Abstract In his Metaphysical Disputation 5, Francisco Suárez offers a concise argument to the effect that all that does or can possibly exist is singular and individual, and that a commitment to real universals would entail what he calls a ‘manifest contradiction’. According to a recent interpretation of this Master Argument against realism, it reveals that Suárez was committed to a hylomorphic version of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, and ruled out the possibility of perfectly similar yet numerically distinct entities. In this paper, however, I argue that (1) at least for fundamental items in his ontology such as immaterial forms and matter-form compounds, Suárez was not committed to the identity of indiscernibles, and (2) a reading of the Master Argument that does justice to this is available. On the basis of this reading I provide a reappraisal of the argument, and conclude that (3) it rests on a premise that the realist would have good reasons to challenge. Hence, while the argument seems consistent with the possibility of indiscernible yet numerically distinct immaterial forms and matter-form compounds Suárez wishes to allow for, it is doubtful whether it can accomplish what it sets out to do, and undermine the case for realism.
{"title":"Suárez’s Argument against Real Universals","authors":"Han Thomas Adriaenssen","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad042","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In his Metaphysical Disputation 5, Francisco Suárez offers a concise argument to the effect that all that does or can possibly exist is singular and individual, and that a commitment to real universals would entail what he calls a ‘manifest contradiction’. According to a recent interpretation of this Master Argument against realism, it reveals that Suárez was committed to a hylomorphic version of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, and ruled out the possibility of perfectly similar yet numerically distinct entities. In this paper, however, I argue that (1) at least for fundamental items in his ontology such as immaterial forms and matter-form compounds, Suárez was not committed to the identity of indiscernibles, and (2) a reading of the Master Argument that does justice to this is available. On the basis of this reading I provide a reappraisal of the argument, and conclude that (3) it rests on a premise that the realist would have good reasons to challenge. Hence, while the argument seems consistent with the possibility of indiscernible yet numerically distinct immaterial forms and matter-form compounds Suárez wishes to allow for, it is doubtful whether it can accomplish what it sets out to do, and undermine the case for realism.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134943602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty Get access Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. Pp. xxi + 264. Stephen Houlgate Stephen Houlgate University of Warwick, United Kingdom Stephen.Houlgate@warwick.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad052, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad052 Published: 06 October 2023
《黑格尔的逻辑和形而上学》，雅各布·麦克纳尔蒂著。剑桥:剑桥大学出版社，2023。第21页+ 264页Stephen Houlgate，英国华威大学，Stephen.Houlgate@warwick.ac.uk搜索作者的其他作品:Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad052, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad052发布日期:2023年10月6日
{"title":"Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty","authors":"Stephen Houlgate","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad052","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty Get access Hegel’s Logic and Metaphysics, by Jacob McNulty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. Pp. xxi + 264. Stephen Houlgate Stephen Houlgate University of Warwick, United Kingdom Stephen.Houlgate@warwick.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad052, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad052 Published: 06 October 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135345867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract People sometimes use speech to interfere with other people’s speech, as in the case of a heckler sabotaging a lecture with constant interjections. Some people claim that such interference infringes upon free speech. Against this view, we argue that where competing speakers in a public forum both have an interest in speaking, free speech principles should not automatically give priority to the ‘official’ speaker. Given the ideals underlying free speech, heckling speech sometimes deserves priority. But what can we say, then, about situations in which heckling clearly seems to infringe upon people’s civil liberties, in a way that intuitively justifies intervention? In such cases, we argue, heckling infringes upon people’s associative freedom. We present and defend an ethical framework for the institutional management of ‘Speech Fights’, geared around this insight.
