Sara C Closs-Davies, Koen P R Bartels, Doris Merkl-Davies
Public administration plays a fundamental role in accountability relationships between citizens and the State, but how these take shape in public encounters is remarkably understudied. Analysing relational dynamics within and around public encounters expands the relational perspective on accountability in public administration–challenging core assumptions of the principal-agent model underpinning studies of citizen-State accountability relationships. We conducted a critical-interpretivist ethnography of public encounters in the UK Tax Credits (TC) system and share findings from our Constructivist Grounded Theory Analysis of multiple data sources, including 28 open interviews. We discuss four relational dynamics of account-giving–emerging from the interplay of neoliberal discourse, digital technologies, and communicative practices–that ‘reversed the accountability chain’. We demonstrate how claimants experiencing significant financial and emotional hardship, in their encounters with an unaccountable State, became accountable for their TC obligations and welfare. We explain these findings by mobilising interdisciplinary theory from critical accounting research on relational power to offer original conceptual and empirical insight into the interactive, dynamic, and emergent accountability relationships between citizens and agents of the State.
{"title":"Reversing the Accountability Chain: How Relational Power Can Shape Accountability in Public Encounters","authors":"Sara C Closs-Davies, Koen P R Bartels, Doris Merkl-Davies","doi":"10.1093/jopart/muag009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muag009","url":null,"abstract":"Public administration plays a fundamental role in accountability relationships between citizens and the State, but how these take shape in public encounters is remarkably understudied. Analysing relational dynamics within and around public encounters expands the relational perspective on accountability in public administration–challenging core assumptions of the principal-agent model underpinning studies of citizen-State accountability relationships. We conducted a critical-interpretivist ethnography of public encounters in the UK Tax Credits (TC) system and share findings from our Constructivist Grounded Theory Analysis of multiple data sources, including 28 open interviews. We discuss four relational dynamics of account-giving–emerging from the interplay of neoliberal discourse, digital technologies, and communicative practices–that ‘reversed the accountability chain’. We demonstrate how claimants experiencing significant financial and emotional hardship, in their encounters with an unaccountable State, became accountable for their TC obligations and welfare. We explain these findings by mobilising interdisciplinary theory from critical accounting research on relational power to offer original conceptual and empirical insight into the interactive, dynamic, and emergent accountability relationships between citizens and agents of the State.","PeriodicalId":48366,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2026-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147462007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Administrative burdens can deter individuals from engaging with government programs before they ever encounter formal application requirements. Drawing on the administrative burden framework and theories of heuristic decision-making, this study examines how prospective applicants form early judgments about program accessibility when presented with varying levels of compliance costs. Using three survey experiments centered on a fictional grocery benefit (N = 2407, N = 965) and a one-time federal tax rebate (N = 1004), we assess how documentation requirements and effort cues shape perceptions of eligibility, willingness to apply, and perceived accessibility. We find that greater documentation requirements or mismatched time cues lowered perceived eligibility and willingness to apply. Yet asking respondents to pause and estimate the effort reversed those effects, but only for individuals who already possessed the documentation or could form a concrete time estimate about the effort. These findings highlight the role of expected burden and heuristic judgments in shaping pre-application decisions, extending administrative burden research beyond realized experiences to the earliest stages of program engagement.
