Pub Date : 2023-09-08DOI: 10.1177/00223433231186449
Jacob S. Lewis, Brandon Ives
This article investigates the relationship between recent repression of protest and the duration of future protests. A rich scholarship examines how repression impacts dissent, highlighting dissent dimensions such as the number of future events and violent escalation. Less examined is another dimension of dissent – protest duration. We hypothesize that recent repression of protests is pivotal for longer duration of future protest events. Our expectation stems from a participant type mechanism. Recent repression of protest may generate more societal grievances but also increase protesting risks. A simultaneous jump in grievances and risks may increase the number of people protesting who are also risk-acceptant and willing to protest for longer durations. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project data and hierarchal negative binomial models are used to estimate the association between recent repression of protest and subsequent protest duration. Compared to having none of the most recent three protests repressed, a protest in a location where the last three protests were repressed has a substantively longer duration. The results are consistent with the participant type mechanism and existing literature on repression’s heterogeneous effects on individuals.
{"title":"Repression, backlash, and the duration of protests in Africa","authors":"Jacob S. Lewis, Brandon Ives","doi":"10.1177/00223433231186449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231186449","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates the relationship between recent repression of protest and the duration of future protests. A rich scholarship examines how repression impacts dissent, highlighting dissent dimensions such as the number of future events and violent escalation. Less examined is another dimension of dissent – protest duration. We hypothesize that recent repression of protests is pivotal for longer duration of future protest events. Our expectation stems from a participant type mechanism. Recent repression of protest may generate more societal grievances but also increase protesting risks. A simultaneous jump in grievances and risks may increase the number of people protesting who are also risk-acceptant and willing to protest for longer durations. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project data and hierarchal negative binomial models are used to estimate the association between recent repression of protest and subsequent protest duration. Compared to having none of the most recent three protests repressed, a protest in a location where the last three protests were repressed has a substantively longer duration. The results are consistent with the participant type mechanism and existing literature on repression’s heterogeneous effects on individuals.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48235226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-08DOI: 10.1177/00223433231186446
Matthew D. DiLorenzo, Bryan Rooney
Scholars increasingly emphasize personal biographical characteristics of leaders in explaining patterns of foreign policy behavior. This article extends insights from this agenda to study how (dis)similarities in the background characteristics of leaders at the dyadic level shape international conflict outcomes. Trust and uncertainty are central to explaining conflict via their connections to commitment- and information-related causes of war. Psychological research provides evidence that perceived similarities between individuals and groups can foment trust and cooperation. We hypothesize that leaders who share more similar backgrounds and life experiences form stronger social bonds and are more trusting of one another. As such, leaders who have more in common with one another should be able to better manage diplomatic disputes and avoid conflict. We test this hypothesis using a new measure of dyadic-leader-level similarity created with the Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions (LEAD) dataset and data on international conflict onset in politically relevant dyads throughout the period 1946–2004. We find that pairs of leaders with more similar backgrounds are significantly less likely to experience militarized interstate disputes at all levels of hostility even after accounting for a variety of observable and unobservable determinants of conflict. The findings contribute to our understanding of the determinants of international conflict and help advance research on linkages between psychological and rationalist approaches to studying conflict.
{"title":"Leader similarity and international conflict","authors":"Matthew D. DiLorenzo, Bryan Rooney","doi":"10.1177/00223433231186446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231186446","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars increasingly emphasize personal biographical characteristics of leaders in explaining patterns of foreign policy behavior. This article extends insights from this agenda to study how (dis)similarities in the background characteristics of leaders at the dyadic level shape international conflict outcomes. Trust and uncertainty are central to explaining conflict via their connections to commitment- and information-related causes of war. Psychological research provides evidence that perceived similarities between individuals and groups can foment trust and cooperation. We hypothesize that leaders who share more similar backgrounds and life experiences form stronger social bonds and are more trusting of one another. As such, leaders who have more in common with one another should be able to better manage diplomatic disputes and avoid conflict. We test this hypothesis using a new measure of dyadic-leader-level similarity created with the Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions (LEAD) dataset and data on international conflict onset in politically relevant dyads throughout the period 1946–2004. We find that pairs of leaders with more similar backgrounds are significantly less likely to experience militarized interstate disputes at all levels of hostility even after accounting for a variety of observable and unobservable determinants of conflict. The findings contribute to our understanding of the determinants of international conflict and help advance research on linkages between psychological and rationalist approaches to studying conflict.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42319412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-13DOI: 10.1177/00223433231178849
Dongshu Liu, L. Shao
How can autocrats boost public support for wars? Previous studies have suggested that in democracies, the public changes its war attitude either through rational cost–benefit calculations or simply by following cues from political elites. This article argues that autocrats can follow a similar logic to manipulate public support for war via nationalist propaganda. Based on two online survey experiments with textual and musical propaganda materials in mainland China, this article finds that nationalist propaganda bolsters public support for war, regarding a potential military conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Evidence shows that propaganda increases respondents’ expected return on winning wars, arousing national pride, and reducing respondents’ sensitivity to war costs. However, people’s confidence in winning a given war remains unchanged. These findings suggest that nationalist propaganda can boost support for war by increasing the perceived benefits of the war and reducing their sensitivity toward war costs without changing their perceived probability of winning. It also demonstrates that nationalist propaganda does not need to be explicit about war in order to boost war support in autocracies. This study also reveals the changing dynamic of public opinions in China regarding war for unification over the Taiwan Strait, which has significant implications for security and geopolitics in East Asia.
