Ps-Political Science & Politics最新文献_第8页

Independent Redistricting Commissions Are Associated with More Competitive Elections 独立的选区重新划分委员会与更具竞争性的选举有关

IF 3.3 3区社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Ps-Political Science & Politics

Pub Date : 2023-01-12 DOI: 10.1017/S104909652200124X

M. Nelson

ABSTRACT Competitive elections are essential for democratic accountability, yet most US House of Representatives elections are uncompetitive. Using district-level data from 1982 to 2018, I examine the relationship between redistricting institutions and election competition. I extend the work of Carson, Crespin, and Williamson (2014) by separating independent and political commissions and find that, relative to legislative redistricting, independent commissions are 2.25 times more likely to have competitive elections, and they decrease incumbent party wins by 52%.

竞争性选举是民主问责制的必要条件，但大多数美国众议院选举是非竞争性的。使用1982年至2018年的地区级数据，我研究了重划制度与选举竞争之间的关系。我扩展了Carson, Crespin和Williamson(2014)的工作，将独立委员会和政治委员会分开，并发现，相对于立法重新划分，独立委员会进行竞争性选举的可能性是其2.25倍，并且它们使现任政党的获胜率降低了52%。

引用次数: 1

On the Replicability of Data Collection Using Online News Databases 论在线新闻数据库数据采集的可复制性

IF 3.3 3区社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Ps-Political Science & Politics

Pub Date : 2023-01-11 DOI: 10.1017/S1049096522001317

Mikaela Karstens, Michael J. Soules, Nick Dietrich

ABSTRACT News databases, such as Factiva and Nexis Uni, are vital for the construction of many commonly used datasets of political events because they provide researchers with access to thousands of diverse news sources. This article raises several issues with news databases that pose a threat to the quality and replicability of data-collection efforts. We recommend best practices for using news databases to gather event data.

新闻数据库，如Factiva和Nexis Uni，对于构建许多常用的政治事件数据集至关重要，因为它们为研究人员提供了数千种不同的新闻来源。本文提出了新闻数据库的几个问题，这些问题对数据收集工作的质量和可复制性构成威胁。我们推荐使用新闻数据库收集事件数据的最佳实践。

引用次数: 0

Disrupted Learning about Democracy: Instructor Strategies for Navigating Temporary Modality Shifts

IF 3.3 3区社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Ps-Political Science & Politics

Pub Date : 2023-01-11 DOI: 10.1017/S1049096522001305

Joshua M. Jansa, Eve M. Ringsmuth

ABSTRACT Within-semester shifts in course modality in response to pandemics, weather, or accommodation for travel and health are increasingly common and can interrupt student learning. We tracked temporary modality changes across 10 sections of “Introduction to American Government” to examine the extent to which instructors have tools to help students successfully navigate such changes and mitigate learning loss. We find that students rated instructors’ handling of shifts well if they made course material engaging, communicated clearly, and effectively used technology. The analysis suggests that instructors can mitigate the impact of unplanned changes to modality on students’ learning when there are three or fewer shifts during a semester.

在学期内，由于流行病、天气或旅行和健康的住宿而改变课程模式越来越普遍，这可能会中断学生的学习。我们在“美国政府简介”的10个章节中追踪了临时模式的变化，以检查教师在多大程度上拥有帮助学生成功驾驭这种变化并减轻学习损失的工具。我们发现，如果教师将课程材料制作得引人入胜，沟通清晰，并有效地使用技术，学生就会对教师对轮班的处理给予很好的评价。分析表明，当一个学期有三个或更少的班次时，教师可以减轻计划外的模式变化对学生学习的影响。

引用次数: 0

Tolerance for the Free Speech of Outgroup Partisans 对党外人士言论自由的容忍

IF 3.3 3区社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Ps-Political Science & Politics

