How does migrants’ social embeddedness influence non-migrants’ attitudes? Although research on intergroup relations has considered the effects of various dimensions of migrants’ lives, often measured by economic and cultural traits, social embeddedness, defined by the composition of interpersonal relationships, has received relatively less attention. We consider two types of social embeddedness and hypothesize that non-migrants will positively view migrants who are more socially embedded with non-migrants. In contrast, theory suggests that co-ethnic social embeddedness will result in a more negative view. Using a conjoint analysis in the UK, results show that non-migrant’s do indeed have more positive attitudes towards a hypothetical migrant who is socially embedded with non-migrants. However, co-ethnic social embeddedness does not result in a more negative perception.
{"title":"Does social embeddedness shape attitudes toward migrants? Evidence from a survey experiment in the United Kingdom","authors":"Akira Igarashi, Mathew J Creighton","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae104","url":null,"abstract":"How does migrants’ social embeddedness influence non-migrants’ attitudes? Although research on intergroup relations has considered the effects of various dimensions of migrants’ lives, often measured by economic and cultural traits, social embeddedness, defined by the composition of interpersonal relationships, has received relatively less attention. We consider two types of social embeddedness and hypothesize that non-migrants will positively view migrants who are more socially embedded with non-migrants. In contrast, theory suggests that co-ethnic social embeddedness will result in a more negative view. Using a conjoint analysis in the UK, results show that non-migrant’s do indeed have more positive attitudes towards a hypothetical migrant who is socially embedded with non-migrants. However, co-ethnic social embeddedness does not result in a more negative perception.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141725855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We distinguish two streams of theory that dominate explanations of religious change: cohort-based cumulative decline theory, which emphasizes small and ongoing declines in individual religiosity accruing across generations; and political backlash theory, which emphasizes period- and identity-based changes due to the politicized meaning of religion. Notably, Muslim countries have largely been excluded from a recent wave of quantitative research on individual-level religious change, implicitly continuing an assumption that Islamic societies require different theoretical concepts. We deploy both theories to examine religious identity and behavior over multiple decades in Turkey, a Muslim-majority country with recent social conflict over religion. Utilizing age-period-cohort interaction models, our results suggest minimal evidence for a cohort-based process in Turkey, in contrast to that observed in Western countries. Rather, a political transformation—the politicization of religion through the rise of Turkey’s AKP (Justice and Development Party) and President Erdogan—is most salient to Turkish religious change. We introduce two concepts to backlash theory—identity updating and performance signaling—to show how different dimensions of individual religiosity respond to different politicized contexts. These findings extend our understanding of religious change beyond the Western context, with further implications for theorizing political backlash and cohort-based processes.
{"title":"Religious rebound, political backlash, and the youngest cohort: understanding religious change in Turkey","authors":"Ibrahim Enes Atac, Gary J Adler Jr","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae102","url":null,"abstract":"We distinguish two streams of theory that dominate explanations of religious change: cohort-based cumulative decline theory, which emphasizes small and ongoing declines in individual religiosity accruing across generations; and political backlash theory, which emphasizes period- and identity-based changes due to the politicized meaning of religion. Notably, Muslim countries have largely been excluded from a recent wave of quantitative research on individual-level religious change, implicitly continuing an assumption that Islamic societies require different theoretical concepts. We deploy both theories to examine religious identity and behavior over multiple decades in Turkey, a Muslim-majority country with recent social conflict over religion. Utilizing age-period-cohort interaction models, our results suggest minimal evidence for a cohort-based process in Turkey, in contrast to that observed in Western countries. Rather, a political transformation—the politicization of religion through the rise of Turkey’s AKP (Justice and Development Party) and President Erdogan—is most salient to Turkish religious change. We introduce two concepts to backlash theory—identity updating and performance signaling—to show how different dimensions of individual religiosity respond to different politicized contexts. These findings extend our understanding of religious change beyond the Western context, with further implications for theorizing political backlash and cohort-based processes.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141725856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Andrew V Papachristos, James P Murphy, Anthony Braga, Brandon Turchan
The salience of neighborhoods in shaping crime patterns is one of sociology’s most robust areas of research. One way through which neighborhoods shape outcomes is through the creation and maintenance of social networks, patterns of interactions and relationships among neighborhood residents, organizations, groups, and institutions. This paper explores the relationship between network structures generated through acts of co-offending—when two or more individuals engage in an alleged crime together—and patterns of neighborhood gun violence and gun availability. Using arrest data from New York City, we create co-arrest networks between individuals arrested in the city between 2010 and 2015. We analyze these network patterns to, first, understand the overall structure of co-offending networks and, then, assess how they impact neighborhood levels of gun violence and gun availability. Results show that local and extra-local networks play a central role in predicting neighborhood levels of shootings: neighborhoods with a greater density of local ties have higher shootings rates, and neighborhoods that share social ties have similar rates of violence. In contrast, the network dynamics involved in gun recoveries are almost entirely local: co-offending patterns within neighborhoods are strongly associated with the level of gun recoveries, especially the clustering of co-offending networks indicative of groups. Contrary to previous research, spatial autocorrelation failed to predict either shootings or gun recoveries when demographic features were considered. Social-demographic characteristics seem to explain much of the observed spatial autocorrelation and the precise measurement of network properties might provide better measurements of the neighborhood dynamics involved in urban gun violence.
