Subjective well-being (SWB) measures, such as satisfaction with income, are increasingly being used to measure changes in well-being in response to policy changes and shocks. However, large policy changes or shocks themselves might cause individuals to change how they answer SWB questions in ways that have little to do with changes in objective well-being measures. For example, respondent-specific scales that individuals use to respond to SWB questions (e.g. threshold of income required to be satisfied) might change at the same time that income is changing following a shock. We illustrate the importance of this concern following the onset of conflict in Yemen, where households reported a large improvement in SWB across a range of different dimensions despite large declines in nearly all traditional and objective measures of well-being.
{"title":"How difficult is it to interpret subjective well-being questions during crises? Evidence from the onset of conflict in Yemen","authors":"S. Tandon","doi":"10.1093/oep/gpad028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpad028","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Subjective well-being (SWB) measures, such as satisfaction with income, are increasingly being used to measure changes in well-being in response to policy changes and shocks. However, large policy changes or shocks themselves might cause individuals to change how they answer SWB questions in ways that have little to do with changes in objective well-being measures. For example, respondent-specific scales that individuals use to respond to SWB questions (e.g. threshold of income required to be satisfied) might change at the same time that income is changing following a shock. We illustrate the importance of this concern following the onset of conflict in Yemen, where households reported a large improvement in SWB across a range of different dimensions despite large declines in nearly all traditional and objective measures of well-being.","PeriodicalId":48092,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Economic Papers-New Series","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49110652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Contributions to public goods, such as nature areas, are often made by private actors, as well as governmental agencies. Typically, the motivation of citizens to voluntarily contribute depends on how the distribution of such tasks has evolved between public and private actors, and wider contextual factors. Therefore, it is unclear whether decreased public spending on nature areas affects private funding. We conduct an economic experiment in The Hague Forest in the Netherlands and ask citizens to perform a task that generates funding for the forest. In the treatment condition, we describe the ongoing policy changes, which implies less state funding and greater dependency on private actors. We find that highlighting a greater need for private funding reduces individual contributions significantly, which is mostly due to a drop in motivation of frequent visitors. Overall, our study suggests that decreasing public spending may have unexpected repercussions on citizens’ motivation to contribute.
{"title":"How does less public spending affect the motivation of citizens to contribute to nature conservation?","authors":"A. Richter, S. Reinhard","doi":"10.1093/oep/gpad025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpad025","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Contributions to public goods, such as nature areas, are often made by private actors, as well as governmental agencies. Typically, the motivation of citizens to voluntarily contribute depends on how the distribution of such tasks has evolved between public and private actors, and wider contextual factors. Therefore, it is unclear whether decreased public spending on nature areas affects private funding. We conduct an economic experiment in The Hague Forest in the Netherlands and ask citizens to perform a task that generates funding for the forest. In the treatment condition, we describe the ongoing policy changes, which implies less state funding and greater dependency on private actors. We find that highlighting a greater need for private funding reduces individual contributions significantly, which is mostly due to a drop in motivation of frequent visitors. Overall, our study suggests that decreasing public spending may have unexpected repercussions on citizens’ motivation to contribute.","PeriodicalId":48092,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Economic Papers-New Series","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46000179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Donations are often made through charitable intermediaries that can fund themselves from these same donations. After intermediation, only a fraction of the amount donated may reach the intended beneficiary. The price of charitable output is therefore higher after intermediation than if donors donated directly toward the end cause. At the same time, this price is hidden from donors since they cannot verify how much intermediaries pass on. We show that while donors reduce their donation in intermediation itself, and also reduce their donation because they expect the price of charitable output to increase, both reactions are either fully or partly compensated by their ethical preferences for the recipient’s rights. Charitable output, therefore, can be a Giffen-good.