Pub Date : 2023-01-05 DOI: 10.1017/S1049096522001202

R. Carlos, Geoffrey Sheagley, Karlee L. Taylor

Americans consistently express broad levels of support for free speech and free expression. For example, 87% of respondents in a recent survey reported that freedom of speech is “very” or “extremely” personally important (Knight Foundation 2022). Moreover, this support seemingly transcends party lines, with 91% of Republicans and 88% of Democrats endorsing this importance.1 Yet, there are reasons to be skeptical that broad levels of support translate to on-theground tolerance of free speech. There are numerous historical examples of Americans’ willingness to selectively withdraw First Amendment protections to those deemed undeserving, particularly along racial, ethnic, and ideological dimensions (King and Smith 2005). Additionally, people are far less likely to tolerate and extend rights to members of their “least-liked” group, especially when threatened (Lambert and Chasteen 1997; Marcus et al. 1995; McClosky and Chong 1985; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). Therefore, we are left to wonder what to make of these strong endorsements that Americans continue to give regarding First Amendment protections. One reason to be skeptical about these declarations of support for free speech is that these endorsements lack tradeoffs and are socially desirable. These low-stakes features could inflate levels of overall public support for civil rights protections. In practice, however, questions related to rights typically do not ask whether a constitutionally protected right should exist. Instead, debates often center on the scope of those rights and/or the groups to whom those protections extend. Creating an additional complication is that beliefs about freedom of speech—and other related rights—can be politicized along partisan lines. Democrats and Republicans could differ significantly in defining First Amendment rights and the values they attach to them based on the object they seek to defend. For example, the previously cited Knight Foundation (2022) report noted that partisans differ substantially in their belief about whether spreading misinformation or hate speech online should be a protected form of speech. To test the limits of Americans’ commitment to free speech, we relied on two survey experiments that were designed expressly to assess whether broad commitments to speech change when tradeoffs or costs to that speech are introduced, as well as whether those speech protections extend to partisan groups. The first experiment focused on broad support for free speech; the second concerned views of free speech on college campuses. The studies yielded four broad conclusions: (1) in the absence of tradeoffs, support for free speech was high; (2) Republicans expressed greater support for free speech than Democrats; (3) the introduction of tradeoffs altered support for free speech and did so similarly for Democrats and Republicans; and (4) support for free speech did not depend on whether partisan in-groups or out-groups engaged in the speech. The survey ex

美国人一贯对言论自由和表达自由表示广泛的支持。例如，在最近的一项调查中，87%的受访者表示，言论自由对个人来说“非常”或“极其”重要(Knight Foundation 2022)。此外，这种支持似乎超越了党派界限，91%的共和党人和88%的民主党人都赞同这一重要性然而，我们有理由怀疑，广泛的支持能否转化为对言论自由的实际容忍。历史上有很多例子表明，美国人愿意有选择地撤销第一修正案对那些被认为不值得保护的人的保护，特别是在种族、民族和意识形态方面(King and Smith 2005)。此外，人们不太可能容忍和扩大他们“最不喜欢”群体成员的权利，特别是当受到威胁时(Lambert和Chasteen 1997;Marcus et al. 1995;McClosky and Chong 1985;Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley, 1997)。因此，我们想知道，美国人继续对第一修正案的保护给予的这些强烈支持是什么。对这些支持言论自由的声明持怀疑态度的一个原因是，这些支持缺乏权衡，而且是社会所希望的。这些低风险的特征可能会提高公众对民权保护的总体支持水平。然而，在实践中，与权利有关的问题通常不会询问受宪法保护的权利是否应该存在。相反，辩论往往集中在这些权利的范围和/或这些保护所涵盖的群体上。更复杂的是，关于言论自由和其他相关权利的信仰可以沿着党派路线被政治化。民主党人和共和党人在定义第一修正案的权利以及根据他们寻求捍卫的对象赋予这些权利的价值观方面可能存在很大差异。例如，之前引用的奈特基金会(2022)报告指出，对于在网上传播错误信息或仇恨言论是否应受到保护，党派之间的看法存在很大差异。为了测试美国人对言论自由的承诺的限度，我们依靠了两个调查实验，这两个实验是专门设计来评估当言论的权衡或成本被引入时，对言论的广泛承诺是否会改变，以及这些言论保护是否延伸到党派团体。第一个实验的重点是对言论自由的广泛支持;第二个问题涉及对大学校园言论自由的看法。这些研究得出了四个广泛的结论:(1)在没有权衡的情况下，对言论自由的支持很高;(2)共和党人比民主党人更支持言论自由;(3)权衡的引入改变了对言论自由的支持，对民主党和共和党的支持也是如此;(4)对言论自由的支持并不取决于党派内部团体或外部团体是否参与了演讲。调查实验被纳入Knight Foundation - ipsos Study (Knight Foundation 2022)，奈特自由表达研究系列。这是一个综合性的项目，召集了一批对研究美国人对言论和表达自由的看法相关问题感兴趣的学者。这项调查具有全国代表性，还包括非白人成年人和大学生的抽样调查。本文中描述的实验包括大约2500名参与者(Carlos, Sheagley, and Taylor 2022)

