Why do foreign-born immigrant workers often concentrate in low-wage, minority-dense workplaces? Do immigrants’ native-born children—who typically acquire better language skills, education, and country-specific knowledge—experience improved access to workplaces in the mainstream economy? Using economy-wide linked employer–employee administrative data from Norway, we analyze both ethnic and economic workplace segregation across immigrant generations. We find that, on average, 32% of immigrants’ coworkers and 16% of second-generation immigrants’ coworkers have immigrant backgrounds, compared to 7% for natives. In terms of economic segregation, the average percentile rank of coworkers’ salaries is 36, 49, and 52 for immigrants, children of immigrants, and natives, respectively. A formal decomposition analysis shows that differences in employee, workplace, and residential location characteristics collectively explain 54–74% of ethnic and 79–84% of economic workplace segregation for immigrants and their children. Key factors driving this segregation in both immigrant generations include education, occupational attainment, industry of employment, having an immigrant manager, and the concentration of immigrant neighbors. This suggests that both skill-based sorting and network-related processes contribute to immigrant–native workplace segregation. However, children of immigrants’ improved access to less immigrant-dense and higher-paying workplaces, compared to immigrants, is primarily driven by differential skill-based sorting (i.e., higher education and shifts in occupation and industry placement). Our findings reveal a sharp decline in workplace segregation relative to natives as children of immigrants advance into the mainstream economy, highlighting the central role of assimilation in skill profiles for workplace integration across immigrant generations.
{"title":"Entering the mainstream economy? Workplace segregation and immigrant assimilation","authors":"Mats Lillehagen, Are Skeie Hermansen","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae162","url":null,"abstract":"Why do foreign-born immigrant workers often concentrate in low-wage, minority-dense workplaces? Do immigrants’ native-born children—who typically acquire better language skills, education, and country-specific knowledge—experience improved access to workplaces in the mainstream economy? Using economy-wide linked employer–employee administrative data from Norway, we analyze both ethnic and economic workplace segregation across immigrant generations. We find that, on average, 32% of immigrants’ coworkers and 16% of second-generation immigrants’ coworkers have immigrant backgrounds, compared to 7% for natives. In terms of economic segregation, the average percentile rank of coworkers’ salaries is 36, 49, and 52 for immigrants, children of immigrants, and natives, respectively. A formal decomposition analysis shows that differences in employee, workplace, and residential location characteristics collectively explain 54–74% of ethnic and 79–84% of economic workplace segregation for immigrants and their children. Key factors driving this segregation in both immigrant generations include education, occupational attainment, industry of employment, having an immigrant manager, and the concentration of immigrant neighbors. This suggests that both skill-based sorting and network-related processes contribute to immigrant–native workplace segregation. However, children of immigrants’ improved access to less immigrant-dense and higher-paying workplaces, compared to immigrants, is primarily driven by differential skill-based sorting (i.e., higher education and shifts in occupation and industry placement). Our findings reveal a sharp decline in workplace segregation relative to natives as children of immigrants advance into the mainstream economy, highlighting the central role of assimilation in skill profiles for workplace integration across immigrant generations.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142678466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Are the positions that protesters take—in favor or against change—consequential for their ability to affect policy? While previous research suggests that protests can inform legislative priorities and facilitate policy introduction, this paper emphasizes policy inaction and stasis as goals of some protest actions. Analysis uses novel and detailed data on energy-related protest and policy actions in Sweden covering a forty-year period and considers protest frequency and size in relation to proposal introduction. The research design uniquely distinguishes between protests in favor or against a specific energy source and proposal activity in line with those demands and also controls for public opinion on each energy source. Findings suggest that pro-renewable energy protests do not yield pro-renewable policies but prevent undesired policies that support non-renewable energy sources. In contrast to pro-renewable protests, protests against renewable energy sources are somewhat more influential. They likewise prevent the introduction of their undesired proposals and also influence the introduction of proposals supporting non-renewable energy sources. Overall, the paper examines policy inaction as a desired protest outcome and argues protest—as a tactic—may be more effective when pushing against rather than for policy change.
