Pub Date : 2024-01-30DOI: 10.1177/00223433231202823
Sigrid Weber
How do armed actors respond to population movements during civil wars? I argue that displacement alters local balances of control between territorial rulers and challengers. Local territorial rulers have incentives to govern violently if displaced persons perceived as members of opposing loyalty groups move into their territories and challengers spoil local governance by inflicting harm on civilians if incoming supporters of a local ruler reinforce the governor’s control. To test these dynamics, I use a combination of manual coding and machine learning to create a novel monthly dataset of territorial control, one-sided violence against moving populations and displacement patterns disaggregated by ethno-religious groups in the war against the Islamic State (2014–2017) in Iraq. Using negative binomial count models, I find that territorial challengers and rulers distinctively respond to population movements in Iraq. The paper extends previous theories of civilian victimization and territorial control by conceptualizing local populations as a dynamic element that explains where fleeing civilians become moving targets.
{"title":"Controlling a moving world: Territorial control, displacement and the spread of civilian targeting in Iraq","authors":"Sigrid Weber","doi":"10.1177/00223433231202823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231202823","url":null,"abstract":"How do armed actors respond to population movements during civil wars? I argue that displacement alters local balances of control between territorial rulers and challengers. Local territorial rulers have incentives to govern violently if displaced persons perceived as members of opposing loyalty groups move into their territories and challengers spoil local governance by inflicting harm on civilians if incoming supporters of a local ruler reinforce the governor’s control. To test these dynamics, I use a combination of manual coding and machine learning to create a novel monthly dataset of territorial control, one-sided violence against moving populations and displacement patterns disaggregated by ethno-religious groups in the war against the Islamic State (2014–2017) in Iraq. Using negative binomial count models, I find that territorial challengers and rulers distinctively respond to population movements in Iraq. The paper extends previous theories of civilian victimization and territorial control by conceptualizing local populations as a dynamic element that explains where fleeing civilians become moving targets.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139938949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-30DOI: 10.1177/00223433231217664
Jon R Lindsay
Most cyber intrusions are a form of intelligence rather than warfare, but intelligence remains undertheorized in international relations (IR). This article develops a theory of intelligence performance at the operational level, which is where technology is most likely to affect broader political and military outcomes. It uses the pragmatic method of abduction to bootstrap general theory from the historical case of Bletchley Park in World War II. This critical case of computationally enabled signals intelligence anticipates important later developments in cybersecurity. Bletchley Park was uncommonly successful due to four conditions drawn from contemporary practice of cryptography: radio networks provided connectivity; German targets created vulnerability; Britain invested in bureaucratic organization; and British personnel exercised discretion. The method of abduction is used to ground these particular conditions in IR theory, revisit the evaluation of the case, and consider historical disanalogies. The result is a more generalizable theory that can be applied to modern cybersecurity as well as traditional espionage. The overarching theme is that intelligence performance in any era depends on institutional context more than technological sophistication. The political distinctiveness of intelligence practice, in contrast to war or coercive diplomacy, is deceptive competition between rival institutions in a cooperatively constituted institutional environment. Because cyberspace is highly institutionalized, furthermore, intelligence contests become pervasive in cyberspace.
