ObjectiveThis paper seeks to explain and empirically test how a public health crisis, such as the COVID‐19 pandemic, might lead to discriminatory attitudes and behaviors against marginalized groups.MethodWe identify four causal mechanisms that may account for the increase in anti‐Asian racism during COVID‐19. Using a large data set of geolocated COVID‐19‐related tweets in the U.S., we examine the spatiotemporal pattern of anti‐Asian sentiment on Twitter and test all four mechanisms that link the crisis to the behaviors of “othering” and “scapegoating.”ResultsWe find evidence consistent with the elite cueing, perceived threat, and grievance mechanisms. The president's scapegoating rhetoric significantly increased anti‐Asian hate tweets across all counties. In addition, high COVID‐19 infection rates and grievances from containment policies are also associated with greater numbers of anti‐Asian hate tweets. On the other hand, counties with larger vulnerable populations do not seem to have more anti‐Asian hate tweets.ConclusionsWe demonstrate that a crisis alone does not necessarily lead to othering behavior, while elite rhetoric can significantly influence the public's opinion and behavior during a crisis.
{"title":"From fear to hate: Sources of anti‐Asian sentiment during COVID‐19","authors":"Yaoyao Dai, Jingjing Gao, Benjamin J. Radford","doi":"10.1111/ssqu.13387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13387","url":null,"abstract":"ObjectiveThis paper seeks to explain and empirically test how a public health crisis, such as the COVID‐19 pandemic, might lead to discriminatory attitudes and behaviors against marginalized groups.MethodWe identify four causal mechanisms that may account for the increase in anti‐Asian racism during COVID‐19. Using a large data set of geolocated COVID‐19‐related tweets in the U.S., we examine the spatiotemporal pattern of anti‐Asian sentiment on Twitter and test all four mechanisms that link the crisis to the behaviors of “othering” and “scapegoating.”ResultsWe find evidence consistent with the elite cueing, perceived threat, and grievance mechanisms. The president's scapegoating rhetoric significantly increased anti‐Asian hate tweets across all counties. In addition, high COVID‐19 infection rates and grievances from containment policies are also associated with greater numbers of anti‐Asian hate tweets. On the other hand, counties with larger vulnerable populations do not seem to have more anti‐Asian hate tweets.ConclusionsWe demonstrate that a crisis alone does not necessarily lead to othering behavior, while elite rhetoric can significantly influence the public's opinion and behavior during a crisis.","PeriodicalId":48253,"journal":{"name":"Social Science Quarterly","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140835077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThis short article investigates how violations of civility norms by politicians affect attitudes about the importance of norms and demand for political accountability after wrongdoing.ResultsOur main findings are twofold: (1) support for norms and (2) demand for punishing norm‐breaking increases when parties hold political officials accountable for their actions—especially in the case of in‐group norm‐breaking.ConclusionsThese findings contribute to a growing literature on Americans’ support for norms by implying that elites play an important role in sustaining the standards of democratic exchange. When elites impose punishment on copartisan elites, they signal to the public that accountability is acceptable.