{"title":"Defenders of the status quo: energy protests and policy (in)action in Sweden","authors":"Katrin Uba, Cassandra Engeman","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae166","url":null,"abstract":"Are the positions that protesters take—in favor or against change—consequential for their ability to affect policy? While previous research suggests that protests can inform legislative priorities and facilitate policy introduction, this paper emphasizes policy inaction and stasis as goals of some protest actions. Analysis uses novel and detailed data on energy-related protest and policy actions in Sweden covering a forty-year period and considers protest frequency and size in relation to proposal introduction. The research design uniquely distinguishes between protests in favor or against a specific energy source and proposal activity in line with those demands and also controls for public opinion on each energy source. Findings suggest that pro-renewable energy protests do not yield pro-renewable policies but prevent undesired policies that support non-renewable energy sources. In contrast to pro-renewable protests, protests against renewable energy sources are somewhat more influential. They likewise prevent the introduction of their undesired proposals and also influence the introduction of proposals supporting non-renewable energy sources. Overall, the paper examines policy inaction as a desired protest outcome and argues protest—as a tactic—may be more effective when pushing against rather than for policy change.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142642553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The global housing affordability crisis and COVID shutdowns have put living space inequality back on the political agenda. Drawing on Durkheim’s theory of anomie and density, this paper argues that on how many square meters a society lives matters for how stable or anomic it develops. Using data from the Swiss Household Panel, we examine the selection, short-term, and dynamic effects associated with transitions to overcrowded and under-occupied dwellings. We conceptualize these transitions as disruptive events that require a reconfiguration of personal and social equilibria in individuals’ lives. While overcrowded housing leads to a heightening of emotional states and more tense internal household dynamics, people respond by adjusting their leisure activities and restructuring their support networks from strong to weak ties. Conversely, moving to an under-occupied dwelling is associated with melancholic emotional stabilization, but improves household balance and leads to consolidation of the core network of relatives at the expense of outer social circles. We conclude that the classical characterization of anomie as a mismatch between personal means and societal ends should be understood as a multifaceted phenomenon in which meso-level social networks can be a crucial means to cope with disruptions that arise at other levels.
{"title":"A room of one’s own? The consequences of living density on individual well-being and social anomie","authors":"Sinisa Hadziabdic, Sebastian Kohl","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae163","url":null,"abstract":"The global housing affordability crisis and COVID shutdowns have put living space inequality back on the political agenda. Drawing on Durkheim’s theory of anomie and density, this paper argues that on how many square meters a society lives matters for how stable or anomic it develops. Using data from the Swiss Household Panel, we examine the selection, short-term, and dynamic effects associated with transitions to overcrowded and under-occupied dwellings. We conceptualize these transitions as disruptive events that require a reconfiguration of personal and social equilibria in individuals’ lives. While overcrowded housing leads to a heightening of emotional states and more tense internal household dynamics, people respond by adjusting their leisure activities and restructuring their support networks from strong to weak ties. Conversely, moving to an under-occupied dwelling is associated with melancholic emotional stabilization, but improves household balance and leads to consolidation of the core network of relatives at the expense of outer social circles. We conclude that the classical characterization of anomie as a mismatch between personal means and societal ends should be understood as a multifaceted phenomenon in which meso-level social networks can be a crucial means to cope with disruptions that arise at other levels.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"117 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142610726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prior scholarship demonstrates that motherhood wage penalties and fatherhood wage premiums contribute to the gender pay gap. These analyses typically take a cross-sectional perspective, asking to what extent gender inequalities in the association between parenthood and wages can explain gender pay inequality for a given cohort or at a given moment in time. By contrast, explorations of gender pay convergence over time have tended to start at the firm’s door, testing the explanatory power of changes in men’s and women’s human capital and job characteristics and neglecting the contributions of fertility change. We bring these two strands of research together, asking to what extent declines 1980–2018 in US employees’ number of children can explain gender pay convergence over the same period. Using a descriptive decomposition and data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we show that, in gross terms, fertility decline can explain almost one-quarter of gender pay convergence from 1980 to 2018. Even net of a host of controls for human capital and job characteristics, fertility decline explains 8 percent of the attenuation of the US gender pay gap 1980–2018—about half as much as changes in education and about a quarter as much as changes in full-time work experience and job tenure combined. Finally, we show that employees’ fertility decline was fastest in the 1980s and subsequently slowed; this, in conjunction with persistent gender differences in parenthood–wage associations, helps explain stalled progress toward gender pay parity.