{"title":"Abducted by hackers: Using the case of Bletchley Park to construct a theory of intelligence performance that generalizes to cybersecurity","authors":"Jon R Lindsay","doi":"10.1177/00223433231217664","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231217664","url":null,"abstract":"Most cyber intrusions are a form of intelligence rather than warfare, but intelligence remains undertheorized in international relations (IR). This article develops a theory of intelligence performance at the operational level, which is where technology is most likely to affect broader political and military outcomes. It uses the pragmatic method of abduction to bootstrap general theory from the historical case of Bletchley Park in World War II. This critical case of computationally enabled signals intelligence anticipates important later developments in cybersecurity. Bletchley Park was uncommonly successful due to four conditions drawn from contemporary practice of cryptography: radio networks provided connectivity; German targets created vulnerability; Britain invested in bureaucratic organization; and British personnel exercised discretion. The method of abduction is used to ground these particular conditions in IR theory, revisit the evaluation of the case, and consider historical disanalogies. The result is a more generalizable theory that can be applied to modern cybersecurity as well as traditional espionage. The overarching theme is that intelligence performance in any era depends on institutional context more than technological sophistication. The political distinctiveness of intelligence practice, in contrast to war or coercive diplomacy, is deceptive competition between rival institutions in a cooperatively constituted institutional environment. Because cyberspace is highly institutionalized, furthermore, intelligence contests become pervasive in cyberspace.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139939038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-30DOI: 10.1177/00223433231201450
Barış Arı, Burak Sonmez
Public pressure to take punitive action against human rights violators is often a driving force behind international sanctions. However, we know little about the way in which public support is shaped by varying types of abuse, the costs and effectiveness of sanctions and the differential harm they inflict upon the target population and leadership. Our study specifically addresses this gap by unpicking contextual factors that jointly sway the perception of morality and the cost-benefit calculus. We propose that there is no simple trade-off between instrumental and moral concerns. The context within which violations take place and the interactions between moral and instrumental dimensions shape preference formation. Findings from our paired conjoint experiment suggest that whether respondents support imposing sanctions depends on the category of human rights abuse and its perceived salience. Individuals also prefer sheltering the target population while punishing the leadership, but collective punishment becomes less unacceptable if the majority of the target population support the human rights infringements. The desire to do something against the perpetrators amplifies the appeal of punishing the leadership but assuages the moral concerns of harming the population.
{"title":"Human rights violations and public support for sanctions","authors":"Barış Arı, Burak Sonmez","doi":"10.1177/00223433231201450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231201450","url":null,"abstract":"Public pressure to take punitive action against human rights violators is often a driving force behind international sanctions. However, we know little about the way in which public support is shaped by varying types of abuse, the costs and effectiveness of sanctions and the differential harm they inflict upon the target population and leadership. Our study specifically addresses this gap by unpicking contextual factors that jointly sway the perception of morality and the cost-benefit calculus. We propose that there is no simple trade-off between instrumental and moral concerns. The context within which violations take place and the interactions between moral and instrumental dimensions shape preference formation. Findings from our paired conjoint experiment suggest that whether respondents support imposing sanctions depends on the category of human rights abuse and its perceived salience. Individuals also prefer sheltering the target population while punishing the leadership, but collective punishment becomes less unacceptable if the majority of the target population support the human rights infringements. The desire to do something against the perpetrators amplifies the appeal of punishing the leadership but assuages the moral concerns of harming the population.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"60 1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139939047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-21DOI: 10.1177/00223433231200923
Elizabeth L Brannon
After conflict, many ex-combatant men experience the spoils of war as their rebel groups transition into political parties and elect former members to party seats. However, it is unclear whether these opportunities are reserved only for male ex-combatants. This article considers when and why voters might support former rebel women running for political office. It argues that the election of these women will depend on their roles within rebel groups, as well as their use of violence during conflict. The article presents a novel dataset on the election of former rebel women to rebel parties from 1970 to 2020. The results indicate that women’s roles as combatants and leaders in rebel groups are associated with higher levels of election for rebel women. In contrast, rebel women’s ties to violent tactics such as terrorism and sexual violence during war are associated with a lower level of election for rebel women after conflict. The interactions between rebel women’s roles and ties to violence are tested; the results suggested that, regardless of elite roles, rebel women’s electoral chances are hurt by extreme forms of violence, demonstrating the salience of the negative stigmas attached to violent women. The findings also demonstrate that while many former rebel women are marginalized after war, a select few experience political gains.