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引用次数: 0

Who Gets Flagged? An Experiment on Censorship and Bias in Social Media Reporting 谁会被标记?社交媒体报道中的审查和偏见实验

IF 3.3 3区社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Ps-Political Science & Politics

Pub Date : 2023-01-05 DOI: 10.1017/S1049096522001238

Jessica T. Feezell, Meredith Conroy, Barbara Gomez-Aguinaga, John K. Wagner

With a large majority of Americans using social media platforms to consume and disseminate information on a regular basis, social media serve as today’s town square in many ways (Pew Research Center 2021). However, unlike public spaces where the free expression of citizens is afforded First Amendment protections, social media platforms are privately owned, and users are subject to the platform’s terms of service and community standards (Congressional Research Service 2021). Although platform rules vary about what is allowable content, most are in agreement that certain forms of content (e.g., credible threats of violence and hate speech) are not, and they strive to identify and remove such posts. Both Twitter and Facebook prohibit credible threats of violence (e.g., “I will...” or “I plan to...”) and hate speech directed at protected classes (e.g., race, gender, and religion). To identify objectionable content, social media platforms rely in part on users to report offensive posts, which the platform then decides to leave up or take down (Crawford and Gillespie 2016). Users play a critical role in determining which content is flagged for review; however, little is known about user reporting behavior. In general, social media platforms use two techniques to identify objectionable content: (1) algorithms (or “classifiers”) that are trained to flag posts that contain certain language; and (2) other users who report posts that they believe violate the community standards (Crawford and Gillespie 2016). Posts that are identified as possibly containing objectionable content then are reviewed by a group of human moderators to determine whether the post in fact violates the terms of service and therefore should be removed or labeled. Adjudicating what is and is not objectionable content is difficult and subject to personal biases; even professional moderators admit to making mistakes (Gadde and Derella 2020; Varner et al. 2017). However, classifiers also are subject to racial bias. For instance, several classifiers were more likely to flag social media posts written in “Black English” as abusive than posts written in standard English (Davidson, Bhattacharya, and Weber 2019; Sap et al. 2019). Automated toxic-language identification tools generally are unable to consider social and cultural context and therefore risk reporting posts that are not actually in violation. Thus, the assumption that automated techniques are a way to remove bias is incorrect andmay invite systemic bias. In our study, we tested for bias in the second pathway to online content removal: that is, through social media users. Specifically, we were interested in whether the demographics of the poster influence a willingness to report content as violating the community standards; this makes certain demographics more likely to have their posts reviewed and possibly removed. We focused on race, gender, and the intersection of these traits because gendered and racial stereotypes—as well as s

