Rising antisemitism in the twenty-first century has alarmed Jewish communities and the general public, but antisemitic hate crime victimization remains understudied outside the US context. This study primarily relies on a comprehensive survey of 16,400 Jews across twelve European countries, supplemented with data from additional sources, to assess individual and country-level predictors of Jews’ experiences and fears of antisemitic harassment and violence. Multilevel models indicate that young age, perceived discrimination, identity visibility, and identification with Israel are pronounced individual risk factors for victimization. On the country level, negative opinion of Israel and Muslim population share predict victimization, highlighting the role of a “new” or Israel-derived antisemitism in the twenty-first century. The factors most strongly associated with fear are young age, previous victimization, perceptions of an ambient antisemitic threat, and recent occurrence of fatal antisemitic violence. Overall, the findings underscore the importance of integrating general theory on hate crime and victimization with context-specific factors when seeking to understand the experiences of targeted groups.
{"title":"Facing antisemitism in Europe: individual and country-level predictors of Jews’ victimization and fear across twelve countries","authors":"Johannes Due Enstad","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae091","url":null,"abstract":"Rising antisemitism in the twenty-first century has alarmed Jewish communities and the general public, but antisemitic hate crime victimization remains understudied outside the US context. This study primarily relies on a comprehensive survey of 16,400 Jews across twelve European countries, supplemented with data from additional sources, to assess individual and country-level predictors of Jews’ experiences and fears of antisemitic harassment and violence. Multilevel models indicate that young age, perceived discrimination, identity visibility, and identification with Israel are pronounced individual risk factors for victimization. On the country level, negative opinion of Israel and Muslim population share predict victimization, highlighting the role of a “new” or Israel-derived antisemitism in the twenty-first century. The factors most strongly associated with fear are young age, previous victimization, perceptions of an ambient antisemitic threat, and recent occurrence of fatal antisemitic violence. Overall, the findings underscore the importance of integrating general theory on hate crime and victimization with context-specific factors when seeking to understand the experiences of targeted groups.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141462778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How do fathers adjust their working hours after the birth of their first child? Though the impact of childbirth on women’s employment is well-established, less is known about its effect on fathers. We investigate this question in the Netherlands (2006–2017), a country characterized by high prevalence of part-time work. We focus on two contexts that might shape the extent to which first-time fathers reduce their working hours after childbirth: the household and the organization. For this purpose, we use detailed longitudinal register data. The results reveal that men’s employment displays a high degree of stability around childbirth: even in the Dutch “part-time economy,” the vast majority of fathers remain full-time employed. We do find substantial heterogeneity in labor market responses after childbirth. Fathers earning relatively less than their partner pre-childbirth are more likely to scale down their working hours. The organizational gender composition is also associated with work hours reductions following childbirth. Although we find that fathers’ employment is contingent on both the household and organizational context, the substantial stability in men’s labor supply remains an obstacle to a more equal division of (un)paid labor.
