Psychological Research-Psychologische Forschung最新文献

Human beings are able to imagine actions with the aim to change movement coordination and to learn particular movements. Meta-analyses to date have shown that when individuals systematically engage in imagery of a motor action without overt behavior this can improve motor performance and facilitate motor learning. Despite a considerable body of research in neuroscience, psychology, and sport science, however, there is at present no consensus on the neurocognitive mechanisms of imagery, and the mechanisms that lead to learning via imagined action are still being debated. In particular, the differences between imagined and overt action, and respective learning effects, remain to be fully explained. The present collection of manuscripts is a result of compiling both theoretical advances in the field of motor control and motor learning and those in imagery research to better understand imagery and learning. It is structured alongside five position papers from leading experts in the field, each of which is followed by a series of short commentaries written by experts from various disciplines. This collection demonstrates (a) that conceptualizations of imagery are manifold, vary highly and depend on the perspective chosen, (b) that existing approaches to the neurocognitive mechanisms of imagery and imagery practice of motor actions draw on distinct motor control and learning perspectives, (c) that perspectives from the wider fields of motor control and learning stimulate new approaches to explain imagery and imagery practice, (d) and that future research is needed to investigate and compare different perspectives and conceptualizations of the neurocognitive mechanisms of imagery and imagery practice of motor actions.

Not applicable.

Bach (Psychological Research 2022, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-022-01773-w ) offer a re-conceptualisation of motor imagery, influenced by older ideas of ideomotor action and formulated in terms of action effects rather than motor output. We share the view of an essential role of action effect in action planning and motor imagery processes, but we challenge the claim that motor imagery is non-motoric in nature. In the present article, we critically review some of Bach et al.'s proposed ideas and pose questions of whether effect and motor processes are functionally separable, and if not, what mechanisms underlie motor imagery and what terminology best captures its function.

Bach, Frank, and Kunde introduce a hypothesis that encompasses two main claims: (1) motor imagery relies primarily on representations of the perceptual effects of actions, and (2) the engagement of motor resources provides access to the specific timing, kinematic or internal bodily state that characterize an action. In this commentary, I argue that the first claim is compelling and suggest some alternatives to the second one.

Modifications of imagined sensory consequences will not benefit overt performance when they cannot be transformed into motor outflow that produces them. With physical practice, the acquisition of internal models of motor transformations is largely based on prediction errors that are absent in imagery practice. What can imagery practice nevertheless contribute to transformation learning? Explicit, strategic adjustments to novel transformations should be possible. This appears less likely for implicit adjustments. Are there variants of imagery practice that can produce adjustments without conscious awareness of the transformation and/or the resultant movement changes?

This study investigated the temporal dynamics of task performance and voluntary task choice within a multitasking paradigm in which the task-related processing outcomes themselves determined the to-be-performed task. In the novel forced-no-go trials, the stimulus for one task required an overt response, but the stimulus for the other task was associated with a no-go response. Task performance results showed that participants often processed the no-go task's stimulus before switching to the go-task. Dual-task interference effects and switch costs indicated various forms of multitasking interference, with their underlying causes appearing to overlap, as engagement in parallel processing seemed to be limited by switch-related reconfiguration processes. Intermixing free-choice trials, where both stimuli were associated with overt responses, revealed costs associated with switching between processing modes, providing new evidence that the distinctions between free and forced task goals stem from differences in their internal representations rather than alterations in processing due to different presentations in the environment. Task choice results align with this perspective, demonstrating a preference for repeating a free- over a forced-choice task. Furthermore, these free-choice results illuminate the interplay of cognitive (task-repetition bias) and environmental constraints (first-task bias) in shaping task choices: It appears that task-specific information increases goal activations for both task goals concurrently, with participants favoring central processing of the second- over the first-presented task to optimize their behavior when shorter central processing is required (task repetition). Overall, this study offers new insights into the dynamics of task processing and choice in environments requiring the balance of multiple tasks.

William James' "stream of thought" is a key component of human cognition. Such thoughts arise in both restricted and unrestricted contexts, either with or without the presence of a secondary task. This study examines the similarities and differences in thoughts produced in these two contexts, which we call restricted and unrestricted mind wandering. Participants performed a mindfulness task representing restricted mind wandering and an unrestricted thought task where they spontaneously explored thoughts, reporting them as they arose. Participants then self-rated their thoughts based on valence, temporal orientation (past/present/future), and reality orientation (imaginary vs. real). Participants' emotional states were also evaluated using the Emotion Recall Task (ERT) and the PANAS questionnaire. Unrestricted mind wandering generated more thoughts, which were more positive and future-oriented than those in restricted mind wandering. Additionally, participants' thought valence correlated with their PANAS and ERT scores. Approximately 1 out of 4 thoughts in both restricted and unrestricted mind wandering were imaginary, with increased future orientation linked to more imaginative thought. Despite the statistical differences separating restricted and unrestricted thought, effect sizes were predominantly small, indicating that the thoughts arise during these two types of mind wandering are largely of the same kind.

Interacting with our environment happens on different levels of complexity: While there are individual and simple actions like an isolated button press, most actions are more complex and involve sequences of simpler actions. The degree to which multiple simple actions are represented as one action sequence can be measured via so-called response-response binding effects. When two or more responses are executed consecutively, they are integrated into one representation so that repetition of one response can start retrieval of the other. Executing such an action sequence typically involves responding to multiple objects or stimuli. Here, we investigated whether the spatial relation of these stimuli affects action sequence execution. To that end, we varied the distance between stimuli in a response-response binding task. Stimulus distance might affect response-response binding effects in one of two ways: It might directly affect the representation of the response sequence, making integration and retrieval between responses more likely if the responses relate to close stimuli. Alternatively, the similarity of stimulus distribution during integration and retrieval might be decisive, leading to larger binding effects if stimulus distance is identical during integration and retrieval. We found stronger binding effects with constant than with changing stimulus distance, indicating that action integration and retrieval can easily affect performance also if responses refer to separated objects. However, this effect on performance is diminished by changing spatial distribution of stimuli at the times of integration and retrieval.