Pub Date : 2024-06-28DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103680
Cuong Viet Nguyen , Tuyen Quang Tran , Huong Van Vu
In this study, we find a negative effect of unexploded ordnance (UXO) on the geographical density of foreign direct investment and large firms in Vietnam. A 1 % increase in the proportion of UXO-contaminated areas leads to a 0.69 % relative decrease in the density of FDI firms within districts. Point estimates for the elasticity of the density of joint-venture FDI firms and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) due to UXO are smaller, equal to -0.56 and -0.36. Moreover, we also find that a 1 % increase in the proportion of UXO-contaminated areas leads to a 0.38 % relative decrease in the intensity of nighttime light.
{"title":"The long-term effects of war on foreign direct investment and economic development: evidence from Vietnam","authors":"Cuong Viet Nguyen , Tuyen Quang Tran , Huong Van Vu","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2024.103680","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this study, we find a negative effect of unexploded ordnance (UXO) on the geographical density of foreign direct investment and large firms in Vietnam. A 1 % increase in the proportion of UXO-contaminated areas leads to a 0.69 % relative decrease in the density of FDI firms within districts. Point estimates for the elasticity of the density of joint-venture FDI firms and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) due to UXO are smaller, equal to -0.56 and -0.36. Moreover, we also find that a 1 % increase in the proportion of UXO-contaminated areas leads to a 0.38 % relative decrease in the intensity of nighttime light.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"143 ","pages":"Article 103680"},"PeriodicalIF":5.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141479786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-25DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103679
Jiangnan Zeng , Qiyao Zhou
What role do local officials’ incentives play in regional economic growth? How do local officials behave under promotion pressure? This paper studies the unintended impact of mayors’ promotion incentives on regional economic growth and subnational-level GDP manipulation in China. We employ a regression discontinuity design that accounts for age restrictions in deciding promotions for mayors. We find that when GDP performance is prioritized in officials’ promotion evaluations (before 2013), mayors’ promotion incentives significantly increase the statistical GDP growth rate by 3.4 percentage points. However, their effects on nighttime light and other non-manipulable real economic growth indicators are close to zero. This gap can be attributed to GDP manipulation under our empirical framework. The above pattern no longer persists after 2013, when the role of GDP statistics in mayoral promotions was reduced. Our findings indicate that GDP manipulation makes performance-based competition between mayors devolve into a data manipulation game.
地方官员的激励机制在地区经济增长中发挥什么作用?地方官员在升迁压力下的行为如何?本文研究了中国市长晋升激励对地区经济增长和国家以下各级 GDP 操纵的意外影响。我们采用回归不连续设计,在决定市长晋升时考虑了年龄限制。我们发现,当官员晋升评价中优先考虑 GDP 表现时(2013 年以前),市长晋升激励会显著提高统计 GDP 增长率 3.4 个百分点。然而,它们对夜间照明和其他不可操控的实际经济增长指标的影响却接近于零。在我们的实证框架下,这一差距可以归因于 GDP 的操纵。2013 年后,GDP 统计在市长晋升中的作用减弱,上述模式不再持续。我们的研究结果表明,GDP操纵使得市长之间基于政绩的竞争演变成了一场数据操纵游戏。
{"title":"Mayors’ promotion incentives and subnational-level GDP manipulation","authors":"Jiangnan Zeng , Qiyao Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103679","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2024.103679","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>What role do local officials’ incentives play in regional economic growth? How do local officials behave under promotion pressure? This paper studies the unintended impact of mayors’ promotion incentives on regional economic growth and subnational-level GDP manipulation in China. We employ a regression discontinuity design that accounts for age restrictions in deciding promotions for mayors. We find that when GDP performance is prioritized in officials’ promotion evaluations (before 2013), mayors’ promotion incentives significantly increase the statistical GDP growth rate by 3.4 percentage points. However, their effects on nighttime light and other non-manipulable real economic growth indicators are close to zero. This gap can be attributed to GDP manipulation under our empirical framework. The above pattern no longer persists after 2013, when the role of GDP statistics in mayoral promotions was reduced. Our findings indicate that GDP manipulation makes performance-based competition between mayors devolve into a data manipulation game.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"143 ","pages":"Article 103679"},"PeriodicalIF":5.7,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141479785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-08DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103670
Thomas Pearson
This paper studies how immigration status affects crime reporting. I focus on Deferred Action for Early Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a policy that temporarily protects youth from deportation and provides work authorization. For identification, I compare the reporting behavior of victims who are more likely to be undocumented around the policy’s age-eligibility cut-off over time. I find that DACA eligibility increased victims’ likelihood of reporting crimes to the police and provide evidence consistent with DACA reducing victims’ fear of deportation. Overall, the results suggest that immigrant legalization increases engagement with police.