{"title":"Fatherhood and men’s working hours in a part-time economy","authors":"Dieuwke Zwier, Matthijs Kalmijn, Thijs Bol","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae081","url":null,"abstract":"How do fathers adjust their working hours after the birth of their first child? Though the impact of childbirth on women’s employment is well-established, less is known about its effect on fathers. We investigate this question in the Netherlands (2006–2017), a country characterized by high prevalence of part-time work. We focus on two contexts that might shape the extent to which first-time fathers reduce their working hours after childbirth: the household and the organization. For this purpose, we use detailed longitudinal register data. The results reveal that men’s employment displays a high degree of stability around childbirth: even in the Dutch “part-time economy,” the vast majority of fathers remain full-time employed. We do find substantial heterogeneity in labor market responses after childbirth. Fathers earning relatively less than their partner pre-childbirth are more likely to scale down their working hours. The organizational gender composition is also associated with work hours reductions following childbirth. Although we find that fathers’ employment is contingent on both the household and organizational context, the substantial stability in men’s labor supply remains an obstacle to a more equal division of (un)paid labor.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141315675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper theorizes the interplay of public and organizational policies by investigating whether the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) shifted patterns of gender inequality within U.S. workplaces. Did this leave law increase women’s representation in positions of authority (moving more women into management jobs)? We argue that the impact of public policies will vary by organizational context, hypothesizing different effects by organizations’ points of departure—the corporate policies in place when public policy changes. Analyzing establishment-level panel data from approximately 800 U.S. private-sector establishments in 1990–1997, we found that women’s representation in managerial positions increased in the years immediately after the FMLA. Importantly, women’s representation in management increased the most in workplaces that provided more generous leave benefits even before the FMLA. The increase in managerial representation was most prominent for women of color. Consistent with relational inequality theory, these findings suggest that women may find it easier to make claims for leave and for career advancement when both legal and organizational policies lend legitimacy to their claims. More broadly, this study points to the need to explicitly evaluate how policy impacts vary by organizational norms and commitments.
{"title":"Points of departure: family leave policy and women’s representation in management in U.S. workplaces","authors":"Eunmi Mun, Shawna Vican, Erin L Kelly","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae080","url":null,"abstract":"This paper theorizes the interplay of public and organizational policies by investigating whether the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) shifted patterns of gender inequality within U.S. workplaces. Did this leave law increase women’s representation in positions of authority (moving more women into management jobs)? We argue that the impact of public policies will vary by organizational context, hypothesizing different effects by organizations’ points of departure—the corporate policies in place when public policy changes. Analyzing establishment-level panel data from approximately 800 U.S. private-sector establishments in 1990–1997, we found that women’s representation in managerial positions increased in the years immediately after the FMLA. Importantly, women’s representation in management increased the most in workplaces that provided more generous leave benefits even before the FMLA. The increase in managerial representation was most prominent for women of color. Consistent with relational inequality theory, these findings suggest that women may find it easier to make claims for leave and for career advancement when both legal and organizational policies lend legitimacy to their claims. More broadly, this study points to the need to explicitly evaluate how policy impacts vary by organizational norms and commitments.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141315624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates two concurrent trends across Europe and North America: the increasing instability of parental unions and men’s rising contributions to household work. Because children have almost universally resided with their mothers and it is difficult for non-residential fathers to maintain any levels of care work, union dissolutions have potentially slowed societal increases in gender equality. A new family form—50/50 living arrangements—has begun to challenge our understanding of the consequences of union dissolution. Since 50/50 residence requires fathers to take full care responsibility for the child half of the time—something few partnered fathers do—it may even push parents into a more egalitarian division of care work. We have studied care work using Swedish administrative data on parents’ leave from work to care for a sick child. We have created a panel of leave-sharing for children aged 2–11, and use an event-study design to estimate the causal effect of dissolution on the sharing of sick-child leave. The results show that in parental unions dissolving today, the dissolution leads to an increase in fathers’ share of sick-child leave. Whereas union dissolutions have for decades been slowing the gender revolution in Sweden, they are now accelerating it.
