Pub Date : 2023-01-19DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2022.2161786
Endre Borbáth, Swen Hutter, A. Leininger
Abstract Polarisation over cultural issues and the emergence of radical, often populist, challenger parties indicate a fundamental restructuring of political conflict in Western Europe. The emerging divide crosscuts and, in part, reshapes older cleavages. This special issue introduction highlights how the transformation of cleavage structures relates to the dynamics of polarisation and political participation. The contributions to the special issue innovate in two ways. First, they adapt concepts and measures of ideological and affective polarisation to the context of Europe’s multi-party and multi-dimensional party competition. Second, they emphasise electoral and protest politics, examining how ideological and affective polarisation shape electoral and non-electoral participation. Apart from introducing the contributions, the introduction combines different datasets – the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and the European Social Survey – to sketch an empirical picture of differentiated polarisation with types of polarisation only weakly associated cross-arena, cross-nationally and over time.
{"title":"Cleavage politics, polarisation and participation in Western Europe","authors":"Endre Borbáth, Swen Hutter, A. Leininger","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2022.2161786","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2161786","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Polarisation over cultural issues and the emergence of radical, often populist, challenger parties indicate a fundamental restructuring of political conflict in Western Europe. The emerging divide crosscuts and, in part, reshapes older cleavages. This special issue introduction highlights how the transformation of cleavage structures relates to the dynamics of polarisation and political participation. The contributions to the special issue innovate in two ways. First, they adapt concepts and measures of ideological and affective polarisation to the context of Europe’s multi-party and multi-dimensional party competition. Second, they emphasise electoral and protest politics, examining how ideological and affective polarisation shape electoral and non-electoral participation. Apart from introducing the contributions, the introduction combines different datasets – the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and the European Social Survey – to sketch an empirical picture of differentiated polarisation with types of polarisation only weakly associated cross-arena, cross-nationally and over time.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"46 1","pages":"631 - 651"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46662671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-17DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2022.2157994
Maria Thürk, S. Krauss
Abstract The vast majority of elections in parliamentary systems result in minority situations. During cabinet formation, parties have three options: building a winning coalition, a genuine substantive minority cabinet without support, or a formal minority with institutionalised long-term support partnerships. Even though the use of permanent support partners has increased substantially, there is still comparatively little knowledge about the circumstances under which parties choose to enter such formalised support partnerships instead of winning coalitions. This article aims to close this gap by analysing how the party system, the institutional configuration, as well as the bargaining environment influence which cabinet type forms. The dataset includes 469 cabinets from 27 Eastern and Western European countries between 1970 and 2019. The hypotheses are tested with the help of multinomial model estimations. While only few of the traditional explanations can explain the formation of formal minority cabinets, the results show that there is a time-trend towards more formalisation.
{"title":"The formalisation of minority governments","authors":"Maria Thürk, S. Krauss","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2022.2157994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2157994","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The vast majority of elections in parliamentary systems result in minority situations. During cabinet formation, parties have three options: building a winning coalition, a genuine substantive minority cabinet without support, or a formal minority with institutionalised long-term support partnerships. Even though the use of permanent support partners has increased substantially, there is still comparatively little knowledge about the circumstances under which parties choose to enter such formalised support partnerships instead of winning coalitions. This article aims to close this gap by analysing how the party system, the institutional configuration, as well as the bargaining environment influence which cabinet type forms. The dataset includes 469 cabinets from 27 Eastern and Western European countries between 1970 and 2019. The hypotheses are tested with the help of multinomial model estimations. While only few of the traditional explanations can explain the formation of formal minority cabinets, the results show that there is a time-trend towards more formalisation.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48627158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-16DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2022.2161727
Adina Akbik, C. Freudlsperger, M. Migliorati
Abstract European Union (EU) institutions have become increasingly involved in direct policy implementation in the member states, creating a new domain of differentiation in EU governance. What brings about such differentiation, and how does it vary across policy fields? Drawing on theories of differentiated integration, this article argues that differentiated implementation occurs at the intersection of postfunctional obstacles (politicisation) and functional pressures for joint implementation (interdependence). There are two identified dimensions of direct implementation, a territorial one referring to states’ participation in such activities, and a procedural one capturing the degree of uniformity in the guidelines for organising implementation. The resulting typology is applied to direct implementation activities (DIAs) conducted by EU agencies alongside national authorities. The qualitative analysis reveals that differentiated participation is a stable feature of DIAs in politicised fields, and although there is a tendency to create more uniform procedures over time and across policy fields, higher uniformity prevails under symmetric interdependence.