{"title":"Nationalist propaganda and support for war in an authoritarian context: Evidence from China","authors":"Dongshu Liu, L. Shao","doi":"10.1177/00223433231178849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231178849","url":null,"abstract":"How can autocrats boost public support for wars? Previous studies have suggested that in democracies, the public changes its war attitude either through rational cost–benefit calculations or simply by following cues from political elites. This article argues that autocrats can follow a similar logic to manipulate public support for war via nationalist propaganda. Based on two online survey experiments with textual and musical propaganda materials in mainland China, this article finds that nationalist propaganda bolsters public support for war, regarding a potential military conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Evidence shows that propaganda increases respondents’ expected return on winning wars, arousing national pride, and reducing respondents’ sensitivity to war costs. However, people’s confidence in winning a given war remains unchanged. These findings suggest that nationalist propaganda can boost support for war by increasing the perceived benefits of the war and reducing their sensitivity toward war costs without changing their perceived probability of winning. It also demonstrates that nationalist propaganda does not need to be explicit about war in order to boost war support in autocracies. This study also reveals the changing dynamic of public opinions in China regarding war for unification over the Taiwan Strait, which has significant implications for security and geopolitics in East Asia.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48740499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-17DOI: 10.1177/00223433231178848
Michael Weintraub, A. Steele, Sebastián Pantoja-Barrios, H. Nygård, Marianne Dahl, H. M. Binningsbø
This article introduces the Mapping Attitudes, Perceptions and Support (MAPS) dataset, which provides rich survey data from more than 12,000 respondents in Colombia. Our panel survey – carried out in two separate waves in 2019 and 2021 – is representative at the level of each ‘Program for Development with a Territorial Focus’ (PDET, for its acronym in Spanish), the most war-affected regions and those targeted for peace agreement implementation. We describe the sample and compare support for the peace agreement in MAPS to other recent surveys in Colombia, showing how MAPS reveals regional variation obscured in nationally representative surveys. Regression analyses illustrate how the panel data allow us to explore how and why people’s perceptions of the agreement shift over time. The MAPS data will enable scholars to gain insights into the microfoundations of peacebuilding over time and across space.
{"title":"Introducing the Mapping Attitudes, Perceptions and Support (MAPS) dataset on the Colombian peace process","authors":"Michael Weintraub, A. Steele, Sebastián Pantoja-Barrios, H. Nygård, Marianne Dahl, H. M. Binningsbø","doi":"10.1177/00223433231178848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231178848","url":null,"abstract":"This article introduces the Mapping Attitudes, Perceptions and Support (MAPS) dataset, which provides rich survey data from more than 12,000 respondents in Colombia. Our panel survey – carried out in two separate waves in 2019 and 2021 – is representative at the level of each ‘Program for Development with a Territorial Focus’ (PDET, for its acronym in Spanish), the most war-affected regions and those targeted for peace agreement implementation. We describe the sample and compare support for the peace agreement in MAPS to other recent surveys in Colombia, showing how MAPS reveals regional variation obscured in nationally representative surveys. Regression analyses illustrate how the panel data allow us to explore how and why people’s perceptions of the agreement shift over time. The MAPS data will enable scholars to gain insights into the microfoundations of peacebuilding over time and across space.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46524120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-13DOI: 10.1177/00223433231168192
Seraphine F. Maerz, Amanda B. Edgell, M. Wilson, S. Hellmeier, Staffan I. Lindberg
This article provides a new conceptualization of regime transformation that allows scholars to address democratization and autocratization as related but obverse processes. We introduce a dataset that captures 680 episodes of regime transformation (ERT) from 1900 to 2019 and offers novel insights into regime change over the past 120 years. The ERT has three main advantages over other approaches. First, it avoids problematic assumptions of unit homogeneity and constant as well as symmetric effects. Second, it integrates key insights from qualitative studies by treating regime change as a gradual and uncertain process. Third, the ERT is based on a unified framework for studying regime transformation in either direction. The dataset differentiates between four broad types of regime transformation: liberalization in autocracies, democratic deepening in democracies, and autocratization in both democracies and autocracies (democratic and autocratic regression). It further distinguishes ten patterns with distinct outcomes, including standard depictions of regime change (i.e. democratic transition or breakdown). A minority (32%) of ERTs produce a regime transition, with the majority of episodes either ending before a transition takes place or not having the potential for such a transition (i.e. further democratization in democratic regimes or further autocratization in autocratic regimes). We also provide comparisons to other datasets, illustrative case studies to demonstrate face validity, and a discussion about how the ERT framework can be applied in peace research.
