David Kretschmer, Lars Leszczensky, Cassie McMillan
Social networks are segregated by sociodemographic characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, religion, and socioeconomic status. A key reason for this segregation is homophily, or people's preferences to associate with similar others. Homophily is documented for relationships of different strengths, ranging from marriage and close friendship to weaker acquaintanceships. But does sociodemographic homophily vary by relationship strength? While most researchers assume more pronounced sociodemographic homophily for strong than for weak relationships, theoretical expectations and empirical evidence are inconclusive. For instance, shared sociodemographic characteristics can come with joint experiences and identities that could facilitate the development of strong relationships. At the same time, however, matching personalities and attitudes may be necessary for forming strong relationships, so the superficial similarity that accompanies shared sociodemographic traits may only suffice for weak relationships. Based on these considerations, we test whether and how gender, ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic status homophily vary by relationship strength in over 600 school-based networks of more than 20,000 adolescents from Israel, England, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Using valued exponential random graph models, we find consistent evidence that strong tie homophily exceeds weak tie homophily. While adolescents are more likely to report strong ties with those who share their gender, ethnicity, religion, and socioeconomic status, homophily is less pronounced for weaker ties. Our finding suggests that it is crucial to consider the link between homophily and tie strength to understand the flow of information, resources, social support, and opportunities in social networks.
{"title":"Strong ties, strong homophily? Variation in homophily on sociodemographic characteristics by relationship strength","authors":"David Kretschmer, Lars Leszczensky, Cassie McMillan","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae169","url":null,"abstract":"Social networks are segregated by sociodemographic characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, religion, and socioeconomic status. A key reason for this segregation is homophily, or people's preferences to associate with similar others. Homophily is documented for relationships of different strengths, ranging from marriage and close friendship to weaker acquaintanceships. But does sociodemographic homophily vary by relationship strength? While most researchers assume more pronounced sociodemographic homophily for strong than for weak relationships, theoretical expectations and empirical evidence are inconclusive. For instance, shared sociodemographic characteristics can come with joint experiences and identities that could facilitate the development of strong relationships. At the same time, however, matching personalities and attitudes may be necessary for forming strong relationships, so the superficial similarity that accompanies shared sociodemographic traits may only suffice for weak relationships. Based on these considerations, we test whether and how gender, ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic status homophily vary by relationship strength in over 600 school-based networks of more than 20,000 adolescents from Israel, England, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Using valued exponential random graph models, we find consistent evidence that strong tie homophily exceeds weak tie homophily. While adolescents are more likely to report strong ties with those who share their gender, ethnicity, religion, and socioeconomic status, homophily is less pronounced for weaker ties. Our finding suggests that it is crucial to consider the link between homophily and tie strength to understand the flow of information, resources, social support, and opportunities in social networks.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142805296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite political calls on the state to “protect the children” from sexual violence, feminist scholars argue the state itself reproduces routine gender-based violence toward incarcerated communities, including youth. Building upon this work, I draw from twenty-three life history interviews with formerly incarcerated cis- and transgender men and women survivors to show how carceral norms facilitate a system of coercive sexual control. I define coercive sexual control as the policies, practices, and social relations that create the context for routine sexual violence and institutional harm toward youth. Coercive sexual control includes the sexual degradation of youth bodies, the underground economy of sexual favors, and the institutional denial of sexual harm. A theory of coercive sexual control shifts attention from sexual violence as solely interpersonal and episodic to the broader institutional mechanisms of power and social control that produce sexual exploitation against youth under the carceral state. Centering carceral institutions as sites of endemic sexual violence further unearths crucial discrepancies between institutional claims of prioritizing children’s sexual safety “on the books” and gaslighting youth claims of sexual misconduct in everyday practice.