由于绝大多数美国人定期使用社交媒体平台来消费和传播信息，社交媒体在许多方面都成为了今天的城市广场(皮尤研究中心2021)。然而，与公民自由表达受到第一修正案保护的公共空间不同，社交媒体平台是私有的，用户必须遵守平台的服务条款和社区标准(国会研究服务2021年)。虽然平台规则对允许的内容有所不同，但大多数人都同意某些形式的内容(例如，可信的暴力威胁和仇恨言论)是不允许的，他们努力识别和删除这些帖子。Twitter和Facebook都禁止可信的暴力威胁(例如，“我将……或“我计划……”)，以及针对受保护阶层(如种族、性别和宗教)的仇恨言论。为了识别令人反感的内容，社交媒体平台部分依赖用户报告冒犯性帖子，然后平台决定保留或删除(Crawford and Gillespie 2016)。用户在决定哪些内容被标记为审查方面发挥着关键作用;然而，我们对用户报告行为知之甚少。一般来说，社交媒体平台使用两种技术来识别令人反感的内容:(1)经过训练的算法(或“分类器”)，用于标记包含某些语言的帖子;(2)举报他们认为违反社区标准的帖子的其他用户(Crawford and Gillespie 2016)。那些被认定可能包含不良内容的帖子随后会由一组人工版主进行审查，以确定该帖子是否确实违反了服务条款，因此应该被删除或贴上标签。判断什么是令人反感的内容，什么不是令人反感的内容是困难的，而且会受到个人偏见的影响;即使是专业的主持人也会承认犯错误(Gadde和Derella 2020;Varner et al. 2017)。然而，分类器也会受到种族偏见的影响。例如，一些分类器更有可能将用“黑人英语”撰写的社交媒体帖子标记为辱骂，而不是用标准英语撰写的帖子(Davidson, Bhattacharya和Weber 2019;Sap et al. 2019)。自动有毒语言识别工具通常无法考虑社会和文化背景，因此无法报告实际上没有违规的风险帖子。因此，认为自动化技术是消除偏见的一种方法的假设是不正确的，可能会引发系统性偏见。在我们的研究中，我们测试了在线内容删除的第二种途径中的偏见:即通过社交媒体用户。具体来说，我们感兴趣的是海报的人口统计数据是否会影响他们举报违反社区标准的内容的意愿;这使得某些人口统计数据更有可能被审查和删除。我们关注种族、性别和这些特征的交集，因为性别和种族的刻板印象——以及传递者和接收者之间的共同特征——会影响人们对内容的态度和评估(Karpowitz, Mendelberg, and Shaker 2012;获取2017)。尽管一些学者认为，计算机媒介传播降低了公众识别信使背景的能力，但其他研究表明，公众的个人特征继续影响在线环境中对信息的评估(Metzger and Flanagin 2013;解决2018)。

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引用次数: 0

Introduction to Freedom of Expression in an Age of Social Media, Misinformation, and Political Polarization 社会媒体、错误信息和政治两极分化时代的言论自由概论

IF 3.3 3区社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Ps-Political Science & Politics

Pub Date : 2023-01-05 DOI: 10.1017/S1049096522001275

Eitan Hersh, Yanna Krupnikov

In January 2022, the Knight Foundation released a study of American attitudes toward freedom of expression, which builds on regular student surveys that the foundation has conducted since 2004. With three other scholars (i.e., Katherine Glenn Bass of Columbia University; Daron Shaw of the University of Texas at Austin; and David Wilson of the University of California, Berkeley), we served as advisors in the development of the national survey of 4,000 Americans that was fielded jointly by Knight and Ipsos. The Knight Foundation study paints a complicated portrait of American public opinion regarding speech and expression, with wide gaps between support for freedom of expression in the abstract and support for particular examples of expression. As part of this study, we put out a call in early 2021 to scholars to submit proposals for experiments that consider how people perceive different dimensions of freedom of expression. The preregistered experiments that we selected, which were fielded by Ipsos along with the Knight survey, reach the heart of the way people translate abstract support into political attitudes and behaviors. This symposium presents the (often-unexpected) findings of these studies. Ranging in topic from police suppression of protests to “flagging” inappropriate content on social media to self-censorship, the experiments measure how identities of speakers, content of speech, and identities of the audience all intersect to affect the way that people apply and understand freedom of expression.