{"title":"Parental union dissolution and the gender revolution","authors":"Helen Eriksson, Martin Kolk","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae079","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates two concurrent trends across Europe and North America: the increasing instability of parental unions and men’s rising contributions to household work. Because children have almost universally resided with their mothers and it is difficult for non-residential fathers to maintain any levels of care work, union dissolutions have potentially slowed societal increases in gender equality. A new family form—50/50 living arrangements—has begun to challenge our understanding of the consequences of union dissolution. Since 50/50 residence requires fathers to take full care responsibility for the child half of the time—something few partnered fathers do—it may even push parents into a more egalitarian division of care work. We have studied care work using Swedish administrative data on parents’ leave from work to care for a sick child. We have created a panel of leave-sharing for children aged 2–11, and use an event-study design to estimate the causal effect of dissolution on the sharing of sick-child leave. The results show that in parental unions dissolving today, the dissolution leads to an increase in fathers’ share of sick-child leave. Whereas union dissolutions have for decades been slowing the gender revolution in Sweden, they are now accelerating it.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141187671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Popular explanations of inequality as the result of individual failings rather than structural processes are powerful cultural mechanisms that legitimize and reproduce inequality in the United States. How might individuals’ experiences of downward or upward mobility shape the explanations they give? We argue that perceived experiences of economic mobility may not only shape how Americans understand economic inequality but may also impact their beliefs about social inequalities more broadly. Using proportionally representative survey data of 1110 U.S. residents, we find that those who perceive that they currently occupy a lower economic class than when they were growing up (i.e., they experienced subjective downward mobility) were more likely than class-stable individuals to reject individualistic explanations of economic inequality and embrace structural ones. By contrast, the upwardly mobile were more likely to reject structural explanations. We find that mobility is similarly related to the likelihood of giving individualistic or structural explanations for race and gender inequality as well. Downward mobility is also associated with greater support of redistributive policies related to economic as well as gender and race inequality. These findings suggest that economic mobility may influence popular explanations of inequality and support for redistributive policy not only related to class inequality but for multiple axes of inequality.
{"title":"The View from Above and Below: Subjective Mobility and Explanations of Class, Race, and Gender Inequality","authors":"Sofia Hiltner, Erin A Cech","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae075","url":null,"abstract":"Popular explanations of inequality as the result of individual failings rather than structural processes are powerful cultural mechanisms that legitimize and reproduce inequality in the United States. How might individuals’ experiences of downward or upward mobility shape the explanations they give? We argue that perceived experiences of economic mobility may not only shape how Americans understand economic inequality but may also impact their beliefs about social inequalities more broadly. Using proportionally representative survey data of 1110 U.S. residents, we find that those who perceive that they currently occupy a lower economic class than when they were growing up (i.e., they experienced subjective downward mobility) were more likely than class-stable individuals to reject individualistic explanations of economic inequality and embrace structural ones. By contrast, the upwardly mobile were more likely to reject structural explanations. We find that mobility is similarly related to the likelihood of giving individualistic or structural explanations for race and gender inequality as well. Downward mobility is also associated with greater support of redistributive policies related to economic as well as gender and race inequality. These findings suggest that economic mobility may influence popular explanations of inequality and support for redistributive policy not only related to class inequality but for multiple axes of inequality.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141165189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scholars and policymakers are increasingly interested in subjective well-being as a development indicator. However, sociological research on this topic is quite limited, as is research that considers the effects of the biophysical environment on subjective well-being. In this study, we address these gaps in the literature by examining social and environmental influences on life satisfaction, a core component of subjective well-being. We employed multi-level regression analysis using data from over 97,000 individuals living across ninety-six countries. The results demonstrated significant effects of several individual-level variables on life satisfaction, in particular respondents’ satisfaction with their local air and water quality and the efforts being made to preserve the environment in their country, as well as numerous social variables, such as income, gender, and employment status. Among the country-level variables, national gross domestic product per capita was positively associated with higher individual life satisfaction. Income inequality had a negative effect on life satisfaction, while wealth inequality, on the other hand, had a positive effect, a surprising finding we contemplate in some detail. The carbon intensity of a nation’s economy as well as the proportion of a nation’s land in protected areas only influenced life satisfaction when not controlling for the other variables. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for sustainable development, including the promise of life satisfaction and other measures of subjective well-being as sustainable development indicators.