行政负担可能会阻止个人在遇到正式的申请要求之前参与政府项目。利用行政负担框架和启发式决策理论，本研究考察了当面临不同程度的合规成本时，潜在申请人如何形成对项目可及性的早期判断。通过三个调查实验，分别以虚构的杂货店福利（N = 2407, N = 965）和一次性联邦退税（N = 1004）为中心，我们评估了文件要求和努力线索如何影响人们对资格、申请意愿和感知可及性的看法。我们发现更大的文件要求或不匹配的时间线索降低了人们对申请资格和意愿的感知。然而，要求被调查者暂停并估计工作量会逆转这些效果，但只针对已经拥有文档或可以形成关于工作量的具体时间估计的个人。这些发现强调了预期负担和启发式判断在形成申请前决策中的作用，将行政负担研究从实现经验扩展到项目参与的最早阶段。
{"title":"Worth the Effort? Compliance Costs, Heuristics, and Perceived Program Accessibility","authors":"Madaline Allen, Cody A Drolc","doi":"10.1093/jopart/muag007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muag007","url":null,"abstract":"Administrative burdens can deter individuals from engaging with government programs before they ever encounter formal application requirements. Drawing on the administrative burden framework and theories of heuristic decision-making, this study examines how prospective applicants form early judgments about program accessibility when presented with varying levels of compliance costs. Using three survey experiments centered on a fictional grocery benefit (N = 2407, N = 965) and a one-time federal tax rebate (N = 1004), we assess how documentation requirements and effort cues shape perceptions of eligibility, willingness to apply, and perceived accessibility. We find that greater documentation requirements or mismatched time cues lowered perceived eligibility and willingness to apply. Yet asking respondents to pause and estimate the effort reversed those effects, but only for individuals who already possessed the documentation or could form a concrete time estimate about the effort. These findings highlight the role of expected burden and heuristic judgments in shaping pre-application decisions, extending administrative burden research beyond realized experiences to the earliest stages of program engagement.","PeriodicalId":48366,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory","volume":"95 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2026-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146215762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jinfeng Zhang, Minjie Song, Zengqiang Qin, Ran Xu, Rong Ran
Public officials are traditionally thought to be more risk-averse than private sector employees, yet consistent empirical evidence is lacking. Prospect theory posits that individuals’ risk decision preferences are influenced by the framing of gains or losses, but it does not distinguish whether gains and losses pertain to personal or public interests. This study incorporates the type of interest with gain–loss framing to construct decision scenarios and compare risk preferences between public officials and private sector employees. In Experiment 1 (Npublic officials = 897, Nprivate sector employees = 685), using a 3 (public interest vs. public-private mixed interest vs. private interest) × 2 (gain frame vs. loss frame) design, public officials were found to exhibit greater risk aversion than private sector employees when the loss frame involves the public interest, while no significant differences were observed for a gain frame involving either the public interest or private interest. Applying blame avoidance theory, accountability is positioned here as a core factor to further explore why public officials are more risk-averse than private sector employees when facing public interest losses. In Experiment 2 (Npublic officials = 625, Nprivate sector employees = 630), using a 2 (reward vs. punishment-oriented accountability) × 2 (process vs. outcome-oriented accountability) design in a public interest decision-making context, public officials were found to be more risk-averse than private sector employees in the case of outcome-oriented punishment accountability. In the other three types of accountability conditions, public officials exhibited a similar risk preference to private sector employees. These findings reveal the situational factors underlying public officials’ risk aversion, and offer practical insights for designing accountability systems that effectively guide decision-making in the public sector.
{"title":"Are Public Officials More Risk-averse than Private Sector Employees in Decision-making? Interest and Accountability Matter","authors":"Jinfeng Zhang, Minjie Song, Zengqiang Qin, Ran Xu, Rong Ran","doi":"10.1093/jopart/muag006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muag006","url":null,"abstract":"Public officials are traditionally thought to be more risk-averse than private sector employees, yet consistent empirical evidence is lacking. Prospect theory posits that individuals’ risk decision preferences are influenced by the framing of gains or losses, but it does not distinguish whether gains and losses pertain to personal or public interests. This study incorporates the type of interest with gain–loss framing to construct decision scenarios and compare risk preferences between public officials and private sector employees. In Experiment 1 (Npublic officials = 897, Nprivate sector employees = 685), using a 3 (public interest vs. public-private mixed interest vs. private interest) × 2 (gain frame vs. loss frame) design, public officials were found to exhibit greater risk aversion than private sector employees when the loss frame involves the public interest, while no significant differences were observed for a gain frame involving either the public interest or private interest. Applying blame avoidance theory, accountability is positioned here as a core factor to further explore why public officials are more risk-averse than private sector employees when facing public interest losses. In Experiment 2 (Npublic officials = 625, Nprivate sector employees = 630), using a 2 (reward vs. punishment-oriented