{"title":"Charitable giving and intermediation: a principal agent problem with hidden prices","authors":"Nadine Chlass, Lata Gangadharan, Kristy Jones","doi":"10.1093/oep/gpad023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpad023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Donations are often made through charitable intermediaries that can fund themselves from these same donations. After intermediation, only a fraction of the amount donated may reach the intended beneficiary. The price of charitable output is therefore higher after intermediation than if donors donated directly toward the end cause. At the same time, this price is hidden from donors since they cannot verify how much intermediaries pass on. We show that while donors reduce their donation in intermediation itself, and also reduce their donation because they expect the price of charitable output to increase, both reactions are either fully or partly compensated by their ethical preferences for the recipient’s rights. Charitable output, therefore, can be a Giffen-good.","PeriodicalId":48092,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Economic Papers-New Series","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46831841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Are charitable gifts of money and time substitutes or complements? The answer to this question would benefit non-profit organizations and governments aiming to maximize charitable gifts, but previous research has not yet delivered a final conclusion. Therefore, I introduce an alternative approach to this question that focuses on variation in individuals’ budgets instead of previously used variation in the price of giving. For this purpose, I develop a theoretical model of charitable giving in which individuals are constrained by two budgets indicating their available money and time. My derivations show that the cross-budget effects can identify the relationship between donating and volunteering. Consequently, I empirically estimate the effect of time on donations using longitudinal survey data of Dutch individuals. My estimates (albeit insignificant) suggest that donating and volunteering are substitutes. This result would be in line with some previous experimental evidence, but additional applications are needed to strengthen this conclusion.
{"title":"Substitutes or complements: a budget-based analysis of the relationship between donating and volunteering","authors":"Lieke Voorintholt","doi":"10.1093/oep/gpad022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpad022","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Are charitable gifts of money and time substitutes or complements? The answer to this question would benefit non-profit organizations and governments aiming to maximize charitable gifts, but previous research has not yet delivered a final conclusion. Therefore, I introduce an alternative approach to this question that focuses on variation in individuals’ budgets instead of previously used variation in the price of giving. For this purpose, I develop a theoretical model of charitable giving in which individuals are constrained by two budgets indicating their available money and time. My derivations show that the cross-budget effects can identify the relationship between donating and volunteering. Consequently, I empirically estimate the effect of time on donations using longitudinal survey data of Dutch individuals. My estimates (albeit insignificant) suggest that donating and volunteering are substitutes. This result would be in line with some previous experimental evidence, but additional applications are needed to strengthen this conclusion.","PeriodicalId":48092,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Economic Papers-New Series","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44696722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tobias Cagala, Johannes Rincke, Amanda Tuset Cueva
This article explores donors’ aversion to financing charities’ fundraising expenses. We hypothesize that such expenses can signal a charity’s efficiency, or affect the donors’ perception of the impact a donation has on the cause. Using data from a randomized field experiment, we disentangle both effects, differentiating between weakly and strongly committed donors. Among potential donors who are weakly committed to the cause, information on the charity’s efficiency does not affect donation behavior. Signaling an increased impact leaves unaffected the average donation among weakly committed donors, but diminishes their likelihood to give. Regarding strongly committed donors, we find that impact-related information does not affect behavior, but a signal of improved efficiency strongly increases donations along the intensive margin. We conclude that information on fundraising expenses plays little role for weakly committed donors. In contrast, strongly committed donors are averse to financing fundraising expenses mostly due to efficiency concerns.
