Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2268459
Marte Winsvold, Atle Haugsgjerd, Jo Saglie, Signe Bock Segaard
High political trust is often interpreted as a sign of good democratic health, and widespread distrust as a sign of democratic ill health. However, there is little knowledge about the basis on which people make assessments about whether to trust or distrust political actors. This article develops and applies a typology for political trust judgement. Through a content analysis of 1,105 open-ended survey questions about political trust and distrust, the study finds that people tend to assess (dis)trust of politicians based on whether they see the politicians as predictable, intrinsically committed, competent and responsive. Moreover, the study finds that citizens use different judgement bases to describe trust and distrust, suggesting that the two concepts are not pure negations of each other. While predictability is the most frequently reported basis for trusting politicians, a lack of intrinsic commitment is the most frequently reported basis for distrusting politicians. This article discusses the reasons for and implications of the apparently different bases for weighing judgements on trust and distrust.
{"title":"What makes people trust or distrust politicians? Insights from open-ended survey questions","authors":"Marte Winsvold, Atle Haugsgjerd, Jo Saglie, Signe Bock Segaard","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2268459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2268459","url":null,"abstract":"High political trust is often interpreted as a sign of good democratic health, and widespread distrust as a sign of democratic ill health. However, there is little knowledge about the basis on which people make assessments about whether to trust or distrust political actors. This article develops and applies a typology for political trust judgement. Through a content analysis of 1,105 open-ended survey questions about political trust and distrust, the study finds that people tend to assess (dis)trust of politicians based on whether they see the politicians as predictable, intrinsically committed, competent and responsive. Moreover, the study finds that citizens use different judgement bases to describe trust and distrust, suggesting that the two concepts are not pure negations of each other. While predictability is the most frequently reported basis for trusting politicians, a lack of intrinsic commitment is the most frequently reported basis for distrusting politicians. This article discusses the reasons for and implications of the apparently different bases for weighing judgements on trust and distrust.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"66 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135933796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-26DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2264717
Anna Kyriazi, Argyrios Altiparmakis, Joseph Ganderson, Joan Miró
A surprising feature of Brexit has been the united front the EU-27 presented during post-referendum negotiations. This membership crisis arrived when the EU had been facing multiple overlapping political and economic crises revealing deep cleavages both between and within member states. How did negotiations prevent a widening politicisation of European integration? In this article a novel dataset is used, containing national and European newspaper Brexit coverage between 2016 and 2020 to establish how negotiating stances were formed in key EU institutions and five influential member states: Ireland, Spain, France, Germany and Poland. The results indicate that the European Commission could maintain a strong, centralised negotiating position over Brexit because the preferences of these member states were mutually inclusive, their negotiating stances aligned, and each national case was subject to generally low levels of domestic politicisation. As a result, while Brexit shocked the EU, its immediate fallout could be contained even during uncertain times.
{"title":"Quiet unity: salience, politicisation and togetherness in the EU’s Brexit negotiating position","authors":"Anna Kyriazi, Argyrios Altiparmakis, Joseph Ganderson, Joan Miró","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2264717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2264717","url":null,"abstract":"A surprising feature of Brexit has been the united front the EU-27 presented during post-referendum negotiations. This membership crisis arrived when the EU had been facing multiple overlapping political and economic crises revealing deep cleavages both between and within member states. How did negotiations prevent a widening politicisation of European integration? In this article a novel dataset is used, containing national and European newspaper Brexit coverage between 2016 and 2020 to establish how negotiating stances were formed in key EU institutions and five influential member states: Ireland, Spain, France, Germany and Poland. The results indicate that the European Commission could maintain a strong, centralised negotiating position over Brexit because the preferences of these member states were mutually inclusive, their negotiating stances aligned, and each national case was subject to generally low levels of domestic politicisation. As a result, while Brexit shocked the EU, its immediate fallout could be contained even during uncertain times.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136377330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-24DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2261085
Rubén García del Horno, Guillem Rico, Enrique Hernández
Rural areas have often been labelled by the literature as ‘left-behind’ areas or ‘places that don’t matter’, implicitly suggesting that residents of these communities feel neglected by political elites. This article studies the rural-urban divide in external political efficacy, which reflects individuals’ beliefs about the responsiveness of political elites, while also examining if compositional and contextual factors can explain such a divide. Drawing on data from the European Social Survey, the results reveal a significant rural-urban gap in external efficacy, which is partly explained by differences in the sociodemographic characteristics of rural and urban dwellers, but not by disparities in their evaluation of the provision of basic public services. Notably, this rural-urban gap in external efficacy is substantively smaller in those countries with higher levels of electoral malapportionment that lead to an overrepresentation of rural areas in national parliaments.
