Pub Date : 2025-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105198
Santiago Forte
This study introduces a nonparametric approach to pricing credit default swaps (CDSs) and other single-name credit-risky securities. This method is notable for its simplicity, estimation speed, and flexibility. That is, it relies exclusively on closed-form solutions, which provide instantaneous results, and allows the user to reproduce any term structure of CDS spreads. I empirically assess its pricing performance by comparing it with an otherwise equivalent semiparametric (piecewise constant default probability) model that requires a series of root-search algorithms and represents the current market convention for marking-to-market CDS contracts. This analysis demonstrates that the new method also implies a reduction in mean percentage absolute pricing errors.
{"title":"A simple nonparametric approach to pricing credit default swaps","authors":"Santiago Forte","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105198","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105198","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study introduces a nonparametric approach to pricing credit default swaps (CDSs) and other single-name credit-risky securities. This method is notable for its simplicity, estimation speed, and flexibility. That is, it relies exclusively on closed-form solutions, which provide instantaneous results, and allows the user to reproduce any term structure of CDS spreads. I empirically assess its pricing performance by comparing it with an otherwise equivalent semiparametric (piecewise constant default probability) model that requires a series of root-search algorithms and represents the current market convention for marking-to-market CDS contracts. This analysis demonstrates that the new method also implies a reduction in mean percentage absolute pricing errors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105198"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145466327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105200
Volker Hahn, Annika Schürle
We develop an overlapping-generations model with sticky wages and prices to study the socially optimal inflation rate in the long term. While sticky prices and firms’ productivity growth would yield a positive optimal inflation rate, we show that sticky wages, in combination with empirically plausible changes in productivity over workers’ lives, make moderate deflation optimal. We also study intergenerational conflicts and show that younger voters gain from lower inflation, whereas older voters prefer higher inflation.
{"title":"How does inflation affect different age groups?","authors":"Volker Hahn, Annika Schürle","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105200","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105200","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop an overlapping-generations model with sticky wages and prices to study the socially optimal inflation rate in the long term. While sticky prices and firms’ productivity growth would yield a positive optimal inflation rate, we show that sticky wages, in combination with empirically plausible changes in productivity over workers’ lives, make moderate deflation optimal. We also study intergenerational conflicts and show that younger voters gain from lower inflation, whereas older voters prefer higher inflation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105200"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145417535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-30DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105204
Toyoichiro Shirota
This study explores the mechanism behind the persistent effects of monetary policy shocks, resolving a discrepancy between an assumption in typical macroeconomic models and micro evidence. While standard macro models often rely on a large demand kink (a micro real rigidity) to generate persistent real effects of monetary policy shocks, micro-empirical studies find this kink to be modest. I show that this discrepancy can be resolved by focusing on a previously underexplored interaction: the effects of this modest, empirically consistent micro real rigidity are amplified when combined with the macro real rigidities inherent in production linkages. A stylized production-chain model first clarifies the mechanism, showing how upstream micro rigidities are transformed into downstream macro rigidities. A large-scale production-network model, disciplined by empirical data, then demonstrates that this combined mechanism is quantitatively important for macroeconomic persistence.
{"title":"Demand-side real rigidities revisited","authors":"Toyoichiro Shirota","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105204","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105204","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study explores the mechanism behind the persistent effects of monetary policy shocks, resolving a discrepancy between an assumption in typical macroeconomic models and micro evidence. While standard macro models often rely on a large demand kink (a micro real rigidity) to generate persistent real effects of monetary policy shocks, micro-empirical studies find this kink to be modest. I show that this discrepancy can be resolved by focusing on a previously underexplored interaction: the effects of this modest, empirically consistent micro real rigidity are amplified when combined with the macro real rigidities inherent in production linkages. A stylized production-chain model first clarifies the mechanism, showing how upstream micro rigidities are transformed into downstream macro rigidities. A large-scale production-network model, disciplined by empirical data, then demonstrates that this combined mechanism is quantitatively important for macroeconomic persistence.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"181 ","pages":"Article 105204"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145448682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-09DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105197
Kwok Ping Tsang , Zichao Yang
Using FOMC transcripts and customized deep learning models, we quantify “hidden dissent”, or disagreement in the FOMC that is unobserved in formal votes. We find hidden dissent to be prevalent and systematically driven by macroeconomic conditions like inflation and unemployment. It strongly correlates with divergent member projections (SEP) and measures of policy sub-optimality, reflecting heterogeneity among members in policy preferences. Furthermore, we show that the financial markets respond to the hidden dissent implied in FOMC minutes.