2022年1月，奈特基金会(Knight Foundation)发布了一项关于美国人对言论自由态度的研究，该研究基于该基金会自2004年以来定期对学生进行的调查。与其他三位学者(即哥伦比亚大学的凯瑟琳·格伦·巴斯;德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校的Daron Shaw;和加州大学伯克利分校的大卫·威尔逊)，我们在奈特和益普索联合对4000名美国人进行的全国调查的发展中担任顾问。奈特基金会的研究描绘了一幅关于言论和表达的美国公众舆论的复杂图景，在支持抽象的表达自由和支持具体的表达例子之间存在着巨大的差距。作为这项研究的一部分，我们在2021年初呼吁学者们提交实验提案，考虑人们如何看待不同维度的言论自由。我们选择的预先注册的实验是由益普索和奈特调查一起进行的，它们触及了人们将抽象的支持转化为政治态度和行为的方式的核心。本次研讨会将介绍这些研究的(通常出乎意料的)发现。从警察镇压抗议活动到在社交媒体上“标记”不适当的内容，再到自我审查，这些实验的主题包括演讲者的身份、言论内容和听众的身份如何相互影响，从而影响人们应用和理解言论自由的方式。

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引用次数: 0

Freedom of Expression in Interpersonal Interactions 人际交往中的言论自由

IF 3.3 3区社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Ps-Political Science & Politics

Pub Date : 2023-01-05 DOI: 10.1017/S1049096522001342

Taylor N. Carlson, Jaime E. Settle

For a half-century, scholars have examined how people navigate political discussions, finding that many avoid expressing their true opinions to others who disagree and instead choose to remain silent (Noelle-Neumann 1974) or conform to the group’s opinion (Carlson and Settle 2016; Levitan and Verhulst 2016). These everyday experiences of censorship draw less attention than concerns about people silencing themselves to avoid being “canceled” in more publicly visible ways (Lukianoff and Haidt 2019). However, these seemingly mundane, everyday political encounters restrict the free flow of opinion, information, and dialogue on important political topics. The majority of previous research on political discussion focuses on the effects of exposure to disagreement (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Mutz 2006), but most of this work does not directly examine how the interpersonal dynamics of a political conversation affect the choices that people make about political expression. Carlson and Settle (2022a) build on extensive qualitative research (Eliasoph 1998; Walsh 2010) to argue that social and psychological impediments in interpersonal conversations—namely, people’s desire to preserve their esteem and relationships—might structure how forthcoming they are about their political opinions. Consistent with previous research, the authors found that disagreement is indeed a central roadblock reducing the likelihood of people expressing their true opinions. However, disagreement is not the only challenge that people face in discussion: Carlson and Settle (2022a) identified other factors—including the political knowledge gap, strength of relationship, and power dynamic between discussants—that could affect how likely people are to express their true opinions. Similarly, recent scholarship highlights other important divides in American politics, such as deep involvement in politics (Krupnikov and Ryan 2022), that could affect the dynamics of discussion. A remaining question is how these factors stack up against one another. To address this gap in our knowledge, we conducted a preregistered conjoint experiment in which we randomized features of a hypothetical political discussant and asked participants to report how comfortable they would be expressing their true political opinions in a discussion with the person described (Carlson and Settle 2022b). We find that, consistent with previous research, expected disagreement is indeed the strongest factor contributing to opinion expression. Specifically, participants were seven points more likely to report that they would express their true opinions in a conversation with someone who was a copartisan compared to an out-partisan. However, they also reported being more likely to express their opinions in faceto-face conversations than online, as well as with people with whom they had a close relationship. Where potential discussants learn about politics also was influential: participants reported being less likely