{"title":"Differentiated participation, uniform procedures: EU agencies in direct policy implementation","authors":"Adina Akbik, C. Freudlsperger, M. Migliorati","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2022.2161727","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2161727","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract European Union (EU) institutions have become increasingly involved in direct policy implementation in the member states, creating a new domain of differentiation in EU governance. What brings about such differentiation, and how does it vary across policy fields? Drawing on theories of differentiated integration, this article argues that differentiated implementation occurs at the intersection of postfunctional obstacles (politicisation) and functional pressures for joint implementation (interdependence). There are two identified dimensions of direct implementation, a territorial one referring to states’ participation in such activities, and a procedural one capturing the degree of uniformity in the guidelines for organising implementation. The resulting typology is applied to direct implementation activities (DIAs) conducted by EU agencies alongside national authorities. The qualitative analysis reveals that differentiated participation is a stable feature of DIAs in politicised fields, and although there is a tendency to create more uniform procedures over time and across policy fields, higher uniformity prevails under symmetric interdependence.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42545085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-16DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2022.2156164
Rahel Freiburghaus, A. Vatter, Isabelle Stadelmann‐Steffen
Abstract Which patterns of democracy perform best? Although a decades-long research tradition has fairly robustly suggested that consensual democracies outperform their Westminster-style majoritarian counterparts, the scope of previous studies has been limited to ‘normal times’. In this article, the endogenous context of the COVID-19 pandemic is leveraged to study whether the alleged superiority of consensualism also holds during crises. It is hypothesised that, in addition to consensus democracy, inclusive institutions – i.e. cabinet size and interest-group corporatism – enhance crisis-related performance. Drawing on new and original data, cross-sectional and hierarchical time-series regression analyses show that horizontal power-sharing and the number of ministers substantively reduced excess mortality, while the structure of the interest-group system had no effect. Although established consensus democracies can draw on their built-in institutional assets even during crises, our findings indicate that majoritarian systems may, as a compensatory performance-enhancing tool, flexibly gear up for crisis-induced necessities by adding more ministers to the cabinet.
{"title":"Kinder, gentler – and crisis-proof? Consensus democracy, inclusive institutions and COVID-19 pandemic performance","authors":"Rahel Freiburghaus, A. Vatter, Isabelle Stadelmann‐Steffen","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2022.2156164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2156164","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Which patterns of democracy perform best? Although a decades-long research tradition has fairly robustly suggested that consensual democracies outperform their Westminster-style majoritarian counterparts, the scope of previous studies has been limited to ‘normal times’. In this article, the endogenous context of the COVID-19 pandemic is leveraged to study whether the alleged superiority of consensualism also holds during crises. It is hypothesised that, in addition to consensus democracy, inclusive institutions – i.e. cabinet size and interest-group corporatism – enhance crisis-related performance. Drawing on new and original data, cross-sectional and hierarchical time-series regression analyses show that horizontal power-sharing and the number of ministers substantively reduced excess mortality, while the structure of the interest-group system had no effect. Although established consensus democracies can draw on their built-in institutional assets even during crises, our findings indicate that majoritarian systems may, as a compensatory performance-enhancing tool, flexibly gear up for crisis-induced necessities by adding more ministers to the cabinet.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"46 1","pages":"1106 - 1132"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49355151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-10DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2022.2156199
N. Aylott, Niklas Bolin
Abstract The Swedish parliamentary election of 11 September 2022 led to the removal of a Social Democratic government and the installation of a right-of-centre coalition. The change was made possible by the mainstream right’s abandonment of the previous cordon sanitaire around the radical-right Sweden Democrats (SD). The new government, consisting of the Moderates, the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, concluded a comprehensive agreement with SD. In this article, we sketch the background to the election; describe how the campaign unfolded; and interpret the results and outcome.
