Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103725
Claes Bäckman , Chandler Lutz
We study how mortgage innovation can cause a housing boom even within a robust regulatory framework and strictly enforced recourse borrowing. Specifically, we find that the 2003 introduction of interest-only (IO) mortgages in Denmark ignited a housing boom that increased house prices 36 percent. In line with IO loans lowering debt-service payments and relaxing payment-to-income constraints, results show higher IO loan uptake and house price growth in areas with greater ex-ante benefits of such mortgages. Overall, our results are relevant for the many countries where IO loans play a sizable role in mortgage finance.
{"title":"Mortgage innovation and house price booms","authors":"Claes Bäckman , Chandler Lutz","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103725","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103725","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study how mortgage innovation can cause a housing boom even within a robust regulatory framework and strictly enforced recourse borrowing. Specifically, we find that the 2003 introduction of interest-only (IO) mortgages in Denmark ignited a housing boom that increased house prices 36 percent. In line with IO loans lowering debt-service payments and relaxing payment-to-income constraints, results show higher IO loan uptake and house price growth in areas with greater ex-ante benefits of such mortgages. Overall, our results are relevant for the many countries where IO loans play a sizable role in mortgage finance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"145 ","pages":"Article 103725"},"PeriodicalIF":5.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143096323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103733
Guglielmo Barone , Guido de Blasio , Elena Gentili
This paper documents the higher growth experienced by politically connected municipalities in Italy between the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall. It leverages the peculiarities of the institutional setting and compares population growth in connected and unconnected municipalities with similar characteristics at the beginning of the period. Our results indicate a population premium of 7.4% over 40 years. Connected municipalities benefited from the location of state-owned enterprises, more infrastructures and higher public spending. Political connections favored industrialization, higher employment and wages, but crowded out private entrepreneurship. Local communities repaid these benefits through voting. There is no evidence of higher agglomeration economies in politically connected cities, suggesting that political connections have not been output-enhancing from a nationwide perspective. The difference in population growth rates fades away after the end of the connections.
{"title":"Politically connected cities: Italy 1951–1991","authors":"Guglielmo Barone , Guido de Blasio , Elena Gentili","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103733","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103733","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper documents the higher growth experienced by politically connected municipalities in Italy between the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall. It leverages the peculiarities of the institutional setting and compares population growth in connected and unconnected municipalities with similar characteristics at the beginning of the period. Our results indicate a population premium of 7.4% over 40 years. Connected municipalities benefited from the location of state-owned enterprises, more infrastructures and higher public spending. Political connections favored industrialization, higher employment and wages, but crowded out private entrepreneurship. Local communities repaid these benefits through voting. There is no evidence of higher agglomeration economies in politically connected cities, suggesting that political connections have not been output-enhancing from a nationwide perspective. The difference in population growth rates fades away after the end of the connections.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"145 ","pages":"Article 103733"},"PeriodicalIF":5.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143096320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103731
Ziyang Chen , Ting Chen , Yatang Lin , Jin Wang
This article examines the determinants and economic efficiency of state-led urbanization, increasingly the mantra of developing countries, focusing on China’s skyscraper development as a prominent example. Employing a political economy lens, we find that local governments subsidized skyscraper development through discounted land prices to encourage the development of new urban agglomerations, particularly in cities where local leaders are motivated by stronger career incentives and during the central government’s monetary easing policy period. But 5 to 10 years after completion, subsidized skyscrapers yield few spatial spillovers in land price premium, new business formation, or endogenous urban amenities, compared to unsubsidized ones. The lack of spillovers is caused by poor location, less reliable developers, and inadequate infrastructure. One important policy implication is that without careful consideration of local factors and related externalities, state interventions in urban development may fail to realize the fruits of public investment.