{"title":"Civility norm violations and political accountability","authors":"Drew Cagle, Nicholas T. Davis","doi":"10.1111/ssqu.13383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13383","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThis short article investigates how violations of civility norms by politicians affect attitudes about the importance of norms and demand for political accountability after wrongdoing.ResultsOur main findings are twofold: (1) support for norms and (2) demand for punishing norm‐breaking increases when parties hold political officials accountable for their actions—especially in the case of in‐group norm‐breaking.ConclusionsThese findings contribute to a growing literature on Americans’ support for norms by implying that elites play an important role in sustaining the standards of democratic exchange. When elites impose punishment on copartisan elites, they signal to the public that accountability is acceptable.","PeriodicalId":48253,"journal":{"name":"Social Science Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140810998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Though parties serving as “personalist vehicles” have been known to exist for some time in less well-established democracies, they are certainly less commonplace in well-institutionalized democracies where parties are normally expected to make decisions by routinized, democratic procedures and maintain substantial value in their own right. And yet, even highly institutionalized parties in such settings may fall prey to personalistic tendencies.1 Such has, for instance, been the case recently for one of the most established, institutionalized parties in one of the most established, institutionalized democracies in the world: Donald Trump's Republican Party in the United States. And while that case may be the most notorious of late, it is hardly the only instance of this phenomenon! Indeed, across a range of democracies over a span of decades, there have been numerous other cases of personalization of well-established parties, though not always personalized in exactly the same ways or to the same degree. It is our explicit purpose in this special issue to gain a better understanding of numerous relevant cases and the process of party personalization in general, through a collection of case studies rigorously employing a common conceptual framework and guided by similar research questions. To what degree, and in what ways, has each case experienced personalization? What factors and circumstances made this possible? (And to the process culminated in less than complete personalization, what hindered/stopped the process?) What have been—or are likely to be—the consequences for the party and the polity?
What follows is a discussion of the common conceptual framework that underpins the analysis of each of the case studies in this special issue.
{"title":"Personalization and de-institutionalization: Our common conceptual framework","authors":"Robert Harmel, Lars Svåsand, Hilmar Mjelde","doi":"10.1111/ssqu.13373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13373","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Though parties serving as “personalist vehicles” have been known to exist for some time in less well-established democracies, they are certainly less commonplace in well-institutionalized democracies where parties are normally expected to make decisions by routinized, democratic procedures and maintain substantial value in their own right. And yet, even highly institutionalized parties in such settings may fall prey to personalistic tendencies.1 Such has, for instance, been the case recently for one of the most established, institutionalized <i>parties</i> in one of the most established, institutionalized <i>democracies</i> in the world: Donald Trump's Republican Party in the United States. And while that case may be the most notorious of late, it is hardly the only instance of this phenomenon! Indeed, across a range of democracies over a span of decades, there have been numerous other cases of personalization of well-established parties, though not always personalized in exactly the same ways or to the same degree. It is our explicit purpose in this special issue to gain a better understanding of numerous relevant cases and the process of party personalization in general, through a collection of case studies rigorously employing a common conceptual framework and guided by similar research questions. To what degree, and in what ways, has each case experienced personalization? What factors and circumstances made this possible? (And to the process culminated in less than complete personalization, what hindered/stopped the process?) What have been—or are likely to be—the consequences for the party and the polity?</p>\u0000<p>What follows is a discussion of the common conceptual framework that underpins the analysis of each of the case studies in this special issue.</p>","PeriodicalId":48253,"journal":{"name":"Social Science Quarterly","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140589890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Christine S. Lipsmeyer, Andrew Q. Philips, Amanda Rutherford, Guy D. Whitten
ObjectiveWe analyze how economic shocks affect the partisan nature of budgetary trade‐offs and use data from the U.S. Census Annual Survey of Government Finance to illustrate it.MethodsWe propose a compositional approach to model trade‐offs among 10 budgetary categories across both time and space in U.S. states.ResultsWe find support for the notion that partisanship drives the allocation of budgetary expenditures. However, during times of negative economic shocks, either within a state or in neighboring states, Democratic and Republican governors have a similar budgetary response.ConclusionsThe results show the effects of economic and political shifts, as well as the implications of spillovers from other states, on partisan decisions about trade‐offs in government budgets.