半个世纪以来，学者们研究了人们如何进行政治讨论，发现许多人避免向不同意他们的人表达自己的真实观点，而是选择保持沉默(诺埃尔-诺伊曼1974)或服从群体的意见(卡尔森和塞特尔2016;Levitan and Verhulst 2016)。这些审查的日常经历引起的关注不如人们为了避免以更公开的方式被“取消”而沉默自己的担忧(Lukianoff和Haidt 2019)。然而，这些看似平凡的日常政治接触限制了意见、信息和重要政治话题对话的自由流动。先前关于政治讨论的大多数研究侧重于暴露于分歧的影响(Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004;Mutz 2006)，但是大部分的工作并没有直接研究政治对话的人际动态如何影响人们对政治表达的选择。卡尔森和塞特尔(2022a)建立在广泛的定性研究(Eliasoph 1998;Walsh 2010)认为人际对话中的社会和心理障碍——即人们希望保持自己的尊重和关系——可能会影响他们对自己政治观点的坦率程度。与之前的研究一致，作者发现分歧确实是降低人们表达真实观点可能性的主要障碍。然而，分歧并不是人们在讨论中面临的唯一挑战:卡尔森和塞特尔(2022a)发现了其他因素，包括政治知识差距、关系强度和讨论者之间的权力动态，这些因素可能会影响人们表达真实观点的可能性。同样，最近的学术研究强调了美国政治中的其他重要分歧，比如对政治的深度参与(Krupnikov和Ryan 2022)，这可能会影响讨论的动态。剩下的问题是这些因素是如何相互叠加的。为了解决我们知识上的这一差距，我们进行了一项预先注册的联合实验，在该实验中，我们随机分配了一个假设的政治讨论者的特征，并要求参与者报告他们在与所描述的人讨论时表达自己真实政治观点的舒适程度(Carlson and Settle 2022b)。我们发现，与之前的研究一致，预期的分歧确实是影响意见表达的最强因素。具体来说，与无党派人士相比，参与者在与合作人士交谈时表达真实观点的可能性要高出7个百分点。然而，他们也报告说，他们更有可能在面对面的交谈中表达自己的观点，而不是在网上，以及与他们关系密切的人。潜在的讨论者在哪里了解政治也有影响:参与者报告说，在讨论者更喜欢边缘媒体而不是主流媒体的对话中，他们不太可能表达自己的真实观点。最后，我们发现，参与者报告说，他们不太可能向与自己性别相同的人表达自己的真实观点，但更愿意向与自己种族或民族身份相同的人表达自己的真实观点。总之，这些结果表明，预期的分歧仍然是政治讨论中自由表达的一个重要障碍，但它不是唯一的障碍。

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引用次数: 0

Religious Freedom Backlash: Evidence from Public Opinion Experiments about Free Expression 宗教自由的反弹:来自言论自由的民意实验的证据

IF 3.3 3区社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Ps-Political Science & Politics

Pub Date : 2023-01-05 DOI: 10.1017/S1049096522001251

A. R. Lewis, Eric L. McDaniel

Religious-freedom conflicts are prominent throughout US history (Sehat 2011); however, for much of the past century, religious freedom represented a pluralist, egalitarian aspiration. This correspondedwith growing levels of religious tolerance and support for the broad contours of religious liberty (Putnam and Campbell 2010). In recent decades, consensus has turned to division because religious freedom has taken center stage in our partisan culture wars and constitutional disputes (Bennett 2017; Lewis 2017; Wilson and Djupe 2020). Although activists and elites are at the helm of these debates over religious liberty, the mass public also is polarized over prominent religious-freedom issues, especially concerning LGBTQ rights and COVID-19 policies (Castle 2019; Mitchell 2016; Nortey 2022). In describing the polarization of religious liberty, academic and journalistic accounts have argued that support for religious freedom is related to preference from group-based exclusivity, such as Christian nationalism, social dominance, and traditionalism (Castle 2017; Gillman and Chemerinsky 2020; Goidel, Smentkowski, and Freeman 2016; Whitehead and Perry 2020). Although these ideological and psychological factors often are attributed to the mass public’s support for religious freedom, the mechanisms have not been tested directly. This study used an experimental survey design to examine how presenting vignettes that emphasize egalitarianism, religious nationalism, and social dominance affects support for three type of religious freedom. We found that reading messages about equality, nationalism, and social dominance does not increase support for religious freedom; however, it does spark backlash in certain cases, particularly among Independents and the non-religious.