{"title":"Cross-National Social and Environmental Influences on Life Satisfaction","authors":"Mark Suchyta, Thomas Dietz, Kenneth A Frank","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae072","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars and policymakers are increasingly interested in subjective well-being as a development indicator. However, sociological research on this topic is quite limited, as is research that considers the effects of the biophysical environment on subjective well-being. In this study, we address these gaps in the literature by examining social and environmental influences on life satisfaction, a core component of subjective well-being. We employed multi-level regression analysis using data from over 97,000 individuals living across ninety-six countries. The results demonstrated significant effects of several individual-level variables on life satisfaction, in particular respondents’ satisfaction with their local air and water quality and the efforts being made to preserve the environment in their country, as well as numerous social variables, such as income, gender, and employment status. Among the country-level variables, national gross domestic product per capita was positively associated with higher individual life satisfaction. Income inequality had a negative effect on life satisfaction, while wealth inequality, on the other hand, had a positive effect, a surprising finding we contemplate in some detail. The carbon intensity of a nation’s economy as well as the proportion of a nation’s land in protected areas only influenced life satisfaction when not controlling for the other variables. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for sustainable development, including the promise of life satisfaction and other measures of subjective well-being as sustainable development indicators.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141085535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Social movement theory holds that disrupting social and political processes is among the most effective tools social movement organizations (SMOs) use to motivate recognition for themselves and their constituents. Yet, recent research suggests that the political reception of disruption is not racially neutral. Black SMOs face a dilemma in that, although disruption is a powerful tool for change, the public often perceives nonviolent Black disruptive protest as violent. We investigate this bind by analyzing how nondisruptive protest, nonviolent disruption, or violence helps or hinders both Black and non-Black SMOs to gain state “acceptance” as legitimate spokes-organizations for their issues. We combine data on newspaper-reported protest events with data covering 41,545 SMO Congressional testimonies from 1462 SMOs from 35 movement families. In panel regressions, we find that Congress is generally more accepting of nondisruptive protest but that nondisruptive protest is only roughly one-tenth as effective for Black SMOs compared with non-Black SMOs. Furthermore, whereas non-Black SMOs are significantly more likely to testify after using nonviolent disruption, Black SMOs using nonviolent disruption are significantly less likely to testify before Congress. Regardless of race, violence was associated with fewer congressional testimonies. Collectively, these findings suggest that Black SMOs face a tactical bind: Black SMOs can use nondisruptive tactics that are resource-intensive and slow, or they can use nonviolent disruption that gets media attention but hinders congressional acceptance. These findings contribute to a growing literature on how racial inequality and prejudice impact the outcomes of social movements.
社会运动理论认为，破坏社会和政治进程是社会运动组织（SMOs）用来促使自身及其支持者获得认可的最有效工具之一。然而，最近的研究表明，对破坏的政治接受并不是种族中立的。黑人社会运动组织（SMOs）面临着一个两难境地，即尽管破坏活动是变革的有力工具，但公众往往将非暴力的黑人破坏性抗议活动视为暴力活动。我们通过分析非破坏性抗议、非暴力破坏或暴力如何帮助或阻碍黑人和非黑人 SMO 获得国家 "认可"，成为其问题的合法代言组织，来研究这一困境。我们将报纸报道的抗议活动数据与来自 35 个运动家族的 1462 个 SMO 的 41545 份 SMO 国会证词数据相结合。在面板回归中，我们发现国会总体上更接受非破坏性抗议，但与非黑人 SMO 相比，黑人 SMO 的非破坏性抗议的效果大约只有后者的十分之一。此外，非黑人 SMO 在使用非暴力破坏手段后作证的可能性要大得多，而使用非暴力破坏手段的黑人 SMO 在国会作证的可能性要小得多。无论种族如何，暴力都与较少的国会作证有关。总之，这些研究结果表明，黑人SMO面临着战术上的束缚：黑人SMO可以使用非破坏性战术，这种战术需要大量资源，速度缓慢；或者他们可以使用非暴力破坏，这种战术会引起媒体关注，但会阻碍国会接受。这些发现为越来越多的关于种族不平等和偏见如何影响社会运动结果的文献做出了贡献。
{"title":"The Racial Limits of Disruption: How Race and Tactics Influence Social Movement Organization Testimony before Congress, 1960–1995","authors":"Thomas V Maher, Charles Seguin, Yongjun Zhang","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae073","url":null,"abstract":"Social movement theory holds that disrupting social and political processes is among the most effective tools social movement organizations (SMOs) use to motivate recognition for themselves and their constituents. Yet, recent research suggests that the political reception of disruption is not racially neutral. Black SMOs face a dilemma in that, although disruption is a powerful tool for change, the public often perceives nonviolent Black disruptive protest as violent. We investigate this bind by analyzing how nondisruptive protest, nonviolent disruption, or violence helps or hinders both Black and non-Black SMOs to gain state “acceptance” as legitimate spokes-organizations for their issues. We combine data on newspaper-reported protest events with data covering 41,545 SMO Congressional testimonies from 1462 SMOs from 35 movement families. In panel regressions, we find that Congress is generally more accepting of nondisruptive protest but that nondisruptive protest is only roughly one-tenth as effective for Black SMOs compared with non-Black SMOs. Furthermore, whereas non-Black SMOs are significantly more likely to testify after using nonviolent disruption, Black SMOs using nonviolent disruption are significantly less likely to testify before Congress. Regardless of race, violence was associated with fewer congressional testimonies. Collectively, these findings suggest that Black SMOs face a tactical bind: Black SMOs can use nondisruptive tactics that are resource-intensive and slow, or they can use nonviolent disruption that gets media attention but hinders congressional acceptance. These findings contribute to a growing literature on how racial inequality and prejudice impact the outcomes of social movements.