{"title":"Do they feel like they don’t matter? The rural-urban divide in external political efficacy","authors":"Rubén García del Horno, Guillem Rico, Enrique Hernández","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2261085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2261085","url":null,"abstract":"Rural areas have often been labelled by the literature as ‘left-behind’ areas or ‘places that don’t matter’, implicitly suggesting that residents of these communities feel neglected by political elites. This article studies the rural-urban divide in external political efficacy, which reflects individuals’ beliefs about the responsiveness of political elites, while also examining if compositional and contextual factors can explain such a divide. Drawing on data from the European Social Survey, the results reveal a significant rural-urban gap in external efficacy, which is partly explained by differences in the sociodemographic characteristics of rural and urban dwellers, but not by disparities in their evaluation of the provision of basic public services. Notably, this rural-urban gap in external efficacy is substantively smaller in those countries with higher levels of electoral malapportionment that lead to an overrepresentation of rural areas in national parliaments.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"25 9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135315982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2257963
Asya Zhelyazkova, Eva Thomann, Eva Ruffing, Sebastiaan Princen
This special issue analyses the patterns, causes and consequences of Differentiated Policy Implementation (DPI) in the European Union (EU). DPI is an umbrella term for the diversity in the presence and use of discretion during legal and practical policy implementation processes and outcomes in the EU. The emergent DPI research agenda emphasises differentiation in EU policy implementation beyond mere legal compliance, which is more widespread, and its role in the broader political and policy processes of EU multilevel governance. The contributions highlight anticipated implementation as one dimension of DPI, as well as legal and practical implementation. DPI serves as an alternative to differentiated integration (DI), accommodating heterogeneous national preferences, capacities and conditions, and feeding back into EU policy-making. The impact of DPI on the EU’s output legitimacy and effectiveness depends on scope conditions that require more scholarly attention.
{"title":"Differentiated policy implementation in the European Union","authors":"Asya Zhelyazkova, Eva Thomann, Eva Ruffing, Sebastiaan Princen","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2257963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2257963","url":null,"abstract":"This special issue analyses the patterns, causes and consequences of Differentiated Policy Implementation (DPI) in the European Union (EU). DPI is an umbrella term for the diversity in the presence and use of discretion during legal and practical policy implementation processes and outcomes in the EU. The emergent DPI research agenda emphasises differentiation in EU policy implementation beyond mere legal compliance, which is more widespread, and its role in the broader political and policy processes of EU multilevel governance. The contributions highlight anticipated implementation as one dimension of DPI, as well as legal and practical implementation. DPI serves as an alternative to differentiated integration (DI), accommodating heterogeneous national preferences, capacities and conditions, and feeding back into EU policy-making. The impact of DPI on the EU’s output legitimacy and effectiveness depends on scope conditions that require more scholarly attention.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135993046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-02DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2258030
Nicolas Bicchi, Javier Arregui
AbstractTo what extent does being aligned in EU negotiations predict favourable outcomes for the Southern Euro countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) in Council of the EU negotiations? This article attempts to answer this question by leveraging data from the DEU (Decision-Making in the European Union) dataset, and comparing this group of countries to two other well-established alliances at the EU level: the Nordics and the Visegrad Four. Results indicate that the Southern alliance generally lacks cohesion compared to the other groups, but when it is able to find a coherent position, it becomes more effective in obtaining its members’ desired legislative outcomes. Preliminary evidence also suggests that this effect occurs because aligning gives groups of countries more voting power, and because their social capital makes them more effective in negotiations.Keywords: European Unionlegislative bargainingCouncil of the EUbargaining satisfaction Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 This study, in accordance with Arregui’s (Citation2016) arguments, uses the terms ‘bargaining satisfaction’ or ‘bargaining utility’ as opposed to ‘success’.2 Given that we are interested in legislative bargaining, it is natural for us to focus on the systemic level, but readers should be aware that Peterson (Citation1995) identifies two further levels of decision making in the EU, i.e. the ‘super-systemic’ (which includes history-making decisions shaping the procedures and institutions of the EU) and ‘sub-systemic’ (which includes the more technocratic decisions about implementation) levels. The analyses from this article should not be applied to these other levels, as dynamics are likely to be very different.3 To our knowledge, no