{"title":"What drives overhead aversion in charity? Evidence from field-experimental variation in fundraising costs","authors":"Tobias Cagala, Johannes Rincke, Amanda Tuset Cueva","doi":"10.1093/oep/gpad021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpad021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article explores donors’ aversion to financing charities’ fundraising expenses. We hypothesize that such expenses can signal a charity’s efficiency, or affect the donors’ perception of the impact a donation has on the cause. Using data from a randomized field experiment, we disentangle both effects, differentiating between weakly and strongly committed donors. Among potential donors who are weakly committed to the cause, information on the charity’s efficiency does not affect donation behavior. Signaling an increased impact leaves unaffected the average donation among weakly committed donors, but diminishes their likelihood to give. Regarding strongly committed donors, we find that impact-related information does not affect behavior, but a signal of improved efficiency strongly increases donations along the intensive margin. We conclude that information on fundraising expenses plays little role for weakly committed donors. In contrast, strongly committed donors are averse to financing fundraising expenses mostly due to efficiency concerns.","PeriodicalId":48092,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Economic Papers-New Series","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45231100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-26DOI: 10.25932/PUBLISHUP-52099
Maximilian Späth
Charities typically ask potential donors repeatedly for a donation. These repeated requests might trigger avoidance behaviour. Considering that, this article analyses the impact of offering the option to opt-out of receiving future fundraising asks on charitable giving. In a proposed utility framework, any opt-out option decreases the social pressure to donate. At the same time, an unconditional opt-out option induces feelings of gratitude toward the fundraiser, which may lead to a reciprocal increase in donations. The results of a lab experiment designed to disentangle the two channels show no negative impact of the option to avoid repeated asking for donations. Instead, the full model indicates a positive impact of the reciprocity channel. This finding suggests that it might be beneficial for charities to introduce an unconditional opt-out option during high-frequency fundraising campaigns.
{"title":"It’s me again… Ask avoidance and the dynamics of charitable giving","authors":"Maximilian Späth","doi":"10.25932/PUBLISHUP-52099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25932/PUBLISHUP-52099","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Charities typically ask potential donors repeatedly for a donation. These repeated requests might trigger avoidance behaviour. Considering that, this article analyses the impact of offering the option to opt-out of receiving future fundraising asks on charitable giving. In a proposed utility framework, any opt-out option decreases the social pressure to donate. At the same time, an unconditional opt-out option induces feelings of gratitude toward the fundraiser, which may lead to a reciprocal increase in donations. The results of a lab experiment designed to disentangle the two channels show no negative impact of the option to avoid repeated asking for donations. Instead, the full model indicates a positive impact of the reciprocity channel. This finding suggests that it might be beneficial for charities to introduce an unconditional opt-out option during high-frequency fundraising campaigns.","PeriodicalId":48092,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Economic Papers-New Series","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46475561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Charities typically ask potential donors repeatedly for a donation. These repeated requests might trigger avoidance behaviour. Considering that, this article analyses the impact of offering the option to opt-out of receiving future fundraising asks on charitable giving. In a proposed utility framework, any opt-out option decreases the social pressure to donate. At the same time, an unconditional opt-out option induces feelings of gratitude toward the fundraiser, which may lead to a reciprocal increase in donations. The results of a lab experiment designed to disentangle the two channels show no negative impact of the option to avoid repeated asking for donations. Instead, the full model indicates a positive impact of the reciprocity channel. This finding suggests that it might be beneficial for charities to introduce an unconditional opt-out option during high-frequency fundraising campaigns.
{"title":"It’s me again… Ask avoidance and the dynamics of charitable giving","authors":"Maximilian Späth","doi":"10.1093/oep/gpad020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpad020","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Charities typically ask potential donors repeatedly for a donation. These repeated requests might trigger avoidance behaviour. Considering that, this article analyses the impact of offering the option to opt-out of receiving future fundraising asks on charitable giving. In a proposed utility framework, any opt-out option decreases the social pressure to donate. At the same time, an unconditional opt-out option induces feelings of gratitude toward the fundraiser, which may lead to a reciprocal increase in donations. The results of a lab experiment designed to disentangle the two channels show no negative impact of the option to avoid repeated asking for donations. Instead, the full model indicates a positive impact of the reciprocity channel. This finding suggests that it might be beneficial for charities to introduce an unconditional opt-out option during high-frequency fundraising campaigns.","PeriodicalId":48092,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Economic Papers-New Series","volume":"275 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135657898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We conducted a natural field experiment at a local toy store in Anchorage, Alaska to estimate the effect on consumer behavior when the firm’s charitable donation is conditional on the total dollar amount of the individual transaction. Results suggest that the donation offer resulted in a modest increase in both the share of transactions exceeding the minimum amount needed to qualify for the donation and sales revenue.
