Pub Date : 2024-08-14DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102757
Ilke Aydogan , Loïc Berger , Vincent Théroude
We investigate the validity of a double random incentive system where only a subset of subjects is paid for one of their choices. By focusing on individual decision-making under risk and ambiguity, we show that using either a standard random incentive system, where all subjects are paid, or a double random system, where only 10% of subjects are paid, yields similar preference elicitation results. These findings suggest that adopting a double random incentive system could significantly reduce experimental costs and logistic efforts, thereby facilitating the exploration of individual decision-making in larger-scale and higher-stakes experiments.
{"title":"Pay all subjects or pay only some? An experiment on decision-making under risk and ambiguity","authors":"Ilke Aydogan , Loïc Berger , Vincent Théroude","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102757","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102757","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate the validity of a double random incentive system where only a subset of subjects is paid for one of their choices. By focusing on individual decision-making under risk and ambiguity, we show that using either a standard random incentive system, where all subjects are paid, or a double random system, where only 10% of subjects are paid, yields similar preference elicitation results. These findings suggest that adopting a double random incentive system could significantly reduce experimental costs and logistic efforts, thereby facilitating the exploration of individual decision-making in larger-scale and higher-stakes experiments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 102757"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487024000655/pdfft?md5=fb88002d92faeb0ca281a7f742f1e6fe&pid=1-s2.0-S0167487024000655-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142084246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-13DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102758
Luuk L. Snijder , Mirre Stallen , Jörg Gross
Cooperation is more likely upheld when individuals can choose their interaction partner. However, when individuals differ in their endowment or ability to cooperate, free partner choice can lead to segregation and increase inequality. To understand how decision-makers can decrease such inequality, we conducted an incentivized and preregistered experiment in which participants (n=500) differed in their endowment and cooperation productivity. First, we investigated how these individual differences impacted cooperation and inequality under free partner choice in a public goods game. Next, we calculated if and how decision-makers should restrict partner choice if their goal is to decrease inequality. Finally, we studied whether decision-makers actually did decrease inequality when asked to allocate endowment and productivity factors between individuals, and combine individuals into pairs of interaction partners for a two-player public goods game. Our results show that without interventions, free partner choice, indeed, leads to segregation and increases inequality. To mitigate such inequality, decision-makers should curb free partner choice and force individuals who were assigned different endowments and productivities to form pairs with each other. However, this comes at the cost of lower overall cooperation and earnings, showing that the restriction of partner choice results in an equality-efficiency trade-off. Participants who acted as third-parties were actually more likely to prioritize inequality reduction over efficiency maximization, by forcing individuals with unequal endowment and productivity levels to form pairs with each other. However, decision-makers who had a ‘stake in the game’ self-servingly navigated the equality-efficiency trade-off by preferring partner choice interventions that benefited themselves. These preferences were partly explained by norms on public good cooperation and redistribution, and participants’ social preferences. Results reveal potential conflicts on how to govern free partner choice stemming from diverging preferences ‘among unequals’.
{"title":"Decision-makers self-servingly navigate the equality-efficiency trade-off of free partner choice in social dilemmas among unequals","authors":"Luuk L. Snijder , Mirre Stallen , Jörg Gross","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102758","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102758","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Cooperation is more likely upheld when individuals can choose their interaction partner. However, when individuals differ in their endowment or ability to cooperate, free partner choice can lead to segregation and increase inequality. To understand how decision-makers can decrease such inequality, we conducted an incentivized and preregistered experiment in which participants (<em>n</em>=500) differed in their endowment and cooperation productivity. First, we investigated how these individual differences impacted cooperation and inequality under free partner choice in a public goods game. Next, we calculated if and how decision-makers <em>should</em> restrict partner choice if their goal is to decrease inequality. Finally, we studied whether decision-makers actually <em>did</em> decrease inequality when asked to allocate endowment and productivity factors between individuals, and combine individuals into pairs of interaction partners for a two-player public goods game. Our results show that without interventions, free partner choice, indeed, leads to segregation and increases inequality. To mitigate such inequality, decision-makers <em>should</em> curb free partner choice and force individuals who were assigned different endowments and productivities to form pairs with each other. However, this comes at the cost of lower overall cooperation and earnings, showing that the restriction of partner choice results in an equality-efficiency trade-off. Participants who acted as third-parties were <em>actually</em> more likely to prioritize inequality reduction over efficiency maximization, by forcing individuals with unequal endowment and productivity levels to form pairs with each other. However, decision-makers who had a ‘stake in the game’ self-servingly navigated the equality-efficiency trade-off by preferring partner choice interventions that benefited themselves. These preferences were partly explained by norms on public good cooperation and redistribution, and participants’ social preferences. Results reveal potential conflicts on how to govern free partner choice stemming from diverging preferences ‘among unequals’.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"105 ","pages":"Article 102758"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487024000667/pdfft?md5=b1f4318f356010a7e0ab4b58b680cca2&pid=1-s2.0-S0167487024000667-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142241040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-10DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102755
Jonathan Yeo , Shi Zhuo
Using a repeated public goods game, we experimentally examine how apologies support mutual cooperation in groups. In two treatments where participants can send either public or private apologies, contributions increase by 0.43 and 0.87 standard deviations respectively, compared to a control treatment. Examining the mechanisms, we find much consistency in the usage of apologies: participants apologise when contributing less than others and subsequently make amends by raising contributions. Recipients of apologies also believe that apologisers are more caring and will contribute more. While there are only minimal differences in the effects of sending and receiving individual apologies across the private and public treatments, we find that sincere apology usage by groups is strongly associated with higher group cooperation, especially in the public treatment.