contribution to date has demonstrated that the Southern countries obtain especially negative outcomes in the Council. However, there is some evidence of a negative reputation for some Mediterranean MSs, usually obtained through expert interviews (e.g. Bailer Citation2004). It could also be speculated that the Southern countries under-perform in terms of network capital (see Naurin Citation2007 or Naurin and Lindahl Citation2008), but the evidence is tenuous.4 Importantly, preference alignment and cooperation are not one and the same. Indeed, having similar preferences does not necessarily imply cooperating (or in other words actively working together) to reach a mutually beneficial outcome. On the other hand, actors may, due to power politics considerations, elect to cooperate with others that they are not necessarily fully aligned with. Our three groups of countries constitute ‘preference’ or ‘policy’ networks, as they are found to often have similar positions on issues (e.g. Thomson Citation2009), but it has to be said that they also tend to indicate each other to be important cooperation partners (e.g. Naurin and Lindahl Citation2008). They can therefore be considered true alliances.5 T
{"title":"Preference cohesion and bargaining satisfaction among Southern EU member states: a comparative perspective","authors":"Nicolas Bicchi, Javier Arregui","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2258030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2258030","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractTo what extent does being aligned in EU negotiations predict favourable outcomes for the Southern Euro countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) in Council of the EU negotiations? This article attempts to answer this question by leveraging data from the DEU (Decision-Making in the European Union) dataset, and comparing this group of countries to two other well-established alliances at the EU level: the Nordics and the Visegrad Four. Results indicate that the Southern alliance generally lacks cohesion compared to the other groups, but when it is able to find a coherent position, it becomes more effective in obtaining its members’ desired legislative outcomes. Preliminary evidence also suggests that this effect occurs because aligning gives groups of countries more voting power, and because their social capital makes them more effective in negotiations.Keywords: European Unionlegislative bargainingCouncil of the EUbargaining satisfaction Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 This study, in accordance with Arregui’s (Citation2016) arguments, uses the terms ‘bargaining satisfaction’ or ‘bargaining utility’ as opposed to ‘success’.2 Given that we are interested in legislative bargaining, it is natural for us to focus on the systemic level, but readers should be aware that Peterson (Citation1995) identifies two further levels of decision making in the EU, i.e. the ‘super-systemic’ (which includes history-making decisions shaping the procedures and institutions of the EU) and ‘sub-systemic’ (which includes the more technocratic decisions about implementation) levels. The analyses from this article should not be applied to these other levels, as dynamics are likely to be very different.3 To our knowledge, no contribution to date has demonstrated that the Southern countries obtain especially negative outcomes in the Council. However, there is some evidence of a negative reputation for some Mediterranean MSs, usually obtained through expert interviews (e.g. Bailer Citation2004). It could also be speculated that the Southern countries under-perform in terms of network capital (see Naurin Citation2007 or Naurin and Lindahl Citation2008), but the evidence is tenuous.4 Importantly, preference alignment and cooperation are not one and the same. Indeed, having similar preferences does not necessarily imply cooperating (or in other words actively working together) to reach a mutually beneficial outcome. On the other hand, actors may, due to power politics considerations, elect to cooperate with others that they are not necessarily fully aligned with. Our three groups of countries constitute ‘preference’ or ‘policy’ networks, as they are found to often have similar positions on issues (e.g. Thomson Citation2009), but it has to be said that they also tend to indicate each other to be important cooperation partners (e.g. Naurin and Lindahl Citation2008). They can therefore be considered true alliances.5 T","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135896005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-25DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2254637
Marie Kübler
AbstractThe rise of right-wing populist parties in Western democracies has led to a renewed interest in theories concerning class-based voting. It is argued that traditional workers’ parties are increasingly being challenged over the working-class vote by the populist radical right because they are perceived as being too culturally liberal for their own electorate. However, while it is established that the views of traditional parties are often incongruent with those of workers, it is not yet clear whether right-wing populist parties fare any better in this regard. Using many-to-many congruence, this article compares the preferences of different social classes and MPs in the 2017 German Federal Election. Three notable findings emerge. First, opinion gaps vary greatly across issues, and occupational groups do not hold fundamentally different views. Second, there are nonetheless significant congruence gaps at the expense of workers. Third, neither left-wing parties’ MPs nor the right-wing populist AfD MPs provide a good fit