Pub Date : 2023-02-20DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2174742
Karina Kosiara-Pedersen
Abstract During the Covid-19 crisis, there was a high level of rallying around the flag for the Social Democratic government. However, support waned with the sense of crisis, and some ‘scandals’ surfaced. The ‘mink scandal’ caused an early election to be called. A high number of parties, 14, competed in the election, and after the election 12 parties are now represented in parliament – a new record number. When comparing the election results of 2019 and 2022, two overall results stand out. First, only one of the two traditional large parties has maintained this status and fragmentation is increased. Second, two new parties made it into the ‘top-5’ in 2022, both formed by former prominent Liberals. The election yielded a narrow victory to the red bloc. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen was able to stay in office after the election but exchanged her red bloc parliamentary majority for a coalition government with the Liberals and Moderates. Thus, a new type of coalition has emerged: a majority government spanning the usual two blocs, but challenged by opposition from both the right and left.
{"title":"New (types of) parties and government: the Danish general election 2022","authors":"Karina Kosiara-Pedersen","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2174742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2174742","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract During the Covid-19 crisis, there was a high level of rallying around the flag for the Social Democratic government. However, support waned with the sense of crisis, and some ‘scandals’ surfaced. The ‘mink scandal’ caused an early election to be called. A high number of parties, 14, competed in the election, and after the election 12 parties are now represented in parliament – a new record number. When comparing the election results of 2019 and 2022, two overall results stand out. First, only one of the two traditional large parties has maintained this status and fragmentation is increased. Second, two new parties made it into the ‘top-5’ in 2022, both formed by former prominent Liberals. The election yielded a narrow victory to the red bloc. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen was able to stay in office after the election but exchanged her red bloc parliamentary majority for a coalition government with the Liberals and Moderates. Thus, a new type of coalition has emerged: a majority government spanning the usual two blocs, but challenged by opposition from both the right and left.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"46 1","pages":"1222 - 1233"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43712009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2177010
Anne Espeland Berg, Jens Jungblut, A. R. Jupskås
Abstract Populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have become more mainstream, increasing their relevance in European politics. While a lot is already known about them, there are still gaps in our knowledge. This article addresses one such gap by studying Western European PRRPs’ positions on education policy. It focuses on the salience of education in election manifestos, substantive positions that parties hold, and in how far these positions reflect their core ideology. Constructing a novel framework based on core ideologies and three dimensions of education policies, including an often-neglected content dimension, the article presents results from a qualitative content analysis of 15 manifestos. The results show that education policy is relevant for PRRPs, albeit to varying degrees, and that their policies are informed by their core ideologies. The findings have important implications for understanding education policy dynamics in liberal democracies as PRRPs fundamentally challenge normative foundations of Western European education systems.
{"title":"We don’t need no education? Education policies of Western European populist radical right parties","authors":"Anne Espeland Berg, Jens Jungblut, A. R. Jupskås","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2177010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2177010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have become more mainstream, increasing their relevance in European politics. While a lot is already known about them, there are still gaps in our knowledge. This article addresses one such gap by studying Western European PRRPs’ positions on education policy. It focuses on the salience of education in election manifestos, substantive positions that parties hold, and in how far these positions reflect their core ideology. Constructing a novel framework based on core ideologies and three dimensions of education policies, including an often-neglected content dimension, the article presents results from a qualitative content analysis of 15 manifestos. The results show that education policy is relevant for PRRPs, albeit to varying degrees, and that their policies are informed by their core ideologies. The findings have important implications for understanding education policy dynamics in liberal democracies as PRRPs fundamentally challenge normative foundations of Western European education systems.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"46 1","pages":"1312 - 1342"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45493176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-06DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2168945
James Tilley, S. Hobolt
{"title":"Losers’ consent and emotions in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum","authors":"James Tilley, S. Hobolt","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2168945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2168945","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44151674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-06DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2169512
Thomas M. Meyer, Ulrich Sieberer, David Schmuck
Abstract In the government formation process, coalition partners make decisions about the inner workings of their future government. However, whether the initial allocation of competencies has the desired effects is uncertain, and deals may therefore be subject to change when the government is in office. This study analyses the frequency of changes in portfolio design (i.e. the distribution of competencies among government ministries and office holders) for 112 coalition governments in eight West European democracies (1970–2015). Its central argument is that in uncertain and complex bargaining situations, coalition partners have greater difficulty finding mutually beneficial deals, and changes to the initial allocation of payoffs are therefore more likely. The results indicate that preference divergence and strenuous coalition negotiations make portfolio design reforms more likely, but show no consistent effect of the familiarity among government parties. These findings show how the bargaining context during government formation foreshadows coalition governance over the cabinet’s life-cycle.