{"title":"A new right: the Swedish parliamentary election of September 2022","authors":"N. Aylott, Niklas Bolin","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2022.2156199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2156199","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Swedish parliamentary election of 11 September 2022 led to the removal of a Social Democratic government and the installation of a right-of-centre coalition. The change was made possible by the mainstream right’s abandonment of the previous cordon sanitaire around the radical-right Sweden Democrats (SD). The new government, consisting of the Moderates, the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, concluded a comprehensive agreement with SD. In this article, we sketch the background to the election; describe how the campaign unfolded; and interpret the results and outcome.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"46 1","pages":"1049 - 1062"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43378798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2022.2062144
J. Basedow
Abstract Scholars have extensively studied how the European Court of Justice (ECJ) interacts with Member State courts. The ECJ’s behaviour vis-à-vis international tribunals remains, however, underexplored despite its salience for EU global actorness. The ECJ does at times condone and at other times reject cooperation with international tribunals in that it either authorises or prohibits EU and Member State participation in relevant regimes. What drives ECJ behaviour? While intuitive, European law fails to fully account for it. This study draws on models of bounded discretion to explain ECJ behaviour in external judicial politics. It argues that two factors – namely jurisdictional overlap between the European legal order and international tribunals as well as the centrality of these tribunals in global governance – decisively influence the preferences of the ECJ, Member States, the European Commission and Parliament and thus delimit the range of politically viable rulings and shape ECJ behaviour.
{"title":"A theory of external judicial politics: the ECJ as cautious gatekeeper in external relations","authors":"J. Basedow","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2022.2062144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2062144","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Scholars have extensively studied how the European Court of Justice (ECJ) interacts with Member State courts. The ECJ’s behaviour vis-à-vis international tribunals remains, however, underexplored despite its salience for EU global actorness. The ECJ does at times condone and at other times reject cooperation with international tribunals in that it either authorises or prohibits EU and Member State participation in relevant regimes. What drives ECJ behaviour? While intuitive, European law fails to fully account for it. This study draws on models of bounded discretion to explain ECJ behaviour in external judicial politics. It argues that two factors – namely jurisdictional overlap between the European legal order and international tribunals as well as the centrality of these tribunals in global governance – decisively influence the preferences of the ECJ, Member States, the European Commission and Parliament and thus delimit the range of politically viable rulings and shape ECJ behaviour.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"46 1","pages":"550 - 572"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59076647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-12DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2022.2143162
Michael Neureiter, F. Schulte
Abstract Scholars have paid considerable attention to the attitudes of host societies towards immigration. However, relatively little is known about whether and under which conditions immigrants themselves support immigration more or less than those without a migration background. This study argues that immigrant attitudes towards immigration are motivated by two competing logics, solidarity and threat, with each logic being activated under different circumstances. Specifically, the relative strength of the two logics depends on factors relating to (1) the immigrants themselves (e.g. how long they have been living in their host country), (2) the type of immigration in question (i.e. characteristics of the prospective immigrants) and (3) certain conditions in the host country (particularly the presence or absence of discrimination and assimilation pressure). Evidence from the European Social Survey in 15 West European countries over a period of 18 years (2002–2019) supports these theoretical expectations.
{"title":"A tale of two logics: how solidarity and threat perceptions shape immigrant attitudes towards immigration in Western Europe","authors":"Michael Neureiter, F. Schulte","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2022.2143162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2143162","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Scholars have paid considerable attention to the attitudes of host societies towards immigration. However, relatively little is known about whether and under which conditions immigrants themselves support immigration more or less than those without a migration background. This study argues that immigrant attitudes towards immigration are motivated by two competing logics, solidarity and threat, with each logic being activated under different circumstances. Specifically, the relative strength of the two logics depends on factors relating to (1) the immigrants themselves (e.g. how long they have been living in their host country), (2) the type of immigration in question (i.e. characteristics of the prospective immigrants) and (3) certain conditions in the host country (particularly the presence or absence of discrimination and assimilation pressure). Evidence from the European Social Survey in 15 West European countries over a period of 18 years (2002–2019) supports these theoretical expectations.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2022-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45844951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-09DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2022.2150944
Sebastiaan Princen, F. Schimmelfennig, Ronja Sczepanski, Hubert Smekal, Robert Zbíral
Abstract Differentiated integration (DI) and flexibility in implementation (FI) are two forms of differentiation that can be used to cope with heterogeneity among EU member states. Given the different ways in which they do so, this article asks whether DI and FI are alternatives for each other or whether they serve different functions in EU legislation. Based on a dataset that maps the occurrence of opt-outs and flexibility provisions in EU directives, the analysis shows that DI and FI tend to be used together. A qualitative analysis of directives that combine different levels of DI and FI shows that, within that overall pattern, DI is used to accommodate individual outliers, while FI is used to address widespread concerns among member states. This suggests that DI and FI are two forms of differentiation in the EU, which are used to address different aspects of a common underlying set of concerns.