{"title":"“You just feel re-violated”: coercive sexual control in juvenile detention","authors":"Amber Joy Powell","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae173","url":null,"abstract":"Despite political calls on the state to “protect the children” from sexual violence, feminist scholars argue the state itself reproduces routine gender-based violence toward incarcerated communities, including youth. Building upon this work, I draw from twenty-three life history interviews with formerly incarcerated cis- and transgender men and women survivors to show how carceral norms facilitate a system of coercive sexual control. I define coercive sexual control as the policies, practices, and social relations that create the context for routine sexual violence and institutional harm toward youth. Coercive sexual control includes the sexual degradation of youth bodies, the underground economy of sexual favors, and the institutional denial of sexual harm. A theory of coercive sexual control shifts attention from sexual violence as solely interpersonal and episodic to the broader institutional mechanisms of power and social control that produce sexual exploitation against youth under the carceral state. Centering carceral institutions as sites of endemic sexual violence further unearths crucial discrepancies between institutional claims of prioritizing children’s sexual safety “on the books” and gaslighting youth claims of sexual misconduct in everyday practice.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142805334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Most models of cultural globalization describe circulation to and around conventional cultural centers. The art world becomes more inclusive, but its fundamental hierarchies remain in place. In this paper, we describe another form of cultural globalization called “decentering”, which involves the circulation and increased interconnectedness between peripheries, either with or without their integration to cultural centers. Using a mixed methods approach, we examined the global circulation of artists from Argentina, Lebanon, and South Korea in the past 20 years (2000–2019). The results show their works circulated to a broader range of destinations, more rapidly than their early artistic cohorts, without necessarily passing through traditional art centers. This trend was particularly true for younger artists. We attribute the increasing prominence of decentering to three factors: (1) The mobility of early artists that enables later artists to gain recognition without physically migrating, (2) the role of vernacularizers, and (3) labeling as categorization. Our research contributes to understandings of cultural globalization by demonstrating how these factors broaden the geographies of the global contemporary art world and encourage more vibrant artistic circulation within and between peripheries.
{"title":"Migrating arts with (out) migrating artists: Decentering the global art world","authors":"Kangsan Lee, Peggy Levitt, Chantal Valdivia-Moreno","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae179","url":null,"abstract":"Most models of cultural globalization describe circulation to and around conventional cultural centers. The art world becomes more inclusive, but its fundamental hierarchies remain in place. In this paper, we describe another form of cultural globalization called “decentering”, which involves the circulation and increased interconnectedness between peripheries, either with or without their integration to cultural centers. Using a mixed methods approach, we examined the global circulation of artists from Argentina, Lebanon, and South Korea in the past 20 years (2000–2019). The results show their works circulated to a broader range of destinations, more rapidly than their early artistic cohorts, without necessarily passing through traditional art centers. This trend was particularly true for younger artists. We attribute the increasing prominence of decentering to three factors: (1) The mobility of early artists that enables later artists to gain recognition without physically migrating, (2) the role of vernacularizers, and (3) labeling as categorization. Our research contributes to understandings of cultural globalization by demonstrating how these factors broaden the geographies of the global contemporary art world and encourage more vibrant artistic circulation within and between peripheries.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142902258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why do foreign-born immigrant workers often concentrate in low-wage, minority-dense workplaces? Do immigrants’ native-born children—who typically acquire better language skills, education, and country-specific knowledge—experience improved access to workplaces in the mainstream economy? Using economy-wide linked employer–employee administrative data from Norway, we analyze both ethnic and economic workplace segregation across immigrant generations. We find that, on average, 32% of immigrants’ coworkers and 16% of second-generation immigrants’ coworkers have immigrant backgrounds, compared to 7% for natives. In terms of economic segregation, the average percentile rank of coworkers’ salaries is 36, 49, and 52 for immigrants, children of immigrants, and natives, respectively. A formal decomposition analysis shows that differences in employee, workplace, and residential location characteristics collectively explain 54–74% of ethnic and 79–84% of economic workplace segregation for immigrants and their children. Key factors driving this segregation in both immigrant generations include education, occupational attainment, industry of employment, having an immigrant manager, and the concentration of immigrant neighbors. This suggests that both skill-based sorting and network-related processes contribute to immigrant–native workplace segregation. However, children of immigrants’ improved access to less immigrant-dense and higher-paying workplaces, compared to immigrants, is primarily driven by differential skill-based sorting (i.e., higher education and shifts in occupation and industry placement). Our findings reveal a sharp decline in workplace segregation relative to natives as children of immigrants advance into the mainstream economy, highlighting the central role of assimilation in skill profiles for workplace integration across immigrant generations.