accountability) × 2 (process vs. outcome-oriented accountability) design in a public interest decision-making context, public officials were found to be more risk-averse than private sector employees in the case of outcome-oriented punishment accountability. In the other three types of accountability conditions, public officials exhibited a similar risk preference to private sector employees. These findings reveal the situational factors underlying public officials’ risk aversion, and offer practical insights for designing accountability systems that effectively guide decision-making in the public sector.","PeriodicalId":48366,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2026-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146215761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public participation processes promise that citizens will be heard, but rarely guarantee they will be heeded. This distinction between procedural acknowledgment and substantive influence lies at the heart of bureaucratic responsiveness, yet these two forms of responsiveness are often conflated in empirical research. I demonstrate that in federal rulemaking, procedural acknowledgment (being heard) is empirically distinct from substantive policy influence (being heeded). Drawing on theories of bureaucratic responsiveness, I argue that agencies strategically cite commenters not primarily to signal agreement but to build defensible administrative records that satisfy procedural requirements while preserving their policy autonomy. Analyzing 854 federal rules from 2017 to 2023, I use semantic text analysis to track changes in binding regulatory provisions distinct from the explanatory preamble. I show that agencies systematically cite comments they ultimately reject, particularly from well-resourced groups. Roughly two-thirds of comment citations are not accompanied by any responsive change to the regulatory text. This reveals that procedural responsiveness can function as a strategic substitute for substantive policy change. These findings suggest that procedural engagement and substantive influence operate as distinct modes of bureaucratic responsiveness, with agencies often prioritizing legal defensibility over policy adaptation when facing potential judicial review.
{"title":"Hearing, Not Heeding: Procedural Acknowledgment and Substantive Influence in Rulemaking","authors":"Alexander Love","doi":"10.1093/jopart/muag003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muag003","url":null,"abstract":"Public participation processes promise that citizens will be heard, but rarely guarantee they will be heeded. This distinction between procedural acknowledgment and substantive influence lies at the heart of bureaucratic responsiveness, yet these two forms of responsiveness are often conflated in empirical research. I demonstrate that in federal rulemaking, procedural acknowledgment (being heard) is empirically distinct from substantive policy influence (being heeded). Drawing on theories of bureaucratic responsiveness, I argue that agencies strategically cite commenters not primarily to signal agreement but to build defensible administrative records that satisfy procedural requirements while preserving their policy autonomy. Analyzing 854 federal rules from 2017 to 2023, I use semantic text analysis to track changes in binding regulatory provisions distinct from the explanatory preamble. I show that agencies systematically cite comments they ultimately reject, particularly from well-resourced groups. Roughly two-thirds of comment citations are not accompanied by any responsive change to the regulatory text. This reveals that procedural responsiveness can function as a strategic substitute for substantive policy change. These findings suggest that procedural engagement and substantive influence operate as distinct modes of bureaucratic responsiveness, with agencies often prioritizing legal defensibility over policy adaptation when facing potential judicial review.","PeriodicalId":48366,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2026-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146135525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rosanna Nagtegaal, Machiel van der Heijden, Noortje de Boer, Lars Tummers
This study investigates whether reducing administrative burdens can increase interest in active labor market programs among job-seeking women. Employing a user-centered approach, the research is divided into two phases. In phase 1, we conducted interviews with women and a focus group with service providers to identify relevant barriers for take-up. The qualitative data showed that learning costs were the most prominent barrier, which could be further differentiated into three specific types: learning about program existence, the specific services offered, and the eligibility criteria. In phase 2, we test whether reducing these three components of learning costs increases program interest. We conduct an online quasi-experimental platform study (N = 75,451), in collaboration with a service provider, in which we adapt advertisements to inform citizens about (a) the specific services offered and (b) the eligibility criteria. A logistic regression shows that the interventions (a and b) attract more people to active labor market programs. Although women are overall more likely to click on the ads, we do not find a differential treatment effect by gender. The findings contribute to the literature by highlighting the importance of distinguishing among different types of learning costs in administrative burden interventions. Moreover, the article shows how a user-centered design can be utilized to design meaningful interventions.