{"title":"Rebuilding the coalition ship at sea: how uncertainty and complexity drive the reform of portfolio design in coalition cabinets","authors":"Thomas M. Meyer, Ulrich Sieberer, David Schmuck","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2169512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2169512","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the government formation process, coalition partners make decisions about the inner workings of their future government. However, whether the initial allocation of competencies has the desired effects is uncertain, and deals may therefore be subject to change when the government is in office. This study analyses the frequency of changes in portfolio design (i.e. the distribution of competencies among government ministries and office holders) for 112 coalition governments in eight West European democracies (1970–2015). Its central argument is that in uncertain and complex bargaining situations, coalition partners have greater difficulty finding mutually beneficial deals, and changes to the initial allocation of payoffs are therefore more likely. The results indicate that preference divergence and strenuous coalition negotiations make portfolio design reforms more likely, but show no consistent effect of the familiarity among government parties. These findings show how the bargaining context during government formation foreshadows coalition governance over the cabinet’s life-cycle.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48252366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-02DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2167046
Lise Bjånesøy, Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, Lars Erik Berntzen
Abstract Political initiatives promoting a far-right agenda have gained significant political influence in Western European democracies. This has occurred despite apparent broad-based public rejection of Europe’s Nazi past. This is a puzzle, since there are affinities between the old and the new far right. This article addresses that puzzle. Theoretically, the article distinguishes between broad and narrow interpretations of what it means to reject Europe’s Nazi past. Empirically, it shows how a well-established survey experimental template reveals substantive variations in public political tolerance of the far right. For citizens in five key Western European democracies, rejecting the Nazi past only means rejecting initiatives explicitly identified as neo-Nazi. For other far-right initiatives, political tolerance is more common and increases in accordance with these initiatives’ institutionalisation in the party system. For far-right parties fully institutionalised in the party system, public political tolerance is at the same level as for other political parties.
{"title":"Public political tolerance of the far right in contemporary Western Europe","authors":"Lise Bjånesøy, Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, Lars Erik Berntzen","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2167046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2167046","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Political initiatives promoting a far-right agenda have gained significant political influence in Western European democracies. This has occurred despite apparent broad-based public rejection of Europe’s Nazi past. This is a puzzle, since there are affinities between the old and the new far right. This article addresses that puzzle. Theoretically, the article distinguishes between broad and narrow interpretations of what it means to reject Europe’s Nazi past. Empirically, it shows how a well-established survey experimental template reveals substantive variations in public political tolerance of the far right. For citizens in five key Western European democracies, rejecting the Nazi past only means rejecting initiatives explicitly identified as neo-Nazi. For other far-right initiatives, political tolerance is more common and increases in accordance with these initiatives’ institutionalisation in the party system. For far-right parties fully institutionalised in the party system, public political tolerance is at the same level as for other political parties.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"46 1","pages":"1264 - 1287"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43315247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-02DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2166734
Viktoria Brendler, Eva Thomann
Abstract This article analyses the role of institutional misfit in why member states customise European Union (EU) renewable energy (RE) policies when implementing them. Institutional misfit theory posits that member states only adjust to EU policies when the adaptation pressure remains moderate and national actors’ policy preferences align. Conversely, this article tests the argument that member states manage institutional misfit by adjusting – customising – EU policies, that is, through vertical EU policy change rather than domestic change. Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis, the article compares the customisation of EU Directive 2009/28/EC in Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Surprisingly, results suggest that institutional misfit is not a necessary condition for customised implementation. Instead, when high institutional fit meets high salience, member states may issue substantively more ambitious policies than the EU requires. Conversely, when high institutional fit meets low salience, member states have no impetus to customise EU rules.
