ABSTRACT:Adverse local labor market shocks such as those generated by exposure of local industries to international trade have impacts on high school enrollment and completion that are theoretically ambiguous. Incentives to stay in school increase when employment prospects are weak, yet public resources for local schools may also shrink. This work demonstrates that, while high school enrollment rates increase significantly, high school degree attainment does not show commensurate growth. “Outmigration” of young adults and changes in the timing of degree receipt reconcile these measures. In addition, high school attainment effects are likely attenuated by declines in local resources per student.
{"title":"Does Enrollment Lead to Completion? Measuring Adjustments in Education to Local Labor Market Shocks","authors":"Ramiro Burga, Sarah Turner","doi":"10.3368/jhr.0121-11408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.0121-11408","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:Adverse local labor market shocks such as those generated by exposure of local industries to international trade have impacts on high school enrollment and completion that are theoretically ambiguous. Incentives to stay in school increase when employment prospects are weak, yet public resources for local schools may also shrink. This work demonstrates that, while high school enrollment rates increase significantly, high school degree attainment does not show commensurate growth. “Outmigration” of young adults and changes in the timing of degree receipt reconcile these measures. In addition, high school attainment effects are likely attenuated by declines in local resources per student.","PeriodicalId":48346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Human Resources","volume":"58 1","pages":"755 - 782"},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75396058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-05DOI: 10.3368/jhr.0820-11118r1
Jorge Luis García
{"title":"Pricing Children, Curbing Daughters: Fertility and the Sex Ratio During China’s One-Child Policy","authors":"Jorge Luis García","doi":"10.3368/jhr.0820-11118r1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.0820-11118r1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Human Resources","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85979743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-05DOI: 10.3368/jhr.1120-11323r1
Mathilde Godard,Pierre Koning,Maarten Lindeboom
{"title":"Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance","authors":"Mathilde Godard,Pierre Koning,Maarten Lindeboom","doi":"10.3368/jhr.1120-11323r1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.1120-11323r1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Human Resources","volume":"10 16","pages":"1120-11323R1"},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138495807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Do school choice programs increase opportunities for educational mobility or reinforce initial disparities in schooling? I address this question in the context of the public education system in Ghana, which uses standardized tests and a nation-wide application process to allocate 150,000 elementary school students to 650 secondary schools. As has been found in other settings, students from lower-performing elementary schools in Ghana apply to less selective secondary schools than students with the same test scores from higher-performing elementary schools. My analysis suggests that dierences in application behavior are largely due to imperfect information about admission chances and dierences in decision-making skills, rather than dierences in preferences or the costs and accessibility of schools. Additionally, I show that the impact of uncertainty declines following a series of reforms in the application process that expanded the number of choices students could list, and encouraged students to select a more diversied"
{"title":"School Choice and Educational Mobility: Lessons from Secondary School Applications in Ghana","authors":"Kehinde F. Ajayi","doi":"10.3368/jhr.0417-8714r2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.0417-8714r2","url":null,"abstract":"Do school choice programs increase opportunities for educational mobility or reinforce initial disparities in schooling? I address this question in the context of the public education system in Ghana, which uses standardized tests and a nation-wide application process to allocate 150,000 elementary school students to 650 secondary schools. As has been found in other settings, students from lower-performing elementary schools in Ghana apply to less selective secondary schools than students with the same test scores from higher-performing elementary schools. My analysis suggests that dierences in application behavior are largely due to imperfect information about admission chances and dierences in decision-making skills, rather than dierences in preferences or the costs and accessibility of schools. Additionally, I show that the impact of uncertainty declines following a series of reforms in the application process that expanded the number of choices students could list, and encouraged students to select a more diversied\"","PeriodicalId":48346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Human Resources","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74072323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-05DOI: 10.3368/jhr.0221-11481r2
O. Thompson
{"title":"Selected Fertility and Racial Inequality","authors":"O. Thompson","doi":"10.3368/jhr.0221-11481r2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.0221-11481r2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Human Resources","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77824409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-21DOI: 10.3368/jhr.monopsony.special-issue-2022-introduction