{"title":"Building tall, falling short: An empirical assessment of Chinese skyscrapers","authors":"Ziyang Chen , Ting Chen , Yatang Lin , Jin Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103731","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103731","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article examines the determinants and economic efficiency of state-led urbanization, increasingly the mantra of developing countries, focusing on China’s skyscraper development as a prominent example. Employing a political economy lens, we find that local governments subsidized skyscraper development through discounted land prices to encourage the development of new urban agglomerations, particularly in cities where local leaders are motivated by stronger career incentives and during the central government’s monetary easing policy period. But 5 to 10 years after completion, subsidized skyscrapers yield few spatial spillovers in land price premium, new business formation, or endogenous urban amenities, compared to unsubsidized ones. The lack of spillovers is caused by poor location, less reliable developers, and inadequate infrastructure. One important policy implication is that without careful consideration of local factors and related externalities, state interventions in urban development may fail to realize the fruits of public investment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"145 ","pages":"Article 103731"},"PeriodicalIF":5.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143096325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103730
Richard Bluhm , Axel Dreher , Andreas Fuchs , Bradley C. Parks , Austin M. Strange , Michael J. Tierney
This paper studies the causal effect of transport infrastructure on the spatial distribution of economic activity within subnational regions across a large number of developing countries. To do so, we introduce a new global dataset of geolocated Chinese grant- and loan-financed development projects from 2000 to 2014 and combine it with measures of spatial concentration based on remotely sensed data. We find that Chinese-financed transportation projects decentralize economic activity within regions, as measured by a spatial Gini coefficient, by 2.2 percentage points. The treatment effects are particularly strong in regions that are less developed, more urbanized, and located closer to cities.
{"title":"Connective financing: Chinese infrastructure projects and the diffusion of economic activity in developing countries","authors":"Richard Bluhm , Axel Dreher , Andreas Fuchs , Bradley C. Parks , Austin M. Strange , Michael J. Tierney","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103730","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103730","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies the causal effect of transport infrastructure on the spatial distribution of economic activity within subnational regions across a large number of developing countries. To do so, we introduce a new global dataset of geolocated Chinese grant- and loan-financed development projects from 2000 to 2014 and combine it with measures of spatial concentration based on remotely sensed data. We find that Chinese-financed transportation projects decentralize economic activity within regions, as measured by a spatial Gini coefficient, by 2.2 percentage points. The treatment effects are particularly strong in regions that are less developed, more urbanized, and located closer to cities.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"145 ","pages":"Article 103730"},"PeriodicalIF":5.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143096322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103732
David R. Agrawal, Jan K. Brueckner
This paper studies the interstate effects of decentralized taxation and spending when work-from-home allows fully remote work from another state. In this setting, a state’s population and employment levels are decoupled, making the impact of state tax differentials radically different from when individuals must live and work in the same state. The impacts depend on whether income is taxed at the location of the employer (source) or employee (residence). Our main findings show that a shift from a non-WFH economy to a work-from-home (WFH) economy reduces employment and raises the wage in the high-tax state, with larger effects under source taxation. The logic is that wages are lower in the high-tax state in the absence of WFH, and with interstate wage equality required when residences and workplaces are decoupled, WFH causes a loss of employment and an increase in the wage in that state. Once WFH is established, a tax increase in the high-tax state either reduces employment further while raising the wage (source taxation) or leaves the labor market unaffected (residence taxation). We also show that the non-WFH equilibrium and the source-tax equilibrium under WFH are inefficient, while the residence-tax WFH equilibrium is efficient.