{"title":"The election of former rebel women","authors":"Elizabeth L Brannon","doi":"10.1177/00223433231200923","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231200923","url":null,"abstract":"After conflict, many ex-combatant men experience the spoils of war as their rebel groups transition into political parties and elect former members to party seats. However, it is unclear whether these opportunities are reserved only for male ex-combatants. This article considers when and why voters might support former rebel women running for political office. It argues that the election of these women will depend on their roles within rebel groups, as well as their use of violence during conflict. The article presents a novel dataset on the election of former rebel women to rebel parties from 1970 to 2020. The results indicate that women’s roles as combatants and leaders in rebel groups are associated with higher levels of election for rebel women. In contrast, rebel women’s ties to violent tactics such as terrorism and sexual violence during war are associated with a lower level of election for rebel women after conflict. The interactions between rebel women’s roles and ties to violence are tested; the results suggested that, regardless of elite roles, rebel women’s electoral chances are hurt by extreme forms of violence, demonstrating the salience of the negative stigmas attached to violent women. The findings also demonstrate that while many former rebel women are marginalized after war, a select few experience political gains.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138947969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-14DOI: 10.1177/00223433231200926
Gabriella Levy
When state armed forces engage in violence against civilians during civil wars, why do some citizens continue to support the government? I argue that individuals’ support for the state in such contexts is shaped by the interplay between their perceptions of violence, governance and ideology. Drawing on research concerning motivated reasoning, I suggest that ideological similarity with and effective governance from the state can alleviate the negative effect of military violence against civilians on support for the state and, conversely, augment the positive effect of insurgent abuse on attitudes toward the government. Analysis of seven years of surveys fielded by the Latin American Public Opinion Project in Colombia between 2005 and 2011 suggests that individuals’ responses to victimization by the state’s armed forces depend on whether the individuals are ideologically aligned with the state. More specifically, among people who have an ideology similar to that of the president, military victimization has a less negative effect on support for the armed forces and for the national government. There is also mixed evidence that the quality of state governance, particularly the provision of security from crime, shapes the ways people respond to victimization. While existing studies primarily focus on the effects of either violence or governance on attitudes toward the state, these findings indicate that a more complete theory of why people support governments which engage in violence against civilians requires an understanding of not only violence but also of governance and ideology.
当国家武装部队在内战期间对平民使用暴力时，为什么有些公民会继续支持政府？我认为，在这种情况下，个人对国家的支持是由他们对暴力、治理和意识形态的看法之间的相互作用形成的。借鉴有关动机推理的研究，我认为意识形态上与国家的相似性和国家的有效治理可以减轻针对平民的军事暴力对国家支持的负面影响，反之，则会增强叛乱分子滥用权力对政府态度的正面影响。拉丁美洲舆论项目（Latin American Public Opinion Project）于 2005 年至 2011 年在哥伦比亚进行了为期七年的调查，分析结果表明，个人对国家武装力量伤害行为的反应取决于个人是否在意识形态上与国家保持一致。更具体地说，在意识形态与总统相似的人群中，军事伤害对武装部队和国家政府支持率的负面影响较小。也有不同的证据表明，国家治理的质量，尤其是提供犯罪安全的情况，会影响人们对受害情况的反应。虽然现有研究主要关注暴力或治理对国家态度的影响，但这些研究结果表明，要想建立一个更完整的理论来解释人们为何支持对平民使用暴力的政府，不仅需要了解暴力，还需要了解治理和意识形态。
{"title":"Violence against civilians and public support for the state: The moderating role of governance and ideology","authors":"Gabriella Levy","doi":"10.1177/00223433231200926","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231200926","url":null,"abstract":"When state armed forces engage in violence against civilians during civil wars, why do some citizens continue to support the government? I argue that individuals’ support for the state in such contexts is shaped by the interplay between their perceptions of violence, governance and ideology. Drawing on research concerning motivated reasoning, I suggest that ideological similarity with and effective governance from the state can alleviate the negative effect of military violence against civilians on support for the state and, conversely, augment the positive effect of insurgent abuse on attitudes toward the government. Analysis of seven years of surveys fielded by the Latin American Public Opinion Project in Colombia between 2005 and 2011 suggests that individuals’ responses to victimization by