Public views on international organizations (IOs) have become a matter of central concern. While actors in world politics increasingly try to legitimize or delegitimize IOs, scholars have begun investigating such phenomena systematically. This paper provides the most comprehensive IO (de)legitimation study to date. Building on cueing theory, and considering input as well as output legitimacy, I examine the isolated and combined effects of delegitimation and self-legitimation on public perceptions of IOs. I concentrate on government criticism and citizen protests as two salient practices of delegitimation. In investigating self-legitimation, I focus on IOs’ public statements and institutional reforms. I study public opinion on the UN, World Bank, and WHO, as IOs of different functional scopes and levels of salience. In 2021, I conducted survey experiments on more than 32,000 citizens in ten countries worldwide (Australia, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, France, Hungary, Indonesia, Kenya, South Korea, and Turkey) – weighted by age, gender, region, and education. My main findings are: Delegitimation by governments and citizen protests has some limited effectiveness, depending on the IO in question. While IO self-legitimization statements and reforms in themselves do not boost public support for IOs, they are generally effective at neutralizing delegitimation attempts by governments and citizen protests.
{"title":"Effects of Self-Legitimation and Delegitimation on Public Attitudes toward International Organizations: A Worldwide Survey Experiment","authors":"Farsan Ghassim","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae012","url":null,"abstract":"Public views on international organizations (IOs) have become a matter of central concern. While actors in world politics increasingly try to legitimize or delegitimize IOs, scholars have begun investigating such phenomena systematically. This paper provides the most comprehensive IO (de)legitimation study to date. Building on cueing theory, and considering input as well as output legitimacy, I examine the isolated and combined effects of delegitimation and self-legitimation on public perceptions of IOs. I concentrate on government criticism and citizen protests as two salient practices of delegitimation. In investigating self-legitimation, I focus on IOs’ public statements and institutional reforms. I study public opinion on the UN, World Bank, and WHO, as IOs of different functional scopes and levels of salience. In 2021, I conducted survey experiments on more than 32,000 citizens in ten countries worldwide (Australia, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, France, Hungary, Indonesia, Kenya, South Korea, and Turkey) – weighted by age, gender, region, and education. My main findings are: Delegitimation by governments and citizen protests has some limited effectiveness, depending on the IO in question. While IO self-legitimization statements and reforms in themselves do not boost public support for IOs, they are generally effective at neutralizing delegitimation attempts by governments and citizen protests.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"151 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140331268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The debate on whether military humanitarian intervention and anti-atrocity norms, such as the responsibility to protect, cause perverse incentives, and provocative violence by a rebel group, has yet to reach a consensus. Specifically, existing theories are unable to fully explain why “emboldened” rebel groups provoke the government in some cases but not others. This paper reconciles this unresolved debate by arguing that it is not anti-atrocity norms but the temporary feasibility of humanitarian intervention that induces the potential rebel group to actually provoke the government. The inherent temporariness of the feasibility of large-scale intervention causes a commitment problem: An expectation of a temporary intervention shifts the balance of power toward a potential rebel and opens a quickly closing window of opportunity. A three-player game shows that, among other findings, a higher probability of humanitarian intervention alleviates the potential rebel’s incentive to fight, implying that the criticism of anti-atrocity norms is a “false charge.” The model also (i) explains why weaker groups can rebel in the shadow of external intervention and (ii) presents a novel implication that lowering the intervention cost can exacerbate the adverse incentive when a domestic commitment problem caused by the consolidation of government power is not severe.