{"title":"Does institutional misfit trigger customisation instead of non-compliance?","authors":"Viktoria Brendler, Eva Thomann","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2166734","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2166734","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article analyses the role of institutional misfit in why member states customise European Union (EU) renewable energy (RE) policies when implementing them. Institutional misfit theory posits that member states only adjust to EU policies when the adaptation pressure remains moderate and national actors’ policy preferences align. Conversely, this article tests the argument that member states manage institutional misfit by adjusting – customising – EU policies, that is, through vertical EU policy change rather than domestic change. Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis, the article compares the customisation of EU Directive 2009/28/EC in Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Surprisingly, results suggest that institutional misfit is not a necessary condition for customised implementation. Instead, when high institutional fit meets high salience, member states may issue substantively more ambitious policies than the EU requires. Conversely, when high institutional fit meets low salience, member states have no impetus to customise EU rules.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43331883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-01DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2165356
Petra Schleiter, C. Bucur
Abstract Are dominant governing parties with discretion to call early elections better able to negotiate their return to office? Dominant incumbents in parliamentary democracies sometimes have extensive powers to dissolve parliament, which enables them to affect coalition bargaining. Yet, whether these powers advantage them in forming the next coalition remains poorly understood. To address this gap, this article develops a theory of coalition formation in the shadow of parliamentary dissolution. Incumbents who can dissolve the assembly, it argues, are more likely to return to government than their peers who lack this power because they enjoy greater bargaining leverage and reputational advantages in coalition formation. The article tests this expectation using mixed and conditional logistic regression analysis of data on 631 government formation opportunities and 433,401 potential coalitions and finds that coalition leaders with discretion to dissolve parliament secure significant advantages in negotiating their return to power.
{"title":"Assembly dissolution powers and incumbency advantages in coalition formation","authors":"Petra Schleiter, C. Bucur","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2165356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2165356","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Are dominant governing parties with discretion to call early elections better able to negotiate their return to office? Dominant incumbents in parliamentary democracies sometimes have extensive powers to dissolve parliament, which enables them to affect coalition bargaining. Yet, whether these powers advantage them in forming the next coalition remains poorly understood. To address this gap, this article develops a theory of coalition formation in the shadow of parliamentary dissolution. Incumbents who can dissolve the assembly, it argues, are more likely to return to government than their peers who lack this power because they enjoy greater bargaining leverage and reputational advantages in coalition formation. The article tests this expectation using mixed and conditional logistic regression analysis of data on 631 government formation opportunities and 433,401 potential coalitions and finds that coalition leaders with discretion to dissolve parliament secure significant advantages in negotiating their return to power.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45492874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-30DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2166728
Sophia Hunger, Swen Hutter, Eylem Kanol
Abstract The Covid-19 pandemic triggered polarisation across Europe. While most citizens supported governments’ containment measures, others took to the streets and voiced their dissatisfaction. The article focuses on the mobilisation potential related to this heterogenous protest wave. It examines individuals that show sympathy and are willing to engage in anti-containment demonstrations based on 16 waves of a rolling cross-section survey fielded in Germany in 2020/2021. The results show a considerable and stable mobilisation potential: every fifth respondent sympathises with the protesters, and around 60% of those are ready to participate themselves. Political distrust, far-right orientations and an emerging ‘freedom divide’ structure the potential, as do Covid-19-related economic and health threats. Moreover, the findings indicate a radicalisation process and show how ideology and threat perceptions drive the step from sympathy to willingness to participate, suggesting that ideological polarisation may quickly spill over to the streets given an appropriate supply of protest opportunities.
