original dataset of institutional characteristics from general consumer authorities in 27 EU countries, the UK, and Norway, offering empirical evidence to support our argument. The results suggest that EU efforts to build institutional harmonization have had limited success. Likewise, traditional administrative models across Europe may no longer hold the same relevance as previously indicated in research. Our findings show instead that consumer authorities in Europe can generally be distinguished from each other based on these two principles, though many operate with a hybrid approach.

We examine how legislative hearings, mandatory in the appointment process for top executives, shape presidential management of cabinet. Research on legislative confirmation suggests that such a requirement generates a trade-off in choosing between loyalty and competence types. Building on this insight, we argue that the appointees' career paths after entering presidential cabinets differ significantly after legislative hearings are adopted, according to which type they are. Using a quasi-experimental identification strategy, we analyze original data on the careers of over 560 ministers from South Korea appointed pre- and post-hearings. We find that competence types are more likely to be retained than loyalty types after legislative hearings. However, loyalty types are more likely to receive promotion—that is, transfer from their initial cabinet appointment to a higher-prestige post—than competence types after legislative hearings. Additionally, we find that agency performance is better under competence types than under loyalty types.

How do states create the skills needed for high technology economic activities that hold an increasingly important role in contemporary societies? Examining economic statecraft in the higher education sector, this article shows that the policies employed by governments to expand the supply of high skills vary depending on their economies' most advanced sectors. Governments who seek to meet the demand of the high-end services sectors pursue a strategy of “open-ended” higher education expansion. “Targeted” expansion of higher education, instead, is the preferred option for governments in countries characterized by large advanced manufacturing sectors. The latter strategy, however, is hampered by the presence of a partly private higher education system since the ability of governments to successfully pursue their strategies is mediated by the existing institutional framework in the realm of higher education policy. Empirically, the argument finds strong support through three country case studies—Germany, South Korea, and the United Kingdom—that allow to simultaneously leverage a most-similar and most-different research design.

How can the administrative state enhance democracy through the practice of governance? We offer a theory of authorized discretion: administrative principles are grounded in democratic values, and, in turn, authorize forms and practices of governance that comport with those values. We argue that (1) public administration is intertwined with a substantive conception of the rule of law; (2) administrative principles in the law shape the development and application of rules and standards by public officials; and (3) when these principles are rooted in democratic values, they are essential to the practice of public governance. We show how the European Union has been defining and emphasizing specific principles through its European Administrative Space initiative. We then show how the essential principles of this initiative embody democratic values. Our practice-based theory offers important implications both for the theoretical relationship between administrative discretion and democracy and a broad empirical research agenda.

Individuals form perceptions about the degree of administrative burdens associated with public agencies and programs, even without being (potential) policy clients themselves (e.g., a wealthy person's view of administrative burdens experienced by welfare program applicants) or without referring to a specific instance (e.g., perceptions of bureaucratic hurdles in the federal government overall). This study develops and validates a scale of perceived administrative burden that is applicable beyond direct policy clients to broad audiences and political stakeholders. The scale underwent psychometric evaluation using large-scale, representative citizen samples from the US and South Korea (n = 3000). Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses on randomly split samples confirmed a unidimensional latent structure and the scale's construct validity. Cronbach's alpha and composite reliability indicated strong internal consistency, while a high average variance extracted, alongside additional correlational analyses, supported convergent and discriminant validity. We discuss the scale's potential applications in exploring how perceived administrative burden shapes policy processes, political behavior, and public administration.

This article explores the role of policy capacity in influencing (regional) government effectiveness. Drawing on various research streams (public administration, public policy, economics, and political science), we assess whether and under what conditions policy capacity affects public policy outcomes. Our proposal is that government effectiveness (operationalized by a novel composite index) results from a combination of factors: socioeconomic context, social capital, political strength, organizational policy capacity, and individual policy analytical capacity, inspired by the Policy Capacity Framework. Based on this theoretical assumption, we conducted a configurational analysis using the fuzzy-set QCA method to examine the drivers of government effectiveness in 13 Italian regions. The findings highlight the significant conjunctural role that (mainly organizational, but also individual) policy capacity can play in influencing (regional) government effectiveness.

Legislative party groups regularly get suggestions from numerous, different interest groups trying to influence policy, but individual party groups are likely to be more receptive to suggestions from groups representing some interests than others. We examine (in)equalities in legislative parties' receptiveness to interest group diversity by asking: what factors explain how (un)equally legislative parties listen to and accept suggestions from different types of interest groups? Combining interest group survey data from six long-established European democracies with data on parties' policy area salience and goal priorities, we find support for three possible party-level explanations. Legislative parties seem more equally receptive to the suggestions they receive from different interests when their party prioritizes office over policy in cases of goal conflicts and in policy areas of high salience to the party. When party salience is high, more equal party receptiveness is particularly associated with greater willingness to compromise on policy to be in office.