Orley Ashenfelter, David Card, H. Farber, Michael R Ransom
The idea that firms have some market power in wage-setting has been slow to gain acceptance in economics. Indeed, until relatively recently, the textbooks viewed monopsony power as either a theoretical curiosum, or a concept limited to a handful of company towns in the past. This view has been changing rapidly, driven by a combination of theoretical innovations, empirical findings, dramatic legal cases, and new data sets that make it possible to measure the degree of market power in different ways. A search of the EconLit database shows that the number of published journal articles mentioning “monopsony” rose from only two in the 1980s to 20 in the 1990s, 32 in the 2000s, and to 64 in the 2010s. This volume contains a set of 11 papers originally presented at the Sundance Conference onMonopsony in LaborMarkets, organized by three of us (Ashenfelter, Farber and Ransom). Together the papers offer a rich perspective on the current state of research on market power in the labor market. Four of the papers use the framework pioneered by Manning (2003) to estimate the elasticity of labor supply to individual firms. A related paper looks at mobility frictions between cities. Three other papers, building on the “structure–conduct–performance” paradigm of industrial organization, relate the level of wages for specific subgroups of workers to measures of the local concentration
{"title":"Monopsony in the Labor Market","authors":"Orley Ashenfelter, David Card, H. Farber, Michael R Ransom","doi":"10.3368/jhr.monopsony.special-issue-2022-introduction","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.monopsony.special-issue-2022-introduction","url":null,"abstract":"The idea that firms have some market power in wage-setting has been slow to gain acceptance in economics. Indeed, until relatively recently, the textbooks viewed monopsony power as either a theoretical curiosum, or a concept limited to a handful of company towns in the past. This view has been changing rapidly, driven by a combination of theoretical innovations, empirical findings, dramatic legal cases, and new data sets that make it possible to measure the degree of market power in different ways. A search of the EconLit database shows that the number of published journal articles mentioning “monopsony” rose from only two in the 1980s to 20 in the 1990s, 32 in the 2000s, and to 64 in the 2010s. This volume contains a set of 11 papers originally presented at the Sundance Conference onMonopsony in LaborMarkets, organized by three of us (Ashenfelter, Farber and Ransom). Together the papers offer a rich perspective on the current state of research on market power in the labor market. Four of the papers use the framework pioneered by Manning (2003) to estimate the elasticity of labor supply to individual firms. A related paper looks at mobility frictions between cities. Three other papers, building on the “structure–conduct–performance” paradigm of industrial organization, relate the level of wages for specific subgroups of workers to measures of the local concentration","PeriodicalId":48346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Human Resources","volume":"57 1","pages":"S1 - S10"},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43944188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-09DOI: 10.3368/jhr.0619-10264r3
D. Pomeranz, Felipe Kast
Poverty is often characterized not only by low and unstable income, but also by heavy debt burdens. We find that providing access to free savings accounts decreases participants’ short-term debt. In addition, participants who experience an economic shock have less need to reduce consumption, and subjective well-being improves significantly. Precautionary savings and credit therefore act as substitutes in providing self-insurance, and participants prefer borrowing less when a free formal savings account is available. Take-up patterns suggest that requests by others for participants to share their resources may be a key obstacle to saving. JEL classification: D14, D91, G22, O16 ∗We are grateful to Fondo Esperanza, Banco Credichile and Microdatos for outstanding collaboration in the implementation process. We thank Ronald Abraham, Samuel Asher, Lorenzo Casaburi, David Clingingsmith, Shawn Cole, David Cutler, Edward Glaeser, Jessica Goldberg, Johannes Haushofer, Daniel Hojman, Lakshmi Iyer, Sarah Janzen, Sandy Jencks, Dean Karlan, Lawrence Katz, Jake Kendall, Michael Kremer, David Laibson, Dan Levy, Jeffrey Liebman, Stephan Meier, Sendhil Mullainathan, Karthik Muralidharan, Joana Naritomi, Oyebola Olabisi, Owen Ozier, Rohini Pande, Silvia Prina, Simon Quinn, David Roodman, Nicola Fuchs-Schuendeln, Russell Toth, Richard Zeckhauser and participants of various conferences and seminars for helpful comments and discussions. This project would not have been possible without the generous support by the following institutions: the Ford Foundation, Banco Credichile, the Lab for Economic Applications and Policy (LEAP) at Harvard, the Women and Public Policy Program at the Harvard Kennedy School, the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, and the Russell Sage Foundation Small Grants Program. The experiment was carried out in accordance with Harvard GSAS IRB approval. Earlier versions of this paper circulated under the titles “Do Savings Constraints Lead to Indebtedness”, “Insurance through Savings Accounts”, and “Saving More to Borrow Less”. †Centro de Estudios Horizontal, fkast@horizontalchile.cl. ‡Corresponding Author. University of Zurich and CEPR, dina.pomeranz@econ.uzh.ch.