{"title":"The mobilisation potential of anti-containment protests in Germany","authors":"Sophia Hunger, Swen Hutter, Eylem Kanol","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2023.2166728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2166728","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Covid-19 pandemic triggered polarisation across Europe. While most citizens supported governments’ containment measures, others took to the streets and voiced their dissatisfaction. The article focuses on the mobilisation potential related to this heterogenous protest wave. It examines individuals that show sympathy and are willing to engage in anti-containment demonstrations based on 16 waves of a rolling cross-section survey fielded in Germany in 2020/2021. The results show a considerable and stable mobilisation potential: every fifth respondent sympathises with the protesters, and around 60% of those are ready to participate themselves. Political distrust, far-right orientations and an emerging ‘freedom divide’ structure the potential, as do Covid-19-related economic and health threats. Moreover, the findings indicate a radicalisation process and show how ideology and threat perceptions drive the step from sympathy to willingness to participate, suggesting that ideological polarisation may quickly spill over to the streets given an appropriate supply of protest opportunities.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"46 1","pages":"812 - 840"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47102070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-27DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2022.2155906
L. Quaglia, A. Verdun
Abstract In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Group of Seven (G7) countries and the European Union (EU) adopted a variety of financial sanctions, including the freezing of foreign reserve assets of the Central Bank of Russia held by other central banks. Drawing on a Principal-Agent framework and on speeches, newspaper articles and interviews with policy-makers, this study examines what it means for the ECB and the central banks of the Eurosystem to be involved in these sanctions. As a consequence of these actions, these central banks have been enlisted in monetary and financial warfare. Moreover, the three-fold objective of the ECB has de facto effectively been reweighted somewhat, as the focus on ‘price stability’ (primary objective) has become seemingly temporarily less prominent. Instead, the secondary and tertiary objectives have moved centre-stage, favouring geopolitical considerations.
{"title":"Weaponisation of finance: the role of European central banks and financial sanctions against Russia","authors":"L. Quaglia, A. Verdun","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2022.2155906","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2155906","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Group of Seven (G7) countries and the European Union (EU) adopted a variety of financial sanctions, including the freezing of foreign reserve assets of the Central Bank of Russia held by other central banks. Drawing on a Principal-Agent framework and on speeches, newspaper articles and interviews with policy-makers, this study examines what it means for the ECB and the central banks of the Eurosystem to be involved in these sanctions. As a consequence of these actions, these central banks have been enlisted in monetary and financial warfare. Moreover, the three-fold objective of the ECB has de facto effectively been reweighted somewhat, as the focus on ‘price stability’ (primary objective) has become seemingly temporarily less prominent. Instead, the secondary and tertiary objectives have moved centre-stage, favouring geopolitical considerations.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"46 1","pages":"872 - 895"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49414639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-27DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2022.2158639
I. Mancheva, M. Pihlajamäki, M. Keskinen
Abstract Governments increasingly apply collaborative governance based on deliberation that typically takes place in non-majoritarian institutions. However, collaborative institutions face accountability challenges depending on their institutional design. Still, empirical research is missing on the different choices member states make when designing collaborative institutions implementing European Union (EU) political goals. Using four theoretical principles of accountability, the study compares how Finland and Sweden implement the requirements for collaborative governance of two EU directives in national legislation and management plans. While Finland has provided more detailed and stricter rules resulting in higher process accountability, Sweden has delegated final decision making to authorities, achieving a higher degree of institutional independence. The results reveal that since the directives set only some of the key rules and procedures needed for achieving accountable collaborative institutions, member states’ discretion can lead to institutional variation even in similar governance contexts, resulting in differing institutional accountability and legitimacy of EU policies.
{"title":"Institutional accountability: the differentiated implementation of collaborative governance in two EU states","authors":"I. Mancheva, M. Pihlajamäki, M. Keskinen","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2022.2158639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2158639","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Governments increasingly apply collaborative governance based on deliberation that typically takes place in non-majoritarian institutions. However, collaborative institutions face accountability challenges depending on their institutional design. Still, empirical research is missing on the different choices member states make when designing collaborative institutions implementing European Union (EU) political goals. Using four theoretical principles of accountability, the study compares how Finland and Sweden implement the requirements for collaborative governance of two EU directives in national legislation and management plans. While Finland has provided more detailed and stricter rules resulting in higher process accountability, Sweden has delegated final decision making to authorities, achieving a higher degree of institutional independence. The results reveal that since the directives set only some of the key rules and procedures needed for achieving accountable collaborative institutions, member states’ discretion can lead to institutional variation even in similar governance contexts, resulting in differing institutional accountability and legitimacy of EU policies.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43500614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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