Psychological Research-Psychologische Forschung最新文献

William James' "stream of thought" is a key component of human cognition. Such thoughts arise in both restricted and unrestricted contexts, either with or without the presence of a secondary task. This study examines the similarities and differences in thoughts produced in these two contexts, which we call restricted and unrestricted mind wandering. Participants performed a mindfulness task representing restricted mind wandering and an unrestricted thought task where they spontaneously explored thoughts, reporting them as they arose. Participants then self-rated their thoughts based on valence, temporal orientation (past/present/future), and reality orientation (imaginary vs. real). Participants' emotional states were also evaluated using the Emotion Recall Task (ERT) and the PANAS questionnaire. Unrestricted mind wandering generated more thoughts, which were more positive and future-oriented than those in restricted mind wandering. Additionally, participants' thought valence correlated with their PANAS and ERT scores. Approximately 1 out of 4 thoughts in both restricted and unrestricted mind wandering were imaginary, with increased future orientation linked to more imaginative thought. Despite the statistical differences separating restricted and unrestricted thought, effect sizes were predominantly small, indicating that the thoughts arise during these two types of mind wandering are largely of the same kind.

Interacting with our environment happens on different levels of complexity: While there are individual and simple actions like an isolated button press, most actions are more complex and involve sequences of simpler actions. The degree to which multiple simple actions are represented as one action sequence can be measured via so-called response-response binding effects. When two or more responses are executed consecutively, they are integrated into one representation so that repetition of one response can start retrieval of the other. Executing such an action sequence typically involves responding to multiple objects or stimuli. Here, we investigated whether the spatial relation of these stimuli affects action sequence execution. To that end, we varied the distance between stimuli in a response-response binding task. Stimulus distance might affect response-response binding effects in one of two ways: It might directly affect the representation of the response sequence, making integration and retrieval between responses more likely if the responses relate to close stimuli. Alternatively, the similarity of stimulus distribution during integration and retrieval might be decisive, leading to larger binding effects if stimulus distance is identical during integration and retrieval. We found stronger binding effects with constant than with changing stimulus distance, indicating that action integration and retrieval can easily affect performance also if responses refer to separated objects. However, this effect on performance is diminished by changing spatial distribution of stimuli at the times of integration and retrieval.

Background and objectives: Typicality asymmetry in generalization refers to enhanced fear generalization when trained with typical compared to atypical exemplars. Typical exemplars are highly representative of their category, whereas atypical exemplars are less representative. Individual risk factors, such as trait anxiety, attenuate this effect, due to the high level of threat ambiguity of atypical exemplars. Although recent research provided evidence for generalization of safety behavior, it is unclear whether this generalization also follows typicality asymmetry. This study examined (1) whether participants exhibited typicality asymmetry in the generalization of safety behavior and (2) whether this effect would be attenuated by individual risk factors, such as intolerance of uncertainty and trait anxiety.

Methods: Participants were trained with either typical (Typical group, n = 53) or atypical (Atypical group, n = 55) exemplars in a fear and avoidance conditioning procedure. Participants acquired differential conditioned fear and costly safety behavior to the threat- and safety-related exemplars. In a following Generalization Test, the degree of safety behavior to novel exemplars of the same categories was tested.

Results: The Atypical group showed greater differential safety behavior responses compared to the Typical group. Higher trait anxiety was associated with lower differential safety behavior generalization, driven by an increase in generalized responding to novel safety-related exemplars.

Limitations: This study used hypothetical cost instead of real cost.

Conclusions: Training with atypical exemplars led to greater safety behavior generalization. Moreover, individuals with high trait anxiety show impaired safety behavior generalization.

When mentally exploring maps representing large-scale environments (e.g., countries or continents), humans are assumed to mainly rely on spatial information derived from direct perceptual experience (e.g., prior visual experience with the geographical map itself). In the present study, we rather tested whether also temporal and linguistic information could account for the way humans explore and ultimately represent this type of maps. We quantified temporal distance as the minimum time needed to travel by train across Italian cities, while linguistic distance was retrieved from natural language through cognitively plausible AI models based on non-spatial associative learning mechanisms (i.e., distributional semantic models). In a first experiment, we show that temporal and linguistic distances capture with high-confidence real geographical distances. Next, in a second behavioral experiment, we show that linguistic information can account for human performance over and above real spatial information (which plays the major role in explaining participants' performance) in a task in which participants have to judge the distance between cities (while temporal information was found to be not relevant). These findings indicate that, when exploring maps representing large-scale environments, humans do take advantage of both perceptual and linguistic information, suggesting in turn that the formation of cognitive maps possibly relies on a strict interplay between spatial and non-spatial learning principles.