贫穷的特点往往不仅是收入低和不稳定，而且还包括沉重的债务负担。我们发现，提供免费储蓄账户可以减少参与者的短期债务。此外，经历经济冲击的参与者减少消费的需求较小，主观幸福感显著提高。因此，预防性储蓄和信贷充当了提供自我保险的替代品，当有免费的正式储蓄账户时，参与者更愿意减少借贷。接受模式表明，其他人要求参与者分享他们的资源可能是储蓄的主要障碍。JEL分类:D14, D91, G22, O16 *我们感谢Fondo Esperanza, Banco Credichile和Microdatos在实施过程中的出色合作。我们感谢Ronald Abraham, Samuel Asher, Lorenzo Casaburi, David Clingingsmith, Shawn Cole, David Cutler, Edward Glaeser, Jessica Goldberg, Johannes Haushofer, Daniel Hojman, Lakshmi Iyer, Sarah Janzen, Sandy Jencks, Dean Karlan, Lawrence Katz, Jake Kendall, Michael Kremer, David Laibson, Dan Levy, Jeffrey Liebman, Stephan Meier, sendhill Mullainathan, Karthik Muralidharan, Joana Naritomi, Oyebola Olabisi, Owen Ozier, Rohini Pande, Silvia Prina, Simon Quinn, David Roodman, Nicola Fuchs-Schuendeln，Russell Toth, Richard Zeckhauser以及各种会议和研讨会的参与者提供有用的评论和讨论。如果没有以下机构的慷慨支持，本项目是不可能实现的:福特基金会、信贷银行、哈佛大学经济应用与政策实验室、哈佛大学肯尼迪学院妇女与公共政策项目、大卫·洛克菲勒拉丁美洲研究中心和拉塞尔·塞奇基金会小额赠款项目。实验是按照哈佛GSAS IRB的批准进行的。本文的早期版本以“储蓄限制会导致负债吗”、“通过储蓄账户进行保险”和“多存少借”为题分发。†Centro de Estudios Horizontal, fkast@horizontalchile.cl。‡通讯作者。苏黎世大学和欧洲经济研究中心，dina.pomeranz@econ.uzh.ch。
{"title":"Savings Accounts to Borrow Less","authors":"D. Pomeranz, Felipe Kast","doi":"10.3368/jhr.0619-10264r3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.0619-10264r3","url":null,"abstract":"Poverty is often characterized not only by low and unstable income, but also by heavy debt burdens. We find that providing access to free savings accounts decreases participants’ short-term debt. In addition, participants who experience an economic shock have less need to reduce consumption, and subjective well-being improves significantly. Precautionary savings and credit therefore act as substitutes in providing self-insurance, and participants prefer borrowing less when a free formal savings account is available. Take-up patterns suggest that requests by others for participants to share their resources may be a key obstacle to saving. JEL classification: D14, D91, G22, O16 ∗We are grateful to Fondo Esperanza, Banco Credichile and Microdatos for outstanding collaboration in the implementation process. We thank Ronald Abraham, Samuel Asher, Lorenzo Casaburi, David Clingingsmith, Shawn Cole, David Cutler, Edward Glaeser, Jessica Goldberg, Johannes Haushofer, Daniel Hojman, Lakshmi Iyer, Sarah Janzen, Sandy Jencks, Dean Karlan, Lawrence Katz, Jake Kendall, Michael Kremer, David Laibson, Dan Levy, Jeffrey Liebman, Stephan Meier, Sendhil Mullainathan, Karthik Muralidharan, Joana Naritomi, Oyebola Olabisi, Owen Ozier, Rohini Pande, Silvia Prina, Simon Quinn, David Roodman, Nicola Fuchs-Schuendeln, Russell Toth, Richard Zeckhauser and participants of various conferences and seminars for helpful comments and discussions. This project would not have been possible without the generous support by the following institutions: the Ford Foundation, Banco Credichile, the Lab for Economic Applications and Policy (LEAP) at Harvard, the Women and Public Policy Program at the Harvard Kennedy School, the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, and the Russell Sage Foundation Small Grants Program. The experiment was carried out in accordance with Harvard GSAS IRB approval. Earlier versions of this paper circulated under the titles “Do Savings Constraints Lead to Indebtedness”, “Insurance through Savings Accounts”, and “Saving More to Borrow Less”. †Centro de Estudios Horizontal, fkast@horizontalchile.cl. ‡Corresponding Author. University of Zurich and CEPR, dina.pomeranz@econ.uzh.ch.","PeriodicalId":48346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Human Resources","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78477570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Melanie Guldi, Amelia Hawkins, Jeffrey Hemmeter, L. Schmidt