{"title":"The impact of immigration status on crime reporting: Evidence from DACA","authors":"Thomas Pearson","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103670","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2024.103670","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies how immigration status affects crime reporting. I focus on Deferred Action for Early Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a policy that temporarily protects youth from deportation and provides work authorization. For identification, I compare the reporting behavior of victims who are more likely to be undocumented around the policy’s age-eligibility cut-off over time. I find that DACA eligibility increased victims’ likelihood of reporting crimes to the police and provide evidence consistent with DACA reducing victims’ fear of deportation. Overall, the results suggest that immigrant legalization increases engagement with police.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"143 ","pages":"Article 103670"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141303087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-21DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103655
Crocker H. Liu , Stuart S. Rosenthal , William C. Strange
Previous work on agglomeration economies ignores the built environment. This paper shows that the built environment matters, especially for commercial sectors that dominate city centers. Buildings are specialized beyond random assignment, in part because externality-generating anchor tenants skew a building's other tenants towards the anchor's industry. An anchor elsewhere on the blockface has a much weaker effect, and one that is weaker still if across the street, suggesting rapidly attenuating agglomeration economies. Attenuation is pronounced for retail and information-oriented office industries but is absent for manufacturing. Building managers have incentives and capacities to partly internalize local externalities, contributing to urban productivity.
{"title":"Agglomeration Economies and the Built Environment: Evidence from Specialized Buildings and Anchor Tenants","authors":"Crocker H. Liu , Stuart S. Rosenthal , William C. Strange","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103655","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2024.103655","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Previous work on agglomeration economies ignores the built environment. This paper shows that the built environment matters, especially for commercial sectors that dominate city centers. Buildings are specialized beyond random assignment, in part because externality-generating anchor tenants skew a building's other tenants towards the anchor's industry. An anchor elsewhere on the blockface has a much weaker effect, and one that is weaker still if across the street, suggesting rapidly attenuating agglomeration economies. Attenuation is pronounced for retail and information-oriented office industries but is absent for manufacturing. Building managers have incentives and capacities to partly internalize local externalities, contributing to urban productivity.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"142 ","pages":"Article 103655"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141073151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-09DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103668
Sumit Agarwal , Weida Kuang , Long Wang , Yang Yang
This study examines the role played by real estate agents in fraudulent activities in China’s housing market. We show that agents contribute to the formation of Yin–Yang contracts and the magnitude of resulting tax evasion through two possible mechanisms: the learning-by-doing effect and the peer effect. Agents’ cumulative experience allows them to discover local registration authorities’ monitoring capability and strategically register prices close to the internal guideline prices. Moreover, agents’ involvement in tax evasion is significantly affected by the tax evasion behaviors of their peers. The difference-in-differences analyses across two policy shocks show that the involvement of experienced real estate agents exacerbates the magnitude of tax evasion during periods of frequent government policy adjustments.
{"title":"The role of agents in fraudulent activities: Evidence from the housing market in Beijing","authors":"Sumit Agarwal , Weida Kuang , Long Wang , Yang Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2024.103668","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines the role played by real estate agents in fraudulent activities in China’s housing market. We show that agents contribute to the formation of <em>Yin–Yang</em> contracts and the magnitude of resulting tax evasion through two possible mechanisms: the learning-by-doing effect and the peer effect. Agents’ cumulative experience allows them to discover local registration authorities’ monitoring capability and strategically register prices close to the internal guideline prices. Moreover, agents’ involvement in tax evasion is significantly affected by the tax evasion behaviors of their peers. The difference-in-differences analyses across two policy shocks show that the involvement of experienced real estate agents exacerbates the magnitude of tax evasion during periods of frequent government policy adjustments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"142 ","pages":"Article 103668"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140901469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-07DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103669
Raven Molloy
Shelter is a large share of household expenditures and therefore has a large weight in inflation measurement. Because rich and poor households tend to make different housing and location choices, does the shelter component of inflation differ across the income distribution? I calculate rent growth for households in each quintile of the income distribution from 1985 to 2021 and find modestly lower rent growth for lower-income groups. However, because lower-income households spend a larger fraction of total expenditures on housing, I find little difference across groups in headline inflation. Therefore, different housing and location choices have not generated materially different shelter components of inflation across the income distribution.
