Pub Date : 2025-10-07DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105196
Philippe Mahenc
This paper investigates a dynamic model of price signaling for a credence product with unknown social performance. A new entrant uses prices to reveal social responsibility and maintain reputation during a verification phase. In equilibrium, the signaling strategy involves penetration or skimming pricing depending on the competitive pressures the entrant faces. Faced with competition from conventional incumbents, the socially responsible entrant repeatedly charges low prices to penetrate the market. In contrast, in an untapped market, the socially responsible entrant repeatedly charges high prices to skim the cream off the top of the demand. In both cases, costly signaling is consistent with Veblen's law that conspicuous waste is an effective signal of reputation.
{"title":"Penetration or skimming pricing for credence products?","authors":"Philippe Mahenc","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105196","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105196","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates a dynamic model of price signaling for a credence product with unknown social performance. A new entrant uses prices to reveal social responsibility and maintain reputation during a verification phase. In equilibrium, the signaling strategy involves penetration or skimming pricing depending on the competitive pressures the entrant faces. Faced with competition from conventional incumbents, the socially responsible entrant repeatedly charges low prices to penetrate the market. In contrast, in an untapped market, the socially responsible entrant repeatedly charges high prices to skim the cream off the top of the demand. In both cases, costly signaling is consistent with Veblen's law that conspicuous waste is an effective signal of reputation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105196"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-07DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105195
Fanny Cartellier , Peter Tankov , Olivier David Zerbib
We show how investors with pro-environmental preferences and who penalize revelations of past environmental controversies impact corporate greenwashing practices. Through a dynamic equilibrium model, we characterize firms' optimal environmental communication, green investments, and greenwashing policies, and we explain the forces driving them. Notably, under a condition that we explicitly characterize, companies greenwash to inflate their environmental rating above their fundamental environmental value, with an effort and impact increasing with investors' pro-environmental preferences. However, investment decisions that penalize greenwashing, policies increasing transparency, and environment-related technological innovation contribute to mitigating corporate greenwashing. We provide empirical support for our results.
{"title":"Can investors curb greenwashing?","authors":"Fanny Cartellier , Peter Tankov , Olivier David Zerbib","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105195","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105195","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We show how investors with pro-environmental preferences and who penalize revelations of past environmental controversies impact corporate greenwashing practices. Through a dynamic equilibrium model, we characterize firms' optimal environmental communication, green investments, and greenwashing policies, and we explain the forces driving them. Notably, under a condition that we explicitly characterize, companies greenwash to inflate their environmental rating above their fundamental environmental value, with an effort and impact increasing with investors' pro-environmental preferences. However, investment decisions that penalize greenwashing, policies increasing transparency, and environment-related technological innovation contribute to mitigating corporate greenwashing. We provide empirical support for our results.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105195"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-02DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105194
Hamilton Galindo Gil , Liu Mendoza Perez
We analyze dollarization hysteresis in emerging economies, linking the persistent demand for foreign currency to past inflation experiences and the perceived risk of returning to high inflation episodes. Using data from 116 emerging economies, we show that dollarization remains high even after disinflation, particularly in countries with histories of extreme inflation. We uncover three stylized facts: (i) high inflation episodes are frequent and severe; (ii) they coincide with sharp currency depreciations, triggering shifts to dollar deposits; and (iii) dollarization persists long after inflation stabilizes. Motivated by these facts, we develop a portfolio-choice model where agents allocate between domestic and dollar deposits. We show that although a hedge demand—associated with the observed correlation between inflation and depreciation in low-inflation economies—plays a role, it is not sufficient to generate a positive allocation to dollar deposits. By incorporating inflation disasters and fear of inflation—persistent pessimism shaped by past instability—we account for dollarization's resilience. Together, risk hedging, disaster risk, and belief heterogeneity explain why dollarization persists in low-inflation emerging economies.
{"title":"Dollarization hysteresis, inflation jumps, and fear of inflation","authors":"Hamilton Galindo Gil , Liu Mendoza Perez","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105194","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105194","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze dollarization hysteresis in emerging economies, linking the persistent demand for foreign currency to past inflation experiences and the perceived risk of returning to high inflation episodes. Using data from 116 emerging economies, we show that dollarization remains high even after disinflation, particularly in countries with histories of extreme inflation. We uncover three stylized facts: (i) high inflation episodes are frequent and severe; (ii) they coincide with sharp currency depreciations, triggering shifts to dollar deposits; and (iii) dollarization persists long after inflation stabilizes. Motivated by these facts, we develop a portfolio-choice model where agents allocate between domestic and dollar deposits. We show that although a hedge demand—associated with the observed correlation between inflation and depreciation in low-inflation economies—plays a role, it is not sufficient to generate a positive allocation to dollar deposits. By incorporating inflation disasters and fear of inflation—persistent pessimism shaped by past instability—we account for dollarization's resilience. Together, risk hedging, disaster risk, and belief heterogeneity explain why dollarization persists in low-inflation emerging economies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105194"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-26DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105185
Rüdiger Bachmann , Christian Bayer , Martin Kornejew
This paper examines how households adjusted their consumption behavior in response to COVID-19 infection risk during the early phase of the pandemic and without consumption lockdowns. We use a monthly consumption survey specifically designed by the German Statistical Office, covering the second wave of COVID-19 infections from September to November 2020. Households reduced their consumption expenditures on durable goods and social activities by 24 percent and 36 percent, respectively, in response to one hundred additional infections per one hundred thousand inhabitants per week. The effect was concentrated among the elderly, whose mortality risk from COVID-19 infection was arguably the highest.