{"title":"The usage of apologies and group cooperation","authors":"Jonathan Yeo , Shi Zhuo","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102755","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102755","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using a repeated public goods game, we experimentally examine how apologies support mutual cooperation in groups. In two treatments where participants can send either <em>public</em> or <em>private</em> apologies, contributions increase by 0.43 and 0.87 standard deviations respectively, compared to a control treatment. Examining the mechanisms, we find much consistency in the usage of apologies: participants apologise when contributing less than others and subsequently make amends by raising contributions. Recipients of apologies also believe that apologisers are more caring and will contribute more. While there are only minimal differences in the effects of sending and receiving <em>individual</em> apologies across the private and public treatments, we find that sincere apology usage by <em>groups</em> is strongly associated with higher group cooperation, especially in the public treatment.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 102755"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142021252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-09DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102744
Mariana de Moraes Ferreira , Milena Yumi Tsushima Santiago , Rafael Bastos , Daniel Fatori , Rodrigo Sardinha Borborema , Leonardo Seda , Marcelo Camargo Batistuzzo
Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky (1997, Money illusion, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 341–374) described the phenomenon of money illusion as the inclination to consider money without adequately taking into account the inflation factor, emphasizing nominal values rather than real ones. This study aims to replicate the four conditions outlined in the original research by Shafir and colleagues, adapted to the Brazilian context: problems that include different financial decision-making situations (regarding earnings, transactions, contracts) that might be affected by money illusion. This cross-sectional and pre-registered study evaluated the money illusion in a sample of 372 Brazilian participants and was conducted via mobile phone/computer. The results found were very similar to the original findings: depending on the terms used (real, nominal, or neutral framing), participants showed varying inclinations towards opting for economically advantageous opportunities. Based on these findings, it is plausible that the money illusion effect may exhibit cultural independence. This assertion is substantiated by the replication of the effect within a distinct cultural context from the original study. To reinforce the empirical basis of this assertion, future investigations should analyze these findings across diverse cultural settings.
{"title":"Replication: The money illusion effect in a Brazilian sample and meta-analyses","authors":"Mariana de Moraes Ferreira , Milena Yumi Tsushima Santiago , Rafael Bastos , Daniel Fatori , Rodrigo Sardinha Borborema , Leonardo Seda , Marcelo Camargo Batistuzzo","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102744","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102744","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky (1997, Money illusion, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 341–374) described the phenomenon of money illusion as the inclination to consider money without adequately taking into account the inflation factor, emphasizing nominal values rather than real ones. This study aims to replicate the four conditions outlined in the original research by Shafir and colleagues, adapted to the Brazilian context: problems that include different financial decision-making situations (regarding earnings, transactions, contracts) that might be affected by money illusion. This cross-sectional and pre-registered study evaluated the money illusion in a sample of 372 Brazilian participants and was conducted via mobile phone/computer. The results found were very similar to the original findings: depending on the terms used (real, nominal, or neutral framing), participants showed varying inclinations towards opting for economically advantageous opportunities. Based on these findings, it is plausible that the money illusion effect may exhibit cultural independence. This assertion is substantiated by the replication of the effect within a distinct cultural context from the original study. To reinforce the empirical basis of this assertion, future investigations should analyze these findings across diverse cultural settings.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 102744"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141979415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-08DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102754
Daniel R. Cavagnaro , Xiaozhi Yang , Michel Regenwetter
The present study examines the effect of social distance on choice behavior through the lens of a probabilistic modeling framework. In an experiment, participants made incentive-compatible choices between lotteries in three different social distance conditions: self, friend, and stranger. We conduct a layered, within-subjects analysis that considers four properties of preferential choice. These properties vary in their granularity. At the coarsest level, we test whether choices are consistent with transitive underlying preferences. At a finer level of granularity, we evaluate whether each participant is best described as having fixed preferences with random errors or probabilistic preferences with error-free choices. In the latter case, we further distinguish three different bounds on response error rates. At the finest level, we identify the specific transitive preference ranking of the choice options that best describes a person’s choices. At each level of the analysis, we find that the stability between the self and friend conditions exceeds that between the self and stranger conditions. Stability increases with the coarseness of the analysis: Nearly all people are consistent with transitive preferences regardless of the social distance condition, but only for very few do we infer the same preference ranking in every social distance condition. Overall, while it matters whether one makes a choice on behalf of a friend versus for a stranger, the differences are most apparent when analyzing the data at a detailed level of granularity.