{"title":"Episodes of regime transformation","authors":"Seraphine F. Maerz, Amanda B. Edgell, M. Wilson, S. Hellmeier, Staffan I. Lindberg","doi":"10.1177/00223433231168192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231168192","url":null,"abstract":"This article provides a new conceptualization of regime transformation that allows scholars to address democratization and autocratization as related but obverse processes. We introduce a dataset that captures 680 episodes of regime transformation (ERT) from 1900 to 2019 and offers novel insights into regime change over the past 120 years. The ERT has three main advantages over other approaches. First, it avoids problematic assumptions of unit homogeneity and constant as well as symmetric effects. Second, it integrates key insights from qualitative studies by treating regime change as a gradual and uncertain process. Third, the ERT is based on a unified framework for studying regime transformation in either direction. The dataset differentiates between four broad types of regime transformation: liberalization in autocracies, democratic deepening in democracies, and autocratization in both democracies and autocracies (democratic and autocratic regression). It further distinguishes ten patterns with distinct outcomes, including standard depictions of regime change (i.e. democratic transition or breakdown). A minority (32%) of ERTs produce a regime transition, with the majority of episodes either ending before a transition takes place or not having the potential for such a transition (i.e. further democratization in democratic regimes or further autocratization in autocratic regimes). We also provide comparisons to other datasets, illustrative case studies to demonstrate face validity, and a discussion about how the ERT framework can be applied in peace research.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48892715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-07DOI: 10.1177/00223433231168187
S. Döring, Katariina Mustasilta
Communal violence is a major source of insecurity within and across borders, sparking significant displacement flows and disturbing livelihoods. While conflict literature has shed light onto its causes, the existing research has paid little systematic attention to the spatial dynamics of communal violence. We distinguish between spillover of violence and spillover of predictors. Spillover of violence is defined as conflict incidences occurring as a direct response to communal violence in a nearby location. Spillover of predictors describes instances of communal violence that occur due to nearby conflict-inducing factors. We clarify theoretical pathways for both spillover processes, focusing on drought exposure affecting not locally but in nearby areas. Applying spatial models, we test the expectations regarding nearby violence breeding violence and nearby drought increasing violence with data on incidences of communal violence for sub-Saharan Africa (1990–2014). Our results demonstrate that communal violence explains nearby communal violence through different spillover processes. We also find evidence for an increase in violence due to exposure from neighborhood droughts as well as other conflict-inducing factors.
{"title":"Spatial patterns of communal violence in sub-Saharan Africa","authors":"S. Döring, Katariina Mustasilta","doi":"10.1177/00223433231168187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231168187","url":null,"abstract":"Communal violence is a major source of insecurity within and across borders, sparking significant displacement flows and disturbing livelihoods. While conflict literature has shed light onto its causes, the existing research has paid little systematic attention to the spatial dynamics of communal violence. We distinguish between spillover of violence and spillover of predictors. Spillover of violence is defined as conflict incidences occurring as a direct response to communal violence in a nearby location. Spillover of predictors describes instances of communal violence that occur due to nearby conflict-inducing factors. We clarify theoretical pathways for both spillover processes, focusing on drought exposure affecting not locally but in nearby areas. Applying spatial models, we test the expectations regarding nearby violence breeding violence and nearby drought increasing violence with data on incidences of communal violence for sub-Saharan Africa (1990–2014). Our results demonstrate that communal violence explains nearby communal violence through different spillover processes. We also find evidence for an increase in violence due to exposure from neighborhood droughts as well as other conflict-inducing factors.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46509456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-05DOI: 10.1177/00223433231168190
L. Garbe
Does increasing Internet access and use challenge authoritarian elections? I argue that Internet access provides both opposition supporters and government authorities with new means to shape electoral conduct. Opposition supporters can use the Internet to report on electoral malpractice and mobilize for support. At the same time government authorities can use the Internet to monitor antiregime sentiment prior to the elections and disrupt Internet access to selectively repress regime opponents during the elections. Studying Uganda’s 2016 presidential elections, evidence from election monitoring and survey data suggests that electoral violence is significantly higher in opposition strongholds with greater Internet access prior to the Internet disruption and is targeted specifically at voters. Insights from qualitative interviews with politicians, journalists and activists underline that the disruption of Internet access indeed hindered opposition supporters to effectively challenge electoral malpractice. Overall, the results stress the important role that Internet access can play for opposition actors in authoritarian elections. At the same time, they highlight their susceptibility to manipulation by government authorities.