{"title":"Pandemic consumption","authors":"Rüdiger Bachmann , Christian Bayer , Martin Kornejew","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105185","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105185","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines how households adjusted their consumption behavior in response to COVID-19 infection risk during the early phase of the pandemic and without consumption lockdowns. We use a monthly consumption survey specifically designed by the German Statistical Office, covering the second wave of COVID-19 infections from September to November 2020. Households reduced their consumption expenditures on durable goods and social activities by 24 percent and 36 percent, respectively, in response to one hundred additional infections per one hundred thousand inhabitants per week. The effect was concentrated among the elderly, whose mortality risk from COVID-19 infection was arguably the highest.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105185"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We identify a minimal set of components to generate price stickiness by a laboratory experiment on an oligopolistic price setting game. Our design involves repeated aggregate shocks to the market but features no uncertainty in their timing and magnitude, no real-nominal distinction, or no need to compute the best response to the prices of the other subjects. We find persistent price stickiness when prices are strategic complements and fully anticipated shocks lower the equilibrium price. By exploring the causes of the observed downward stickiness, we find that it stems from strategic uncertainty regarding beliefs about others' prices, compounded by strategic complementarity and an asymmetric payoff structure.
{"title":"Price stickiness and strategic uncertainty: An experimental study","authors":"Yukihiko Funaki , Kohei Kawamura , Kozo Ueda , Nobuyuki Uto","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105186","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105186","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We identify a minimal set of components to generate price stickiness by a laboratory experiment on an oligopolistic price setting game. Our design involves repeated aggregate shocks to the market but features no uncertainty in their timing and magnitude, no real-nominal distinction, or no need to compute the best response to the prices of the other subjects. We find persistent price stickiness when prices are strategic complements and fully anticipated shocks lower the equilibrium price. By exploring the causes of the observed downward stickiness, we find that it stems from strategic uncertainty regarding beliefs about others' prices, compounded by strategic complementarity and an asymmetric payoff structure.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105186"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145222663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-19DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105184
Sujan Bandyopadhyay , Domenico Ferraro
Workhorse business cycle models struggle to explain the magnitude and persistence of cyclical fluctuations in the labor share of output and employment in the United States. A model with search frictions in the labor market and a technology choice addresses this shortcoming. In this model, the production technology is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) in the short run, while it converges to Cobb-Douglas in the long run. We calibrate the model using U.S. data and find that the inclusion of a technology choice with adjustment costs significantly enhances the model's ability to propagate productivity shocks, compared to a model with a fixed Cobb-Douglas technology. The calibrated model successfully replicates the overshooting of the labor share in the data.
{"title":"Persistence of labor share fluctuations and overshooting","authors":"Sujan Bandyopadhyay , Domenico Ferraro","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105184","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105184","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Workhorse business cycle models struggle to explain the magnitude and persistence of cyclical fluctuations in the labor share of output and employment in the United States. A model with search frictions in the labor market and a technology choice addresses this shortcoming. In this model, the production technology is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) in the short run, while it converges to Cobb-Douglas in the long run. We calibrate the model using U.S. data and find that the inclusion of a technology choice with adjustment costs significantly enhances the model's ability to propagate productivity shocks, compared to a model with a fixed Cobb-Douglas technology. The calibrated model successfully replicates the overshooting of the labor share in the data.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105184"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145120574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-16DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105180
Nihad Aliyev
We model investors facing ambiguity about the number of informed traders and characterize equilibrium in both financial and information markets. In the financial market, this ambiguity generates a premium that can be positive or negative, depending on traders' ambiguity attitude. The premium always increases with ambiguity aversion but only increases with ambiguity level when traders are sufficiently ambiguity averse. We show that traders' effective ambiguity aversion increases with the number of informed traders, resulting in a non-monotonic relation between the equity premium and the number of informed traders. In the information market, ambiguity about the number of informed traders emerges endogenously from a range of information acquisition costs.