for workers’ opinions.Keywords: Representationpolicy congruencepolitical partiespolitical inequalityworking class Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Although the term ‘left-authoritarian’ can be misleading, I follow the literature cited here and use the term to describe a combination of left-wing economic and conservative cultural positions. In this article, the term does not refer to general authoritarian or anti-democratic attitudes.2 Results can be found in the online appendix.3 Although Golder and Stramski (Citation2010) originally recommended using cumulative frequencies, I follow Andeweg (Citation2011) and Schakel and Hakhverdian (Citation2018) by using probability distribution functions.4 As previously described, I use a bootstrapping technique and work with estimated rather than simple congruence calculations in the following analysis.Additional informationNotes on contributorsMarie KüblerMarie Kübler is a doctoral candidate at the Department of Political Science, University of Mainz. Her research focuses on political representation. [kuebler@politik.uni-mainz.de]
{"title":"Who speaks for manual workers? Unequal congruence in the 2017 German Federal Election","authors":"Marie Kübler","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2254637","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2254637","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThe rise of right-wing populist parties in Western democracies has led to a renewed interest in theories concerning class-based voting. It is argued that traditional workers’ parties are increasingly being challenged over the working-class vote by the populist radical right because they are perceived as being too culturally liberal for their own electorate. However, while it is established that the views of traditional parties are often incongruent with those of workers, it is not yet clear whether right-wing populist parties fare any better in this regard. Using many-to-many congruence, this article compares the preferences of different social classes and MPs in the 2017 German Federal Election. Three notable findings emerge. First, opinion gaps vary greatly across issues, and occupational groups do not hold fundamentally different views. Second, there are nonetheless significant congruence gaps at the expense of workers. Third, neither left-wing parties’ MPs nor the right-wing populist AfD MPs provide a good fit for workers’ opinions.Keywords: Representationpolicy congruencepolitical partiespolitical inequalityworking class Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Although the term ‘left-authoritarian’ can be misleading, I follow the literature cited here and use the term to describe a combination of left-wing economic and conservative cultural positions. In this article, the term does not refer to general authoritarian or anti-democratic attitudes.2 Results can be found in the online appendix.3 Although Golder and Stramski (Citation2010) originally recommended using cumulative frequencies, I follow Andeweg (Citation2011) and Schakel and Hakhverdian (Citation2018) by using probability distribution functions.4 As previously described, I use a bootstrapping technique and work with estimated rather than simple congruence calculations in the following analysis.Additional informationNotes on contributorsMarie KüblerMarie Kübler is a doctoral candidate at the Department of Political Science, University of Mainz. Her research focuses on political representation. [kuebler@politik.uni-mainz.de]","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135816197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-19DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2252698
Eroll Kuhn, Rahsaan Maxwell
AbstractEuropean countries are struggling with the largest inflows of asylum seekers since World War II, with ongoing debates about how best to promote asylum seeker integration. This article presents evidence from Germany which suggests asylum seekers feel more welcome when living in counties with more foreign-born residents. This relationship is stronger when asylum seekers and foreign-born residents have similar origins. Among Syrian asylum seekers, larger percentages of co-national residents are especially important. These findings have numerous implications that broaden our understanding of asylum seeker integration and engage debates about how to design asylum seeker reception policies. This article also contributes to broader debates about the relationship between geographic context and social and political attitudes.Keywords: Asylum seekerGermanyEuropemigrant integrationcontextual effects AcknowledgementsPrevious versions were presented at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the European University Institute, Aarhus University, the University of Copenhagen, the University of Sussex, the American Political Science Association annual conference, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of California, Berkeley, Sciences Po, Harvard University, University College London, the University of California San Diego, the University of Amsterdam, and New York University. The authors would like to thank participants at each venue for excellent feedback that improved the article.