{"title":"The Mercurial Commitment: Revisiting the Unintended Consequences of Military Humanitarian Intervention and Anti-Atrocity Norms","authors":"Hiroto Sawada","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae023","url":null,"abstract":"The debate on whether military humanitarian intervention and anti-atrocity norms, such as the responsibility to protect, cause perverse incentives, and provocative violence by a rebel group, has yet to reach a consensus. Specifically, existing theories are unable to fully explain why “emboldened” rebel groups provoke the government in some cases but not others. This paper reconciles this unresolved debate by arguing that it is not anti-atrocity norms but the temporary feasibility of humanitarian intervention that induces the potential rebel group to actually provoke the government. The inherent temporariness of the feasibility of large-scale intervention causes a commitment problem: An expectation of a temporary intervention shifts the balance of power toward a potential rebel and opens a quickly closing window of opportunity. A three-player game shows that, among other findings, a higher probability of humanitarian intervention alleviates the potential rebel’s incentive to fight, implying that the criticism of anti-atrocity norms is a “false charge.” The model also (i) explains why weaker groups can rebel in the shadow of external intervention and (ii) presents a novel implication that lowering the intervention cost can exacerbate the adverse incentive when a domestic commitment problem caused by the consolidation of government power is not severe.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anna Getmansky, Konstantinos Matakos, Tolga Sinmazdemir
What shapes the host population’s willingness to accept refugees into social, economic, and political life in their country? We argue that refugees’ ethnicity plays a key role—both directly and indirectly—in shaping support for having refugees as neighbors and for granting them a work permit or citizenship. Fielding a conjoint experiment in Turkey (N = 2,362), we find that locals discriminate against Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees compared to Turkomans. Although a university degree, social ties with locals, and knowledge of language boost prorefugee attitudes, ethnic bias may attenuate their effect. For example, local language knowledge increases support for Arab refugee profiles, but only when it comes to granting them a work permit, but not having them as neighbors or granting citizenship. In contrast, it increases support for profiles of Turkomans and Kurds in all the three domains. Thus, strategies such as learning the local language may not advance all refugees in all domains.
{"title":"Diversity without Adversity? Ethnic Bias toward Refugees in a Co-Religious Society","authors":"Anna Getmansky, Konstantinos Matakos, Tolga Sinmazdemir","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae031","url":null,"abstract":"What shapes the host population’s willingness to accept refugees into social, economic, and political life in their country? We argue that refugees’ ethnicity plays a key role—both directly and indirectly—in shaping support for having refugees as neighbors and for granting them a work permit or citizenship. Fielding a conjoint experiment in Turkey (N = 2,362), we find that locals discriminate against Syrian Arab and Kurdish refugees compared to Turkomans. Although a university degree, social ties with locals, and knowledge of language boost prorefugee attitudes, ethnic bias may attenuate their effect. For example, local language knowledge increases support for Arab refugee profiles, but only when it comes to granting them a work permit, but not having them as neighbors or granting citizenship. In contrast, it increases support for profiles of Turkomans and Kurds in all the three domains. Thus, strategies such as learning the local language may not advance all refugees in all domains.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article investigates determinants of representation in international human rights bodies. It is argued that socioeconomic factors shape whether human rights abuses translate into complaints to international human rights mechanisms. To seek international remedy, victims of human rights abuse must be aware of remedies, and they require complaint literacy to file complaints. Alternatively, they need ties to skilled networks that might represent their cases. Such complaint resources are systematically shaped by socioeconomic factors, implying that international human rights remedies tend to represent a self-selection of economic elites. The theoretical claims are tested both on the national and individual levels with novel data on the human rights complaint mechanisms operated by the UN Special Procedures (UNSP). While this mechanism is universally open, the follow-up statements of the UNSP reflect socioeconomic disparities both on the national and individual levels. On the national level, human rights abuses translate into more UNSP statements directed at richer countries. On the individual level, lawyers and professors tend to be more likely to be covered by the UNSP. The findings contribute to our understanding of representation in international human rights remedies, suggesting that these mechanisms struggle to reach marginalized groups in low-income countries.