{"title":"The importance of neighborhood offending networks for gun violence and firearm availability","authors":"Andrew V Papachristos, James P Murphy, Anthony Braga, Brandon Turchan","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae099","url":null,"abstract":"The salience of neighborhoods in shaping crime patterns is one of sociology’s most robust areas of research. One way through which neighborhoods shape outcomes is through the creation and maintenance of social networks, patterns of interactions and relationships among neighborhood residents, organizations, groups, and institutions. This paper explores the relationship between network structures generated through acts of co-offending—when two or more individuals engage in an alleged crime together—and patterns of neighborhood gun violence and gun availability. Using arrest data from New York City, we create co-arrest networks between individuals arrested in the city between 2010 and 2015. We analyze these network patterns to, first, understand the overall structure of co-offending networks and, then, assess how they impact neighborhood levels of gun violence and gun availability. Results show that local and extra-local networks play a central role in predicting neighborhood levels of shootings: neighborhoods with a greater density of local ties have higher shootings rates, and neighborhoods that share social ties have similar rates of violence. In contrast, the network dynamics involved in gun recoveries are almost entirely local: co-offending patterns within neighborhoods are strongly associated with the level of gun recoveries, especially the clustering of co-offending networks indicative of groups. Contrary to previous research, spatial autocorrelation failed to predict either shootings or gun recoveries when demographic features were considered. Social-demographic characteristics seem to explain much of the observed spatial autocorrelation and the precise measurement of network properties might provide better measurements of the neighborhood dynamics involved in urban gun violence.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141597369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Divorce among older adults—known as gray divorce—is increasingly common; however, we have a relative gap in knowledge about predictors of gray divorce. Job insecurity, a pervasive and disruptive work-related exposure, may be a salient predictor of divorce among older couples for whom job loss can be particularly detrimental. Using longitudinal dyadic data from the Health and Retirement Study (1998–2020), the present study examined whether labor force status and job insecurity were prospectively associated with the risk of divorce in mid to later life, with attention to differences based on gender (n = 10,446 couples). Discrete-time event history models linked husbands’ and wives’ labor force status and job insecurity with subsequent odds of divorce in mid to later life. Findings show that husbands’ part-time employment, unemployment, and disability status were risk factors for divorce. Wives’ work disability also increased the risk of divorce, whereas wives’ retirement and exclusion from the labor force were protective against divorce. Husbands’ exposure to objective job insecurity (shorter job tenure) and perceived job insecurity were associated with divorce in mid to later life, whereas the adverse consequence of wives’ exposure to shorter job tenure reduced to non-significance with the inclusion of covariates. The present study documents previously untested predictors of gray divorce, finding that work-related factors may be an area of vulnerability for marriages in later life. Understanding the linkages between job insecurity and divorce is important because job insecurity is pervasive and divorce can contribute to declines in health and well-being.