以往的研究表明，母亲的工资惩罚和父亲的工资溢价造成了性别薪酬差距。这些分析通常从横截面的角度出发，询问父母身份与工资之间的性别不平等在多大程度上可以解释特定队列或特定时刻的性别薪酬不平等。相比之下，随着时间的推移，对性别薪酬趋同性的探索往往从公司开始，检验男性和女性人力资本和工作特征变化的解释力，而忽视生育率变化的贡献。我们将这两方面的研究结合起来，询问 1980-2018 年美国雇员子女数量的下降在多大程度上可以解释同期的性别薪酬趋同。利用描述性分解和《收入动态面板研究》（Panel Study of Income Dynamics）的数据，我们表明，从总体上看，生育率下降可以解释 1980 年至 2018 年近四分之一的性别薪酬趋同。即使不考虑一系列人力资本和工作特征的控制因素，生育率下降也能解释 1980-2018 年美国性别薪酬差距 8% 的衰减--约为教育变化的一半，约为全职工作经验和工作年限变化总和的四分之一。最后，我们表明，雇员生育率的下降在 20 世纪 80 年代最快，随后放缓；这一点与父母身份-工资关联中持续存在的性别差异相结合，有助于解释在实现男女薪酬平等方面停滞不前的进展。
{"title":"Can fertility decline help explain gender pay convergence?","authors":"Alexandra Killewald, Nino José Cricco","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae153","url":null,"abstract":"Prior scholarship demonstrates that motherhood wage penalties and fatherhood wage premiums contribute to the gender pay gap. These analyses typically take a cross-sectional perspective, asking to what extent gender inequalities in the association between parenthood and wages can explain gender pay inequality for a given cohort or at a given moment in time. By contrast, explorations of gender pay convergence over time have tended to start at the firm’s door, testing the explanatory power of changes in men’s and women’s human capital and job characteristics and neglecting the contributions of fertility change. We bring these two strands of research together, asking to what extent declines 1980–2018 in US employees’ number of children can explain gender pay convergence over the same period. Using a descriptive decomposition and data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we show that, in gross terms, fertility decline can explain almost one-quarter of gender pay convergence from 1980 to 2018. Even net of a host of controls for human capital and job characteristics, fertility decline explains 8 percent of the attenuation of the US gender pay gap 1980–2018—about half as much as changes in education and about a quarter as much as changes in full-time work experience and job tenure combined. Finally, we show that employees’ fertility decline was fastest in the 1980s and subsequently slowed; this, in conjunction with persistent gender differences in parenthood–wage associations, helps explain stalled progress toward gender pay parity.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142563236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the gendered distribution of peer-ascribed status in schools. Using network data from more than 14,000 students in 676 classrooms, we explore gender differences in the ascription of status and the types of behavior rewarded with status. On average, girls receive slightly fewer status ascriptions than boys, and students tend to grant status more frequently within the same gender. Contextual analyses show that classroom demographics can moderate some of these patterns. We also uncover gender-specific differences and similarities in status-related behaviors. Notably, girls engaging in substance use are awarded with slightly more status ascriptions than boys. However, network models reveal that most behaviors affect peer status similarly for both genders, suggesting that previous findings of gender-behavioral differences based on regression analysis may be conflated with network processes. Our study updates long-held notions regarding gendered status orders in schools and highlights the value of a multidimensional approach to status processes. We discuss implications for future social network research on status ascriptions and other relational cognitions and consider how school-based interventions might benefit from our findings.