{"title":"Entering the mainstream economy? Workplace segregation and immigrant assimilation","authors":"Mats Lillehagen, Are Skeie Hermansen","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae162","url":null,"abstract":"Why do foreign-born immigrant workers often concentrate in low-wage, minority-dense workplaces? Do immigrants’ native-born children—who typically acquire better language skills, education, and country-specific knowledge—experience improved access to workplaces in the mainstream economy? Using economy-wide linked employer–employee administrative data from Norway, we analyze both ethnic and economic workplace segregation across immigrant generations. We find that, on average, 32% of immigrants’ coworkers and 16% of second-generation immigrants’ coworkers have immigrant backgrounds, compared to 7% for natives. In terms of economic segregation, the average percentile rank of coworkers’ salaries is 36, 49, and 52 for immigrants, children of immigrants, and natives, respectively. A formal decomposition analysis shows that differences in employee, workplace, and residential location characteristics collectively explain 54–74% of ethnic and 79–84% of economic workplace segregation for immigrants and their children. Key factors driving this segregation in both immigrant generations include education, occupational attainment, industry of employment, having an immigrant manager, and the concentration of immigrant neighbors. This suggests that both skill-based sorting and network-related processes contribute to immigrant–native workplace segregation. However, children of immigrants’ improved access to less immigrant-dense and higher-paying workplaces, compared to immigrants, is primarily driven by differential skill-based sorting (i.e., higher education and shifts in occupation and industry placement). Our findings reveal a sharp decline in workplace segregation relative to natives as children of immigrants advance into the mainstream economy, highlighting the central role of assimilation in skill profiles for workplace integration across immigrant generations.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142678466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Are the positions that protesters take—in favor or against change—consequential for their ability to affect policy? While previous research suggests that protests can inform legislative priorities and facilitate policy introduction, this paper emphasizes policy inaction and stasis as goals of some protest actions. Analysis uses novel and detailed data on energy-related protest and policy actions in Sweden covering a forty-year period and considers protest frequency and size in relation to proposal introduction. The research design uniquely distinguishes between protests in favor or against a specific energy source and proposal activity in line with those demands and also controls for public opinion on each energy source. Findings suggest that pro-renewable energy protests do not yield pro-renewable policies but prevent undesired policies that support non-renewable energy sources. In contrast to pro-renewable protests, protests against renewable energy sources are somewhat more influential. They likewise prevent the introduction of their undesired proposals and also influence the introduction of proposals supporting non-renewable energy sources. Overall, the paper examines policy inaction as a desired protest outcome and argues protest—as a tactic—may be more effective when pushing against rather than for policy change.
{"title":"Defenders of the status quo: energy protests and policy (in)action in Sweden","authors":"Katrin Uba, Cassandra Engeman","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae166","url":null,"abstract":"Are the positions that protesters take—in favor or against change—consequential for their ability to affect policy? While previous research suggests that protests can inform legislative priorities and facilitate policy introduction, this paper emphasizes policy inaction and stasis as goals of some protest actions. Analysis uses novel and detailed data on energy-related protest and policy actions in Sweden covering a forty-year period and considers protest frequency and size in relation to proposal introduction. The research design uniquely distinguishes between protests in favor or against a specific energy source and proposal activity in line with those demands and also controls for public opinion on each energy source. Findings suggest that pro-renewable energy protests do not yield pro-renewable policies but prevent undesired policies that support non-renewable energy sources. In contrast to pro-renewable protests, protests against renewable energy sources are somewhat more influential. They likewise prevent the introduction of their undesired proposals and also influence the introduction of proposals supporting non-renewable energy sources. Overall, the paper examines policy inaction as a desired protest outcome and argues protest—as a tactic—may be more effective when pushing against rather than for policy change.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142642553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The global housing affordability crisis and COVID shutdowns have put living space inequality back on the political agenda. Drawing on Durkheim’s theory of anomie and density, this paper argues that on how many square meters a society lives matters for how stable or anomic it develops. Using data from the Swiss Household Panel, we examine the selection, short-term, and dynamic effects associated with transitions to overcrowded and under-occupied dwellings. We conceptualize these transitions as disruptive events that require a reconfiguration of personal and social equilibria in individuals’ lives. While overcrowded housing leads to a heightening of emotional states and more tense internal household dynamics, people respond by adjusting their leisure activities and restructuring their support networks from strong to weak ties. Conversely, moving to an under-occupied dwelling is associated with melancholic emotional stabilization, but improves household balance and leads to consolidation of the core network of relatives at the expense of outer social circles. We conclude that the classical characterization of anomie as a mismatch between personal means and societal ends should be understood as a multifaceted phenomenon in which meso-level social networks can be a crucial means to cope with disruptions that arise at other levels.