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"127 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140961565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
School integration is an important indicator of equality of opportunity and racial reconciliation in contemporary South Africa. Despite its prominence in public and political discourse, however, there is no systemic evidence on the levels and patterns of school segregation. Drawing on the literature on the post-apartheid political settlement and sociological theories of opportunity hoarding, we explain how the small White minority and, to a lesser extent, the new Black middle class monopolized access to South Africa’s most prestigious schools following the abolition of de jure segregation in 1994. Using the 2021 Annual School Survey—an administrative dataset covering all South African schools—and the 2019 Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study school survey, we find very high levels of school segregation along racial as well as socioeconomic lines. White students almost exclusively attend former White schools, have little exposure to the low-income Black majority, and are vastly overrepresented in elite public and private schools. We argue that in South Africa and other contexts with under-resourced education systems, elite capture of the few high-performing schools serves to reproduce race and class privilege.
{"title":"Opportunity Hoarding and Elite Reproduction: School Segregation in Post-Apartheid South Africa","authors":"Rob J Gruijters, Benjamin Elbers, Vijay Reddy","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae070","url":null,"abstract":"School integration is an important indicator of equality of opportunity and racial reconciliation in contemporary South Africa. Despite its prominence in public and political discourse, however, there is no systemic evidence on the levels and patterns of school segregation. Drawing on the literature on the post-apartheid political settlement and sociological theories of opportunity hoarding, we explain how the small White minority and, to a lesser extent, the new Black middle class monopolized access to South Africa’s most prestigious schools following the abolition of de jure segregation in 1994. Using the 2021 Annual School Survey—an administrative dataset covering all South African schools—and the 2019 Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study school survey, we find very high levels of school segregation along racial as well as socioeconomic lines. White students almost exclusively attend former White schools, have little exposure to the low-income Black majority, and are vastly overrepresented in elite public and private schools. We argue that in South Africa and other contexts with under-resourced education systems, elite capture of the few high-performing schools serves to reproduce race and class privilege.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"107 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140819992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The etiology of psychological differences among those who pursue distinct lines of work have long been of scholarly interest. A prevalent early and continuing assumption is that experiences on the job influence psychological development; contemporary analysts focus on dimensions indicative of mental health. Still, such work-related psychological differences may instead be attributable to selection processes to the extent that individuals can choose, or be selected to, different lines of work, based on their prior characteristics. Whereas much attention has been directed to employment per se as a key determinant of mental health, we consider work status (employed or not) and hours of work, as well as work quality, including both intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions among those who are employed. We also investigate differences in the effects of work experiences on mental health in distinct phases of the work career. Drawing on eleven waves of longitudinal data obtained from a cohort of ninth grade students followed prospectively to age 45–46 (54% female; 73% white), we examine whether key psychological dimensions indicative of mental health (mastery, depressive affect, and self-esteem) change in response to employment and to particular experiences on the job. The findings, based on a fixed-effects modeling strategy, indicate that observed psychological differences related to employment and work quality are not attributable to stable individual proclivities. Evidence suggests that mental health is responsive to changing experiences at work from mid-adolescence to mid-life.