{"title":"Double standards in status ascriptions? The role of gender, behaviors, and social networks in status orders among adolescents","authors":"Mark Wittek, Xinwei Xu","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae145","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the gendered distribution of peer-ascribed status in schools. Using network data from more than 14,000 students in 676 classrooms, we explore gender differences in the ascription of status and the types of behavior rewarded with status. On average, girls receive slightly fewer status ascriptions than boys, and students tend to grant status more frequently within the same gender. Contextual analyses show that classroom demographics can moderate some of these patterns. We also uncover gender-specific differences and similarities in status-related behaviors. Notably, girls engaging in substance use are awarded with slightly more status ascriptions than boys. However, network models reveal that most behaviors affect peer status similarly for both genders, suggesting that previous findings of gender-behavioral differences based on regression analysis may be conflated with network processes. Our study updates long-held notions regarding gendered status orders in schools and highlights the value of a multidimensional approach to status processes. We discuss implications for future social network research on status ascriptions and other relational cognitions and consider how school-based interventions might benefit from our findings.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142536617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While prior research has widely acknowledged the consequences of specific family transitions (e.g., parental death, parenthood, grandparenthood) for individual wealth holdings, the interplay of multiple family transitions and positions occurring at different life stages and in various orderings has received little attention. This is despite the fact that these transitions and positions most likely jointly shape wealth accumulation, both in the shorter and longer run. We apply (1) sequence analysis to identify typical family life course clusters defined by the timing of the death of the parent generation, the timing of the transition into parenthood, and grandparenthood and (2) regression analysis to describe how the accumulation of wealth between ages 40 and 64 differs by family life course cluster. Using Norwegian register data of individuals born in 1953 (N = 47,945), we identified six clusters of family trajectories ranging from childless individuals to individuals who were sandwiched between their parents, children, and grandchildren because of relatively early (grand)parenthood and late parental death. Individuals experiencing patterns with a later transition into (grand)parenthood occupied stable and high wealth positions over time. Individuals without children exhibited a steady increase in their wealth position. Additionally, experiencing parental death later in life was associated with increasing wealth, whereas early parental death was not. These results held net of gender and education. Pronounced and even increasing wealth differences over the life course seem to be associated with the interplay of multiple family transitions.
{"title":"Intergenerational family life courses and wealth accumulation in Norway","authors":"Bettina Hünteler, Theresa Nutz, Jonathan Wörn","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae151","url":null,"abstract":"While prior research has widely acknowledged the consequences of specific family transitions (e.g., parental death, parenthood, grandparenthood) for individual wealth holdings, the interplay of multiple family transitions and positions occurring at different life stages and in various orderings has received little attention. This is despite the fact that these transitions and positions most likely jointly shape wealth accumulation, both in the shorter and longer run. We apply (1) sequence analysis to identify typical family life course clusters defined by the timing of the death of the parent generation, the timing of the transition into parenthood, and grandparenthood and (2) regression analysis to describe how the accumulation of wealth between ages 40 and 64 differs by family life course cluster. Using Norwegian register data of individuals born in 1953 (N = 47,945), we identified six clusters of family trajectories ranging from childless individuals to individuals who were sandwiched between their parents, children, and grandchildren because of relatively early (grand)parenthood and late parental death. Individuals experiencing patterns with a later transition into (grand)parenthood occupied stable and high wealth positions over time. Individuals without children exhibited a steady increase in their wealth position. Additionally, experiencing parental death later in life was associated with increasing wealth, whereas early parental death was not. These results held net of gender and education. Pronounced and even increasing wealth differences over the life course seem to be associated with the interplay of multiple family transitions.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142451378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research has demonstrated that couples have similar partisan preferences, a finding associated with political polarization. However, it remains debated to what extent different mechanisms contribute to this homogamy. Analyzing dyadic panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 1984–2020, we distinguish analytically between (1) direct political matching (i.e., partner selection on matching party preferences); (2) indirect political matching (i.e., social structural homogamy with political homogamy as a by-product); and (3) couples’ political alignment over time, to explain party preference similarity. First, we study matching among recently formed couples using an innovative method that compares real-world couples with three types of counterfactuals: couples that are matched (1) randomly, (2) by multidimensional social structural characteristics, and (3) by maximizing similarity in party preference. Second, we study couples’ political alignment over the course of relationships, tracking real-world couples over time and controlling for macro-level changes in the party-political landscape. Results indicate substantial political homogamy among recently formed couples, which is best explained by political matching (i.e., direct selection based on partisan preferences). Effects of social structural homogamy appear weak in comparison and rather stable across cohorts. Couples further align in their partisan preferences over time, but this effect is countered by an increasing heterogeneity of the German political landscape.
