{"title":"On the Temporality of Emotions: An Essay on Grief, Anger, and Love, Berislav Marušić","authors":"Kyla Ebels-Duggan","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad039","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44154649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Realism for Realistic People: A New Pragmatic Philosophy of Science, by Hasok Chang Get access Realism for Realistic People: A New Pragmatic Philosophy of Science, by Hasok Chang. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. vii + 282. Sharon Crasnow Sharon Crasnow Norco College, United States of America sharon.crasnow@norcocollege.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad038, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad038 Published: 01 September 2023
{"title":"Realism for Realistic People: A New Pragmatic Philosophy of Science, by Hasok Chang","authors":"Sharon Crasnow","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad038","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Realism for Realistic People: A New Pragmatic Philosophy of Science, by Hasok Chang Get access Realism for Realistic People: A New Pragmatic Philosophy of Science, by Hasok Chang. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. vii + 282. Sharon Crasnow Sharon Crasnow Norco College, United States of America sharon.crasnow@norcocollege.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad038, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad038 Published: 01 September 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"156 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136353964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy, by Katrina Forrester Get access In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy, by Katrina Forrester. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2019. Pp. xxii + 402. Alan Thomas Alan Thomas University of York, United Kingdom ap.thomas@york.ac.uk https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8053-7195 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad030, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad030 Published: 23 August 2023
《在正义的阴影下:战后自由主义与政治哲学的重塑》,作者:Katrina Forrester普林斯顿,新泽西州:普林斯顿大学出版社,2019。第22页+ 402页。Alan Thomas英国约克大学Alan Thomas ap.thomas@york.ac.uk https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8053-7195搜索作者的其他作品:Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad030, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad030发布日期:2023年8月23日
{"title":"<i>In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy</i>, by Katrina Forrester","authors":"Alan Thomas","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad030","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy, by Katrina Forrester Get access In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy, by Katrina Forrester. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2019. Pp. xxii + 402. Alan Thomas Alan Thomas University of York, United Kingdom ap.thomas@york.ac.uk https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8053-7195 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad030, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad030 Published: 23 August 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"06 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135571241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A major challenge in the philosophy of mathematics is to explain how mathematical language can pick out unique structures and acquire determinate content. In recent work, Button and Walsh have introduced a view they call ‘internalism’, according to which mathematical content is explained by internal categoricity results formulated and proven in second-order logic. In this paper, we critically examine the internalist response to the challenge and discuss the philosophical significance of internal categoricity results. Surprisingly, as we argue, while internalism arguably explains how we pick out unique mathematical structures, this does not suffice to account for the determinacy of mathematical discourse.
{"title":"Internalism and the Determinacy of Mathematics","authors":"Lavinia Picollo, Daniel Waxman","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzac073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac073","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A major challenge in the philosophy of mathematics is to explain how mathematical language can pick out unique structures and acquire determinate content. In recent work, Button and Walsh have introduced a view they call ‘internalism’, according to which mathematical content is explained by internal categoricity results formulated and proven in second-order logic. In this paper, we critically examine the internalist response to the challenge and discuss the philosophical significance of internal categoricity results. Surprisingly, as we argue, while internalism arguably explains how we pick out unique mathematical structures, this does not suffice to account for the determinacy of mathematical discourse.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135492358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Hume’s claim that we project necessity onto objects we take to be causally related has been influential in contemporary discussions of modality, inspiring deflationary accounts of our modal commitments. Hume is commonly understood as holding that modal projection explains our judging that an effect must follow its cause. This misunderstands the role of projection in Hume’s discussions of causation and causal judgement. Projection is a diagnosis of a distinctively philosophical confusion: the commitment to mind-independent necessary connections. In arguing for this, I provide an account of the psychological process that, in Hume’s view, underlies projection. This account resolves problems with Hume’s projectivism identified by his commentators.
{"title":"Hume on Modal Projection","authors":"Bridger Ehli","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad020","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Hume’s claim that we project necessity onto objects we take to be causally related has been influential in contemporary discussions of modality, inspiring deflationary accounts of our modal commitments. Hume is commonly understood as holding that modal projection explains our judging that an effect must follow its cause. This misunderstands the role of projection in Hume’s discussions of causation and causal judgement. Projection is a diagnosis of a distinctively philosophical confusion: the commitment to mind-independent necessary connections. In arguing for this, I provide an account of the psychological process that, in Hume’s view, underlies projection. This account resolves problems with Hume’s projectivism identified by his commentators.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135652384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract At the core of the recent debate over moral debunking arguments is a disagreement between explanationist and modalist approaches. Explanationists think that the lack of an explanatory connection between our moral beliefs and the moral truths, given a non-naturalist realist conception of morality, is a reason to reject non-naturalism. Modalists disagree. They say that, given non-naturalism, our beliefs have the appropriate modal features with respect to truth – in particular they are safe and sensitive – so there is no problem. There is a stand-off here. I argue, though, that by looking at the role explanatory and modal factors have to play in theory choice more generally, and, in particular, by considering the practice of theory choice in science, we can see that the explanationist is right. The lack of an explanatory connection between our moral beliefs and the moral truths is a reason to reject non-naturalist realism about morality.
{"title":"Explanationism versus Modalism in Debunking (and Theory Choice)","authors":"Harjit Bhogal","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad029","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract At the core of the recent debate over moral debunking arguments is a disagreement between explanationist and modalist approaches. Explanationists think that the lack of an explanatory connection between our moral beliefs and the moral truths, given a non-naturalist realist conception of morality, is a reason to reject non-naturalism. Modalists disagree. They say that, given non-naturalism, our beliefs have the appropriate modal features with respect to truth – in particular they are safe and sensitive – so there is no problem. There is a stand-off here. I argue, though, that by looking at the role explanatory and modal factors have to play in theory choice more generally, and, in particular, by considering the practice of theory choice in science, we can see that the explanationist is right. The lack of an explanatory connection between our moral beliefs and the moral truths is a reason to reject non-naturalist realism about morality.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":"232 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135652382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tadros on Non-Responsible Threats","authors":"C. H. Wellman","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad025","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43353484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Authority Without the Duty to Obey","authors":"J. Frick, Daniel Viehoff","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad023","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42373833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"To Reason Why a Bit More","authors":"Victor Tadros","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad027","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45412750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}