{"title":"Agree to disagree: Measuring hidden dissent in FOMC meetings","authors":"Kwok Ping Tsang , Zichao Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105197","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105197","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using FOMC transcripts and customized deep learning models, we quantify “hidden dissent”, or disagreement in the FOMC that is unobserved in formal votes. We find hidden dissent to be prevalent and systematically driven by macroeconomic conditions like inflation and unemployment. It strongly correlates with divergent member projections (SEP) and measures of policy sub-optimality, reflecting heterogeneity among members in policy preferences. Furthermore, we show that the financial markets respond to the hidden dissent implied in FOMC minutes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105197"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-07DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105196
Philippe Mahenc
This paper investigates a dynamic model of price signaling for a credence product with unknown social performance. A new entrant uses prices to reveal social responsibility and maintain reputation during a verification phase. In equilibrium, the signaling strategy involves penetration or skimming pricing depending on the competitive pressures the entrant faces. Faced with competition from conventional incumbents, the socially responsible entrant repeatedly charges low prices to penetrate the market. In contrast, in an untapped market, the socially responsible entrant repeatedly charges high prices to skim the cream off the top of the demand. In both cases, costly signaling is consistent with Veblen's law that conspicuous waste is an effective signal of reputation.
{"title":"Penetration or skimming pricing for credence products?","authors":"Philippe Mahenc","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105196","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105196","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates a dynamic model of price signaling for a credence product with unknown social performance. A new entrant uses prices to reveal social responsibility and maintain reputation during a verification phase. In equilibrium, the signaling strategy involves penetration or skimming pricing depending on the competitive pressures the entrant faces. Faced with competition from conventional incumbents, the socially responsible entrant repeatedly charges low prices to penetrate the market. In contrast, in an untapped market, the socially responsible entrant repeatedly charges high prices to skim the cream off the top of the demand. In both cases, costly signaling is consistent with Veblen's law that conspicuous waste is an effective signal of reputation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105196"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-07DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105195
Fanny Cartellier , Peter Tankov , Olivier David Zerbib
We show how investors with pro-environmental preferences and who penalize revelations of past environmental controversies impact corporate greenwashing practices. Through a dynamic equilibrium model, we characterize firms' optimal environmental communication, green investments, and greenwashing policies, and we explain the forces driving them. Notably, under a condition that we explicitly characterize, companies greenwash to inflate their environmental rating above their fundamental environmental value, with an effort and impact increasing with investors' pro-environmental preferences. However, investment decisions that penalize greenwashing, policies increasing transparency, and environment-related technological innovation contribute to mitigating corporate greenwashing. We provide empirical support for our results.
{"title":"Can investors curb greenwashing?","authors":"Fanny Cartellier , Peter Tankov , Olivier David Zerbib","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105195","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105195","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We show how investors with pro-environmental preferences and who penalize revelations of past environmental controversies impact corporate greenwashing practices. Through a dynamic equilibrium model, we characterize firms' optimal environmental communication, green investments, and greenwashing policies, and we explain the forces driving them. Notably, under a condition that we explicitly characterize, companies greenwash to inflate their environmental rating above their fundamental environmental value, with an effort and impact increasing with investors' pro-environmental preferences. However, investment decisions that penalize greenwashing, policies increasing transparency, and environment-related technological innovation contribute to mitigating corporate greenwashing. We provide empirical support for our results.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105195"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-02DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105194
Hamilton Galindo Gil , Liu Mendoza Perez
We analyze dollarization hysteresis in emerging economies, linking the persistent demand for foreign currency to past inflation experiences and the perceived risk of returning to high inflation episodes. Using data from 116 emerging economies, we show that dollarization remains high even after disinflation, particularly in countries with histories of extreme inflation. We uncover three stylized facts: (i) high inflation episodes are frequent and severe; (ii) they coincide with sharp currency depreciations, triggering shifts to dollar deposits; and (iii) dollarization persists long after inflation stabilizes. Motivated by these facts, we develop a portfolio-choice model where agents allocate between domestic and dollar deposits. We show that although a hedge demand—associated with the observed correlation between inflation and depreciation in low-inflation economies—plays a role, it is not sufficient to generate a positive allocation to dollar deposits. By incorporating inflation disasters and fear of inflation—persistent pessimism shaped by past instability—we account for dollarization's resilience. Together, risk hedging, disaster risk, and belief heterogeneity explain why dollarization persists in low-inflation emerging economies.