Previous research has demonstrated the presence of an effect (i.e., the spatial-numerical association of response codes or SNARC) in both numerical parity and magnitude judgment tasks in which smaller numerical magnitudes are manually responded to faster on the left side and larger numerical magnitudes on the right side. Such a result has typically been attributed to a spatially based representation of numerical magnitude in long-term memory, the format of which has recently been postulated to be positional in line with learning of a canonically ordered number sequence. As a test of this view, in the current research, participants made classification judgments involving either the size (N = 88) or the living-nonliving status (N = 114) corresponding to the names of animals/objects etc. to which no learned canonical ordering of size exists. Names were taken from a very large set of 400 animals/objects etc. and each name was presented only once in an experimental session. Responses were made using left and right manual keypresses. In this work, the relation between response time and the relative sizes of the animals/objects did not differ across the left-right side of response indicating that SNARC-like effects did not occur. As such, the results suggest that space is not an inherent aspect of the long-term representation of magnitude in the brain and that some form of positional coding of magnitude is necessary for SNARC-like effects to occur.

In grasping studies, maximum grip aperture (MGA) is commonly used as an indicator of the object size representation within the visuomotor system. However, a number of additional factors, such as movement safety, comfort, and efficiency, might affect the scaling of MGA with object size and potentially mask perceptual effects on actions. While unimanual grasping has been investigated for a wide range of object sizes, so far very small objects (<5 mm) have not been included. Investigating grasping of these tiny objects is particularly interesting because it allows us to evaluate the three most prominent explanatory accounts of grasping (the perception-action model, the digits-in-space hypothesis, and the biomechanical account) by comparing the predictions that they make for these small objects. In the first experiment, participants ( $N=26$ ) grasped and manually estimated the height of square cuboids with heights from 0.5 to 5 mm. In the second experiment, a different sample of participants ( $N=24$ ) performed the same tasks with square cuboids with heights from 5 to 20 mm. We determined MGAs, manual estimation apertures (MEA), and the corresponding just-noticeable differences (JND). In both experiments, MEAs scaled with object height and adhered to Weber's law. MGAs for grasping scaled with object height in the second experiment but not consistently in the first experiment. JNDs for grasping never scaled with object height. We argue that the digits-in-space hypothesis provides the most plausible account of the data. Furthermore, the findings highlight that the reliability of MGA as an indicator of object size is strongly task-dependent.

In basketball, an attacking player often plays a pass to one side while looking to the other side. This head fake provokes a conflict in the observing opponent, as the processing of the head orientation interferes with the processing of the pass direction. Accordingly, responses to passes with head fakes are slower and result in more errors than responses to passes without head fakes (head-fake effect). The head-fake effect and structurally similar interference effects (e.g., Stroop effect) are modulated by the frequency of conflicting trials. Previous studies mostly applied a block-wise manipulation of proportion congruency. However, in basketball (and also in other team sports), where different individual opponents can be encountered, it might be important to take the individual frequency (e.g., 20% vs. 80%) of these opponents into account. Therefore, the present study investigates the possibility to quickly (i.e., on a trial-by-trial basis) reconfigure the response behavior to different proportions of incongruent trials, which are contingent on different basketball players. Results point out that participants indeed adapted to the fake-frequency of different basketball players, which could be the result of strategic adaptation processes. Multi-level analyses, however, indicate that a substantial portion of the player-specific adaptation to fake frequencies is accounted by episodic retrieval processes, suggesting that item-specific proportion congruency effects can be explained in terms of stimulus-response binding and retrieval: The head orientation (e.g., to the right) of a current stimulus retrieves the last episode with the same head orientation including the response that was part of this last episode. Thus, from a theoretical perspective, an attacking player would provoke the strongest detrimental effect on an opponent if s/he repeats the same head movement but changes the direction of the pass. Whether it is at all possible to strategically apply this recommendation in practice needs still to be answered.

Age-related differences in mind wandering are robust, with older adults reporting less mind wandering compared to younger adults. While several theories have been put forth to explain this difference, one view has received less attention than others. Specifically, age-related differences in mind wandering might occur because older adults are reluctant to report on their mind wandering. The aim of the current study was to explicitly test this hypothesis. Older and younger adults completed a go/no-go task with intermittent thought probes to assess mind wandering. In one condition, participants were provided with standard instructions about how to respond to questions about their thoughts. In a second condition, participants were provided with a positive framing of mind wandering. Mind wandering was assessed both subjectively (i.e., via thought probes) and objectively (i.e., using different behavioral measures from the go/no-go task). The results of the study suggest that positively framing mind wandering did not impact rates of mind wandering or objective indicators of mind wandering for older or younger adults. Older adults reported less mind wandering, regardless of condition, compared to younger adults. Older adults also had generally better performance on the go/no-go task compared to younger adults. Bayesian analyses suggested that the main effect of framing condition, although not significant in Frequentist terms, did provide moderate evidence of an overall effect on mind wandering rates. We interpret the results as evidence against the reluctance hypothesis, consistent with previous work.