{"title":"Heckling, Free Speech, and Freedom of Association","authors":"Emily McTernan, Robert Mark Simpson","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad049","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract People sometimes use speech to interfere with other people’s speech, as in the case of a heckler sabotaging a lecture with constant interjections. Some people claim that such interference infringes upon free speech. Against this view, we argue that where competing speakers in a public forum both have an interest in speaking, free speech principles should not automatically give priority to the ‘official’ speaker. Given the ideals underlying free speech, heckling speech sometimes deserves priority. But what can we say, then, about situations in which heckling clearly seems to infringe upon people’s civil liberties, in a way that intuitively justifies intervention? In such cases, we argue, heckling infringes upon people’s associative freedom. We present and defend an ethical framework for the institutional management of ‘Speech Fights’, geared around this insight.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135483028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does: Critical Essays on Effective Altruism, by Carol J. Adams, Alice Crary, and Lori Gruen Get access The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does: Critical Essays on Effective Altruism, by Carol J. Adams, Alice Crary, and Lori Gruen (eds.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. xxx + 281. Richard Pettigrew Richard Pettigrew University of Bristol, UK richard.pettigrew@bristol.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad047, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad047 Published: 27 September 2023
{"title":"The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does: Critical Essays on Effective Altruism, by Carol J. Adams, Alice Crary, and Lori Gruen","authors":"Richard Pettigrew","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad047","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does: Critical Essays on Effective Altruism, by Carol J. Adams, Alice Crary, and Lori Gruen Get access The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does: Critical Essays on Effective Altruism, by Carol J. Adams, Alice Crary, and Lori Gruen (eds.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. xxx + 281. Richard Pettigrew Richard Pettigrew University of Bristol, UK richard.pettigrew@bristol.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad047, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad047 Published: 27 September 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135477836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism, by Theron Pummer","authors":"Daniel Muñoz","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad043","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135010730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Learning to Live Naturally: Stoic Ethics and its Modern Significance, by Christopher Gill Get access Learning to Live Naturally: Stoic Ethics and its Modern Significance, by Christopher Gill. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xii + 365. Raphael Woolf Raphael Woolf King’s College London, UK raphael.g.woolf@kcl.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad044, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad044 Published: 19 September 2023
期刊文章《学习自然生活:斯多葛伦理学及其现代意义》，克里斯托弗·吉尔著。牛津:牛津大学出版社，2022。Pp. xii + 365拉斐尔·伍尔夫拉斐尔·伍尔夫伦敦国王学院，英国raphael.g.woolf@kcl.ac.uk搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者思想，fzad044, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad044出版日期:2023年9月19日
{"title":"Learning to Live Naturally: Stoic Ethics and its Modern Significance, by Christopher Gill","authors":"Raphael Woolf","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad044","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Learning to Live Naturally: Stoic Ethics and its Modern Significance, by Christopher Gill Get access Learning to Live Naturally: Stoic Ethics and its Modern Significance, by Christopher Gill. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xii + 365. Raphael Woolf Raphael Woolf King’s College London, UK raphael.g.woolf@kcl.ac.uk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, fzad044, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad044 Published: 19 September 2023","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135010724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article explores the connection between Boolean-valued class models of set theory and the theory of arbitrary objects in roughly Kit Fine’s sense of the word. In particular, it explores the hypothesis that the set-theoretic universe as a whole can be seen as an arbitrary entity. According to this view, the set-theoretic universe can be in many different states. These states are structurally like Boolean-valued models, and they contain sets conceived of as variable or arbitrary objects.
{"title":"Boolean-Valued Sets as Arbitrary Objects","authors":"Leon Horsten","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad035","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article explores the connection between Boolean-valued class models of set theory and the theory of arbitrary objects in roughly Kit Fine’s sense of the word. In particular, it explores the hypothesis that the set-theoretic universe as a whole can be seen as an arbitrary entity. According to this view, the set-theoretic universe can be in many different states. These states are structurally like Boolean-valued models, and they contain sets conceived of as variable or arbitrary objects.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135257680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Imagining the End: Mourning and Ethical Life, by Jonathan Lear","authors":"R Jay Wallace","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad040","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135878299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Our decision-theoretic states are not luminous. We are imperfectly reliable at identifying our own credences, utilities and available acts, and thus can never be more than imperfectly reliable at identifying the prescriptions of decision theory. The lack of luminosity affords decision theory a remarkable opportunity — to issue guidance on the basis of epistemically inaccessible facts. We show how a decision theory can guarantee action in accordance with contingent truths about which an agent is arbitrarily uncertain. It may seem that such advantages would require dubiously adverting to externalist facts that go beyond the internalism of traditional decision theory, but this is not so. Using only the standard repertoire of decision-theoretic tools, we show how to modify existing decision theories to take advantage of this opportunity. These improved decision theories require agents to maximize conditional expected utility — expected utility conditional upon an agent’s actual decision situation. We call such modified decision theories ‘self-confident’. These self-confident decision theories have a distinct advantage over standard decision theories: their prescriptions are better.
{"title":"Decision Theory without Luminosity","authors":"Yoaav Isaacs, Benjamin A Levinstein","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad037","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Our decision-theoretic states are not luminous. We are imperfectly reliable at identifying our own credences, utilities and available acts, and thus can never be more than imperfectly reliable at identifying the prescriptions of decision theory. The lack of luminosity affords decision theory a remarkable opportunity — to issue guidance on the basis of epistemically inaccessible facts. We show how a decision theory can guarantee action in accordance with contingent truths about which an agent is arbitrarily uncertain. It may seem that such advantages would require dubiously adverting to externalist facts that go beyond the internalism of traditional decision theory, but this is not so. Using only the standard repertoire of decision-theoretic tools, we show how to modify existing decision theories to take advantage of this opportunity. These improved decision theories require agents to maximize conditional expected utility — expected utility conditional upon an agent’s actual decision situation. We call such modified decision theories ‘self-confident’. These self-confident decision theories have a distinct advantage over standard decision theories: their prescriptions are better.","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136298515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Frege on Language, Logic & Psychology, by Eva Picardi","authors":"Mark Textor","doi":"10.1093/mind/fzad034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad034","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48124,"journal":{"name":"MIND","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136361726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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