{"title":"An experimental test of cause-related marketing and charitable giving","authors":"James J. Murphy, Molly Conlin, Bryan Haugstad","doi":"10.1093/oep/gpad019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpad019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We conducted a natural field experiment at a local toy store in Anchorage, Alaska to estimate the effect on consumer behavior when the firm’s charitable donation is conditional on the total dollar amount of the individual transaction. Results suggest that the donation offer resulted in a modest increase in both the share of transactions exceeding the minimum amount needed to qualify for the donation and sales revenue.","PeriodicalId":48092,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Economic Papers-New Series","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42168475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
International assessments are important to benchmark the quality of education internationally. However, ignoring students’ efforts in low-stakes tests can lead to biased interpretations of test performance. We use data from the PISA to analyse the potential role of student effort in explaining gender achievement gaps across countries. We build two effort measures based on students’ response times to test questions (i.e. rapid-guessing rates) and the student effort on the post-test survey (i.e. item non-response rates). We find a strong association between student efforts and test scores. After accounting for differences in effort, the estimated gender achievement gap in mathematics and science could be up to 36% and 40% of an standard deviation wider, respectively, in favour of boys. Altogether, our effort measures on average explain between 51% and 56% of the cross-country variation in test scores.
{"title":"The role of student effort on performance in PISA: revisiting the gender gap in achievement","authors":"Lina Anaya, Gema Zamarro","doi":"10.1093/oep/gpad018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpad018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 International assessments are important to benchmark the quality of education internationally. However, ignoring students’ efforts in low-stakes tests can lead to biased interpretations of test performance. We use data from the PISA to analyse the potential role of student effort in explaining gender achievement gaps across countries. We build two effort measures based on students’ response times to test questions (i.e. rapid-guessing rates) and the student effort on the post-test survey (i.e. item non-response rates). We find a strong association between student efforts and test scores. After accounting for differences in effort, the estimated gender achievement gap in mathematics and science could be up to 36% and 40% of an standard deviation wider, respectively, in favour of boys. Altogether, our effort measures on average explain between 51% and 56% of the cross-country variation in test scores.","PeriodicalId":48092,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Economic Papers-New Series","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49383145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article characterizes the relation between the equilibrium unemployment insurance replacement rate and the frequency of its political choice. We first use a tractable analytical model to show how insurance, incentive, and redistribution effects interact at the equilibrium. We then examine a fully repeated choices equilibrium in a quantitative heterogeneous agents model and show that unemployment persistence, whether a policy is announced first or not, and the type of the political process are key determinants of the relation between the equilibrium replacement rate and the frequency of its choice. In a utilitarian welfare context, we find that the equilibrium replacement rate is higher if the policy is chosen more frequently but this relation is reversed in a median voter context.
{"title":"Unemployment insurance design with repeated choices","authors":"Sumudu Kankanamge, Thomas Weitzenblum","doi":"10.1093/oep/gpad016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpad016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article characterizes the relation between the equilibrium unemployment insurance replacement rate and the frequency of its political choice. We first use a tractable analytical model to show how insurance, incentive, and redistribution effects interact at the equilibrium. We then examine a fully repeated choices equilibrium in a quantitative heterogeneous agents model and show that unemployment persistence, whether a policy is announced first or not, and the type of the political process are key determinants of the relation between the equilibrium replacement rate and the frequency of its choice. In a utilitarian welfare context, we find that the equilibrium replacement rate is higher if the policy is chosen more frequently but this relation is reversed in a median voter context.","PeriodicalId":48092,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Economic Papers-New Series","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46236840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：