the state’s armed forces depend on whether the individuals are ideologically aligned with the state. More specifically, among people who have an ideology similar to that of the president, military victimization has a less negative effect on support for the armed forces and for the national government. There is also mixed evidence that the quality of state governance, particularly the provision of security from crime, shapes the ways people respond to victimization. While existing studies primarily focus on the effects of either violence or governance on attitudes toward the state, these findings indicate that a more complete theory of why people support governments which engage in violence against civilians requires an understanding of not only violence but also of governance and ideology.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"29 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138974644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-09DOI: 10.1177/00223433231200928
Samuel Brazys, Indra de Soysa, K. Vadlamannati
The question of foreign direct investment (FDI) and socio-political development is debated heavily. Liberals believe that FDI brings economic opportunities and/or increased incentives for peace and security among host societies. Critics suggest that FDI is exploitative, leading to conditions that increase the risk of violence. We take a political economy perspective that views FDI as problematic depending on how FDI affects politically powerful local interests. As such, all forms of FDI should meet domestic opposition, but only FDI in the extractive sector, where domestic political actors have little at stake, escalates to major war. Building on recent work which examines this question pertaining to extractive sector FDI, we introduce sub-national, geo-referenced data on FDI in all sectors for evaluating local conflict using combined data from four distinct geo-referenced conflict databases. Using site-period fixed effects with a difference-in-difference like approach, we find that FDI in all sectors increases local conflict. Conflicts induced by most FDI sectors fall short of becoming civil war, except for extractive sector FDI.
{"title":"Blessing or curse? Assessing the local impacts of foreign direct investment on conflict in Africa","authors":"Samuel Brazys, Indra de Soysa, K. Vadlamannati","doi":"10.1177/00223433231200928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231200928","url":null,"abstract":"The question of foreign direct investment (FDI) and socio-political development is debated heavily. Liberals believe that FDI brings economic opportunities and/or increased incentives for peace and security among host societies. Critics suggest that FDI is exploitative, leading to conditions that increase the risk of violence. We take a political economy perspective that views FDI as problematic depending on how FDI affects politically powerful local interests. As such, all forms of FDI should meet domestic opposition, but only FDI in the extractive sector, where domestic political actors have little at stake, escalates to major war. Building on recent work which examines this question pertaining to extractive sector FDI, we introduce sub-national, geo-referenced data on FDI in all sectors for evaluating local conflict using combined data from four distinct geo-referenced conflict databases. Using site-period fixed effects with a difference-in-difference like approach, we find that FDI in all sectors increases local conflict. Conflicts induced by most FDI sectors fall short of becoming civil war, except for extractive sector FDI.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"13 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138585652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-09DOI: 10.1177/00223433231201448
Samuel E. Bestvater, C. Loyle
Mobilization is central to the emergence, survival and success of armed groups challenging the state, and has lately expanded to new arenas with the rise of social media. Using a new dataset of rebel group Twitter use, we examined the topics contained in rebel group social media communications to understand how different messaging strategies impact civilian engagement with rebel messages. Rather than benefiting solely from direct calls to action, we found that rebel groups also increased civilian engagement through indirect messages of self-promotion. While direct appeals received more engagement than indirect appeals, their effects were tempered by audience fatigue when relied on too heavily. We additionally found that including images further enhanced the impact of a mobilizing message. These findings expanded our understanding of rebel communications and mobilization, with important implications for combating the use of social media as a recruitment tool for violent extremism.