{"title":"Elitist Remedies? Complaint Resources and Representation in International Human Rights Bodies","authors":"Christoph Valentin Steinert","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae042","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates determinants of representation in international human rights bodies. It is argued that socioeconomic factors shape whether human rights abuses translate into complaints to international human rights mechanisms. To seek international remedy, victims of human rights abuse must be aware of remedies, and they require complaint literacy to file complaints. Alternatively, they need ties to skilled networks that might represent their cases. Such complaint resources are systematically shaped by socioeconomic factors, implying that international human rights remedies tend to represent a self-selection of economic elites. The theoretical claims are tested both on the national and individual levels with novel data on the human rights complaint mechanisms operated by the UN Special Procedures (UNSP). While this mechanism is universally open, the follow-up statements of the UNSP reflect socioeconomic disparities both on the national and individual levels. On the national level, human rights abuses translate into more UNSP statements directed at richer countries. On the individual level, lawyers and professors tend to be more likely to be covered by the UNSP. The findings contribute to our understanding of representation in international human rights remedies, suggesting that these mechanisms struggle to reach marginalized groups in low-income countries.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How do policymakers respond to global crises? I argue that interpersonal trust enables policymakers to engage in ad hoc cooperation, in conditions of crisis and uncertainty. Leaders’ differentiated ties by degree—of stronger, looser, or absent—interpersonal trust influenced economies’ access to Federal Reserve swap lines over costlier unilateral and multilateral alternatives during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Using this framework, I re-examine the emergence of the Fed swap network. I triangulate evidence from elite interviews with central bankers in office during the crisis, and transcripts of Fed meetings. My findings highlight the role of interpersonal trust as an operating variable in shaping patterns of international cooperation and problematize the politics of technocratic governance. While necessary and successful, these crisis management policies reinforce global hierarchies and exacerbate the democratic deficit in central banking. This article thus draws attention to the contentious and undemocratic foundations of the global financial safety net.
{"title":"Central Bankers in Crisis: Interpersonal Trust, Cooperation, and the Creation of the Fed Swap Network during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis","authors":"Aditi Sahasrabuddhe","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae030","url":null,"abstract":"How do policymakers respond to global crises? I argue that interpersonal trust enables policymakers to engage in ad hoc cooperation, in conditions of crisis and uncertainty. Leaders’ differentiated ties by degree—of stronger, looser, or absent—interpersonal trust influenced economies’ access to Federal Reserve swap lines over costlier unilateral and multilateral alternatives during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Using this framework, I re-examine the emergence of the Fed swap network. I triangulate evidence from elite interviews with central bankers in office during the crisis, and transcripts of Fed meetings. My findings highlight the role of interpersonal trust as an operating variable in shaping patterns of international cooperation and problematize the politics of technocratic governance. While necessary and successful, these crisis management policies reinforce global hierarchies and exacerbate the democratic deficit in central banking. This article thus draws attention to the contentious and undemocratic foundations of the global financial safety net.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140196132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent studies on the public opinion mechanism of the democratic peace have demonstrated experimentally that democratic citizens are averse to attacking other democracies. The presence of rivalry, however, has long been recognized as one of the important factors contributing to either initiation or recurrence of international conflict. Despite such importance, our understanding remains limited as to how rivalry affects public opinion, particularly in the context of the democratic peace. In this article, we argue that democratic publics’ perception of rivalry weakens the effect of regime type. We expect democratic publics to be less reluctant in terms of fighting other rival democracies. Using an original survey experiment in South Korea, we demonstrate that the South Korean public, similar to those of western democracies, is reluctant to use force against nonrival democracies, but less so against rival democracies. Our findings suggest that the scope of the democratic peace should be qualified.
{"title":"Public Opinion, Rivalry, and the Democratic Peace: Experimental Evidence from South Korea","authors":"Gidong Kim, Yu Bin Kim, Dongjin Kwak","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae027","url":null,"abstract":"Recent studies on the public opinion mechanism of the democratic peace have demonstrated experimentally that democratic citizens are averse to attacking other democracies. The presence of rivalry, however, has long been recognized as one of the important factors contributing to either initiation or recurrence of international conflict. Despite such importance, our understanding remains limited as to how rivalry affects public opinion, particularly in the context of the democratic peace. In this article, we argue that democratic publics’ perception of rivalry weakens the effect of regime type. We expect democratic publics to be less reluctant in terms of fighting other rival democracies. Using an original survey experiment in South Korea, we demonstrate that the South Korean public, similar to those of western democracies, is reluctant to use force against nonrival democracies, but less so against rival democracies. Our findings suggest that the scope of the democratic peace should be qualified.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140196127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, I suggest that economic globalization is experiencing a particularly serious kind of crisis: a “polycrisis.” Use of this term has proliferated recently but with many meanings. I propose that it be defined as a cluster of distinct crises that interact in ways that they and/or their effects tend to reinforce each other. This core definition enables the identification of distinct types of polycrises that capture multiple uses of the term to date. These types vary according to the spatiality, temporality, and level of generality of each polycrisis as well as the traits of its constituent crises. The analytical utility of the term, when defined in this way, is to encourage scholars to analyze interconnections between different kinds of crises across various issue areas and to reject monocausal analyses of crisis clusters they study. Applying this understanding of the concept to the study of economic globalization, I focus on five constituent crises that are contributing to its current polycrisis. This application of the term highlights yet another type of polycrisis, illustrating the importance of the conceptual issues raised above. The article concludes with some cautions about efforts to predict economic globalization's future and about ways in which polycrisis discourse may serve political projects.