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Replication materialReplication materials for this article is available at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HZVI6INotes1 Ukrainian asylum seekers were more likely than Syrians to leave Western Europe and return home after a few months. Even so, there was a large influx of Ukrainian asylum seekers in 2022, and at the time of writing, their integration prospects remain uncertain.2 The underlying causal mechanism behind this relationship is an ongoing source of debate. Exposure to foreign-origin residents may make people who live in those communities more supportive of multiculturalism. However, people who support multiculturalism may select into communities with more foreign-origin residents.3 See http://www.bamf.de for an overview. See German Asylum Act (09.02.2008, last amended 03.11.2016) for full law.4 Respondents were able to choose from seven languages to conduct their interview, and translation was facilitated by a computer-assisted personal interviewing device (CAPI) – and a translation hot-line if necessary.5 State fixed effects account for the federal structure of German government, including potential differences in reception and processing of asylum seekers across states. Year fixed effects account for any differences in asylum reception dynamics between 2016 and 2017.6 After Syrians (N = 1946), Afghans (N = 446) are the second largest national-origin group in the s
{"title":"Asylum seekers feel more welcome in counties with more foreign-born residents","authors":"Eroll Kuhn, Rahsaan Maxwell","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2252698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2252698","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractEuropean countries are struggling with the largest inflows of asylum seekers since World War II, with ongoing debates about how best to promote asylum seeker integration. This article presents evidence from Germany which suggests asylum seekers feel more welcome when living in counties with more foreign-born residents. This relationship is stronger when asylum seekers and foreign-born residents have similar origins. Among Syrian asylum seekers, larger percentages of co-national residents are especially important. These findings have numerous implications that broaden our understanding of asylum seeker integration and engage debates about how to design asylum seeker reception policies. This article also contributes to broader debates about the relationship between geographic context and social and political attitudes.Keywords: Asylum seekerGermanyEuropemigrant integrationcontextual effects AcknowledgementsPrevious versions were presented at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the European University Institute, Aarhus University, the University of Copenhagen, the University of Sussex, the American Political Science Association annual conference, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of California, Berkeley, Sciences Po, Harvard University, University College London, the University of California San Diego, the University of Amsterdam, and New York University. The authors would like to thank participants at each venue for excellent feedback that improved the article.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Replication materialReplication materials for this article is available at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HZVI6INotes1 Ukrainian asylum seekers were more likely than Syrians to leave Western Europe and return home after a few months. Even so, there was a large influx of Ukrainian asylum seekers in 2022, and at the time of writing, their integration prospects remain uncertain.2 The underlying causal mechanism behind this relationship is an ongoing source of debate. Exposure to foreign-origin residents may make people who live in those communities more supportive of multiculturalism. However, people who support multiculturalism may select into communities with more foreign-origin residents.3 See http://www.bamf.de for an overview. See German Asylum Act (09.02.2008, last amended 03.11.2016) for full law.4 Respondents were able to choose from seven languages to conduct their interview, and translation was facilitated by a computer-assisted personal interviewing device (CAPI) – and a translation hot-line if necessary.5 State fixed effects account for the federal structure of German government, including potential differences in reception and processing of asylum seekers across states. Year fixed effects account for any differences in asylum reception dynamics between 2016 and 2017.6 After Syrians (N = 1946), Afghans (N = 446) are the second largest national-origin group in the s","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135060776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-13DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2249316
Wolfgang C. Müller, Hanna Bäck, Johan Hellström
In parliamentary democracies, elections distribute the seats in parliament, but who gets into government and determines the policy agenda over the course of the legislative term is decided upon after the elections, in negotiations between the political parties. This introduction to the special issue discusses research concerning dynamic approaches to coalition governments. A dynamic approach implies that what happens at the electoral stage influences the government formation stage, which in turn shapes what happens during the government’s tenure, which may influence the cabinet’s durability. Hence, this type of research tries to analyse various stages of a government’s ‘life cycle’ from its ‘birth’ to its ‘death’ as interdependent processes, rather than examining them in mutual isolation. These processes may be restricted to the confines of a self-contained universe of politicians and political parties, or they may involve ‘external’ events, such as, for example, elections, or the state of the economy. In addition to having a dynamic approach to analysing coalitions, the contributions in the special issue use brand-new comparative data from several independent research projects investigating various aspects of coalition politics.