{"title":"Breaking Down Administrative Burdens: A User-Centered Approach to Increase Interest in Active Labor Market Programs by Women","authors":"Rosanna Nagtegaal, Machiel van der Heijden, Noortje de Boer, Lars Tummers","doi":"10.1093/jopart/muaf039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muaf039","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates whether reducing administrative burdens can increase interest in active labor market programs among job-seeking women. Employing a user-centered approach, the research is divided into two phases. In phase 1, we conducted interviews with women and a focus group with service providers to identify relevant barriers for take-up. The qualitative data showed that learning costs were the most prominent barrier, which could be further differentiated into three specific types: learning about program existence, the specific services offered, and the eligibility criteria. In phase 2, we test whether reducing these three components of learning costs increases program interest. We conduct an online quasi-experimental platform study (N = 75,451), in collaboration with a service provider, in which we adapt advertisements to inform citizens about (a) the specific services offered and (b) the eligibility criteria. A logistic regression shows that the interventions (a and b) attract more people to active labor market programs. Although women are overall more likely to click on the ads, we do not find a differential treatment effect by gender. The findings contribute to the literature by highlighting the importance of distinguishing among different types of learning costs in administrative burden interventions. Moreover, the article shows how a user-centered design can be utilized to design meaningful interventions.","PeriodicalId":48366,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146089534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How do public agencies manage diverse programs under limited budgets? Resource constraints force agencies to prioritize tasks, requiring strategic decisions about how to allocate resources effectively. In this paper, I develop a gametheoretical model that explores how agencies shape and restructure their task portfolios under budgetary constraints. In response to budget reductions, I argue that agencies reallocate resources by prioritizing more efficient tasks for improved performance, within their portfolios. To test my theoretical claims, I analyze an original dataset of antitrust cases filed by the U.S. Antitrust Division (AD) from 1970 to 2019. Using compositional analysis, I find systematic associations between budgetary changes and the AD’s litigation portfolios. Specifically, budget cuts are associated with a higher share of antitrust criminal cases—the most efficient type for improving performance metrics—and with relatively lower shares for other case types. This study offers new insight into how public agencies navigate budgetary constraints to achieve their public missions while meeting performance expectations.
{"title":"How Do Public Agencies Respond to Budgetary Control? A Theory of Strategic Task Portfolios in Public Administration","authors":"Jonghoon Lee","doi":"10.1093/jopart/muag001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muag001","url":null,"abstract":"How do public agencies manage diverse programs under limited budgets? Resource constraints force agencies to prioritize tasks, requiring strategic decisions about how to allocate resources effectively. In this paper, I develop a gametheoretical model that explores how agencies shape and restructure their task portfolios under budgetary constraints. In response to budget reductions, I argue that agencies reallocate resources by prioritizing more efficient tasks for improved performance, within their portfolios. To test my theoretical claims, I analyze an original dataset of antitrust cases filed by the U.S. Antitrust Division (AD) from 1970 to 2019. Using compositional analysis, I find systematic associations between budgetary changes and the AD’s litigation portfolios. Specifically, budget cuts are associated with a higher share of antitrust criminal cases—the most efficient type for improving performance metrics—and with relatively lower shares for other case types. This study offers new insight into how public agencies navigate budgetary constraints to achieve their public missions while meeting performance expectations.","PeriodicalId":48366,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145961881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines blame shifting, where elected officials attempt to deflect blame for negative outcomes onto other actors. While prior research suggests that citizens generally disapprove of this tactic, this study re-evaluates how contextual factors shape these reactions, focusing specifically on cases of public service failure. In many areas of public management, service delivery is delegated or contracted out to public or private organizations, raising the question of whether such institutional arrangements make it easier for politicians to shift blame onto these agents. A survey experiment (n = 955) was conducted in the United Kingdom involving a hypothetical public service failure. Information cues varied the response strategy of local elected officials (shifting blame or accepting responsibility) and the service delivery model (public or private sector; high or low delegation). The results from OLS regression analyses show that participants were generally less approving of blame shifting compared to accepting responsibility. However, approval increased when the organization being blamed was viewed by participants as carrying more blame for failures in service delivery than the official. Although delegation levels did not directly moderate the effect of blame shifting, further logistic regression analysis shows that higher delegation made participants more likely to view the service provider as culpable, which in turn influenced how they reacted to blame shifting tactics. These findings highlight the conditional nature of public reactions to blame avoidance behavior, showing that citizens’ evaluations of tactics like blame shifting depend on their beliefs about who is responsible, which can be shaped by institutional context. The study offers new insights into when blame shifting may appear more credible or justified and underscores the role of context in shaping the effectiveness of political blame avoidance strategies.