{"title":"Different yet the same? Differentiated integration and flexibility in implementation in the European Union","authors":"Sebastiaan Princen, F. Schimmelfennig, Ronja Sczepanski, Hubert Smekal, Robert Zbíral","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2022.2150944","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2150944","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Differentiated integration (DI) and flexibility in implementation (FI) are two forms of differentiation that can be used to cope with heterogeneity among EU member states. Given the different ways in which they do so, this article asks whether DI and FI are alternatives for each other or whether they serve different functions in EU legislation. Based on a dataset that maps the occurrence of opt-outs and flexibility provisions in EU directives, the analysis shows that DI and FI tend to be used together. A qualitative analysis of directives that combine different levels of DI and FI shows that, within that overall pattern, DI is used to accommodate individual outliers, while FI is used to address widespread concerns among member states. This suggests that DI and FI are two forms of differentiation in the EU, which are used to address different aspects of a common underlying set of concerns.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2022-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48313718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-08DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2022.2150943
Raul Gómez
Abstract While the electoral decline of Social democracy has received considerable attention in the literature, much less is known about how the structural changes experienced by advanced capitalist societies in the past decades have affected support for the mainstream right. In order to fill this gap, this article examines the relationship between secularisation, educational expansion and support for Conservative and Christian democratic parties in 18 West European democracies since the 1960s. The analysis reveals that secularisation is negatively associated with support for the mainstream right, but the effect is only significant for Christian democratic parties. Moreover, the findings support the expectation that social conservatism tends to damage the electoral prospects of mainstream right parties in highly educated societies. This suggests that, although engaging in cultural wars might sometimes seem like a winning strategy in the short term, it is unlikely to produce long-term positive electoral returns for the centre-right in post-industrial contexts.
{"title":"How have secularisation and educational expansion affected support for the mainstream right in Western Europe?","authors":"Raul Gómez","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2022.2150943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2150943","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract While the electoral decline of Social democracy has received considerable attention in the literature, much less is known about how the structural changes experienced by advanced capitalist societies in the past decades have affected support for the mainstream right. In order to fill this gap, this article examines the relationship between secularisation, educational expansion and support for Conservative and Christian democratic parties in 18 West European democracies since the 1960s. The analysis reveals that secularisation is negatively associated with support for the mainstream right, but the effect is only significant for Christian democratic parties. Moreover, the findings support the expectation that social conservatism tends to damage the electoral prospects of mainstream right parties in highly educated societies. This suggests that, although engaging in cultural wars might sometimes seem like a winning strategy in the short term, it is unlikely to produce long-term positive electoral returns for the centre-right in post-industrial contexts.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2022-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41792502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-02DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2022.2145447
M. Meijers, Yaël van Drunen, Kristof Jacobs
Abstract Many citizens are sceptical of policies implemented to mitigate climate change. Existing research shows that citizens’ populist beliefs are significant determinants of climate scepticism. However, little is known about the underlying factors driving populist opposition to climate policies. To address this gap in the literature, this study develops structural equation models with new ideological measures using a high-quality probability sample of Dutch citizens (2019). The findings show that the relationship between populist attitudes and climate policy opposition is mediated through two anti-elite dispositions: the idea that climate science is unreliable and the belief that politicians exploit climate change for political gain. This relationship holds for left- and right-wing individuals alike. Moreover, a replication of a recent study shows that these findings hold alongside mechanisms rooted in institutional trust. These findings provide important evidence that populists’ opposition to climate policy is principally rooted in distrust in political and scientific elites.
{"title":"It’s a hoax! The mediating factors of populist climate policy opposition","authors":"M. Meijers, Yaël van Drunen, Kristof Jacobs","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2022.2145447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2145447","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many citizens are sceptical of policies implemented to mitigate climate change. Existing research shows that citizens’ populist beliefs are significant determinants of climate scepticism. However, little is known about the underlying factors driving populist opposition to climate policies. To address this gap in the literature, this study develops structural equation models with new ideological measures using a high-quality probability sample of Dutch citizens (2019). The findings show that the relationship between populist attitudes and climate policy opposition is mediated through two anti-elite dispositions: the idea that climate science is unreliable and the belief that politicians exploit climate change for political gain. This relationship holds for left- and right-wing individuals alike. Moreover, a replication of a recent study shows that these findings hold alongside mechanisms rooted in institutional trust. These findings provide important evidence that populists’ opposition to climate policy is principally rooted in distrust in political and scientific elites.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"46 1","pages":"1288 - 1311"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2022-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49099700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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