{"title":"Bad times keep us together: Policy priorities and economic shocks","authors":"Christine S. Lipsmeyer, Andrew Q. Philips, Amanda Rutherford, Guy D. Whitten","doi":"10.1111/ssqu.13382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13382","url":null,"abstract":"ObjectiveWe analyze how economic shocks affect the partisan nature of budgetary trade‐offs and use data from the U.S. Census Annual Survey of Government Finance to illustrate it.MethodsWe propose a compositional approach to model trade‐offs among 10 budgetary categories across both time and space in U.S. states.ResultsWe find support for the notion that partisanship drives the allocation of budgetary expenditures. However, during times of negative economic shocks, either within a state or in neighboring states, Democratic and Republican governors have a similar budgetary response.ConclusionsThe results show the effects of economic and political shifts, as well as the implications of spillovers from other states, on partisan decisions about trade‐offs in government budgets.","PeriodicalId":48253,"journal":{"name":"Social Science Quarterly","volume":"67 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140589881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ObjectiveAt U.S. Supreme Court oral arguments, female attorneys are more likely to be interrupted than their male counterparts under some conditions. This makes it difficult for women to effectively construct a narrative and substantively impact case law. While existing work conceptualizes gender as a binary, I draw on recent work stressing gender is performative to deesentialize gender and explore how attorneys’ compliance with gender norms and subtle expectations about men's and women's behavior in a host of contexts, predicts interruptions at oral arguments.MethodsVia quantitative textual analysis of all oral arguments from 2004 to 2019 where one attorney argues for the petitioner and one for the respondent, I examine the extent to which gender norm compliance predicts interruptions.ResultsI find both male and female attorneys are interrupted more frequently when their oral arguments are not gender normative. Thus, an argument that is successful for a male attorney is not necessarily successful for a female attorney, and vice versa.ConclusionMy results underscore female attorneys are not less successful as a matter of course; attorney success is driven by attorney compliance with gender norms. This work also raises a number of normative questions I encourage future scholars to explore.
{"title":"Since you put it that way… Gender norms and interruptions at Supreme Court oral arguments","authors":"Shane A. Gleason","doi":"10.1111/ssqu.13377","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13377","url":null,"abstract":"ObjectiveAt U.S. Supreme Court oral arguments, female attorneys are more likely to be interrupted than their male counterparts under some conditions. This makes it difficult for women to effectively construct a narrative and substantively impact case law. While existing work conceptualizes gender as a binary, I draw on recent work stressing gender is performative to deesentialize gender and explore how attorneys’ compliance with gender norms and subtle expectations about men's and women's behavior in a host of contexts, predicts interruptions at oral arguments.MethodsVia quantitative textual analysis of all oral arguments from 2004 to 2019 where one attorney argues for the petitioner and one for the respondent, I examine the extent to which gender norm compliance predicts interruptions.ResultsI find both male and female attorneys are interrupted more frequently when their oral arguments are not gender normative. Thus, an argument that is successful for a male attorney is not necessarily successful for a female attorney, and vice versa.ConclusionMy results underscore female attorneys are not less successful as a matter of course; attorney success is driven by attorney compliance with gender norms. This work also raises a number of normative questions I encourage future scholars to explore.","PeriodicalId":48253,"journal":{"name":"Social Science Quarterly","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140589670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ObjectiveResearch on conspiracy theories has mainly focused on psychosocial and sociodemographic factors associated with conspiracy beliefs. Little is known about factors at the nation level that provide a breeding ground for conspiracist thinking. However, an interesting finding emerges from recent international comparisons: people living in countries with a highly corrupt public sector seem to be more likely to endorse conspiracy theories. The present study aims to replicate this finding with new data.MethodsWe investigate the relationship between corruption and conspiracy beliefs across 26 Western and non‐Western countries through multiple linear regression analyses and conditional inference trees. In addition to the corruption level of these countries, our statistical models include other nation‐level factors known to be associated with the prevalence of conspiracy beliefs, namely, their levels of democracy, freedom of the press, social threat (unemployment and homicide rates), economic inequality, and human development (life expectancy, standard of living, and education).ResultsOur analyses confirm a robust link between public sector corruption and conspiracy beliefs that remains significant when controlling for these other factors.ConclusionWe suggest that public sector corruption is fertile ground for conspiracy theories because it makes them less implausible to the public.