{"title":"Job insecurity as a predictor of gray divorce: a gendered dyadic analysis","authors":"Rachel Donnelly","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae097","url":null,"abstract":"Divorce among older adults—known as gray divorce—is increasingly common; however, we have a relative gap in knowledge about predictors of gray divorce. Job insecurity, a pervasive and disruptive work-related exposure, may be a salient predictor of divorce among older couples for whom job loss can be particularly detrimental. Using longitudinal dyadic data from the Health and Retirement Study (1998–2020), the present study examined whether labor force status and job insecurity were prospectively associated with the risk of divorce in mid to later life, with attention to differences based on gender (n = 10,446 couples). Discrete-time event history models linked husbands’ and wives’ labor force status and job insecurity with subsequent odds of divorce in mid to later life. Findings show that husbands’ part-time employment, unemployment, and disability status were risk factors for divorce. Wives’ work disability also increased the risk of divorce, whereas wives’ retirement and exclusion from the labor force were protective against divorce. Husbands’ exposure to objective job insecurity (shorter job tenure) and perceived job insecurity were associated with divorce in mid to later life, whereas the adverse consequence of wives’ exposure to shorter job tenure reduced to non-significance with the inclusion of covariates. The present study documents previously untested predictors of gray divorce, finding that work-related factors may be an area of vulnerability for marriages in later life. Understanding the linkages between job insecurity and divorce is important because job insecurity is pervasive and divorce can contribute to declines in health and well-being.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141584341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rising antisemitism in the twenty-first century has alarmed Jewish communities and the general public, but antisemitic hate crime victimization remains understudied outside the US context. This study primarily relies on a comprehensive survey of 16,400 Jews across twelve European countries, supplemented with data from additional sources, to assess individual and country-level predictors of Jews’ experiences and fears of antisemitic harassment and violence. Multilevel models indicate that young age, perceived discrimination, identity visibility, and identification with Israel are pronounced individual risk factors for victimization. On the country level, negative opinion of Israel and Muslim population share predict victimization, highlighting the role of a “new” or Israel-derived antisemitism in the twenty-first century. The factors most strongly associated with fear are young age, previous victimization, perceptions of an ambient antisemitic threat, and recent occurrence of fatal antisemitic violence. Overall, the findings underscore the importance of integrating general theory on hate crime and victimization with context-specific factors when seeking to understand the experiences of targeted groups.
{"title":"Facing antisemitism in Europe: individual and country-level predictors of Jews’ victimization and fear across twelve countries","authors":"Johannes Due Enstad","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae091","url":null,"abstract":"Rising antisemitism in the twenty-first century has alarmed Jewish communities and the general public, but antisemitic hate crime victimization remains understudied outside the US context. This study primarily relies on a comprehensive survey of 16,400 Jews across twelve European countries, supplemented with data from additional sources, to assess individual and country-level predictors of Jews’ experiences and fears of antisemitic harassment and violence. Multilevel models indicate that young age, perceived discrimination, identity visibility, and identification with Israel are pronounced individual risk factors for victimization. On the country level, negative opinion of Israel and Muslim population share predict victimization, highlighting the role of a “new” or Israel-derived antisemitism in the twenty-first century. The factors most strongly associated with fear are young age, previous victimization, perceptions of an ambient antisemitic threat, and recent occurrence of fatal antisemitic violence. Overall, the findings underscore the importance of integrating general theory on hate crime and victimization with context-specific factors when seeking to understand the experiences of targeted groups.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141462778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How do fathers adjust their working hours after the birth of their first child? Though the impact of childbirth on women’s employment is well-established, less is known about its effect on fathers. We investigate this question in the Netherlands (2006–2017), a country characterized by high prevalence of part-time work. We focus on two contexts that might shape the extent to which first-time fathers reduce their working hours after childbirth: the household and the organization. For this purpose, we use detailed longitudinal register data. The results reveal that men’s employment displays a high degree of stability around childbirth: even in the Dutch “part-time economy,” the vast majority of fathers remain full-time employed. We do find substantial heterogeneity in labor market responses after childbirth. Fathers earning relatively less than their partner pre-childbirth are more likely to scale down their working hours. The organizational gender composition is also associated with work hours reductions following childbirth. Although we find that fathers’ employment is contingent on both the household and organizational context, the substantial stability in men’s labor supply remains an obstacle to a more equal division of (un)paid labor.