{"title":"A room of one’s own? The consequences of living density on individual well-being and social anomie","authors":"Sinisa Hadziabdic, Sebastian Kohl","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae163","url":null,"abstract":"The global housing affordability crisis and COVID shutdowns have put living space inequality back on the political agenda. Drawing on Durkheim’s theory of anomie and density, this paper argues that on how many square meters a society lives matters for how stable or anomic it develops. Using data from the Swiss Household Panel, we examine the selection, short-term, and dynamic effects associated with transitions to overcrowded and under-occupied dwellings. We conceptualize these transitions as disruptive events that require a reconfiguration of personal and social equilibria in individuals’ lives. While overcrowded housing leads to a heightening of emotional states and more tense internal household dynamics, people respond by adjusting their leisure activities and restructuring their support networks from strong to weak ties. Conversely, moving to an under-occupied dwelling is associated with melancholic emotional stabilization, but improves household balance and leads to consolidation of the core network of relatives at the expense of outer social circles. We conclude that the classical characterization of anomie as a mismatch between personal means and societal ends should be understood as a multifaceted phenomenon in which meso-level social networks can be a crucial means to cope with disruptions that arise at other levels.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"117 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142610726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prior scholarship demonstrates that motherhood wage penalties and fatherhood wage premiums contribute to the gender pay gap. These analyses typically take a cross-sectional perspective, asking to what extent gender inequalities in the association between parenthood and wages can explain gender pay inequality for a given cohort or at a given moment in time. By contrast, explorations of gender pay convergence over time have tended to start at the firm’s door, testing the explanatory power of changes in men’s and women’s human capital and job characteristics and neglecting the contributions of fertility change. We bring these two strands of research together, asking to what extent declines 1980–2018 in US employees’ number of children can explain gender pay convergence over the same period. Using a descriptive decomposition and data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we show that, in gross terms, fertility decline can explain almost one-quarter of gender pay convergence from 1980 to 2018. Even net of a host of controls for human capital and job characteristics, fertility decline explains 8 percent of the attenuation of the US gender pay gap 1980–2018—about half as much as changes in education and about a quarter as much as changes in full-time work experience and job tenure combined. Finally, we show that employees’ fertility decline was fastest in the 1980s and subsequently slowed; this, in conjunction with persistent gender differences in parenthood–wage associations, helps explain stalled progress toward gender pay parity.