{"title":"Coalition dynamics: advances in the study of the coalition life cycle","authors":"Wolfgang C. Müller, Hanna Bäck, Johan Hellström","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2249316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2249316","url":null,"abstract":"In parliamentary democracies, elections distribute the seats in parliament, but who gets into government and determines the policy agenda over the course of the legislative term is decided upon after the elections, in negotiations between the political parties. This introduction to the special issue discusses research concerning dynamic approaches to coalition governments. A dynamic approach implies that what happens at the electoral stage influences the government formation stage, which in turn shapes what happens during the government’s tenure, which may influence the cabinet’s durability. Hence, this type of research tries to analyse various stages of a government’s ‘life cycle’ from its ‘birth’ to its ‘death’ as interdependent processes, rather than examining them in mutual isolation. These processes may be restricted to the confines of a self-contained universe of politicians and political parties, or they may involve ‘external’ events, such as, for example, elections, or the state of the economy. In addition to having a dynamic approach to analysing coalitions, the contributions in the special issue use brand-new comparative data from several independent research projects investigating various aspects of coalition politics.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135741912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-13DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2253514
Kaitlin Alper, Caroline Marie Lancaster
AbstractRadical right parties have grown in popularity recently, leaning heavily on state-level nationalism, anti-immigrant sentiment and the promise of a homogenous nation state. There has also recently been increased devolution of power to subnational communities, who historically have resisted homogenisation and infringements on their autonomy. This implies a tension between the interests of subnational units and those of radical right parties. Using data from the 2016 and 2018 European Social Surveys and a new measure of regional identity strength constructed from the Regionalist Parties Dataset (Massetti and Schakel Citation2016) for 10 European countries, this study shows that people living in regions with strong legacies of regionalism are less attached to their national state. Second, the article demonstrates regional identity strength is negatively associated with voting for radical right parties due to their opposition to radical right parties’ exclusive state-level nationalism. Lastly, this relationship can eclipse the effect of immigration attitudes on vote choice as radical right parties’ rhetoric around immigration generally focuses on the importance of cultural homogeneity. Evidence supporting these hypotheses is found using both cross-national data and case evidence from Italy. This study underscores the importance of examining the role older social cleavages play in structuring party politics in the transnational era.Keywords: Party politicscleavage theoryregional identitymultilevel governanceradical right parties AcknowledgementsWe would like to give special thanks to Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Christina Zuber, Sean T. Norton, David Attewell, John D. Stephens, Evelyne Huber, and the three anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments on various drafts of this manuscript. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Comparative Politics working group at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where we received valuable feedback from our colleagues at the department.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.Notes1 Massetti and Schakel's (Citation2016) database also includes three ‘controversial cases’ which are parties that have some association with a national party but which acts sufficiently independently as to be classified as a regionalist party for the purposes of their dataset. These are the CSU in the German region of Bavaria, the UPN in the Spanish region of Navarre, and the UUP in the UK region of Northern Ireland.2 This mirrors the strategies of nation-builders during the era of state consolidation, who, as noted previously, frequently co-opted symbols of regional identity and subsumed them into a broader, constructed national identity (Giordano and Roller Citation2001; Pasquier Citation2015). Similarly, modern radical right parties sometimes make claims that those peripheral cultures are in fact ‘purer’ expressions of a broader, unifying statewide id