{"title":"Public sector corruption is fertile ground for conspiracy beliefs: A comparison between 26 Western and non‐Western countries","authors":"Laurent Cordonier, Florian Cafiero","doi":"10.1111/ssqu.13374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13374","url":null,"abstract":"ObjectiveResearch on conspiracy theories has mainly focused on psychosocial and sociodemographic factors associated with conspiracy beliefs. Little is known about factors at the nation level that provide a breeding ground for conspiracist thinking. However, an interesting finding emerges from recent international comparisons: people living in countries with a highly corrupt public sector seem to be more likely to endorse conspiracy theories. The present study aims to replicate this finding with new data.MethodsWe investigate the relationship between corruption and conspiracy beliefs across 26 Western and non‐Western countries through multiple linear regression analyses and conditional inference trees. In addition to the corruption level of these countries, our statistical models include other nation‐level factors known to be associated with the prevalence of conspiracy beliefs, namely, their levels of democracy, freedom of the press, social threat (unemployment and homicide rates), economic inequality, and human development (life expectancy, standard of living, and education).ResultsOur analyses confirm a robust link between public sector corruption and conspiracy beliefs that remains significant when controlling for these other factors.ConclusionWe suggest that public sector corruption is fertile ground for conspiracy theories because it makes them less implausible to the public.","PeriodicalId":48253,"journal":{"name":"Social Science Quarterly","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140589678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Steven Jokinsky, Christine S. Lipsmeyer, Andrew Q. Philips, Laron K. Williams, Guy D. Whitten
ObjectiveThis study aims to test whether the American public is polarized and/or parallel in its assessments of the most important problem.MethodsWe use compositional time series models and new data on public opinion to test for differences between subgroups.ResultsWe find inconsistent evidence of polarization for some issue areas but not others and remarkably robust evidence of parallel reactions across subgroups to economic and international shocks.ConclusionThe U.S. public is remarkably consistent in terms of its assessments of the most important problem and in how subgroups shift their perceptions of issue importance in reaction to changing circumstances.
{"title":"Look over there. Where? A compositional approach to the modeling of public opinion on the most important problem","authors":"Steven Jokinsky, Christine S. Lipsmeyer, Andrew Q. Philips, Laron K. Williams, Guy D. Whitten","doi":"10.1111/ssqu.13360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13360","url":null,"abstract":"ObjectiveThis study aims to test whether the American public is polarized and/or parallel in its assessments of the most important problem.MethodsWe use compositional time series models and new data on public opinion to test for differences between subgroups.ResultsWe find inconsistent evidence of polarization for some issue areas but not others and remarkably robust evidence of parallel reactions across subgroups to economic and international shocks.ConclusionThe U.S. public is remarkably consistent in terms of its assessments of the most important problem and in how subgroups shift their perceptions of issue importance in reaction to changing circumstances.","PeriodicalId":48253,"journal":{"name":"Social Science Quarterly","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140589669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the degree to which sentencing patterns in Texas capital cases vary by the gender of the prosecutor. In so doing, we explore the possibility that a factor unrelated to the crime influences whether the death penalty is sought and whether it is imposed.
{"title":"The prosecutor gender gap in Texas death penalty cases","authors":"David Niven, Mallory Rock","doi":"10.1111/ssqu.13379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13379","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the degree to which sentencing patterns in Texas capital cases vary by the gender of the prosecutor. In so doing, we explore the possibility that a factor unrelated to the crime influences whether the death penalty is sought and whether it is imposed.","PeriodicalId":48253,"journal":{"name":"Social Science Quarterly","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140297888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Robert G. Boatright, Caroline J. Tolbert, Nathan K. Micatka
ObjectiveFew studies have measured public attitudes about reform proposals for changing direct primaries. Despite strong public support over the past century for holding primaries, does the public want to change the direct primary, given its very low voter turnout and its potential role in fostering political polarization?MethodUsing a unique nationally representative survey of 3000 U.S. adults conducted in March 2023 by YouGov, this study shows that a majority of Americans support reform of primary elections.ResultsThe reforms which receive the greatest support are those that seem more “democratic” such as establishing national congressional primary and holding open primaries. There is lower support for reforms that give political parties more control over selecting candidates, such as state party conventions. There are significant differences between Republicans, Democrats, and independents, while factors such as interest, education, gender, and race have a minimal impact. Individuals living in states with nonpartisan primaries are more favorable toward this specific reform, ranked‐choice voting, and open primaries, but primary type was not significant in regression models.ConclusionsThe public is opposed to reforms that give parties more say in choosing candidates, consistent with public sentiment a century earlier when the direct primary was adopted.