{"title":"Dollarization hysteresis, inflation jumps, and fear of inflation","authors":"Hamilton Galindo Gil , Liu Mendoza Perez","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105194","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105194","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze dollarization hysteresis in emerging economies, linking the persistent demand for foreign currency to past inflation experiences and the perceived risk of returning to high inflation episodes. Using data from 116 emerging economies, we show that dollarization remains high even after disinflation, particularly in countries with histories of extreme inflation. We uncover three stylized facts: (i) high inflation episodes are frequent and severe; (ii) they coincide with sharp currency depreciations, triggering shifts to dollar deposits; and (iii) dollarization persists long after inflation stabilizes. Motivated by these facts, we develop a portfolio-choice model where agents allocate between domestic and dollar deposits. We show that although a hedge demand—associated with the observed correlation between inflation and depreciation in low-inflation economies—plays a role, it is not sufficient to generate a positive allocation to dollar deposits. By incorporating inflation disasters and fear of inflation—persistent pessimism shaped by past instability—we account for dollarization's resilience. Together, risk hedging, disaster risk, and belief heterogeneity explain why dollarization persists in low-inflation emerging economies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105194"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-26DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105185
Rüdiger Bachmann , Christian Bayer , Martin Kornejew
This paper examines how households adjusted their consumption behavior in response to COVID-19 infection risk during the early phase of the pandemic and without consumption lockdowns. We use a monthly consumption survey specifically designed by the German Statistical Office, covering the second wave of COVID-19 infections from September to November 2020. Households reduced their consumption expenditures on durable goods and social activities by 24 percent and 36 percent, respectively, in response to one hundred additional infections per one hundred thousand inhabitants per week. The effect was concentrated among the elderly, whose mortality risk from COVID-19 infection was arguably the highest.
{"title":"Pandemic consumption","authors":"Rüdiger Bachmann , Christian Bayer , Martin Kornejew","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105185","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105185","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines how households adjusted their consumption behavior in response to COVID-19 infection risk during the early phase of the pandemic and without consumption lockdowns. We use a monthly consumption survey specifically designed by the German Statistical Office, covering the second wave of COVID-19 infections from September to November 2020. Households reduced their consumption expenditures on durable goods and social activities by 24 percent and 36 percent, respectively, in response to one hundred additional infections per one hundred thousand inhabitants per week. The effect was concentrated among the elderly, whose mortality risk from COVID-19 infection was arguably the highest.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105185"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145268734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We identify a minimal set of components to generate price stickiness by a laboratory experiment on an oligopolistic price setting game. Our design involves repeated aggregate shocks to the market but features no uncertainty in their timing and magnitude, no real-nominal distinction, or no need to compute the best response to the prices of the other subjects. We find persistent price stickiness when prices are strategic complements and fully anticipated shocks lower the equilibrium price. By exploring the causes of the observed downward stickiness, we find that it stems from strategic uncertainty regarding beliefs about others' prices, compounded by strategic complementarity and an asymmetric payoff structure.
{"title":"Price stickiness and strategic uncertainty: An experimental study","authors":"Yukihiko Funaki , Kohei Kawamura , Kozo Ueda , Nobuyuki Uto","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105186","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105186","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We identify a minimal set of components to generate price stickiness by a laboratory experiment on an oligopolistic price setting game. Our design involves repeated aggregate shocks to the market but features no uncertainty in their timing and magnitude, no real-nominal distinction, or no need to compute the best response to the prices of the other subjects. We find persistent price stickiness when prices are strategic complements and fully anticipated shocks lower the equilibrium price. By exploring the causes of the observed downward stickiness, we find that it stems from strategic uncertainty regarding beliefs about others' prices, compounded by strategic complementarity and an asymmetric payoff structure.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105186"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145222663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-09-19DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105184
Sujan Bandyopadhyay , Domenico Ferraro
Workhorse business cycle models struggle to explain the magnitude and persistence of cyclical fluctuations in the labor share of output and employment in the United States. A model with search frictions in the labor market and a technology choice addresses this shortcoming. In this model, the production technology is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) in the short run, while it converges to Cobb-Douglas in the long run. We calibrate the model using U.S. data and find that the inclusion of a technology choice with adjustment costs significantly enhances the model's ability to propagate productivity shocks, compared to a model with a fixed Cobb-Douglas technology. The calibrated model successfully replicates the overshooting of the labor share in the data.
{"title":"Persistence of labor share fluctuations and overshooting","authors":"Sujan Bandyopadhyay , Domenico Ferraro","doi":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105184","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jedc.2025.105184","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Workhorse business cycle models struggle to explain the magnitude and persistence of cyclical fluctuations in the labor share of output and employment in the United States. A model with search frictions in the labor market and a technology choice addresses this shortcoming. In this model, the production technology is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) in the short run, while it converges to Cobb-Douglas in the long run. We calibrate the model using U.S. data and find that the inclusion of a technology choice with adjustment costs significantly enhances the model's ability to propagate productivity shocks, compared to a model with a fixed Cobb-Douglas technology. The calibrated model successfully replicates the overshooting of the labor share in the data.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48314,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105184"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145120574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}