宗教自由冲突在美国历史上一直很突出(Sehat 2011);然而，在过去一个世纪的大部分时间里，宗教自由代表了一种多元化、平等主义的愿望。这与不断增长的宗教宽容水平和对广泛的宗教自由的支持相对应(Putnam和Campbell 2010)。近几十年来，由于宗教自由在我们的党派文化战争和宪法纠纷中占据了中心位置，共识已经变成了分歧(Bennett 2017;刘易斯2017年;Wilson and Djupe 2020)。尽管活动人士和精英们主导着这些关于宗教自由的辩论，但大众在突出的宗教自由问题上也出现了两极分化，特别是在LGBTQ权利和COVID-19政策方面(Castle 2019;米切尔2016;Nortey 2022)。在描述宗教自由的两极分化时，学术和新闻报道认为，对宗教自由的支持与对基于群体的排他性的偏好有关，例如基督教民族主义、社会支配和传统主义(Castle 2017;Gillman and Chemerinsky 2020;Goidel, Smentkowski, and Freeman 2016;Whitehead and Perry 2020)。虽然这些意识形态和心理因素往往归因于大众对宗教自由的支持，但其机制尚未得到直接检验。本研究采用实验调查设计来检验强调平等主义、宗教民族主义和社会支配地位的小插曲如何影响对三种宗教自由的支持。我们发现，阅读有关平等、民族主义和社会支配地位的信息并没有增加对宗教自由的支持;然而，在某些情况下，它确实引发了反弹，特别是在无党派人士和非宗教人士中。

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引用次数: 2

Policing Protest: An Examination of Support for Police Suppression of Protest 警察抗议:对警察镇压抗议的支持的考察

IF 3.3 3区社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Ps-Political Science & Politics

Pub Date : 2022-12-23 DOI: 10.1017/S1049096522001354

Tony E. Carey, Ángel Saavedra Cisneros

The freedom of peaceful assembly is a key component of a healthy democracy. However, even democratic nations sometimes respond forcefully—and even violently—against demonstrations of public dissent. According to Barker, Baker, and Watkins (2021), in the United States, the state response to protests surrounding several highly visible incidents of police violence directed toward Black citizens illustrates the degree to which state force may be used to thwart peaceful protest. These responses are in contrast to the state response to violent protests aimed at overturning the results from the 2020 presidential election. They have heightened concerns that suppression of social protests varies depending on the racial background of the protesters involved (Chason and Schmidt 2021). Media reporting on demonstrations can profoundly affect the way the public reacts not only to protest but also the state response to protest. The extensive literature on media framing (see Chong and Druckman 2007 for a review) found that how the media choose to frame a story plays an important role in the public’s evaluation of protestors and the reaction from authorities to the protests (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997) and institutional legitimacy (Nicholson and Howard 2003)—and even can shape how voters decide on ballot questions related to the relevant news (García-Perdomo, Harlow, and Brown 2022). For this study, we considered the role that the media framing of protest events, issues, and race of protesters has on support for police suppression. Using a 3 (i.e., race of protester: white, Black, or Latina/o) x 2 (i.e., media frame: social order or free speech) x 2 (i.e., issue: policing or the environment) factorial experimental design, we find little evidence that the characteristics of protest events shaped support for police suppression. Instead, the race of the respondent had the strongest effect on attitudes toward protest suppression. White respondents reported significantly higher levels of support for police intervention than Black respondents. Latinas/os reported lower levels of support than white respondents but not as low as Black respondents. Ultimately, we conclude that whereas characteristics of a protest did not shape attitudes, the effect of the respondents’ race likely reflects fundamental differences in the faith that each racial group places in police authority and, consequently, in their actions to suppress protest activities. MEDIAFRAMING, ISSUES, ANDTHERACEOFPROTESTERS

