Is trying to earn status effective or self-defeating? We show that whether effort increases or decreases admiration and respect (i.e., status) depends on how the person is trying to earn status. Groups evaluate people along multiple status dimensions (e.g., wealth, coolness). Each dimension is associated with a different ideology, or set of beliefs, that ascribe status to behaviors that contribute to the group's goals. Whether behaviors, including effort, increase status, thus, depends on the ideologies that people use to interpret if a behavior contributes to the group. Four experiments demonstrate that people earn more status when they try to become wealthy compared to when they are effortlessly wealthy, but earn less status when they try to become cool compared to when they are effortlessly cool. Effort increases status when directed at wealth but not at coolness because contemporary ideologies suggest that people who gain wealth through effort contribute more to society, whereas people who gain coolness through effort contribute less.
Recent decades have witnessed a burst of neuroscience research investigating mental and physiological processes central to consumer behavior, including sensory perception, memory, and decision making. Nonetheless, few publications that include neural and physiological measures, or develop conceptual frameworks around neuroscience principles, have been published in consumer psychology. It is clear that “consumer neuroscience” has thus far not lived up to its promises in the marketing literature. We suggest three main reasons for this. First, neural and other biological markers are often mistaken to be identical to the overlaying psychological constructs in traditional consumer psychology work. Second, somewhat surprisingly, there has been an overly narrow utilization of neural data. Most previous work focused on linking existing behavioral phenomena or psychological constructs central to consumer research to neural correlates using brain imaging techniques while ignoring other methods. We argue that much can be gained from improved integration of physiological measures and through them, different levels of analysis. Third, there remain significant structural hurdles to the broad adoption of neural and physiological measures for consumer researchers. We outline how addressing these three components can translate to a more holistic understanding of the consumer via both broader and deeper consumer insights.
Brands often encourage consumers to compare themselves to two types of standards: other people (i.e., social comparisons) and their own past (i.e., temporal comparisons). Although research has drawn many parallels between these two self-comparisons, relatively little work has examined how they diverge. Moreover, existing research on their differences focuses on individuals engaging in—rather than brands encouraging—different self-comparisons. The present research identifies moral perceptions as one critical dimension on which brand-elicited temporal and social comparisons differ. Four studies find that evoking downward social (vs. temporal) comparisons undermines brand morality perceptions and, consequently, brand evaluations and choice. Providing preliminary insight into the mechanism, when brands evoke downward social (vs. temporal) comparisons, consumers perceive them as promoting status-seeking behavior, which mediates morality judgments. Furthermore, the effects of comparison type are eliminated among consumers with stronger status motives—those who are less prone to condemn status-seeking behavior. Altogether, these findings reveal a lay belief in the moral superiority of downward temporal (vs. social) comparisons and the downstream consequences for brands that elicit such comparisons.
A brand name is a fundamental component of a brand's identity. This research introduces a novel linguistic tool for brand name creation: phonesthemes—sound and spelling letter clusters that are associated with one dominant meaning. For instance, sn, one of over 140 phonesthemes in English, consistently appears in words related to the nose or breathing (sneeze, sniff, snort). Six experiments reveal positive effects of phonesthemic non-word brand names (e.g., Glif; gl-; e.g., glow, glimmer; meaning “light”) on consumer preference, attitude, purchase intent, and choice when the dominant meaning activated by the phonestheme is semantically congruent with the product category or product attribute (e.g., luminant car wax), due to enhanced processing fluency. Phonological (sound) and orthographic (spelling) priming are eliminated as alternative explanations for the phenomenon. This research advances psycholinguistic research in marketing and the emerging area of brand linguistics by broadening the focus beyond brand name phonology.
The assumption that consumers prefer better quality options over worse ones seems almost definitional. However, a variety of marketplace examples suggest that consumers sometimes choose content that is “so bad it's good,” such as Tommy Wiseau's The Room or Rebecca Black's “Friday,” over apparently better alternatives (e.g., those of mediocre quality). In 12 preregistered studies (N = 5393) across several content domains (e.g., jokes, talent show auditions), we provide the first controlled, empirical demonstration of consumer preferences for badness (i.e., choosing options because consumers expect them to be bad). We provide initial evidence that these preferences are rooted in expectations of entertainment value from the worst available option. Preferences for these options emerge more frequently when their deviations from quality standards are perceived as benign (i.e., inconsequential). Accordingly, such preferences are less prevalent when consumption is consequential, and involves utilitarian goals or monetary costs. We conclude by exploring the extent to which dimensions such as humor, absurdity, esthetic quality, and utilitarian value underlie so-bad-it's-good perceptions, and highlight several open questions to spark future research.