{"title":"Taxes and telework: The impacts of state income taxes in a work-from-home economy","authors":"David R. Agrawal, Jan K. Brueckner","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103732","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103732","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies the interstate effects of decentralized taxation and spending when work-from-home allows fully remote work from another state. In this setting, a state’s population and employment levels are decoupled, making the impact of state tax differentials radically different from when individuals must live and work in the same state. The impacts depend on whether income is taxed at the location of the employer (source) or employee (residence). Our main findings show that a shift from a non-WFH economy to a work-from-home (WFH) economy reduces employment and raises the wage in the high-tax state, with larger effects under source taxation. The logic is that wages are lower in the high-tax state in the absence of WFH, and with interstate wage equality required when residences and workplaces are decoupled, WFH causes a loss of employment and an increase in the wage in that state. Once WFH is established, a tax increase in the high-tax state either reduces employment further while raising the wage (source taxation) or leaves the labor market unaffected (residence taxation). We also show that the non-WFH equilibrium and the source-tax equilibrium under WFH are inefficient, while the residence-tax WFH equilibrium is efficient.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"145 ","pages":"Article 103732"},"PeriodicalIF":5.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143096324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-30DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103729
Jingjing Chen , Wei Chen , Ernest Liu , Jie Luo , Zheng Song
Containing the COVID-19 pandemic by non-pharmacological interventions is costly. Using high-frequency, city-to-city truck flow data, this paper estimates the economic cost of lockdown in China, a stringent yet effective policy prior to the Omicron surge. By comparing the truck flow change in the cities with and without lockdown, we find that a one-month full-scale lockdown causally reduces the truck flows connected to the locked down city in the month by 54%, implying a decline of the city’s real income with the same proportion in a gravity model of city-to-city trade. We also structurally estimate the cost of lockdown in the gravity model, where the effects of lockdown can spill over to other cities through trade linkages. Imposing full-scale lockdown on the four largest cities in China (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen) for one month would reduce the real national GDP by 8.7%, of which 8.5% is contributed by the spillover effects.
{"title":"The economic cost of locking down like China: Evidence from city-to-city truck flows","authors":"Jingjing Chen , Wei Chen , Ernest Liu , Jie Luo , Zheng Song","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103729","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103729","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Containing the COVID-19 pandemic by non-pharmacological interventions is costly. Using high-frequency, city-to-city truck flow data, this paper estimates the economic cost of lockdown in China, a stringent yet effective policy prior to the Omicron surge. By comparing the truck flow change in the cities with and without lockdown, we find that a one-month full-scale lockdown causally reduces the truck flows connected to the locked down city in the month by 54%, implying a decline of the city’s real income with the same proportion in a gravity model of city-to-city trade. We also structurally estimate the cost of lockdown in the gravity model, where the effects of lockdown can spill over to other cities through trade linkages. Imposing full-scale lockdown on the four largest cities in China (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen) for one month would reduce the real national GDP by 8.7%, of which 8.5% is contributed by the spillover effects.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"145 ","pages":"Article 103729"},"PeriodicalIF":5.7,"publicationDate":"2024-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142744484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the effects of real estate transfer taxes (RETT) on property prices using a rich micro dataset of roughly 17 million German properties for the period from 2005 to 2019. Our empirical analysis exploits variation in RETT rate hikes across German states and over time. Our monthly event study estimates indicate a price response that strongly exceeds the change in the tax burden for single transactions. Twelve months after a reform, a one percentage point increase in the tax rate reduces property prices by on average 3%. Price effects are larger for apartments (−4%) than for single-family houses (−2%). Exploring potential mechanisms, we provide evidence that different holding periods are the main driver of the differential price effect between property types.