不同的NUTS水平可能对应于不同国家理论上和/或实际上“有用”的领土单位/地区(例如，NUTS 1级对应于德国Länder，而NUTS 2级对应于奥地利Länder)。此外，ESS和其他调查可能在不同国家使用不同的NUTS水平。在我们的分析中，我们根据ESS中的NUTS水平来选择NUTS水平，这样我们就可以将个别受访者与其所在地区相匹配同样，请参见在线附录表6，以获得有关该变量按地区的更详细描述性统计数据这些是唯一可用的变量，有足够的时间和区域覆盖，包括在我们的分析然而，地方主义派系仍然存在于党内，这可能会导致未来的复杂化或分裂(Albertazzi等人)。Citation2018)。作者简介:kaitlin Alper是南丹麦大学丹麦福利研究中心的博士后研究员。她的研究主要集中在比较福利国家政治、多层次治理和分权政治以及比较政治经济学，特别是在西欧。她的作品发表在《社会力量》杂志上。[kalp@sam.sdu.dk]Caroline Marie Lancaster是芝加哥大学NORC的研究方法学家，她专注于心理测量学、项目评估和调查研究。她曾在《英国政治科学杂志》和《欧洲政治研究杂志》等期刊上发表有关政治态度、移民和激进右翼的文章。[lancaster-caroline@norc.org]
{"title":"The strength of attachment: regionalism, nationalism and vote choice","authors":"Kaitlin Alper, Caroline Marie Lancaster","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2253514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2253514","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractRadical right parties have grown in popularity recently, leaning heavily on state-level nationalism, anti-immigrant sentiment and the promise of a homogenous nation state. There has also recently been increased devolution of power to subnational communities, who historically have resisted homogenisation and infringements on their autonomy. This implies a tension between the interests of subnational units and those of radical right parties. Using data from the 2016 and 2018 European Social Surveys and a new measure of regional identity strength constructed from the Regionalist Parties Dataset (Massetti and Schakel Citation2016) for 10 European countries, this study shows that people living in regions with strong legacies of regionalism are less attached to their national state. Second, the article demonstrates regional identity strength is negatively associated with voting for radical right parties due to their opposition to radical right parties’ exclusive state-level nationalism. Lastly, this relationship can eclipse the effect of immigration attitudes on vote choice as radical right parties’ rhetoric around immigration generally focuses on the importance of cultural homogeneity. Evidence supporting these hypotheses is found using both cross-national data and case evidence from Italy. This study underscores the importance of examining the role older social cleavages play in structuring party politics in the transnational era.Keywords: Party politicscleavage theoryregional identitymultilevel governanceradical right parties AcknowledgementsWe would like to give special thanks to Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Christina Zuber, Sean T. Norton, David Attewell, John D. Stephens, Evelyne Huber, and the three anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments on various drafts of this manuscript. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Comparative Politics working group at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where we received valuable feedback from our colleagues at the department.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.Notes1 Massetti and Schakel's (Citation2016) database also includes three ‘controversial cases’ which are parties that have some association with a national party but which acts sufficiently independently as to be classified as a regionalist party for the purposes of their dataset. These are the CSU in the German region of Bavaria, the UPN in the Spanish region of Navarre, and the UUP in the UK region of Northern Ireland.2 This mirrors the strategies of nation-builders during the era of state consolidation, who, as noted previously, frequently co-opted symbols of regional identity and subsumed them into a broader, constructed national identity (Giordano and Roller Citation2001; Pasquier Citation2015). Similarly, modern radical right parties sometimes make claims that those peripheral cultures are in fact ‘purer’ expressions of a broader, unifying statewide id","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135781924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-08DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2246110
Anna Lavizzari, Andrea L. P. Pirro
{"title":"The gender politics of populist parties in Southern Europe","authors":"Anna Lavizzari, Andrea L. P. Pirro","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2246110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2246110","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48059090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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