{"title":"Fatherhood and men’s working hours in a part-time economy","authors":"Dieuwke Zwier, Matthijs Kalmijn, Thijs Bol","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae081","url":null,"abstract":"How do fathers adjust their working hours after the birth of their first child? Though the impact of childbirth on women’s employment is well-established, less is known about its effect on fathers. We investigate this question in the Netherlands (2006–2017), a country characterized by high prevalence of part-time work. We focus on two contexts that might shape the extent to which first-time fathers reduce their working hours after childbirth: the household and the organization. For this purpose, we use detailed longitudinal register data. The results reveal that men’s employment displays a high degree of stability around childbirth: even in the Dutch “part-time economy,” the vast majority of fathers remain full-time employed. We do find substantial heterogeneity in labor market responses after childbirth. Fathers earning relatively less than their partner pre-childbirth are more likely to scale down their working hours. The organizational gender composition is also associated with work hours reductions following childbirth. Although we find that fathers’ employment is contingent on both the household and organizational context, the substantial stability in men’s labor supply remains an obstacle to a more equal division of (un)paid labor.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141315675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper theorizes the interplay of public and organizational policies by investigating whether the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) shifted patterns of gender inequality within U.S. workplaces. Did this leave law increase women’s representation in positions of authority (moving more women into management jobs)? We argue that the impact of public policies will vary by organizational context, hypothesizing different effects by organizations’ points of departure—the corporate policies in place when public policy changes. Analyzing establishment-level panel data from approximately 800 U.S. private-sector establishments in 1990–1997, we found that women’s representation in managerial positions increased in the years immediately after the FMLA. Importantly, women’s representation in management increased the most in workplaces that provided more generous leave benefits even before the FMLA. The increase in managerial representation was most prominent for women of color. Consistent with relational inequality theory, these findings suggest that women may find it easier to make claims for leave and for career advancement when both legal and organizational policies lend legitimacy to their claims. More broadly, this study points to the need to explicitly evaluate how policy impacts vary by organizational norms and commitments.
{"title":"Points of departure: family leave policy and women’s representation in management in U.S. workplaces","authors":"Eunmi Mun, Shawna Vican, Erin L Kelly","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae080","url":null,"abstract":"This paper theorizes the interplay of public and organizational policies by investigating whether the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) shifted patterns of gender inequality within U.S. workplaces. Did this leave law increase women’s representation in positions of authority (moving more women into management jobs)? We argue that the impact of public policies will vary by organizational context, hypothesizing different effects by organizations’ points of departure—the corporate policies in place when public policy changes. Analyzing establishment-level panel data from approximately 800 U.S. private-sector establishments in 1990–1997, we found that women’s representation in managerial positions increased in the years immediately after the FMLA. Importantly, women’s representation in management increased the most in workplaces that provided more generous leave benefits even before the FMLA. The increase in managerial representation was most prominent for women of color. Consistent with relational inequality theory, these findings suggest that women may find it easier to make claims for leave and for career advancement when both legal and organizational policies lend legitimacy to their claims. More broadly, this study points to the need to explicitly evaluate how policy impacts vary by organizational norms and commitments.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141315624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates two concurrent trends across Europe and North America: the increasing instability of parental unions and men’s rising contributions to household work. Because children have almost universally resided with their mothers and it is difficult for non-residential fathers to maintain any levels of care work, union dissolutions have potentially slowed societal increases in gender equality. A new family form—50/50 living arrangements—has begun to challenge our understanding of the consequences of union dissolution. Since 50/50 residence requires fathers to take full care responsibility for the child half of the time—something few partnered fathers do—it may even push parents into a more egalitarian division of care work. We have studied care work using Swedish administrative data on parents’ leave from work to care for a sick child. We have created a panel of leave-sharing for children aged 2–11, and use an event-study design to estimate the causal effect of dissolution on the sharing of sick-child leave. The results show that in parental unions dissolving today, the dissolution leads to an increase in fathers’ share of sick-child leave. Whereas union dissolutions have for decades been slowing the gender revolution in Sweden, they are now accelerating it.
{"title":"Parental union dissolution and the gender revolution","authors":"Helen Eriksson, Martin Kolk","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae079","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates two concurrent trends across Europe and North America: the increasing instability of parental unions and men’s rising contributions to household work. Because children have almost universally resided with their mothers and it is difficult for non-residential fathers to maintain any levels of care work, union dissolutions have potentially slowed societal increases in gender equality. A new family form—50/50 living arrangements—has begun to challenge our understanding of the consequences of union dissolution. Since 50/50 residence requires fathers to take full care responsibility for the child half of the time—something few partnered fathers do—it may even push parents into a more egalitarian division of care work. We have studied care work using Swedish administrative data on parents’ leave from work to care for a sick child. We have created a panel of leave-sharing for children aged 2–11, and use an event-study design to estimate the causal effect of dissolution on the sharing of sick-child leave. The results show that in parental unions dissolving today, the dissolution leads to an increase in fathers’ share of sick-child leave. Whereas union dissolutions have for decades been slowing the gender revolution in Sweden, they are now accelerating it.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141187671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Popular explanations of inequality as the result of individual failings rather than structural processes are powerful cultural mechanisms that legitimize and reproduce inequality in the United States. How might individuals’ experiences of downward or upward mobility shape the explanations they give? We argue that perceived experiences of economic mobility may not only shape how Americans understand economic inequality but may also impact their beliefs about social inequalities more broadly. Using proportionally representative survey data of 1110 U.S. residents, we find that those who perceive that they currently occupy a lower economic class than when they were growing up (i.e., they experienced subjective downward mobility) were more likely than class-stable individuals to reject individualistic explanations of economic inequality and embrace structural ones. By contrast, the upwardly mobile were more likely to reject structural explanations. We find that mobility is similarly related to the likelihood of giving individualistic or structural explanations for race and gender inequality as well. Downward mobility is also associated with greater support of redistributive policies related to economic as well as gender and race inequality. These findings suggest that economic mobility may influence popular explanations of inequality and support for redistributive policy not only related to class inequality but for multiple axes of inequality.