{"title":"Supplemental Security Income for Children, Maternal Labor Supply, and Family Well-Being: Evidence from Birth Weight Eligibility Cutoffs","authors":"Melanie Guldi, Amelia Hawkins, Jeffrey Hemmeter, L. Schmidt","doi":"10.3368/jhr.0818-9654r2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.0818-9654r2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Human Resources","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78566048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-09DOI: 10.3368/jhr.1220-11370r1
S. Briole, E. Maurin
{"title":"There's Always Room for Improvement: The Persistent Benefits of a Large-scale Teacher Evaluation System","authors":"S. Briole, E. Maurin","doi":"10.3368/jhr.1220-11370r1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.1220-11370r1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Human Resources","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85131059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-09DOI: 10.3368/jhr.0221-11478r2
L. Gazzè
Lead paint, a harmful environmental hazard, can still be found in millions of homes in the United States. Due to high inspection and clean-up costs, prevention programs target intervention to the relatively few homes where small children test positive for lead poisoning. Because children have to visit a doctor to get tested, only households willing to undergo this hassle self-select into screening. Is self-selection an effective targeting mechanism? I study screening take-up by analyzing geocoded 2001-2016 lead screening data on 2 million Illinois children. My empirical strategy exploits variation in travel costs due to healthcare providers’ openings and closings. I find that travel costs reduce screening among lowand high-risk households alike, without improving targeting. Consistent with low poisoning rates, high-risk households are only willing to pay $4-29 more than low-risk households for screening. Despite poor targeting, screening incentives may be cost-effective because of the externalities of lead exposure. ∗Department of Economics, University of Chicago. Email: lgazze@uchicago.edu. I am indebted to Michael Greenstone for his mentorship throughout my postdoctoral scholarship. Ali Abbasi, Marcella Alsan, Alex Bartik, Fiona Burlig, Thomas Covert, Catie Hausman, Michael Kofoed, David Meltzer, Rebecca Meyerson, Jack Mountjoy, Nick Sanders, Tommaso Sonno, Dan Waldinger, and seminar and conference participants at EPIC, Indiana University, Urban Labs, APPAM, ASHEcon, the H2D2 Research Day, and the 4th Marco Fanno Alumni Workshop provided helpful comments and suggestions. I am also extremely grateful to the staff at the Illinois Department of Public Health for sharing the data for this analysis as well as their insights and expertise in interpreting the results. The conclusions, opinions, and recommendations in this paper are not necessarily the conclusions, opinions, or recommendations of IDPH. This project would not have been possible without the generous support of the Joyce Foundation. Bridget Pals and Xiyue (Iris) Song provided excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are my own.
