Journal of Policy Analysis and Management最新文献

If voters do not like federal tax policy, they can elect new representatives. At the local level, though, voters can directly deny the tax increases their elected officials propose. All but three states have a limit on either the taxing or spending abilities of local governments and, most commonly, state laws require that increases in local taxes receive a public referendum before they are enacted (Mullins, 2010). In the November 2020 election, voters nationwide decided on the fate of $52.7 billion of proposed funding, down from $70 billion 4 years prior (Pierog, 2020).

Requirements that budgeting questions be put to a vote reduce the level of spending (Feld & Matsusaka, 2003; Funk & Gathmann, 2011). However, the rules that govern these votes vary in myriad ways. States differ in the types of taxes or spending the rules cover: Some only allow proposals for capital spending, while others also include current expenditure spending. States also often limit the total amount of tax revenue or the tax rate governments can propose, and vary in whether they adjust for inflation, for changes in population, or for growth in the property tax base. Certain election rules limit the timing of when governments can put proposals on the ballot, since local governments may use this timing flexibility strategically (Anzia, 2011; Kogan et al., 2018; Meredith, 2009). States also differ in the vote share required to approve the proposals, with many proposals requiring more than a simple majority. There is little empirical research, however, documenting how these differences in voting requirements may affect government budgets, local spending, and the provision of public goods and services. This is a significant gap in the literature given the millions of dollars in funding at stake in each local referendum and the billions at stake nationwide.

In this paper, we study a proposition in California that weakened the constraints on some local governments by lowering the vote share required to approve capital funding for schools and community colleges. We use a difference-in-differences design around this policy change and data for over 4,000 local elections across the state over 2 decades. We estimate the effects of this policy change on the proposals made by affected districts, their outcomes at the ballot box, and on the eventual funding outcomes.

We develop a theoretical model of the interaction between a school board and voters, building on the literature in local political economy (Barseghyan & Coate, 2014; Coate & Ma, 2017; Romer & Rosenthal, 1982). In our model, the school board makes a tax proposal that the voter can accept or reject. Thus, the school board has “agenda-setting” power to extract policies closer to its preferences than those of the voter. However, uncertainty in how residents will vo

I study whether the amount of time students take to complete their bachelor's degree affects labor outcomes after graduation using a resume-based field experiment. I randomly assign a time to degree of either 4 or 6 years to over 7,000 fictitious resumes of recent graduates and submit them to entry-level business jobs. Resumes listing degree completion in 6 years received 1% to 2% fewer employer responses than resumes indicating graduation in 4 years, which is not a statistically significant difference. There is also no difference in the effect of longer time to degree between resumes listing a more or less selective college. However, among jobs with relatively large applicant pools, resumes listing 6 years to degree receive 16% fewer responses.

Non-take-up of social benefits is a significant policy issue caused by factors such as lack of awareness, compliance costs, and stigma. While public information campaigns, default options, and in-person assistance are increasingly used, their effectiveness remains poorly understood. This study provides a systematic review of field experiments evaluating nudges and simple behavioral interventions on program take-up. We analyzed 93 interventions from 35 studies published over nearly 20 years, predominantly focusing on major U.S. programs. We compared study characteristics, including sample and intervention types, and assessed study quality. Due to high heterogeneity, we did not conduct a meta-analysis but used forest plots and thematic summaries instead. Most studies reported a positive impact on program take-up, but not on program application. Two types of interventions were notable for their impact on program application and take-up: 1) providing and framing information; and 2) providing assistance. We discuss the limitations of this review, including the cost and safety of nudges and the implications of focusing on field experiments. We conclude that further research is needed on simpler interventions outside the U.S., as well as on compliance and psychological costs. Additionally, improving the quality and transparency of field experiments is essential.

In this study we describe the potential of human-centered design principles to identify burdens, reducing the effects of administrative checkpoints. Administrative checkpoints—mandatory requirements that must be satisfied in order to progress in an administrative process—have disproportionate negative effects in excluding the public from receiving public services. Mandatory interviews are one such checkpoint. Based on consultation with safety net clients and caseworkers, we designed a field experiment (N = 1,554) to minimize the exclusionary effects of mandatory interviews for SNAP applicants. Compared to a control group that received a traditional mailer reminder, SNAP applicants who also received texts reminding them of the interview and communicating flexible “interview anytime” scheduling options had a higher interview completion rate by 10 percentage points, a higher benefit-approval rate by 6 to 7 percentage points, and also completed interviews 3 to 4 days sooner. Follow-up surveys show that the text reminders reduced learning costs about the interview requirement and increased applicant confidence about their ability to manage the process.