We know very little about why the legal status of prostitution varies across countries. Drawing on central arguments in the normative literature on the legal status of prostitution, in which a central argument concerns the sexual and bodily autonomy of women, we ask whether a country's position on the individualism-collectivism affects the legal status of prostitution. We investigate this question using a panel of 61 countries, finding a robust positive relationship between individualism and the legality of prostitution. In the baseline model, a one-standard deviation increase in individualism is associated with a ten percentage point increase in the likelihood that prostitution is legal. This relationship is robust to controls for institutional structure, other dimensions of culture, and measures of women's economic status and historical patriarchy. It is also robust to the use of instrumental variable analysis to address issues of endogeneity and measurement error. Our results also shed light on two additional aspects of the normative debate over legal prostitution. In particular, we find that prostitution is more likely to be legal in countries in which women enjoy greater economic status, but we fail to find a consistent empirical relationship between historical patriarchy and legal prostitution.
This paper employs a novel game-theory model to characterize the impact and the resulting welfare implications of a corrupt relationship in the marketization process in an economy with weak institutions. This relationship between a bureaucrat and a domestic firm enables the bureaucrat to share part of the domestic firm’s gain generated by the bureaucrat’s imposition of barriers to deter the entry of foreign firms. When the barrier has an upper bound and both the bureaucrat and the foreign firm have sufficient knowledge regarding the domestic firm’s cost information, the equilibrium level of the barrier would first equal the upper bound and then decrease with the domestic firm’s cost. This result is robust regardless of whether the cost of the domestic firm and the foreign firm are positively correlated or independent. The welfare loss is largest in industries where a firm’s cost relies heavily on its private advantage: e.g., innovation-intensive industries, and when the domestic firm has a relatively large cost disadvantage. This paper provides novel and insightful implications for marketization in countries with weak institutions.
There is growing interest in exploring the use of information and communication technology (ICT) to enhance academic performance. Whereas previous studies have predominantly focused on the direct effects of ICT on education quality, only limited attention has been paid to the interactions between teachers’ use of ICT in the classroom and the students’ use of ICT at home and the role of teachers in the pedagogical process. In this study, we use a nationally representative survey of secondary school students in China to investigate the impact of teachers’ integration of ICT into the instructional process and the impact of the interactions between home ICT resources and school ICT use on students’ academic performance. Our findings indicate that teachers’ increased frequency of ICT use during instruction improves the current and long-term academic performance of students who lack access to computers at home, compared with those with home computers. These positive effects can be attributed to improvements in the quality and preparation time of teachers’ lessons, increased use of interactive teaching methods, and heightened student motivation to learn.