{"title":"Economic Globalization's Polycrisis","authors":"Eric Helleiner","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae024","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I suggest that economic globalization is experiencing a particularly serious kind of crisis: a “polycrisis.” Use of this term has proliferated recently but with many meanings. I propose that it be defined as a cluster of distinct crises that interact in ways that they and/or their effects tend to reinforce each other. This core definition enables the identification of distinct types of polycrises that capture multiple uses of the term to date. These types vary according to the spatiality, temporality, and level of generality of each polycrisis as well as the traits of its constituent crises. The analytical utility of the term, when defined in this way, is to encourage scholars to analyze interconnections between different kinds of crises across various issue areas and to reject monocausal analyses of crisis clusters they study. Applying this understanding of the concept to the study of economic globalization, I focus on five constituent crises that are contributing to its current polycrisis. This application of the term highlights yet another type of polycrisis, illustrating the importance of the conceptual issues raised above. The article concludes with some cautions about efforts to predict economic globalization's future and about ways in which polycrisis discourse may serve political projects.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140196129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Identifying a clear relationship between rebel group structures and the use of violence faces the challenge that group structures rarely change over time. We exploit the analytical advantage provided by long religious holidays to address this issue using the principal-agent framework. Religious holidays serve as a focal point and reduce group coordination costs, but also raise the societal costs of violence. We argue the principal of rebel groups is more sensitive to the increased societal costs than the agents and thereby attempts to restrain the agents from attacking during religious holidays. However, the success of these attempts depends on the group’s institutionalization level. Long religious holidays exacerbate the principal-agent problem due to the high costs of restraining agents from attacking for an extended period, making them the most likely case for our analysis. We test the theory by first conducting microlevel analysis of Islamic separatist groups in three Southeast Asian countries and then analyzing a cross-sectional sample of Islamic rebel groups. Results show that highly institutionalized groups that have a central command system and control over constituent groups are less likely to attack during long religious holidays than on other days, and vice versa for weakly institutionalized groups.
{"title":"Rebel Institutionalization, Religious Holidays, and Political Violence","authors":"Xin Nong, Chun-Ying Wu","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae046","url":null,"abstract":"Identifying a clear relationship between rebel group structures and the use of violence faces the challenge that group structures rarely change over time. We exploit the analytical advantage provided by long religious holidays to address this issue using the principal-agent framework. Religious holidays serve as a focal point and reduce group coordination costs, but also raise the societal costs of violence. We argue the principal of rebel groups is more sensitive to the increased societal costs than the agents and thereby attempts to restrain the agents from attacking during religious holidays. However, the success of these attempts depends on the group’s institutionalization level. Long religious holidays exacerbate the principal-agent problem due to the high costs of restraining agents from attacking for an extended period, making them the most likely case for our analysis. We test the theory by first conducting microlevel analysis of Islamic separatist groups in three Southeast Asian countries and then analyzing a cross-sectional sample of Islamic rebel groups. Results show that highly institutionalized groups that have a central command system and control over constituent groups are less likely to attack during long religious holidays than on other days, and vice versa for weakly institutionalized groups.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140196125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What explains the initiation and escalation of International Criminal Court (ICC) involvement in a situation? In light of growing charges of bias against the court, understanding the determinants of ICC involvement is critically important. Building upon research on bounded discretion at international courts, we argue that two potentially competing forces influence the court. While prioritizing impartiality should lead the court to target perpetrators of the gravest violations of human rights in states with domestic impunity, prioritizing powerful states’ interests suggests that the court may avoid involvement in powerful states and those with close ties to powerful countries. We test these arguments using original data on ICC involvement and a novel estimator that accounts for the sequential nature of ICC activity. We find that the court acts more in accordance with the legal mandate when initiating preliminary examinations, but power politics play a more dominant role at the formal investigation stage. These findings have several implications for academic and policy work on both the ICC and international courts more generally.