{"title":"Why do partners often prefer the same political parties? Evidence from couples in Germany","authors":"Ansgar Hudde, Daniela Grunow","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae133","url":null,"abstract":"Research has demonstrated that couples have similar partisan preferences, a finding associated with political polarization. However, it remains debated to what extent different mechanisms contribute to this homogamy. Analyzing dyadic panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 1984–2020, we distinguish analytically between (1) direct political matching (i.e., partner selection on matching party preferences); (2) indirect political matching (i.e., social structural homogamy with political homogamy as a by-product); and (3) couples’ political alignment over time, to explain party preference similarity. First, we study matching among recently formed couples using an innovative method that compares real-world couples with three types of counterfactuals: couples that are matched (1) randomly, (2) by multidimensional social structural characteristics, and (3) by maximizing similarity in party preference. Second, we study couples’ political alignment over the course of relationships, tracking real-world couples over time and controlling for macro-level changes in the party-political landscape. Results indicate substantial political homogamy among recently formed couples, which is best explained by political matching (i.e., direct selection based on partisan preferences). Effects of social structural homogamy appear weak in comparison and rather stable across cohorts. Couples further align in their partisan preferences over time, but this effect is countered by an increasing heterogeneity of the German political landscape.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142306402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Drawing on a unique survey of US workers with information about their employers’ policies on pay discussions and whether workers engage in such talk with their coworkers, we provide the most comprehensive investigation into pay talk in workplaces to date. Unlike existing treatments, we focus on core organizational and relational factors that influence whether workers talk about pay. We theorize pay talk as a challenge to managerial discretion, and we hypothesize that organizational attributes related to pay-setting influence workers’ willingness to discuss wages and salaries with colleagues. Managers, in turn, combat such challenges to their discretion by instituting pay secrecy rules. Particular relational factors within organizations are related to workers’ violations of these rules. Findings indicate that the likelihood of pay discussions varies by workplace pay secrecy rules, managerial relations within organizations, and, in certain model specifications, sector and career turning points. Among status characteristics, only age is associated with discussing pay, with younger workers significantly more likely to talk about pay and to violate organizational rules meant to suppress pay discussions.
{"title":"Pay talk in contemporary workplaces","authors":"Patrick Denice, Jake Rosenfeld, Shengwei Sun","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae130","url":null,"abstract":"Drawing on a unique survey of US workers with information about their employers’ policies on pay discussions and whether workers engage in such talk with their coworkers, we provide the most comprehensive investigation into pay talk in workplaces to date. Unlike existing treatments, we focus on core organizational and relational factors that influence whether workers talk about pay. We theorize pay talk as a challenge to managerial discretion, and we hypothesize that organizational attributes related to pay-setting influence workers’ willingness to discuss wages and salaries with colleagues. Managers, in turn, combat such challenges to their discretion by instituting pay secrecy rules. Particular relational factors within organizations are related to workers’ violations of these rules. Findings indicate that the likelihood of pay discussions varies by workplace pay secrecy rules, managerial relations within organizations, and, in certain model specifications, sector and career turning points. Among status characteristics, only age is associated with discussing pay, with younger workers significantly more likely to talk about pay and to violate organizational rules meant to suppress pay discussions.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142166624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Benefit cutbacks have been prominent after the Great Recession. The Family Economic Stress Model (FESM) theorizes how financial losses such as those spurred by cutbacks might adversely affect parental and child well-being. Yet, few links with policy have been established. We extend current knowledge by comprehensively assessing how benefits cutbacks may affect parents and their adolescent children. We rely on the first ten waves of the UK Household Longitudinal Study (2009–2019) and an event-study approach to examine the aftermath of an exceptional raft of benefit cutbacks. We find that mothers with lower incomes and single mothers accumulated losses equal to 20–30 percent of their household benefit income. Mothers could not fully compensate for such benefit income losses via their extra earnings, despite increased workforce participation. Financial worries, some forms of material hardship, and mental health worsened among mothers with lower incomes and single mothers exposed to cutbacks. Adolescent socio-emotional difficulties also increased in the period. We find little evidence, though, that cutbacks disrupted parenting. Parents thus display more agency than that accorded by the FESM. Nonetheless, findings point to deepening socioeconomic divides in financial and mental well-being, questioning the rationale for cutbacks.