{"title":"Pulling through elections by pulling the plug: Internet disruptions and electoral violence in Uganda","authors":"L. Garbe","doi":"10.1177/00223433231168190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231168190","url":null,"abstract":"Does increasing Internet access and use challenge authoritarian elections? I argue that Internet access provides both opposition supporters and government authorities with new means to shape electoral conduct. Opposition supporters can use the Internet to report on electoral malpractice and mobilize for support. At the same time government authorities can use the Internet to monitor antiregime sentiment prior to the elections and disrupt Internet access to selectively repress regime opponents during the elections. Studying Uganda’s 2016 presidential elections, evidence from election monitoring and survey data suggests that electoral violence is significantly higher in opposition strongholds with greater Internet access prior to the Internet disruption and is targeted specifically at voters. Insights from qualitative interviews with politicians, journalists and activists underline that the disruption of Internet access indeed hindered opposition supporters to effectively challenge electoral malpractice. Overall, the results stress the important role that Internet access can play for opposition actors in authoritarian elections. At the same time, they highlight their susceptibility to manipulation by government authorities.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41532043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-02DOI: 10.1177/00223433231168188
Neil Ketchley, F. Eibl, J. Gunning
In late developing states, labor markets are often segmented as a result of import substitution and political coalitions centered on the formally employed. Building on insider–outsider and moral economy frameworks from political economy, we theorize that in such contexts labor market insiders develop strong expectations about welfare provision and public transfers that make them more likely to riot against proposed austerity measures. We test our argument with the case of Egypt during the 1977 Bread Intifada, when the announcement of subsidy cuts sparked rioting across the country. To conduct our analysis, we match an original event catalog compiled from Arabic-language sources with disaggregated employment data. Spatial models, rich micro-level data, and the sudden and short-lived nature of the rioting help us to disentangle the importance of an area’s labor force from its location and wider socio-economic context. As we show, despite the diffuse impact of the subsidy cuts, rioting was especially concentrated in areas with labor market insiders – and this is after accounting for a range of plausible alternative explanations. The results suggest that moral economies arising from labor market segmentation can powerfully structure violent opposition to austerity.
{"title":"Anti-austerity riots in late developing states: Evidence from the 1977 Egyptian Bread Intifada","authors":"Neil Ketchley, F. Eibl, J. Gunning","doi":"10.1177/00223433231168188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231168188","url":null,"abstract":"In late developing states, labor markets are often segmented as a result of import substitution and political coalitions centered on the formally employed. Building on insider–outsider and moral economy frameworks from political economy, we theorize that in such contexts labor market insiders develop strong expectations about welfare provision and public transfers that make them more likely to riot against proposed austerity measures. We test our argument with the case of Egypt during the 1977 Bread Intifada, when the announcement of subsidy cuts sparked rioting across the country. To conduct our analysis, we match an original event catalog compiled from Arabic-language sources with disaggregated employment data. Spatial models, rich micro-level data, and the sudden and short-lived nature of the rioting help us to disentangle the importance of an area’s labor force from its location and wider socio-economic context. As we show, despite the diffuse impact of the subsidy cuts, rioting was especially concentrated in areas with labor market insiders – and this is after accounting for a range of plausible alternative explanations. The results suggest that moral economies arising from labor market segmentation can powerfully structure violent opposition to austerity.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48771729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/00223433231185169
Shawn Davies, T. Pettersson, Magnus Öberg
This article reports on trends in organized violence, building on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2022, fatalities from organized violence increased by a staggering 97%, compared to the previous year, from 120,000 in 2021 to 237,000 in 2022, making 2022 the deadliest year since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The increase was driven by two, particularly deadly, state-based armed conflicts: the Russia–Ukraine war, and the war in Ethiopia against TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front). With more than 81,500 and 101,000 fatalities respectively, these are the two most deadly state-based conflict-years recorded in the post-1989 period. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the first large-scale interstate war in 20 years, and the first interstate armed conflict since World War II where a major power in the international system seeks both territorial gains for itself and the subjugation of another state through regime change. We have witnessed an emerging trend of increased conflict between states in the last decade, including cases where major powers support opposite sides in internationalized intrastate conflict. UCDP recorded 55 active state-based armed conflicts in 2022, an increase of one compared to the previous year. Eight of these conflicts reached the level of war. While the fatalities caused by non-state conflict decreased somewhat when compared to 2021, the number of non-state conflicts, as well as both the number of civilians killed in one-sided violence and the number of actors carrying out such violence, increased in 2022.