{"title":"Understanding the Determinants of ICC Involvement: Legal Mandate and Power Politics","authors":"Alyssa K Prorok, Benjamin Appel, Shahryar Minhas","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae018","url":null,"abstract":"What explains the initiation and escalation of International Criminal Court (ICC) involvement in a situation? In light of growing charges of bias against the court, understanding the determinants of ICC involvement is critically important. Building upon research on bounded discretion at international courts, we argue that two potentially competing forces influence the court. While prioritizing impartiality should lead the court to target perpetrators of the gravest violations of human rights in states with domestic impunity, prioritizing powerful states’ interests suggests that the court may avoid involvement in powerful states and those with close ties to powerful countries. We test these arguments using original data on ICC involvement and a novel estimator that accounts for the sequential nature of ICC activity. We find that the court acts more in accordance with the legal mandate when initiating preliminary examinations, but power politics play a more dominant role at the formal investigation stage. These findings have several implications for academic and policy work on both the ICC and international courts more generally.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"130 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140192731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While International Relations scholarship has increasingly addressed questions of race, the literature on international organizations (IOs) has been slower to do so. In particular, it has neglected how race functions within IO workforces. Building on sociological theories of racialized organizations, we develop the concept of racialized IOs. Like domestic organizations, racialized IOs are characterized by enhanced or inhibited agency of racial groups, racialized distribution of resources, credentialing of whiteness, and decoupling of formal rules and informal practices along racial lines. However, there are also two important differences. First, since IOs rely on member states for resources, their secretariats need to accommodate powerful white-majority countries (macro-level pressures). Second, since IO workforces are diverse, their employees may bring a range of racial stereotypes that exist in their societies into their professional practice (micro-level pressures). Using the case of UN peacekeeping, we demonstrate how the four features of racialized organizations operate in light of these macro- and micro-level pressures. We show that locally hired peacekeeping staff face constraints on exercising agency; that non-white peacekeepers perform more dangerous jobs than their white counterparts; that whiteness serves as a proxy for desirable skills while non-white peacekeepers’ knowledge is devalued; and that peacekeepers from white-majority countries receive special treatment or deviate from UN-wide procedures.
{"title":"Race and International Organizations","authors":"Kseniya Oksamytna, Sarah von Billerbeck","doi":"10.1093/isq/sqae010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae010","url":null,"abstract":"While International Relations scholarship has increasingly addressed questions of race, the literature on international organizations (IOs) has been slower to do so. In particular, it has neglected how race functions within IO workforces. Building on sociological theories of racialized organizations, we develop the concept of racialized IOs. Like domestic organizations, racialized IOs are characterized by enhanced or inhibited agency of racial groups, racialized distribution of resources, credentialing of whiteness, and decoupling of formal rules and informal practices along racial lines. However, there are also two important differences. First, since IOs rely on member states for resources, their secretariats need to accommodate powerful white-majority countries (macro-level pressures). Second, since IO workforces are diverse, their employees may bring a range of racial stereotypes that exist in their societies into their professional practice (micro-level pressures). Using the case of UN peacekeeping, we demonstrate how the four features of racialized organizations operate in light of these macro- and micro-level pressures. We show that locally hired peacekeeping staff face constraints on exercising agency; that non-white peacekeepers perform more dangerous jobs than their white counterparts; that whiteness serves as a proxy for desirable skills while non-white peacekeepers’ knowledge is devalued; and that peacekeepers from white-majority countries receive special treatment or deviate from UN-wide procedures.","PeriodicalId":48313,"journal":{"name":"International Studies Quarterly","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140192784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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