{"title":"Families of austerity: benefit cutbacks and family stress in the UK","authors":"Gabriele Mari, Renske Keizer","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae126","url":null,"abstract":"Benefit cutbacks have been prominent after the Great Recession. The Family Economic Stress Model (FESM) theorizes how financial losses such as those spurred by cutbacks might adversely affect parental and child well-being. Yet, few links with policy have been established. We extend current knowledge by comprehensively assessing how benefits cutbacks may affect parents and their adolescent children. We rely on the first ten waves of the UK Household Longitudinal Study (2009–2019) and an event-study approach to examine the aftermath of an exceptional raft of benefit cutbacks. We find that mothers with lower incomes and single mothers accumulated losses equal to 20–30 percent of their household benefit income. Mothers could not fully compensate for such benefit income losses via their extra earnings, despite increased workforce participation. Financial worries, some forms of material hardship, and mental health worsened among mothers with lower incomes and single mothers exposed to cutbacks. Adolescent socio-emotional difficulties also increased in the period. We find little evidence, though, that cutbacks disrupted parenting. Parents thus display more agency than that accorded by the FESM. Nonetheless, findings point to deepening socioeconomic divides in financial and mental well-being, questioning the rationale for cutbacks.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142138262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the United States, exclusionary public policies generate inequalities within and across labor, financial, and legal status hierarchies, which together undermine immigrant well-being. But can inclusive public policies improve immigrant health? We examine whether and how an immigrant-inclusive federal program, Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs), shaped health care access and use among farmworkers over nearly three decades, paying particular attention to disparities at the intersection of nativity and legal status. Linking historical administrative data on the location and funding of FQHCs with the National Agricultural Workers Survey from 1989–2017, we first document trends in farmworkers’ county-level proximity to FQHCs and identify a steady increase in FQHC access among undocumented farmworkers following the Affordable Care Act. Next, using time-series cross-sectional regressions with a battery of fixed effects, we find that living in a county where FQHCs are available and better resourced is associated with increased health care use among undocumented farmworkers, but not among U.S.-born or documented immigrant farmworkers. We also find that county-level access to FQHCs is associated with reduced reports of language barriers to care among both documented and undocumented foreign-born farmworkers. These findings suggest that FQHCs may improve access for immigrants who are typically excluded from U.S. health care institutions. Still, county-level FQHC infrastructure is not associated with cost-related barriers to care for any nativity or legal status groups. Taken together, our study highlights both the potential and constraints of inclusive public policies for promoting health equity in a welfare state context characterized by commodification and stratification.
{"title":"The promise and limits of inclusive public policy: federal safety net clinics and immigrant access to health care in the U.S.","authors":"Emily Parker, Rebecca Anna Schut, Courtney Boen","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae111","url":null,"abstract":"In the United States, exclusionary public policies generate inequalities within and across labor, financial, and legal status hierarchies, which together undermine immigrant well-being. But can inclusive public policies improve immigrant health? We examine whether and how an immigrant-inclusive federal program, Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs), shaped health care access and use among farmworkers over nearly three decades, paying particular attention to disparities at the intersection of nativity and legal status. Linking historical administrative data on the location and funding of FQHCs with the National Agricultural Workers Survey from 1989–2017, we first document trends in farmworkers’ county-level proximity to FQHCs and identify a steady increase in FQHC access among undocumented farmworkers following the Affordable Care Act. Next, using time-series cross-sectional regressions with a battery of fixed effects, we find that living in a county where FQHCs are available and better resourced is associated with increased health care use among undocumented farmworkers, but not among U.S.-born or documented immigrant farmworkers. We also find that county-level access to FQHCs is associated with reduced reports of language barriers to care among both documented and undocumented foreign-born farmworkers. These findings suggest that FQHCs may improve access for immigrants who are typically excluded from U.S. health care institutions. Still, county-level FQHC infrastructure is not associated with cost-related barriers to care for any nativity or legal status groups. Taken together, our study highlights both the potential and constraints of inclusive public policies for promoting health equity in a welfare state context characterized by commodification and stratification.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"67 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142131000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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