Psychological Research-Psychologische Forschung最新文献

When mentally exploring maps representing large-scale environments (e.g., countries or continents), humans are assumed to mainly rely on spatial information derived from direct perceptual experience (e.g., prior visual experience with the geographical map itself). In the present study, we rather tested whether also temporal and linguistic information could account for the way humans explore and ultimately represent this type of maps. We quantified temporal distance as the minimum time needed to travel by train across Italian cities, while linguistic distance was retrieved from natural language through cognitively plausible AI models based on non-spatial associative learning mechanisms (i.e., distributional semantic models). In a first experiment, we show that temporal and linguistic distances capture with high-confidence real geographical distances. Next, in a second behavioral experiment, we show that linguistic information can account for human performance over and above real spatial information (which plays the major role in explaining participants' performance) in a task in which participants have to judge the distance between cities (while temporal information was found to be not relevant). These findings indicate that, when exploring maps representing large-scale environments, humans do take advantage of both perceptual and linguistic information, suggesting in turn that the formation of cognitive maps possibly relies on a strict interplay between spatial and non-spatial learning principles.

Background and objectives: Typicality asymmetry in generalization refers to enhanced fear generalization when trained with typical compared to atypical exemplars. Typical exemplars are highly representative of their category, whereas atypical exemplars are less representative. Individual risk factors, such as trait anxiety, attenuate this effect, due to the high level of threat ambiguity of atypical exemplars. Although recent research provided evidence for generalization of safety behavior, it is unclear whether this generalization also follows typicality asymmetry. This study examined (1) whether participants exhibited typicality asymmetry in the generalization of safety behavior and (2) whether this effect would be attenuated by individual risk factors, such as intolerance of uncertainty and trait anxiety.

Methods: Participants were trained with either typical (Typical group, n = 53) or atypical (Atypical group, n = 55) exemplars in a fear and avoidance conditioning procedure. Participants acquired differential conditioned fear and costly safety behavior to the threat- and safety-related exemplars. In a following Generalization Test, the degree of safety behavior to novel exemplars of the same categories was tested.

Results: The Atypical group showed greater differential safety behavior responses compared to the Typical group. Higher trait anxiety was associated with lower differential safety behavior generalization, driven by an increase in generalized responding to novel safety-related exemplars.

Limitations: This study used hypothetical cost instead of real cost.

Conclusions: Training with atypical exemplars led to greater safety behavior generalization. Moreover, individuals with high trait anxiety show impaired safety behavior generalization.

Previous research has demonstrated the presence of an effect (i.e., the spatial-numerical association of response codes or SNARC) in both numerical parity and magnitude judgment tasks in which smaller numerical magnitudes are manually responded to faster on the left side and larger numerical magnitudes on the right side. Such a result has typically been attributed to a spatially based representation of numerical magnitude in long-term memory, the format of which has recently been postulated to be positional in line with learning of a canonically ordered number sequence. As a test of this view, in the current research, participants made classification judgments involving either the size (N = 88) or the living-nonliving status (N = 114) corresponding to the names of animals/objects etc. to which no learned canonical ordering of size exists. Names were taken from a very large set of 400 animals/objects etc. and each name was presented only once in an experimental session. Responses were made using left and right manual keypresses. In this work, the relation between response time and the relative sizes of the animals/objects did not differ across the left-right side of response indicating that SNARC-like effects did not occur. As such, the results suggest that space is not an inherent aspect of the long-term representation of magnitude in the brain and that some form of positional coding of magnitude is necessary for SNARC-like effects to occur.

In grasping studies, maximum grip aperture (MGA) is commonly used as an indicator of the object size representation within the visuomotor system. However, a number of additional factors, such as movement safety, comfort, and efficiency, might affect the scaling of MGA with object size and potentially mask perceptual effects on actions. While unimanual grasping has been investigated for a wide range of object sizes, so far very small objects (<5 mm) have not been included. Investigating grasping of these tiny objects is particularly interesting because it allows us to evaluate the three most prominent explanatory accounts of grasping (the perception-action model, the digits-in-space hypothesis, and the biomechanical account) by comparing the predictions that they make for these small objects. In the first experiment, participants ( $N=26$ ) grasped and manually estimated the height of square cuboids with heights from 0.5 to 5 mm. In the second experiment, a different sample of participants ( $N=24$ ) performed the same tasks with square cuboids with heights from 5 to 20 mm. We determined MGAs, manual estimation apertures (MEA), and the corresponding just-noticeable differences (JND). In both experiments, MEAs scaled with object height and adhered to Weber's law. MGAs for grasping scaled with object height in the second experiment but not consistently in the first experiment. JNDs for grasping never scaled with object height. We argue that the digits-in-space hypothesis provides the most plausible account of the data. Furthermore, the findings highlight that the reliability of MGA as an indicator of object size is strongly task-dependent.