和平集会自由是健康民主的关键组成部分。然而，即使是民主国家，有时也会对表达公众异议的示威活动作出强有力甚至是暴力的回应。根据Barker、Baker和Watkins(2021)的观点，在美国，国家对围绕几起针对黑人公民的明显警察暴力事件的抗议活动的反应说明了国家武力可能被用来挫败和平抗议的程度。这些反应与国家对旨在推翻2020年总统选举结果的暴力抗议的反应形成鲜明对比。他们强调了对社会抗议活动的镇压因抗议者的种族背景而异的担忧(Chason和Schmidt 2021)。媒体对示威活动的报道不仅会深刻影响公众对抗议活动的反应，也会深刻影响国家对抗议活动的反应。关于媒体框架的大量文献(见Chong and Druckman 2007)发现，媒体如何选择框架故事在公众对抗议者的评价以及当局对抗议的反应(Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997)和制度合法性(Nicholson and Howard 2003)中起着重要作用，甚至可以影响选民如何决定与相关新闻相关的投票问题(García-Perdomo, Harlow, and Brown 2022)。在这项研究中，我们考虑了媒体对抗议事件、问题和抗议者种族的描述对警察镇压的支持所起的作用。使用3(即抗议者的种族:白人、黑人或拉丁裔)× 2(即媒体框架:社会秩序或言论自由)× 2(即问题:治安或环境)因子实验设计，我们发现很少有证据表明抗议事件的特征塑造了对警察镇压的支持。相反，受访者的种族对抗议镇压的态度影响最大。白人受访者对警察干预的支持程度明显高于黑人受访者。拉丁裔/非裔受访者的支持率低于白人受访者，但低于黑人受访者。最后，我们得出结论，尽管抗议的特征并没有塑造态度，但受访者种族的影响可能反映了每个种族群体对警察当局的信仰的根本差异，因此，在他们镇压抗议活动的行动中。媒体框架、问题和抗议者的行动

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引用次数: 0

Teaching Undergraduates Research Methods: A “Methods Lab” Approach 本科生研究方法教学:“方法实验室”教学法

IF 3.3 3区社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Ps-Political Science & Politics

Pub Date : 2022-12-22 DOI: 10.1017/S1049096522001366

Heather Sullivan, Erica De Bruin

ABSTRACT This article introduces a “methods lab” approach to teaching undergraduates about different types of research in political science. In this approach, students are given explicit instruction on what a specific research method entails and the opportunity to practice it before conducting their own research. Methods labs can help students craft more creative research designs as well as understand the strengths and potential pitfalls associated with each method, making the subsequent process of writing a research paper or thesis easier. We provide two sample methods labs focused on conducting archival research and developing survey and interview questions. We discuss our experiences in implementing the labs in a thesis course, describe how the modular lab approach could fit into multiple types of courses, and offer suggestions for those interested in developing labs for other types of research methods.

摘要:本文介绍了一种“方法实验室”的教学方法，用于对本科生进行不同类型的政治学研究。在这种方法中，学生在进行自己的研究之前，会得到明确的指导，了解具体的研究方法需要什么，并有机会实践它。方法实验室可以帮助学生制作更有创意的研究设计，并了解与每种方法相关的优势和潜在的缺陷，使撰写研究论文或论文的后续过程更容易。我们提供了两个样本方法实验室，专注于进行档案研究和开发调查和访谈问题。我们将讨论我们在论文课程中实施实验室的经验，描述模块化实验室方法如何适用于多种类型的课程，并为那些有兴趣为其他类型的研究方法开发实验室的人提供建议。

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