含铅涂料是一种有害的环境危害，在美国仍有数百万家庭使用。由于检查和清理费用高昂，预防方案的干预目标是相对较少的家庭，那里的小孩铅中毒检测呈阳性。因为孩子们必须去看医生进行检查，所以只有愿意经历这种麻烦的家庭自己选择进行筛查。自我选择是一种有效的靶向机制吗?我通过分析2001年至2016年伊利诺伊州200万儿童的地理编码铅筛查数据来研究筛查的接受情况。我的实证策略利用差旅成本的变化，由于医疗服务提供者的开放和关闭。我发现，旅行成本降低了低风险家庭和高风险家庭的筛查，却没有提高筛查的针对性。与低中毒率一致，高风险家庭只愿意比低风险家庭多支付4-29美元进行筛查。尽管目标不明确，但由于铅暴露的外部性，筛查激励措施可能具有成本效益。*芝加哥大学经济系。电子邮件:lgazze@uchicago.edu。我非常感谢Michael Greenstone在我获得博士后奖学金期间对我的指导。Ali Abbasi, Marcella Alsan, Alex Bartik, Fiona Burlig, Thomas Covert, Catie Hausman, Michael Kofoed, David Meltzer, Rebecca Meyerson, Jack Mountjoy, Nick Sanders, Tommaso Sonno, Dan Waldinger以及EPIC, Indiana University, Urban Labs, APPAM, ASHEcon, H2D2研究日和第四届Marco Fanno校友研讨会的研讨会和会议参与者提供了有用的意见和建议。我也非常感谢伊利诺斯州公共卫生部的工作人员分享了这一分析的数据，以及他们在解释结果方面的见解和专业知识。本文中的结论、意见和建议不一定是IDPH的结论、意见或建议。如果没有乔伊斯基金会的慷慨支持，这个项目是不可能完成的。Bridget Pals和Xiyue Song提供了出色的研究协助。所有剩下的错误都是我自己的。
{"title":"Hassles and Environmental Health Screenings: Evidence from Lead Tests in Illinois","authors":"L. Gazzè","doi":"10.3368/jhr.0221-11478r2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.0221-11478r2","url":null,"abstract":"Lead paint, a harmful environmental hazard, can still be found in millions of homes in the United States. Due to high inspection and clean-up costs, prevention programs target intervention to the relatively few homes where small children test positive for lead poisoning. Because children have to visit a doctor to get tested, only households willing to undergo this hassle self-select into screening. Is self-selection an effective targeting mechanism? I study screening take-up by analyzing geocoded 2001-2016 lead screening data on 2 million Illinois children. My empirical strategy exploits variation in travel costs due to healthcare providers’ openings and closings. I find that travel costs reduce screening among lowand high-risk households alike, without improving targeting. Consistent with low poisoning rates, high-risk households are only willing to pay $4-29 more than low-risk households for screening. Despite poor targeting, screening incentives may be cost-effective because of the externalities of lead exposure. ∗Department of Economics, University of Chicago. Email: lgazze@uchicago.edu. I am indebted to Michael Greenstone for his mentorship throughout my postdoctoral scholarship. Ali Abbasi, Marcella Alsan, Alex Bartik, Fiona Burlig, Thomas Covert, Catie Hausman, Michael Kofoed, David Meltzer, Rebecca Meyerson, Jack Mountjoy, Nick Sanders, Tommaso Sonno, Dan Waldinger, and seminar and conference participants at EPIC, Indiana University, Urban Labs, APPAM, ASHEcon, the H2D2 Research Day, and the 4th Marco Fanno Alumni Workshop provided helpful comments and suggestions. I am also extremely grateful to the staff at the Illinois Department of Public Health for sharing the data for this analysis as well as their insights and expertise in interpreting the results. The conclusions, opinions, and recommendations in this paper are not necessarily the conclusions, opinions, or recommendations of IDPH. This project would not have been possible without the generous support of the Joyce Foundation. Bridget Pals and Xiyue (Iris) Song provided excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are my own.","PeriodicalId":48346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Human Resources","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89904506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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