{"title":"Messaging and mobilization: Rebel groups, social media communication, and audience engagement","authors":"Samuel E. Bestvater, C. Loyle","doi":"10.1177/00223433231201448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231201448","url":null,"abstract":"Mobilization is central to the emergence, survival and success of armed groups challenging the state, and has lately expanded to new arenas with the rise of social media. Using a new dataset of rebel group Twitter use, we examined the topics contained in rebel group social media communications to understand how different messaging strategies impact civilian engagement with rebel messages. Rather than benefiting solely from direct calls to action, we found that rebel groups also increased civilian engagement through indirect messages of self-promotion. While direct appeals received more engagement than indirect appeals, their effects were tempered by audience fatigue when relied on too heavily. We additionally found that including images further enhanced the impact of a mobilizing message. These findings expanded our understanding of rebel communications and mobilization, with important implications for combating the use of social media as a recruitment tool for violent extremism.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"1 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138585634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-09DOI: 10.1177/00223433231200918
Nazli Avdan, Andrew S Rosenberg, Christopher F Gelpi
Over the last decade, there has been a notable surge in the movement of refugees across international borders, posing significant challenges for the international community. In response, various policy measures have been implemented, including the construction of border walls, with the aim of impeding refugee influx. However, scholars have expressed doubts regarding the effectiveness of these fortifications, suggesting that walls merely redirect migrants to alternative routes, discourage return migration, or alter migrants’ cost–benefit calculations. Despite these concerns, there has been a lack of rigorous testing to support or refute these claims beyond case-specific evidence. This article addresses this research gap by thoroughly examining the arguments surrounding the impact of border fencing on refugee flows. We conduct a systematic, cross-national test of these arguments with a two-way fixed-effects estimator, an equivalence test, and a recently developed matching estimator designed for use on time-series cross-sectional data. Our results strongly support those who are skeptical of the impact of walls. We consistently demonstrate either that border fencing has not had any causal impact on refugee flows between 1970 and 2017 or that the statistical state-of-the-art is incapable of discerning that true effect. In either scenario, the evidence suggests that border fences fail to deliver the anticipated outcomes. These findings hold significant implications as violence-driven refugee flows persist, underscoring that while walls may serve as politically attractive tools for populist leaders, their actual deterrent effects are highly questionable at best.
{"title":"Where there’s a will, there’s a way: Border walls and refugees","authors":"Nazli Avdan, Andrew S Rosenberg, Christopher F Gelpi","doi":"10.1177/00223433231200918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231200918","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last decade, there has been a notable surge in the movement of refugees across international borders, posing significant challenges for the international community. In response, various policy measures have been implemented, including the construction of border walls, with the aim of impeding refugee influx. However, scholars have expressed doubts regarding the effectiveness of these fortifications, suggesting that walls merely redirect migrants to alternative routes, discourage return migration, or alter migrants’ cost–benefit calculations. Despite these concerns, there has been a lack of rigorous testing to support or refute these claims beyond case-specific evidence. This article addresses this research gap by thoroughly examining the arguments surrounding the impact of border fencing on refugee flows. We conduct a systematic, cross-national test of these arguments with a two-way fixed-effects estimator, an equivalence test, and a recently developed matching estimator designed for use on time-series cross-sectional data. Our results strongly support those who are skeptical of the impact of walls. We consistently demonstrate either that border fencing has not had any causal impact on refugee flows between 1970 and 2017 or that the statistical state-of-the-art is incapable of discerning that true effect. In either scenario, the evidence suggests that border fences fail to deliver the anticipated outcomes. These findings hold significant implications as violence-driven refugee flows persist, underscoring that while walls may serve as politically attractive tools for populist leaders, their actual deterrent effects are highly questionable at best.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138586007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-07DOI: 10.1177/00223433231201447
Andrew Bertoli, Allan Dafoe, Robert Trager
Does leader age matter for the likelihood of interstate conflict? Many studies in biology, psychology, and physiology have found that aggression tends to decline with age throughout the adult lifespan, particularly in males. Moreover, a number of major international conflicts have been attributed to young leaders, including the conquests of Alexander the Great and the ambitious military campaigns of Napoleon. However, the exact nature of the relationship between leader age and international conflict has been difficult to study because of the endogeneity problem. Leaders do not come to power randomly. Rather, many domestic and international factors influence who becomes the leader of a country, and some of these factors could correlate with the chances of interstate conflict. For instance, wary democratic publics might favor older leaders when future international conflict seems likely, inducing a relationship between older leaders and interstate conflict. This article overcomes such confounding by using a regression discontinuity design. Specifically, it looks at close elections of national leaders who had large differences in age. It finds that when older candidates barely defeated younger ones, countries were much less likely to engage in military conflict. Its sample is also fairly representative of democracies more broadly, meaning that the findings likely hold true for cases outside the sample. The results demonstrate the important role that individuals play in shaping world politics. They also illustrate the value of design-based inference for learning about important questions in the study of international relations and peace science.