以往的研究表明，母亲的工资惩罚和父亲的工资溢价造成了性别薪酬差距。这些分析通常从横截面的角度出发，询问父母身份与工资之间的性别不平等在多大程度上可以解释特定队列或特定时刻的性别薪酬不平等。相比之下，随着时间的推移，对性别薪酬趋同性的探索往往从公司开始，检验男性和女性人力资本和工作特征变化的解释力，而忽视生育率变化的贡献。我们将这两方面的研究结合起来，询问 1980-2018 年美国雇员子女数量的下降在多大程度上可以解释同期的性别薪酬趋同。利用描述性分解和《收入动态面板研究》（Panel Study of Income Dynamics）的数据，我们表明，从总体上看，生育率下降可以解释 1980 年至 2018 年近四分之一的性别薪酬趋同。即使不考虑一系列人力资本和工作特征的控制因素，生育率下降也能解释 1980-2018 年美国性别薪酬差距 8% 的衰减--约为教育变化的一半，约为全职工作经验和工作年限变化总和的四分之一。最后，我们表明，雇员生育率的下降在 20 世纪 80 年代最快，随后放缓；这一点与父母身份-工资关联中持续存在的性别差异相结合，有助于解释在实现男女薪酬平等方面停滞不前的进展。
{"title":"Can fertility decline help explain gender pay convergence?","authors":"Alexandra Killewald, Nino José Cricco","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae153","url":null,"abstract":"Prior scholarship demonstrates that motherhood wage penalties and fatherhood wage premiums contribute to the gender pay gap. These analyses typically take a cross-sectional perspective, asking to what extent gender inequalities in the association between parenthood and wages can explain gender pay inequality for a given cohort or at a given moment in time. By contrast, explorations of gender pay convergence over time have tended to start at the firm’s door, testing the explanatory power of changes in men’s and women’s human capital and job characteristics and neglecting the contributions of fertility change. We bring these two strands of research together, asking to what extent declines 1980–2018 in US employees’ number of children can explain gender pay convergence over the same period. Using a descriptive decomposition and data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we show that, in gross terms, fertility decline can explain almost one-quarter of gender pay convergence from 1980 to 2018. Even net of a host of controls for human capital and job characteristics, fertility decline explains 8 percent of the attenuation of the US gender pay gap 1980–2018—about half as much as changes in education and about a quarter as much as changes in full-time work experience and job tenure combined. Finally, we show that employees’ fertility decline was fastest in the 1980s and subsequently slowed; this, in conjunction with persistent gender differences in parenthood–wage associations, helps explain stalled progress toward gender pay parity.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142563236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the gendered distribution of peer-ascribed status in schools. Using network data from more than 14,000 students in 676 classrooms, we explore gender differences in the ascription of status and the types of behavior rewarded with status. On average, girls receive slightly fewer status ascriptions than boys, and students tend to grant status more frequently within the same gender. Contextual analyses show that classroom demographics can moderate some of these patterns. We also uncover gender-specific differences and similarities in status-related behaviors. Notably, girls engaging in substance use are awarded with slightly more status ascriptions than boys. However, network models reveal that most behaviors affect peer status similarly for both genders, suggesting that previous findings of gender-behavioral differences based on regression analysis may be conflated with network processes. Our study updates long-held notions regarding gendered status orders in schools and highlights the value of a multidimensional approach to status processes. We discuss implications for future social network research on status ascriptions and other relational cognitions and consider how school-based interventions might benefit from our findings.
{"title":"Double standards in status ascriptions? The role of gender, behaviors, and social networks in status orders among adolescents","authors":"Mark Wittek, Xinwei Xu","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae145","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the gendered distribution of peer-ascribed status in schools. Using network data from more than 14,000 students in 676 classrooms, we explore gender differences in the ascription of status and the types of behavior rewarded with status. On average, girls receive slightly fewer status ascriptions than boys, and students tend to grant status more frequently within the same gender. Contextual analyses show that classroom demographics can moderate some of these patterns. We also uncover gender-specific differences and similarities in status-related behaviors. Notably, girls engaging in substance use are awarded with slightly more status ascriptions than boys. However, network models reveal that most behaviors affect peer status similarly for both genders, suggesting that previous findings of gender-behavioral differences based on regression analysis may be conflated with network processes. Our study updates long-held notions regarding gendered status orders in schools and highlights the value of a multidimensional approach to status processes. We discuss implications for future social network research on status ascriptions and other relational cognitions and consider how school-based interventions might benefit from our findings.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142536617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While prior research has widely acknowledged the consequences of specific family transitions (e.g., parental death, parenthood, grandparenthood) for individual wealth holdings, the interplay of multiple family transitions and positions occurring at different life stages and in various orderings has received little attention. This is despite the fact that these transitions and positions most likely jointly shape wealth accumulation, both in the shorter and longer run. We apply (1) sequence analysis to identify typical family life course clusters defined by the timing of the death of the parent generation, the timing of the transition into parenthood, and grandparenthood and (2) regression analysis to describe how the accumulation of wealth between ages 40 and 64 differs by family life course cluster. Using Norwegian register data of individuals born in 1953 (N = 47,945), we identified six clusters of family trajectories ranging from childless individuals to individuals who were sandwiched between their parents, children, and grandchildren because of relatively early (grand)parenthood and late parental death. Individuals experiencing patterns with a later transition into (grand)parenthood occupied stable and high wealth positions over time. Individuals without children exhibited a steady increase in their wealth position. Additionally, experiencing parental death later in life was associated with increasing wealth, whereas early parental death was not. These results held net of gender and education. Pronounced and even increasing wealth differences over the life course seem to be associated with the interplay of multiple family transitions.