{"title":"JUE insight: Differences in rent growth by income from 1985 to 2021 and implications for inflation","authors":"Raven Molloy","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103669","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2024.103669","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Shelter is a large share of household expenditures and therefore has a large weight in inflation measurement. Because rich and poor households tend to make different housing and location choices, does the shelter component of inflation differ across the income distribution? I calculate rent growth for households in each quintile of the income distribution from 1985 to 2021 and find modestly lower rent growth for lower-income groups. However, because lower-income households spend a larger fraction of total expenditures on housing, I find little difference across groups in headline inflation. Therefore, different housing and location choices have not generated materially different shelter components of inflation across the income distribution.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"142 ","pages":"Article 103669"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140879197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-25DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103667
David Mitre-Becerril , John M. MacDonald
This paper estimates the effect of enacting a new zoning code in Philadelphia on urban development and crime. The new zoning code was intended to ease regulatory burdens for property development and land use changes, but the law allowed city council members to keep prerogative over urban development in their districts. The council district prerogative created arbitrary geographic discontinuities in the ability of the zoning code to promote urban development. Using a difference-in-discontinuities design, we find that the new zoning regulation caused a 35 percent reduction in land use zoning changes and building permits in council districts less friendly to urban development relative to neighboring districts. The decline in urban development had no short-term effect on crime. Construction projects and land-use changes appear to occur in the most densely populated areas, suggesting that council districts less inclined to urban development prevent residential construction in areas that would otherwise be a source for new residential housing development.
{"title":"Does urban development influence crime? Evidence from Philadelphia’s new zoning regulations","authors":"David Mitre-Becerril , John M. MacDonald","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2024.103667","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper estimates the effect of enacting a new zoning code in Philadelphia on urban development and crime. The new zoning code was intended to ease regulatory burdens for property development and land use changes, but the law allowed city council members to keep prerogative over urban development in their districts. The council district prerogative created arbitrary geographic discontinuities in the ability of the zoning code to promote urban development. Using a difference-in-discontinuities design, we find that the new zoning regulation caused a 35 percent reduction in land use zoning changes and building permits in council districts less friendly to urban development relative to neighboring districts. The decline in urban development had no short-term effect on crime. Construction projects and land-use changes appear to occur in the most densely populated areas, suggesting that council districts less inclined to urban development prevent residential construction in areas that would otherwise be a source for new residential housing development.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"142 ","pages":"Article 103667"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140646552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-16DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103666
Dominika Langenmayr , Martin Simmler
Firms should use all available information to anticipate future tax rates. Firm mobility is one source of such information. We first establish theoretically that expected future tax rates are higher in jurisdictions attractive for immobile firms (such as wind power plants or resource extracting firms). Fewer mobile firms enter in such a jurisdiction. Building on previous empirical evidence that German municipalities raise tax rates following the entry of immobile firms, we confirm that firms use this information to anticipate future tax rates. In the jurisdictions with the largest expected future tax rate increases, 10% fewer firms enter.