{"title":"Choose for others as you would choose for yourself? A layered analysis of probabilistic preferential choice across social distances","authors":"Daniel R. Cavagnaro , Xiaozhi Yang , Michel Regenwetter","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102754","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102754","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The present study examines the effect of social distance on choice behavior through the lens of a probabilistic modeling framework. In an experiment, participants made incentive-compatible choices between lotteries in three different social distance conditions: self, friend, and stranger. We conduct a layered, within-subjects analysis that considers four properties of preferential choice. These properties vary in their granularity. At the coarsest level, we test whether choices are consistent with transitive underlying preferences. At a finer level of granularity, we evaluate whether each participant is best described as having fixed preferences with random errors or probabilistic preferences with error-free choices. In the latter case, we further distinguish three different bounds on response error rates. At the finest level, we identify the specific transitive preference ranking of the choice options that best describes a person’s choices. At each level of the analysis, we find that the stability between the self and friend conditions exceeds that between the self and stranger conditions. Stability increases with the coarseness of the analysis: Nearly all people are consistent with transitive preferences regardless of the social distance condition, but only for very few do we infer the same preference ranking in every social distance condition. Overall, while it matters whether one makes a choice on behalf of a friend versus for a stranger, the differences are most apparent when analyzing the data at a detailed level of granularity.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 102754"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016748702400062X/pdfft?md5=706b4a7b4f243a4c13f3494c9c557ee9&pid=1-s2.0-S016748702400062X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142021253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-05DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102753
Nikola Frollová , Marcel Tkáčik , Petr Houdek
Assigning responsibility for a project’s success or failure is key to organizational performance, yet attribution fallacies often interfere. Our experimental study (N=339) shows team members mistakenly attribute too much influence to their leaders on task outcomes. Despite task outcomes being randomly determined by easy or hard difficulty rather than leadership, leaders received undue credit or blame. Leaders assessed their teams more negatively in difficult tasks, except for female leaders, who were more lenient in assessing both conditions than men. Leaders' self-assessments did not differ between experimental conditions, confirming their self-motivated evaluation; moreover completing an easy task boosted their confidence for harder challenges. Our study shows that attributional errors manifest differently in the evaluation of leaders and followers and demonstrates that success in simpler tasks can increase leaders' confidence, potentially leading to riskier behaviors.
{"title":"The leadership fallacy: How misattribution of leadership leads to a blaming game","authors":"Nikola Frollová , Marcel Tkáčik , Petr Houdek","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102753","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102753","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Assigning responsibility for a project’s success or failure is key to organizational performance, yet attribution fallacies often interfere. Our experimental study (<em>N</em>=339) shows team members mistakenly attribute too much influence to their leaders on task outcomes. Despite task outcomes being randomly determined by easy or hard difficulty rather than leadership, leaders received undue credit or blame. Leaders assessed their teams more negatively in difficult tasks, except for female leaders, who were more lenient in assessing both conditions than men. Leaders' self-assessments did not differ between experimental conditions, confirming their self-motivated evaluation; moreover completing an easy task boosted their confidence for harder challenges. Our study shows that attributional errors manifest differently in the evaluation of leaders and followers and demonstrates that success in simpler tasks can increase leaders' confidence, potentially leading to riskier behaviors.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 102753"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141992981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-05DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102756
Wenhua Wang , Peikun Chen , Jianbiao Li, Xiaofei Niu
Quarantine has been implemented worldwide to mitigate the spread of infectious diseases such as COVID-19. Although recent literature has outlined the mental and psychological costs of quarantine, its ethical costs are not fully understood. In two online experiments conducted during an institutional quarantine event (481 participants), we find that institutional quarantine leads to more dishonest behavior, including lying about the outcome of a random-draw task and overreporting one’s performance in a real-effort task to gain financial benefits. By directly manipulating individuals’ perceived psychological ownership, we provide suggestive evidence that psychological ownership may be one mechanism underlying the relationship between institutional quarantine and dishonest behavior. A complementary experiment (226 participants) suggests that anxiety and frustration may also serve as explanatory factors for this effect. We then discuss the implications of our findings, which may inspire approaches to mitigate the negative effects of institutional quarantine on honesty.