In basketball, an attacking player often plays a pass to one side while looking to the other side. This head fake provokes a conflict in the observing opponent, as the processing of the head orientation interferes with the processing of the pass direction. Accordingly, responses to passes with head fakes are slower and result in more errors than responses to passes without head fakes (head-fake effect). The head-fake effect and structurally similar interference effects (e.g., Stroop effect) are modulated by the frequency of conflicting trials. Previous studies mostly applied a block-wise manipulation of proportion congruency. However, in basketball (and also in other team sports), where different individual opponents can be encountered, it might be important to take the individual frequency (e.g., 20% vs. 80%) of these opponents into account. Therefore, the present study investigates the possibility to quickly (i.e., on a trial-by-trial basis) reconfigure the response behavior to different proportions of incongruent trials, which are contingent on different basketball players. Results point out that participants indeed adapted to the fake-frequency of different basketball players, which could be the result of strategic adaptation processes. Multi-level analyses, however, indicate that a substantial portion of the player-specific adaptation to fake frequencies is accounted by episodic retrieval processes, suggesting that item-specific proportion congruency effects can be explained in terms of stimulus-response binding and retrieval: The head orientation (e.g., to the right) of a current stimulus retrieves the last episode with the same head orientation including the response that was part of this last episode. Thus, from a theoretical perspective, an attacking player would provoke the strongest detrimental effect on an opponent if s/he repeats the same head movement but changes the direction of the pass. Whether it is at all possible to strategically apply this recommendation in practice needs still to be answered.

Age-related differences in mind wandering are robust, with older adults reporting less mind wandering compared to younger adults. While several theories have been put forth to explain this difference, one view has received less attention than others. Specifically, age-related differences in mind wandering might occur because older adults are reluctant to report on their mind wandering. The aim of the current study was to explicitly test this hypothesis. Older and younger adults completed a go/no-go task with intermittent thought probes to assess mind wandering. In one condition, participants were provided with standard instructions about how to respond to questions about their thoughts. In a second condition, participants were provided with a positive framing of mind wandering. Mind wandering was assessed both subjectively (i.e., via thought probes) and objectively (i.e., using different behavioral measures from the go/no-go task). The results of the study suggest that positively framing mind wandering did not impact rates of mind wandering or objective indicators of mind wandering for older or younger adults. Older adults reported less mind wandering, regardless of condition, compared to younger adults. Older adults also had generally better performance on the go/no-go task compared to younger adults. Bayesian analyses suggested that the main effect of framing condition, although not significant in Frequentist terms, did provide moderate evidence of an overall effect on mind wandering rates. We interpret the results as evidence against the reluctance hypothesis, consistent with previous work.

A fundamental limitation in the type of information that can be retained in working memory is identified in this theoretical / review article. The analysis is based on studies of skilled motor performance that were not initially conceived in terms of working memory. Findings from a long history of experimentation involving reaction time (RT) prior to making a brief motor response indicate that although the parameters representing the goal to be achieved by the response can be retained in working memory, the control code that implements timing of action components cannot. This lack of working memory requires that the "timing code" must be compiled immediately prior to the moment that it is to be utilized; it is not possible to be fully ready to respond earlier. This compiling process increases RT and may also underlie both the psychological refractory period effect and the difficulty of generating concurrent motor actions with independent timing. These conclusions extend, but do not conflict with, other models of working memory.

For the auditory dimensions loudness and pitch a vertical SARC effect (Spatial Association of Response Codes) exists: When responding to loud (high) tones, participants are faster with top-sided responses compared to bottom-sided responses and vice versa for soft (low) tones. These effects are typically explained by two different spatial representations for both dimensions with pitch being represented on a helix structure and loudness being represented as spatially associated magnitude. Prior studies show incoherent results with regard to the question whether two SARC effects can occur at the same time as well as whether SARC effects interact with each other. Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the interrelation between the SARC effect for pitch and the SARC effect for loudness in a timbre discrimination task. Participants (N = 36) heard one tone per trial and had to decide whether the presented tone was a violin tone or an organ tone by pressing a top-sided or bottom-sided response key. Loudness and pitch were varied orthogonally. We tested the occurrence of SARC effects for pitch and loudness as well as their potential interaction by conducting a multiple linear regression with difference of reaction time (dRT) as dependent variable, and loudness and pitch as predictors. Frequentist and Bayesian analyses revealed that the regression coefficients of pitch and loudness were smaller than zero indicating the simultaneous occurrence of a SARC effects for both dimensions. In contrast, the interaction coefficient was not different from zero indicating an additive effect of both predictors.

Recollecting an autobiographical memory requires a cue to initiate processes related to accessing and then elaborating on a past personal experience. Prior work has shown that the familiarity of a cue can influence the autobiographical memory retrieval process. Extending this work, we tested how familiarity accrued from cumulative lifetime exposures associated with the cue-as well as associated semantic knowledge-can affect how we access and remember autobiographical memories. In Experiment 1, we measured reaction times to access and report memories in response to cue words. In Experiment 2 we examined the details with which participants described memories in response to cue words. For both experiments, participants provided estimates of lifetime exposure and semantic knowledge for each cue. In Experiment 1, we found a cue's lifetime exposure, independent of semantic knowledge, led to quicker memory access. In Experiment 2, we found the lifetime exposure and semantic knowledge of a cue interactively affected the specificity of a described autobiographical memory. These results provide new evidence that the amount of lifetime exposure associated with a cue, both independently and interactively with semantic knowledge, influences how autobiographical memories are accessed and described.Clinical trial This was not a clinical trial.Trial Registration Number (TRN) N/A.