{"title":"Leader age and international conflict: A regression discontinuity analysis","authors":"Andrew Bertoli, Allan Dafoe, Robert Trager","doi":"10.1177/00223433231201447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231201447","url":null,"abstract":"Does leader age matter for the likelihood of interstate conflict? Many studies in biology, psychology, and physiology have found that aggression tends to decline with age throughout the adult lifespan, particularly in males. Moreover, a number of major international conflicts have been attributed to young leaders, including the conquests of Alexander the Great and the ambitious military campaigns of Napoleon. However, the exact nature of the relationship between leader age and international conflict has been difficult to study because of the endogeneity problem. Leaders do not come to power randomly. Rather, many domestic and international factors influence who becomes the leader of a country, and some of these factors could correlate with the chances of interstate conflict. For instance, wary democratic publics might favor older leaders when future international conflict seems likely, inducing a relationship between older leaders and interstate conflict. This article overcomes such confounding by using a regression discontinuity design. Specifically, it looks at close elections of national leaders who had large differences in age. It finds that when older candidates barely defeated younger ones, countries were much less likely to engage in military conflict. Its sample is also fairly representative of democracies more broadly, meaning that the findings likely hold true for cases outside the sample. The results demonstrate the important role that individuals play in shaping world politics. They also illustrate the value of design-based inference for learning about important questions in the study of international relations and peace science.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"18 21","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138591279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-30DOI: 10.1177/00223433231200921
Matthew Nanes
Security sector reform often involves integrating marginalized groups into the police. Extensive discussion surrounds the benefits of inclusion to the marginalized group, but we know little about impacts on the dominant group. I argue that exposure to out-group police can increase dominant group civilians’ trust in the out-group, opening the door for further reforms and increasing the likelihood of peace. I explore dominant group citizens’ responses to out-group police officers in Israel. First, using a survey experiment, I find no evidence that exposure to Arab (marginalized) police officers leads to backlash by Jewish (dominant) civilians. Then, drawing on multiple surveys and panel data on the identity of officers at every station over six years, I find that exposure to Arab police is associated with increased trust in Arabs among Jews. This trust extends to both everyday situations like willingness to live next door to an Arab and to beliefs about Arabs’ intentions to commit political violence. Collectively, these results contradict fears that backlash by the dominant group might spoil peace, opening the door for police integration as an important part of peace processes.
{"title":"Dominant group backlash? Majority responses to minority participation in the police","authors":"Matthew Nanes","doi":"10.1177/00223433231200921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231200921","url":null,"abstract":"Security sector reform often involves integrating marginalized groups into the police. Extensive discussion surrounds the benefits of inclusion to the marginalized group, but we know little about impacts on the dominant group. I argue that exposure to out-group police can increase dominant group civilians’ trust in the out-group, opening the door for further reforms and increasing the likelihood of peace. I explore dominant group citizens’ responses to out-group police officers in Israel. First, using a survey experiment, I find no evidence that exposure to Arab (marginalized) police officers leads to backlash by Jewish (dominant) civilians. Then, drawing on multiple surveys and panel data on the identity of officers at every station over six years, I find that exposure to Arab police is associated with increased trust in Arabs among Jews. This trust extends to both everyday situations like willingness to live next door to an Arab and to beliefs about Arabs’ intentions to commit political violence. Collectively, these results contradict fears that backlash by the dominant group might spoil peace, opening the door for police integration as an important part of peace processes.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":"341 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139204581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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