Psychological Research-Psychologische Forschung最新文献

Frank et al.'s (2023) perceptual-cognitive scaffold meaningfully extends the cognitive action architecture approach and we support this interdisciplinary advancement. However, there are theoretical and applied aspects that could be further developed within this research to maximise practical impact across domains such as sport. In particular, there is a need to consider how these mechanisms (1) might critically inform or relate to other prominent theories within sport (e.g., constrained action hypothesis and ecological approaches) and, (2) reflect the real-world challenges experienced by athletes. With these ideas in mind, this commentary aims to stimulate discussion and enhance the translational application of Frank et al.'s research.

The mechanism through which motor imagery practice improves motor performance remains unclear. In this special issue, Rieger et al. propose a model to explain why motor imagery practice improves motor performance. According to their model, motor imagery involves a comparison between intended and predicted action effects, allowing for the modification of the internal model upon detecting errors. I believe that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is a candidate as a brain region responsible for comparing intended and predicted action effects. Evidence supports this hypothesis, as a previous study has observed error-related activity in the ACC preceding incorrect responses (i.e., commission errors) in the Go/No-go task (Bediou et al., 2012, Neuroimage). Therefore, the error-related activity can be induced without any feedback. This fact also sheds light on the mechanisms of brain-computer interface. I believe that this additional literature will enhance Rieger's model.

In a recent Psychological Research article, Eaves et al. (2022) review the literature on how motor imagery (MI) practice combined with action observation (AO) enhances motor performance. The authors propose that the synchronous form of AO and MI (AOMI) affords unique benefits to performance that are not possible when the two interventions are performed asynchronously. We discuss three questions raised by Eaves et al.'s review: (1) are there any clear advantages to synchronous AOMI? (2) Are there super-additive benefits to AOMI, and if so, are they unique to synchronous AOMI? (3) How might coordinative AOMI, in which people imagine complementary actions, facilitate joint actions?

In a recent article entitled "Why motor imagery is not really motoric: towards a re-conceptualization in terms of effect-based action control", Bach et al. nicely renewed the concept of motor equivalence between actual movement and motor imagery (MI), i.e. the mental simulation of an action without its corresponding motor output. Their approach is largely based on behavioral studies and, to a lesser extent, on the literature using cerebral imagery. However, the literature on cortico-spinal circuitry modulation during MI can provide further, interesting aspects. Indeed, when it comes to addressing the motor system, one should consider the whole path from brain region to muscle contraction, including sub-cortical structures such as the spinal circuitry. This commentary aims at bridging this gap by providing supplemental evidence and outlining a complementary approach.

In their article, Frank and colleagues review the effectiveness of motor imagery in learning motor skills, proposing a perceptual-cognitive theory that may facilitate learning. Imagery effectiveness could be enhanced by different techniques, influencing neurophysiological processes. Identifying individuals who could benefit from MI is crucial, and incorporating MI into strong motor representations may lead to better outcomes. Combining MI with other treatments like virtual reality and brain stimulation can further enhance its effectiveness. The purpose of this commentary is to analyze these interventions in light of their potential to influence perceptual-cognitive states in order to strengthen imagery practice and achieve the desired outcomes.

Our comment emphasizes the multisensory guidance of mental training processes as pointed out by Krüger et al. 2022. Guided multisensory mental training can focus on different aspects of action performance and gradually increase the vividness of the mental construct. The authors previously described an interaction between neural representation, subjective experience, and training gain. To enrich the subjective experience of the mental process, the establishment and testing of different guided mental training procedures are discussed.

It is well accepted that repeatedly imagining oneself acting without any overt behavior can lead to learning. The prominent theory accounting for why imagery practice is effective, motor simulation theory, posits that imagined action and overt action are functionally equivalent, the exception being activation of the end effector. If, as motor simulation theory states, one can compile the goal, plan, motor program and outcome of an action during imagined action similar to overt action, then learning of novel skills via imagery should proceed in a manner equivalent to that of overt action. While the evidence on motor simulation theory is both plentiful and diverse, it does not explicitly account for differences in neural and behavioural findings between imagined and overt action. In this position paper, we briefly review theoretical accounts to date and present a perceptual-cognitive theory that accounts for often observed outcomes of imagery practice. We suggest that learning by way of imagery reflects perceptual-cognitive scaffolding, and that this 'perceptual' learning transfers into 'motor' learning (or not) depending on various factors. Based on this theory, we characterize consistently reported learning effects that occur with imagery practice, against the background of well-known physical practice effects and show that perceptual-cognitive scaffolding is well-suited to explain what is being learnt during imagery practice.

Overt and imagined action seem inextricably linked. Both have similar timing, activate shared brain circuits, and motor imagery influences overt action and vice versa. Motor imagery is, therefore, often assumed to recruit the same motor processes that govern action execution, and which allow one to play through or simulate actions offline. Here, we advance a very different conceptualization. Accordingly, the links between imagery and overt action do not arise because action imagery is intrinsically motoric, but because action planning is intrinsically imaginistic and occurs in terms of the perceptual effects one want to achieve. Seen like this, the term 'motor imagery' is a misnomer of what is more appropriately portrayed as 'effect imagery'. In this article, we review the long-standing arguments for effect-based accounts of action, which are often ignored in motor imagery research. We show that such views provide a straightforward account of motor imagery. We review the evidence for imagery-execution overlaps through this new lens and argue that they indeed emerge because every action we execute is planned, initiated and controlled through an imagery-like process. We highlight findings that this new view can now explain and point out open questions.

A vast body of research suggests that the primary motor cortex is involved in motor imagery. This raises the issue of inhibition: how is it possible for motor imagery not to lead to motor execution? Bach et al. (Psychol Res Psychol Forschung. 10.1007/s00426-022-01773-w, 2022, this issue) suggest that the motor execution threshold may be "upregulated" during motor imagery to prevent execution. Alternatively, it has been proposed that, in parallel to excitatory mechanisms, inhibitory mechanisms may be actively suppressing motor output during motor imagery. These theories are verbal in nature, with well-known limitations. Here, we describe a toy-model of the inhibitory mechanisms thought to be at play during motor imagery to start disentangling predictions from competing hypotheses.

In this commentary on Rieger et al., Psychological Research Psychologische Forschung, 2023, I discuss possible ways to test the hypothesis that action imagery is achieved by simulations of actions through an internal forward model. These include brain imaging, perturbation through TMS, and psychophysical tests of adaptation of intended reach actions.