{"title":"Who bears the burden of real estate transfer taxes? Evidence from the German housing market","authors":"Mathias Dolls , Clemens Fuest , Carla Krolage , Florian Neumeier","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103717","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103717","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the effects of real estate transfer taxes (RETT) on property prices using a rich micro dataset of roughly 17 million German properties for the period from 2005 to 2019. Our empirical analysis exploits variation in RETT rate hikes across German states and over time. Our monthly event study estimates indicate a price response that strongly exceeds the change in the tax burden for single transactions. Twelve months after a reform, a one percentage point increase in the tax rate reduces property prices by on average 3%. Price effects are larger for apartments (−4%) than for single-family houses (−2%). Exploring potential mechanisms, we provide evidence that different holding periods are the main driver of the differential price effect between property types.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"145 ","pages":"Article 103717"},"PeriodicalIF":5.7,"publicationDate":"2024-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142703106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-16DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103716
Wei TANG , Yuan WANG , Jiameng WU
This paper aims to disentangle the roles of information frictions and career incentives of local officials in the allocation of government contracts. Drawing on a unique dataset including both winning and losing bidders of public procurement auctions in China, we document a strong local bias in the contract allocation. These patterns are hardly reconciled with explanations rooted in information frictions or corruption. Instead, we highlight the role of local leaders’ career incentives, presenting evidence that local favoritism is more pronounced in localities with more incentivized mayors. Our findings prompt a reconsideration of the effectiveness of bureaucratic discretion in allocating public resources. (JEL H57, H77, H72, D73, R51)
{"title":"Local favoritism in China's public procurement: Information frictions or incentive distortion?","authors":"Wei TANG , Yuan WANG , Jiameng WU","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103716","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103716","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper aims to disentangle the roles of information frictions and career incentives of local officials in the allocation of government contracts. Drawing on a unique dataset including both winning and losing bidders of public procurement auctions in China, we document a strong local bias in the contract allocation. These patterns are hardly reconciled with explanations rooted in information frictions or corruption. Instead, we highlight the role of local leaders’ career incentives, presenting evidence that local favoritism is more pronounced in localities with more incentivized mayors. Our findings prompt a reconsideration of the effectiveness of bureaucratic discretion in allocating public resources. (JEL H57, H77, H72, D73, R51)</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"145 ","pages":"Article 103716"},"PeriodicalIF":5.7,"publicationDate":"2024-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142656367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103709
Malte Borghorst , Ismir Mulalic , Jos van Ommeren
We demonstrate that women with children are much more likely to leave their job when they have a long commute, which is not true for men. Interpreting these results through the lens of a dynamic search model, we demonstrate that commuting costs increase substantially for women after they have children. For women with children, a 12 kilometer increase in commuting distance induces costs equivalent to about 20% of their wage.
{"title":"Commuting, gender and children","authors":"Malte Borghorst , Ismir Mulalic , Jos van Ommeren","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103709","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103709","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We demonstrate that women with children are much more likely to leave their job when they have a long commute, which is not true for men. Interpreting these results through the lens of a dynamic search model, we demonstrate that commuting costs increase substantially for women after they have children. For women with children, a 12 kilometer increase in commuting distance induces costs equivalent to about 20% of their wage.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"144 ","pages":"Article 103709"},"PeriodicalIF":5.7,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142578667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103715
Ting Chen , Yizhen Gu , Ben Zou
Using commuting flows derived from cellphone location data at fine geographical levels, this paper presents the first delineation of China’s commuting-based metropolitan areas (MAs). The size distribution of those MAs follows a power law, with larger MAs hosting more skilled workers, more productive firms, and offering higher wage premiums. China’s commuting-based MAs exhibit a few notable features compared to several other large countries. First, commutes are short in both time and distance and rarely cross administrative boundaries. Second, China’s MAs are small relative to the size of the country, with MA sizes highly correlated with the administrative hierarchy. We discuss existing policies that may have contributed to these characteristics. We demonstrate that commuting-based MAs differ substantively from other definitions of Chinese cities. The commuting-based MAs provide a valuable tool for researchers who need to define Chinese cities as local labor markets but are limited by the availability of official delineations.
{"title":"China’s commuting-based metropolitan areas","authors":"Ting Chen , Yizhen Gu , Ben Zou","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103715","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103715","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using commuting flows derived from cellphone location data at fine geographical levels, this paper presents the first delineation of China’s commuting-based metropolitan areas (MAs). The size distribution of those MAs follows a power law, with larger MAs hosting more skilled workers, more productive firms, and offering higher wage premiums. China’s commuting-based MAs exhibit a few notable features compared to several other large countries. First, commutes are short in both time and distance and rarely cross administrative boundaries. Second, China’s MAs are small relative to the size of the country, with MA sizes highly correlated with the administrative hierarchy. We discuss existing policies that may have contributed to these characteristics. We demonstrate that commuting-based MAs differ substantively from other definitions of Chinese cities. The commuting-based MAs provide a valuable tool for researchers who need to define Chinese cities as local labor markets but are limited by the availability of official delineations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"144 ","pages":"Article 103715"},"PeriodicalIF":5.7,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142662721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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