{"title":"Institutional quarantine and dishonest behavior","authors":"Wenhua Wang , Peikun Chen , Jianbiao Li, Xiaofei Niu","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102756","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102756","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Quarantine has been implemented worldwide to mitigate the spread of infectious diseases such as COVID-19. Although recent literature has outlined the mental and psychological costs of quarantine, its ethical costs are not fully understood. In two online experiments conducted during an institutional quarantine event (481 participants), we find that institutional quarantine leads to more dishonest behavior, including lying about the outcome of a random-draw task and overreporting one’s performance in a real-effort task to gain financial benefits. By directly manipulating individuals’ perceived psychological ownership, we provide suggestive evidence that psychological ownership may be one mechanism underlying the relationship between institutional quarantine and dishonest behavior. A complementary experiment (226 participants) suggests that anxiety and frustration may also serve as explanatory factors for this effect. We then discuss the implications of our findings, which may inspire approaches to mitigate the negative effects of institutional quarantine on honesty.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 102756"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141946552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-01DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102743
Alexandra Baier , Brent Davis , Tarek Jaber-Lopez
We conduct a laboratory experiment to examine gender differences in task choices and competitiveness: Individuals have the option to self-select into one of two stereotypically different tasks and subsequently decide whether or not to engage in competition while receiving one of three different feedback treatments. Compared to a control setting, we study the effect of providing relative performance feedback (rankings), and additionally the effect of providing information about the gender of the competitors. We find a significant gender gap in the choice of the male task, only when presenting the ranking in addition to the gender composition of the group. Turning to the decision to enter competition, we observe that task choice, combined with ranking feedback on performance, reduces the gender gap in competition entry in both tasks compared to the control. The dynamics over treatments reveal that men primarily respond to feedback in the male task, while women respond to feedback in the word task. These findings highlight that gender differences in task choice and competitiveness are contingent on feedback, the underlying task, and the task choice set.
{"title":"Gender, choice of task, and the effect of feedback on competition: An experiment","authors":"Alexandra Baier , Brent Davis , Tarek Jaber-Lopez","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102743","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102743","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We conduct a laboratory experiment to examine gender differences in task choices and competitiveness: Individuals have the option to self-select into one of two stereotypically different tasks and subsequently decide whether or not to engage in competition while receiving one of three different feedback treatments. Compared to a control setting, we study the effect of providing relative performance feedback (rankings), and additionally the effect of providing information about the gender of the competitors. We find a significant gender gap in the choice of the male task, only when presenting the ranking in addition to the gender composition of the group. Turning to the decision to enter competition, we observe that task choice, combined with ranking feedback on performance, reduces the gender gap in competition entry in both tasks compared to the control. The dynamics over treatments reveal that men primarily respond to feedback in the male task, while women respond to feedback in the word task. These findings highlight that gender differences in task choice and competitiveness are contingent on feedback, the underlying task, and the task choice set.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"103 ","pages":"Article 102743"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141853858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-30DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102746
Tünde Lénárd , Dániel Horn , Hubert János Kiss
The gender gap in competitiveness is argued to explain gender differences in later life outcomes, including career choices and the gender wage gap. In experimental settings, a prevalent explanation attributes this gap to males being more (over)confident than females (we call this the compositional channel). While our lab-in-the-field study using data from students in 53 classrooms ( 1000) reproduces this finding, it also uncovers a second, potentially more impactful channel of confidence contributing to the gender gap in competitiveness (the preference channel). To disentangle the two channels, we propose a more precise measure of confidence based on whether the subjects’ believed performance rank exceeds, coincides with or falls short of their actual performance in a real-effort task. We label categories of this Guessed - Actual Performance (GAP) difference as overconfident, realistic or underconfident, respectively. Surprisingly, there is no gender difference in competitiveness within the over- and underconfident subgroups, while a significant gender gap exists among the realistic. So, even if both genders had the same level of confidence, a persistent gender gap in preference (or taste) for competition would remain in the realistic group. This finding is robust across all specifications, challenging previous theories about the overconfidence of men being the main driver of the relationship between confidence and the gender gap in competition.