{"title":"Intergenerational family life courses and wealth accumulation in Norway","authors":"Bettina Hünteler, Theresa Nutz, Jonathan Wörn","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae151","url":null,"abstract":"While prior research has widely acknowledged the consequences of specific family transitions (e.g., parental death, parenthood, grandparenthood) for individual wealth holdings, the interplay of multiple family transitions and positions occurring at different life stages and in various orderings has received little attention. This is despite the fact that these transitions and positions most likely jointly shape wealth accumulation, both in the shorter and longer run. We apply (1) sequence analysis to identify typical family life course clusters defined by the timing of the death of the parent generation, the timing of the transition into parenthood, and grandparenthood and (2) regression analysis to describe how the accumulation of wealth between ages 40 and 64 differs by family life course cluster. Using Norwegian register data of individuals born in 1953 (N = 47,945), we identified six clusters of family trajectories ranging from childless individuals to individuals who were sandwiched between their parents, children, and grandchildren because of relatively early (grand)parenthood and late parental death. Individuals experiencing patterns with a later transition into (grand)parenthood occupied stable and high wealth positions over time. Individuals without children exhibited a steady increase in their wealth position. Additionally, experiencing parental death later in life was associated with increasing wealth, whereas early parental death was not. These results held net of gender and education. Pronounced and even increasing wealth differences over the life course seem to be associated with the interplay of multiple family transitions.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142451378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research has demonstrated that couples have similar partisan preferences, a finding associated with political polarization. However, it remains debated to what extent different mechanisms contribute to this homogamy. Analyzing dyadic panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 1984–2020, we distinguish analytically between (1) direct political matching (i.e., partner selection on matching party preferences); (2) indirect political matching (i.e., social structural homogamy with political homogamy as a by-product); and (3) couples’ political alignment over time, to explain party preference similarity. First, we study matching among recently formed couples using an innovative method that compares real-world couples with three types of counterfactuals: couples that are matched (1) randomly, (2) by multidimensional social structural characteristics, and (3) by maximizing similarity in party preference. Second, we study couples’ political alignment over the course of relationships, tracking real-world couples over time and controlling for macro-level changes in the party-political landscape. Results indicate substantial political homogamy among recently formed couples, which is best explained by political matching (i.e., direct selection based on partisan preferences). Effects of social structural homogamy appear weak in comparison and rather stable across cohorts. Couples further align in their partisan preferences over time, but this effect is countered by an increasing heterogeneity of the German political landscape.
{"title":"Why do partners often prefer the same political parties? Evidence from couples in Germany","authors":"Ansgar Hudde, Daniela Grunow","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae133","url":null,"abstract":"Research has demonstrated that couples have similar partisan preferences, a finding associated with political polarization. However, it remains debated to what extent different mechanisms contribute to this homogamy. Analyzing dyadic panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 1984–2020, we distinguish analytically between (1) direct political matching (i.e., partner selection on matching party preferences); (2) indirect political matching (i.e., social structural homogamy with political homogamy as a by-product); and (3) couples’ political alignment over time, to explain party preference similarity. First, we study matching among recently formed couples using an innovative method that compares real-world couples with three types of counterfactuals: couples that are matched (1) randomly, (2) by multidimensional social structural characteristics, and (3) by maximizing similarity in party preference. Second, we study couples’ political alignment over the course of relationships, tracking real-world couples over time and controlling for macro-level changes in the party-political landscape. Results indicate substantial political homogamy among recently formed couples, which is best explained by political matching (i.e., direct selection based on partisan preferences). Effects of social structural homogamy appear weak in comparison and rather stable across cohorts. Couples further align in their partisan preferences over time, but this effect is countered by an increasing heterogeneity of the German political landscape.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142306402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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