{"title":"Judging the blame game: how do citizens react to blame shifting in public service delivery?","authors":"Oscar Nowlan","doi":"10.1093/jopart/muaf038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muaf038","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines blame shifting, where elected officials attempt to deflect blame for negative outcomes onto other actors. While prior research suggests that citizens generally disapprove of this tactic, this study re-evaluates how contextual factors shape these reactions, focusing specifically on cases of public service failure. In many areas of public management, service delivery is delegated or contracted out to public or private organizations, raising the question of whether such institutional arrangements make it easier for politicians to shift blame onto these agents. A survey experiment (n = 955) was conducted in the United Kingdom involving a hypothetical public service failure. Information cues varied the response strategy of local elected officials (shifting blame or accepting responsibility) and the service delivery model (public or private sector; high or low delegation). The results from OLS regression analyses show that participants were generally less approving of blame shifting compared to accepting responsibility. However, approval increased when the organization being blamed was viewed by participants as carrying more blame for failures in service delivery than the official. Although delegation levels did not directly moderate the effect of blame shifting, further logistic regression analysis shows that higher delegation made participants more likely to view the service provider as culpable, which in turn influenced how they reacted to blame shifting tactics. These findings highlight the conditional nature of public reactions to blame avoidance behavior, showing that citizens’ evaluations of tactics like blame shifting depend on their beliefs about who is responsible, which can be shaped by institutional context. The study offers new insights into when blame shifting may appear more credible or justified and underscores the role of context in shaping the effectiveness of political blame avoidance strategies.","PeriodicalId":48366,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145938000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Morten Hjortskov, Nanna Vestergaard Ahrensberg, Jesper Asring Jessen Hansen, Jakob Majlund Holm, Simon Calmar Andersen
The challenges of implementing public policies and interventions have long been recognized, and a wide range of well-documented barriers frequently hinder effective implementation. We develop a framework of implementation support approaches, distinguishing between two types: fidelity and professional responsibility. We test the framework in a large-scale, preregistered field experiment involving 250 Danish schools implementing an evidence-based reading intervention. Regression results show that, at the family level, a professional responsibility approach emphasizing discretion led to behavioral changes in program take-up and, to some extent, use. A plausible mechanism is increased encouragement from teachers in this group, as indicated by the parents. Somewhat unexpectedly, teachers most appreciated the fidelity approach. Overall, the findings suggest that even minor changes in the framing of implementation support have detectable consequences, and while the fidelity approach may ease teachers’ workload in the short run, granting greater discretion through a professional responsibility approach ultimately enhances benefits for the target group.
{"title":"Implementation Support: A Field Experiment on the Effects of Fidelity and Professional Responsibility Approaches","authors":"Morten Hjortskov, Nanna Vestergaard Ahrensberg, Jesper Asring Jessen Hansen, Jakob Majlund Holm, Simon Calmar Andersen","doi":"10.1093/jopart/muaf040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muaf040","url":null,"abstract":"The challenges of implementing public policies and interventions have long been recognized, and a wide range of well-documented barriers frequently hinder effective implementation. We develop a framework of implementation support approaches, distinguishing between two types: fidelity and professional responsibility. We test the framework in a large-scale, preregistered field experiment involving 250 Danish schools implementing an evidence-based reading intervention. Regression results show that, at the family level, a professional responsibility approach emphasizing discretion led to behavioral changes in program take-up and, to some extent, use. A plausible mechanism is increased encouragement from teachers in this group, as indicated by the parents. Somewhat unexpectedly, teachers most appreciated the fidelity approach. Overall, the findings suggest that even minor changes in the framing of implementation support have detectable consequences, and while the fidelity approach may ease teachers’ workload in the short run, granting greater discretion through a professional responsibility approach ultimately enhances benefits for the target group.","PeriodicalId":48366,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145895705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While gender biases in public service delivery are well-established, we still lack empirical insights on the underlying behavioral micro-mechanisms. This paper contributes towards closing this perennial gap by investigating gender-differences in the complexity and emotionality of verbal bureaucrat-client communication. We build on a dataset comprising 154 dialogs recorded across different local public services in Germany. Combining rule-based and machine learning classification, we analyze differences in verbal administrative communication across 20,000 utterances. We find no association between bureaucrats’ gender and their communication. Conversely, clients’ gender yields a significant difference, with officials communicating more complex and emotional when interacting with male clients. No differences prevail for gender-matching. As the first study to systematically examine implicit (gender) biases in bureaucrats’ communication, the paper advance our existing understanding of the micro-mechanisms of administrative inequality: The findings contradict expectations from gender socialization theory, they confirm expectations linked to gender stereotypes, and they challenge the idea that in-group settings reduce stereotypical biases at the level of communication.