{"title":"Competition, confidence and gender: Shifting the focus from the overconfident to the realistic","authors":"Tünde Lénárd , Dániel Horn , Hubert János Kiss","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102746","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102746","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The gender gap in competitiveness is argued to explain gender differences in later life outcomes, including career choices and the gender wage gap. In experimental settings, a prevalent explanation attributes this gap to males being more (over)confident than females (we call this the compositional channel). While our lab-in-the-field study using data from students in 53 classrooms (<span><math><mi>N</mi></math></span> <span><math><mo>></mo></math></span> 1000) reproduces this finding, it also uncovers a second, potentially more impactful channel of confidence contributing to the gender gap in competitiveness (the preference channel). To disentangle the two channels, we propose a more precise measure of confidence based on whether the subjects’ believed performance rank exceeds, coincides with or falls short of their actual performance in a real-effort task. We label categories of this Guessed - Actual Performance (GAP) difference as overconfident, realistic or underconfident, respectively. Surprisingly, there is no gender difference in competitiveness within the over- and underconfident subgroups, while a significant gender gap exists among the realistic. So, even if both genders had the same level of confidence, a persistent gender gap in preference (or taste) for competition would remain in the realistic group. This finding is robust across all specifications, challenging previous theories about the overconfidence of men being the main driver of the relationship between confidence and the gender gap in competition.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 102746"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487024000540/pdfft?md5=e381b9a73681465938b0bb60e4b00bc4&pid=1-s2.0-S0167487024000540-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141963504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Consumption choices depend on the feelings experienced in the period preceding a consumer's decisions. We confirm this hypothesis using a large sample of Italian consumers collected by ISTAT (the Italian National Statistics Institute) as part of the multi-purpose survey “Indagine multiscopo sulle famiglie: Aspetti della vita quotidiana” (n = 114,052). Specifically, positive feelings are associated with wine and beer consumption, while negative feelings relate to spirits consumption. The latter pattern is common among men and women, whereas the former is only applicable to male consumers. Additionally, older consumers drink more following a period of positive feelings, whereas younger consumers drink less. Our two-level modelling strategy confirms the mediating role of personal characteristics in explaining the relation between feelings and alcohol consumption.
消费选择取决于消费者在做出决定前的一段时间内所经历的感受。我们利用意大利国家统计局(ISTAT)在 "Indagine multiscopo sulle famiglie: Aspetti della vita quotidiana"(n=114,052)多功能调查中收集的大量意大利消费者样本证实了这一假设。具体而言,积极情绪与葡萄酒和啤酒消费有关,而消极情绪则与烈性酒消费有关。后一种模式在男性和女性中都很常见,而前一种模式只适用于男性消费者。此外,年龄较大的消费者在出现积极情绪后会喝得更多,而年轻消费者则喝得较少。我们的双层建模策略证实了个人特征在解释情感与酒精消费之间的关系时所起的中介作用。
{"title":"Feelings and alcohol consumption","authors":"Efi Vasileiou , Lara Agnoli , Steve Charters , Nikolaos Georgantzis","doi":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102745","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.joep.2024.102745","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Consumption choices depend on the feelings experienced in the period preceding a consumer's decisions. We confirm this hypothesis using a large sample of Italian consumers collected by ISTAT (the Italian National Statistics Institute) as part of the multi-purpose survey “<em>Indagine multiscopo sulle famiglie: Aspetti della vita quotidiana</em>” (n = 114,052). Specifically, positive feelings are associated with wine and beer consumption, while negative feelings relate to spirits consumption. The latter pattern is common among men and women, whereas the former is only applicable to male consumers. Additionally, older consumers drink more following a period of positive feelings, whereas younger consumers drink less. Our two-level modelling strategy confirms the mediating role of personal characteristics in explaining the relation between feelings and alcohol consumption.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48318,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Psychology","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 102745"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487024000539/pdfft?md5=9429b455003a11bebaf3d6bde9149292&pid=1-s2.0-S0167487024000539-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141842163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}