{"title":"Public opinion on reforming U.S. primaries","authors":"Robert G. Boatright, Caroline J. Tolbert, Nathan K. Micatka","doi":"10.1111/ssqu.13370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13370","url":null,"abstract":"ObjectiveFew studies have measured public attitudes about reform proposals for changing direct primaries. Despite strong public support over the past century for holding primaries, does the public want to change the direct primary, given its very low voter turnout and its potential role in fostering political polarization?MethodUsing a unique nationally representative survey of 3000 U.S. adults conducted in March 2023 by YouGov, this study shows that a majority of Americans support reform of primary elections.ResultsThe reforms which receive the greatest support are those that seem more “democratic” such as establishing national congressional primary and holding open primaries. There is lower support for reforms that give political parties more control over selecting candidates, such as state party conventions. There are significant differences between Republicans, Democrats, and independents, while factors such as interest, education, gender, and race have a minimal impact. Individuals living in states with nonpartisan primaries are more favorable toward this specific reform, ranked‐choice voting, and open primaries, but primary type was not significant in regression models.ConclusionsThe public is opposed to reforms that give parties more say in choosing candidates, consistent with public sentiment a century earlier when the direct primary was adopted.","PeriodicalId":48253,"journal":{"name":"Social Science Quarterly","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140204011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lonna Rae Atkeson, Eli McKown‐Dawson, Jack Santucci, Kyle L. Saunders
ObjectivesElection observers have expressed concerns about voter “confusion” under ranked choice voting (RCV) since the 1890s. What is the meaning of “confusing,” and how does it affect behavior? We argue (with much of the literature) that ranking candidates for public office is a cognitively complex task because of a lack of information.MethodsWe explore some observable implications of this perspective using exit poll data from the first RCV election in Santa Fe, New Mexico, in 2018.ResultsSixteen percent of voters reported having felt very (6 percent) or somewhat (10 percent) confused, and Hispanic voters were more likely to be confused than white voters. Confused voters report ranking fewer candidates, have lower confidence in ballot‐counting accuracy, and are less supportive of RCV than nonconfused voters.ConclusionsThese results raise questions about RCV's equity, participation costs for voters, ease of use, and longevity.
{"title":"The impact of voter confusion in ranked choice voting","authors":"Lonna Rae Atkeson, Eli McKown‐Dawson, Jack Santucci, Kyle L. Saunders","doi":"10.1111/ssqu.13366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13366","url":null,"abstract":"ObjectivesElection observers have expressed concerns about voter “confusion” under ranked choice voting (RCV) since the 1890s. What is the meaning of “confusing,” and how does it affect behavior? We argue (with much of the literature) that ranking candidates for public office is a cognitively complex task because of a lack of information.MethodsWe explore some observable implications of this perspective using exit poll data from the first RCV election in Santa Fe, New Mexico, in 2018.ResultsSixteen percent of voters reported having felt very (6 percent) or somewhat (10 percent) confused, and Hispanic voters were more likely to be confused than white voters. Confused voters report ranking fewer candidates, have lower confidence in ballot‐counting accuracy, and are less supportive of RCV than nonconfused voters.ConclusionsThese results raise questions about RCV's equity, participation costs for voters, ease of use, and longevity.","PeriodicalId":48253,"journal":{"name":"Social Science Quarterly","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140204014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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