{"title":"JUE insight: Expectations about future tax rates and firm entry","authors":"Dominika Langenmayr , Martin Simmler","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103666","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103666","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Firms should use all available information to anticipate future tax rates. Firm mobility is one source of such information. We first establish theoretically that expected future tax rates are higher in jurisdictions attractive for immobile firms (such as wind power plants or resource extracting firms). Fewer mobile firms enter in such a jurisdiction. Building on previous empirical evidence that German municipalities raise tax rates following the entry of immobile firms, we confirm that firms use this information to anticipate future tax rates. In the jurisdictions with the largest expected future tax rate increases, 10% fewer firms enter.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"142 ","pages":"Article 103666"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094119024000366/pdfft?md5=6b44a5a69cfbd305509fc411b6e43992&pid=1-s2.0-S0094119024000366-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140757202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-25DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103656
Stephen Calabrese
I apply a Tiebout model of multiple local jurisdictions to study the political economy and welfare effects of state limitations on the taxing powers of local governments, investigating the effects of such restrictions on housing markets, community composition, and the types of expenditures undertaken by local governments. The Tiebout model in this paper is distinguished by voters choosing values of multiple local policy (tax and expenditure) instruments, a mixture of renters and owners residing in each community, and different degrees of household mobility. I characterize and provide sufficient conditions for voting equilibrium even with multiple policy instruments and varying housing tenure by developing a novel application of the Besley and Coate (1997) model of representative democracy. The different degrees of household mobility following the introduction of tax limits have significant impacts on equilibrium values, the predicted level of political support, and the welfare effects associated with these tax limits. In addition, almost none of the tax limits increase overall welfare, even though many gain majority support. The only case that is predicted to have majority support and increases welfare is when all households are mobile, head and income taxes have previously been constrained, and property taxes are then limited. These results accord well with the hypothesis of Vigdor (2001)—that much political support for tax limits comes from a desire by individuals to limit taxes in localities other than their own.
{"title":"Household mobility and the political economy and welfare effects of local tax limits","authors":"Stephen Calabrese","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2024.103656","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I apply a Tiebout model of multiple local jurisdictions to study the political economy and welfare effects of state limitations on the taxing powers of local governments, investigating the effects of such restrictions on housing markets, community composition, and the types of expenditures undertaken by local governments. The Tiebout model in this paper is distinguished by voters choosing values of multiple local policy (tax and expenditure) instruments, a mixture of renters and owners residing in each community, and different degrees of household mobility. I characterize and provide sufficient conditions for voting equilibrium even with multiple policy instruments and varying housing tenure by developing a novel application of the <span>Besley and Coate (1997)</span> model of representative democracy. The different degrees of household mobility following the introduction of tax limits have significant impacts on equilibrium values, the predicted level of political support, and the welfare effects associated with these tax limits. In addition, almost none of the tax limits increase overall welfare, even though many gain majority support. The only case that is predicted to have majority support and increases welfare is when all households are mobile, head and income taxes have previously been constrained, and property taxes are then limited. These results accord well with the hypothesis of <span>Vigdor (2001)</span>—that much political support for tax limits comes from a desire by individuals to limit taxes in localities other than their own.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"142 ","pages":"Article 103656"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094119024000263/pdfft?md5=112d8c363b7f4d0301c18b83c2dc4dca&pid=1-s2.0-S0094119024000263-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140209171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-28DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103645
Sheridan Titman , Guozhong Zhu
We develop a model that describes how city characteristics affect the volatility of real estate rents and values. The model includes agglomeration externalities, which amplify the effect of productivity shocks on population growth and rents, as well as city characteristics that constrain population growth. While growth constraints make rents more subject to productivity shocks because of the inelastic supply, they can also suppress the benefits of agglomeration, which has the effect of decreasing the sensitivity of rents to productivity shocks. Our dynamic model exhibits persistent rent growth and rent-to-value ratios that vary across cities and over time. In particular, we show that productivity shocks have a larger initial effect on rents in more constrained cities, but a greater long-term effect in less constrained cities.
{"title":"City characteristics, land prices and volatility","authors":"Sheridan Titman , Guozhong Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.jue.2024.103645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2024.103645","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We develop a model that describes how city characteristics affect the volatility of real estate rents and values. The model includes agglomeration externalities, which amplify the effect of productivity shocks on population growth and rents, as well as city characteristics that constrain population growth. While growth constraints make rents more subject to productivity shocks because of the inelastic supply, they can also suppress the benefits of agglomeration, which has the effect of decreasing the sensitivity of rents to productivity shocks. Our dynamic model exhibits persistent rent growth and rent-to-value ratios that vary across cities and over time. In particular, we show that productivity shocks have a larger initial effect on rents in more constrained cities, but a greater long-term effect in less constrained cities.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48340,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Urban Economics","volume":"140 ","pages":"Article 103645"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094119024000159/pdfft?md5=c011de93bc7b8def0223ab877d552521&pid=1-s2.0-S0094119024000159-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139985924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}