{"title":"Ambiguity and information tradeoffs","authors":"Nihad Aliyev","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105180","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105180","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We model investors facing ambiguity about the number of informed traders and characterize equilibrium in both financial and information markets. In the financial market, this ambiguity generates a premium that can be positive or negative, depending on traders' ambiguity attitude. The premium always increases with ambiguity aversion but only increases with ambiguity level when traders are sufficiently ambiguity averse. We show that traders' effective ambiguity aversion increases with the number of informed traders, resulting in a non-monotonic relation between the equity premium and the number of informed traders. In the information market, ambiguity about the number of informed traders emerges endogenously from a range of information acquisition costs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"179 ","pages":"Article 105180"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145099747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-15DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105178
Ning Cai , Siyi Wang , Wei Zhang , Haohong Lin
We propose a unified closed-form approximation approach to pricing path-dependent equity and credit derivatives such as defaultable single- and double-barrier options and equity default swaps (EDSs) under jump-to-default extended exponential Lévy models with local volatilities. This rich class of hybrid equity-credit models allows for state-dependent volatilities, state-dependent default intensities, and general Lévy types with either finite or infinite activities and with either finite or infinite variations, and includes many important hybrid equity-credit models as special cases. The convergences of the closed-form approximation pricing formulas are theoretically proved, and the corresponding convergence rates are also theoretically established. Numerical results indicate that our pricing method is accurate and efficient under a wide range of hybrid equity-credit models.
{"title":"Pricing path-dependent equity and credit derivatives within a general hybrid equity-credit framework: A unified CTMC approximation approach","authors":"Ning Cai , Siyi Wang , Wei Zhang , Haohong Lin","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105178","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105178","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a unified closed-form approximation approach to pricing path-dependent equity and credit derivatives such as defaultable single- and double-barrier options and equity default swaps (EDSs) under jump-to-default extended exponential Lévy models with local volatilities. This rich class of hybrid equity-credit models allows for state-dependent volatilities, state-dependent default intensities, and general Lévy types with either finite or infinite activities and with either finite or infinite variations, and includes many important hybrid equity-credit models as special cases. The convergences of the closed-form approximation pricing formulas are theoretically proved, and the corresponding convergence rates are also theoretically established. Numerical results indicate that our pricing method is accurate and efficient under a wide range of hybrid equity-credit models.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105178"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145099132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-15DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105182
Tirupam Goel
Should there be few large or several small banks? Large banks benefit from scale economies, but their default can be systemic. This paper develops a macroeconomic model with heterogeneous banks to study the efficiency versus financial-stability trade-off. Scale economies and default losses are calibrated using micro-data. Unlike representative bank models, a novel banking-dynamics channel of regulation emerges – the endogenous response in banks' size-distribution matters for welfare. Capital regulation that equalizes leverage, default rate, or expected loss across banks fails to account for the size-dependent trade-off. Optimal regulation is size-dependent, features a hump-shaped welfare response, and induces more medium-sized banks.
{"title":"Efficient or systemic banks: Can regulation strike a deal?","authors":"Tirupam Goel","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105182","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105182","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Should there be few large or several small banks? Large banks benefit from scale economies, but their default can be systemic. This paper develops a macroeconomic model with heterogeneous banks to study the efficiency versus financial-stability trade-off. Scale economies and default losses are calibrated using micro-data. Unlike representative bank models, a novel banking-dynamics channel of regulation emerges – the endogenous response in banks' size-distribution matters for welfare. Capital regulation that equalizes leverage, default rate, or expected loss across banks fails to account for the size-dependent trade-off. Optimal regulation is size-dependent, features a hump-shaped welfare response, and induces more medium-sized banks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"179 ","pages":"Article 105182"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145099745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-15DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105183
François de Soyres , Erik Frohm , Emily Highkin , Carter Mix
We study the role of expectations in driving export adjustment. Using bilateral data on exchange rates, exchange rate forecasts, and HS2-product export data for a panel of countries, we show that expectations of exchange rate changes are an important channel for anticipatory export adjustment. In our preferred specification, an expected exchange rate depreciation induces substantial entry of new exporters (extensive margin adjustment), with no significant effect on total export volumes or the intensive margin. We develop a simple model with heterogeneous firms to provide intuition for these findings and discuss how anticipation behavior may affect trade elasticity measurement.
{"title":"Forward looking exporters","authors":"François de Soyres , Erik Frohm , Emily Highkin , Carter Mix","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105183","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105183","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the role of expectations in driving export adjustment. Using bilateral data on exchange rates, exchange rate forecasts, and HS2-product export data for a panel of countries, we show that expectations of exchange rate changes are an important channel for anticipatory export adjustment. In our preferred specification, an expected exchange rate depreciation induces substantial entry of new exporters (extensive margin adjustment), with no significant effect on total export volumes or the intensive margin. We develop a simple model with heterogeneous firms to provide intuition for these findings and discuss how anticipation behavior may affect trade elasticity measurement.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105183"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145099130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}