{"title":"Inequality in frontline communication: Bureaucrats talk differently to men and women","authors":"Laurin Friedrich, Steffen Eckhard","doi":"10.1093/jopart/muaf036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muaf036","url":null,"abstract":"While gender biases in public service delivery are well-established, we still lack empirical insights on the underlying behavioral micro-mechanisms. This paper contributes towards closing this perennial gap by investigating gender-differences in the complexity and emotionality of verbal bureaucrat-client communication. We build on a dataset comprising 154 dialogs recorded across different local public services in Germany. Combining rule-based and machine learning classification, we analyze differences in verbal administrative communication across 20,000 utterances. We find no association between bureaucrats’ gender and their communication. Conversely, clients’ gender yields a significant difference, with officials communicating more complex and emotional when interacting with male clients. No differences prevail for gender-matching. As the first study to systematically examine implicit (gender) biases in bureaucrats’ communication, the paper advance our existing understanding of the micro-mechanisms of administrative inequality: The findings contradict expectations from gender socialization theory, they confirm expectations linked to gender stereotypes, and they challenge the idea that in-group settings reduce stereotypical biases at the level of communication.","PeriodicalId":48366,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145836065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Performance-Based Contracting (PBC) is promoted as a model that improves results, enhances quality, reduces costs, and increases accountability. It has become a standard element of government contracting worldwide and a key component of newer pay-for-success models. However, scholarly evaluations remain scattered and often lack a solid theoretical foundation. This study conducts a meta-analysis of 740 observations from 38 studies across 10 service areas to evaluate genuine performance. Utilizing principal–agent, incomplete-contract, and goal-setting theories, we examine what influences the performance of PBC. By combining these perspectives within a single empirical framework, the paper offers a systematic test of core assumptions about incentive alignment, contract incompleteness, and goal design in public contracting. Results indicate that outcome-focused contracts are more successful than those targeting process- or output-based results. This finding provides quantitative evidence supporting incomplete-contract theory’s claim that performance depends on the contractibility of outcomes and extends principal–agent logic by demonstrating when and why incentives fail in multidimensional public settings. Although context matters, factors such as residual control, collaboration, and shared goals are central to PBC success. The study thus makes a theoretical contribution by bridging economic and behavioral contracting theories and empirically grounding their predictions in public-sector evidence.
{"title":"The Performance of Performance-Based Contracting in Public Outsourcing: A Meta-regression Analysis","authors":"Germà Bel, Pedro Espaillat, Marc Esteve","doi":"10.1093/jopart/muaf037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muaf037","url":null,"abstract":"Performance-Based Contracting (PBC) is promoted as a model that improves results, enhances quality, reduces costs, and increases accountability. It has become a standard element of government contracting worldwide and a key component of newer pay-for-success models. However, scholarly evaluations remain scattered and often lack a solid theoretical foundation. This study conducts a meta-analysis of 740 observations from 38 studies across 10 service areas to evaluate genuine performance. Utilizing principal–agent, incomplete-contract, and goal-setting theories, we examine what influences the performance of PBC. By combining these perspectives within a single empirical framework, the paper offers a systematic test of core assumptions about incentive alignment, contract incompleteness, and goal design in public contracting. Results indicate that outcome-focused contracts are more successful than those targeting process- or output-based results. This finding provides quantitative evidence supporting incomplete-contract theory’s claim that performance depends on the contractibility of outcomes and extends principal–agent logic by demonstrating when and why incentives fail in multidimensional public settings. Although context matters, factors such as residual control, collaboration, and shared goals are central to PBC success. The study thus makes a theoretical contribution by bridging economic and behavioral contracting theories and empirically grounding their predictions in public-sector evidence.","PeriodicalId":48366,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145812768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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