{"title":"Work Experience and Mental Health from Adolescence to Mid-Life","authors":"Jeremy Staff, Jeylan T Mortimer","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae067","url":null,"abstract":"The etiology of psychological differences among those who pursue distinct lines of work have long been of scholarly interest. A prevalent early and continuing assumption is that experiences on the job influence psychological development; contemporary analysts focus on dimensions indicative of mental health. Still, such work-related psychological differences may instead be attributable to selection processes to the extent that individuals can choose, or be selected to, different lines of work, based on their prior characteristics. Whereas much attention has been directed to employment per se as a key determinant of mental health, we consider work status (employed or not) and hours of work, as well as work quality, including both intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions among those who are employed. We also investigate differences in the effects of work experiences on mental health in distinct phases of the work career. Drawing on eleven waves of longitudinal data obtained from a cohort of ninth grade students followed prospectively to age 45–46 (54% female; 73% white), we examine whether key psychological dimensions indicative of mental health (mastery, depressive affect, and self-esteem) change in response to employment and to particular experiences on the job. The findings, based on a fixed-effects modeling strategy, indicate that observed psychological differences related to employment and work quality are not attributable to stable individual proclivities. Evidence suggests that mental health is responsive to changing experiences at work from mid-adolescence to mid-life.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"117 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140637608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public discourse has become more polarized, especially when it comes to moral issues. Moral issues related to gender and sexuality—particularly concerning children—are politically fraught. To assess the extent to which ideologies about gender and parenting are polarized, we interviewed eighty-five gender activists from diverse political orientations. Surprisingly, we found some convergence in how activists on the political left and right discussed gender and parenting. Specifically, those on the right endorsed some traditionally progressive ideas, including that girls should be able to play with “boy toys” and to aspire to traditionally male pursuits. Meanwhile, in affirming children’s right to express their gender identity, those on the left treated gender identity as innate, an idea traditionally associated with conservatives, while saying little about sexism. These similarities, notwithstanding, we also found important differences between how these two groups discussed gender socialization. We discuss the implications of these different approaches and how caregivers and other adults can reconcile a commitment to affirming children’s gender identity while also addressing gender inequalities.
{"title":"Following a Child’s Lead and Setting Kids Up for Success: Convergence and Divergence in Parenting Ideologies on the Political Right and Left","authors":"Mallory E Rees, Abigail C Saguy","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae069","url":null,"abstract":"Public discourse has become more polarized, especially when it comes to moral issues. Moral issues related to gender and sexuality—particularly concerning children—are politically fraught. To assess the extent to which ideologies about gender and parenting are polarized, we interviewed eighty-five gender activists from diverse political orientations. Surprisingly, we found some convergence in how activists on the political left and right discussed gender and parenting. Specifically, those on the right endorsed some traditionally progressive ideas, including that girls should be able to play with “boy toys” and to aspire to traditionally male pursuits. Meanwhile, in affirming children’s right to express their gender identity, those on the left treated gender identity as innate, an idea traditionally associated with conservatives, while saying little about sexism. These similarities, notwithstanding, we also found important differences between how these two groups discussed gender socialization. We discuss the implications of these different approaches and how caregivers and other adults can reconcile a commitment to affirming children’s gender identity while also addressing gender inequalities.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140622895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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