{"title":"The View from Above and Below: Subjective Mobility and Explanations of Class, Race, and Gender Inequality","authors":"Sofia Hiltner, Erin A Cech","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae075","url":null,"abstract":"Popular explanations of inequality as the result of individual failings rather than structural processes are powerful cultural mechanisms that legitimize and reproduce inequality in the United States. How might individuals’ experiences of downward or upward mobility shape the explanations they give? We argue that perceived experiences of economic mobility may not only shape how Americans understand economic inequality but may also impact their beliefs about social inequalities more broadly. Using proportionally representative survey data of 1110 U.S. residents, we find that those who perceive that they currently occupy a lower economic class than when they were growing up (i.e., they experienced subjective downward mobility) were more likely than class-stable individuals to reject individualistic explanations of economic inequality and embrace structural ones. By contrast, the upwardly mobile were more likely to reject structural explanations. We find that mobility is similarly related to the likelihood of giving individualistic or structural explanations for race and gender inequality as well. Downward mobility is also associated with greater support of redistributive policies related to economic as well as gender and race inequality. These findings suggest that economic mobility may influence popular explanations of inequality and support for redistributive policy not only related to class inequality but for multiple axes of inequality.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141165189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scholars and policymakers are increasingly interested in subjective well-being as a development indicator. However, sociological research on this topic is quite limited, as is research that considers the effects of the biophysical environment on subjective well-being. In this study, we address these gaps in the literature by examining social and environmental influences on life satisfaction, a core component of subjective well-being. We employed multi-level regression analysis using data from over 97,000 individuals living across ninety-six countries. The results demonstrated significant effects of several individual-level variables on life satisfaction, in particular respondents’ satisfaction with their local air and water quality and the efforts being made to preserve the environment in their country, as well as numerous social variables, such as income, gender, and employment status. Among the country-level variables, national gross domestic product per capita was positively associated with higher individual life satisfaction. Income inequality had a negative effect on life satisfaction, while wealth inequality, on the other hand, had a positive effect, a surprising finding we contemplate in some detail. The carbon intensity of a nation’s economy as well as the proportion of a nation’s land in protected areas only influenced life satisfaction when not controlling for the other variables. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for sustainable development, including the promise of life satisfaction and other measures of subjective well-being as sustainable development indicators.
{"title":"Cross-National Social and Environmental Influences on Life Satisfaction","authors":"Mark Suchyta, Thomas Dietz, Kenneth A Frank","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae072","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars and policymakers are increasingly interested in subjective well-being as a development indicator. However, sociological research on this topic is quite limited, as is research that considers the effects of the biophysical environment on subjective well-being. In this study, we address these gaps in the literature by examining social and environmental influences on life satisfaction, a core component of subjective well-being. We employed multi-level regression analysis using data from over 97,000 individuals living across ninety-six countries. The results demonstrated significant effects of several individual-level variables on life satisfaction, in particular respondents’ satisfaction with their local air and water quality and the efforts being made to preserve the environment in their country, as well as numerous social variables, such as income, gender, and employment status. Among the country-level variables, national gross domestic product per capita was positively associated with higher individual life satisfaction. Income inequality had a negative effect on life satisfaction, while wealth inequality, on the other hand, had a positive effect, a surprising finding we contemplate in some detail. The carbon intensity of a nation’s economy as well as the proportion of a nation’s land in protected areas only influenced life satisfaction when not controlling for the other variables. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for sustainable development, including the promise of life satisfaction and other measures of subjective well-being as sustainable development indicators.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141085535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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