{"title":"Organized violence 1989–2022, and the return of conflict between states","authors":"Shawn Davies, T. Pettersson, Magnus Öberg","doi":"10.1177/00223433231185169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231185169","url":null,"abstract":"This article reports on trends in organized violence, building on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2022, fatalities from organized violence increased by a staggering 97%, compared to the previous year, from 120,000 in 2021 to 237,000 in 2022, making 2022 the deadliest year since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The increase was driven by two, particularly deadly, state-based armed conflicts: the Russia–Ukraine war, and the war in Ethiopia against TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front). With more than 81,500 and 101,000 fatalities respectively, these are the two most deadly state-based conflict-years recorded in the post-1989 period. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the first large-scale interstate war in 20 years, and the first interstate armed conflict since World War II where a major power in the international system seeks both territorial gains for itself and the subjugation of another state through regime change. We have witnessed an emerging trend of increased conflict between states in the last decade, including cases where major powers support opposite sides in internationalized intrastate conflict. UCDP recorded 55 active state-based armed conflicts in 2022, an increase of one compared to the previous year. Eight of these conflicts reached the level of war. While the fatalities caused by non-state conflict decreased somewhat when compared to 2021, the number of non-state conflicts, as well as both the number of civilians killed in one-sided violence and the number of actors carrying out such violence, increased in 2022.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46474124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-29DOI: 10.1177/00223433231168181
Matteo CM Casiraghi, E. Cusumano
Terrorist organizations are often described as brands. However, the most important visual representations of these brands – terrorist groups’ logos – have remained unexplored. In this article, we demonstrate that logos are signalling devices that provide vital cues on the propensity to use violence. To this end, we code and analyse 562 terrorist logos (2000–16). After providing a descriptive overview of the main colours and symbols used by terrorist groups worldwide, we rely on a zero-inflated negative binomial model to analyse the relationship between these organizations’ visual choices and their deadly activities. Our results show that the presence of violent, religious, and extremist symbols in terrorist organizations’ logos, as well as the use of black as the main colour, correlates with more frequent and deadlier attacks. These findings have important policy implications, demonstrating that logos serve as behavioural cues predicting the threat posed by terrorist groups not less effectively than their ideology. By highlighting the importance of visual artifacts like logos and their amenability to quantitative research, our article also provides a novel methodological contribution to international relations, helping bridge the gap between explanatory and critical security studies.
{"title":"Lethal brands: Terrorist groups’ logos and violence","authors":"Matteo CM Casiraghi, E. Cusumano","doi":"10.1177/00223433231168181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231168181","url":null,"abstract":"Terrorist organizations are often described as brands. However, the most important visual representations of these brands – terrorist groups’ logos – have remained unexplored. In this article, we demonstrate that logos are signalling devices that provide vital cues on the propensity to use violence. To this end, we code and analyse 562 terrorist logos (2000–16). After providing a descriptive overview of the main colours and symbols used by terrorist groups worldwide, we rely on a zero-inflated negative binomial model to analyse the relationship between these organizations’ visual choices and their deadly activities. Our results show that the presence of violent, religious, and extremist symbols in terrorist organizations’ logos, as well as the use of black as the main colour, correlates with more frequent and deadlier attacks. These findings have important policy implications, demonstrating that logos serve as behavioural cues predicting the threat posed by terrorist groups not less effectively than their ideology. By highlighting the importance of visual artifacts like logos and their amenability to quantitative research, our article also provides a novel methodological contribution to international relations, helping bridge the gap between explanatory and critical security studies.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47562152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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