While studies show that public opinion and educational workshops promoted by nonprofits affect judicial behavior, it remains unclear whether and how social movements affect judges’ decision-making through disruptive actions. I develop a framework to explain the conditions under which and the mechanisms through which social movement mobilization affects the decision-making of judges, drawing on a mixed-methods study of anti-corruption protests in Brazil. I constructed an original dataset of decisions of corruption cases at the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (2003–2016). Results showed that actions that target judicial cases (case-focused protests)—but not protests that simply put the issue on the public agenda—are associated with higher chances that judges will decide in ways that are aligned with the movements’ demands. I supplemented this data with a qualitative analysis of appeals on two investigations of similar crimes and some of the same defendants but with different outcomes in appellate courts: Sandcastle (Castelo de Areia) and Car Wash (Lava Jato). Drawing on 110 interviews with prosecutors and judges and document analysis of criminal charges and judicial decisions, I show that case-focused protests affect judicial behavior through two mechanisms: by threatening the personal reputation of judges and the legitimacy of courts.
虽然研究表明，非营利组织推动的舆论和教育研讨会会影响司法行为，但社会运动是否以及如何通过破坏性行动影响法官的决策仍不清楚。我借鉴对巴西反腐败抗议活动的混合方法研究，建立了一个框架来解释社会运动动员影响法官决策的条件和机制。我构建了巴西高等法院腐败案件判决的原始数据集（2003-2016 年）。结果显示，以司法案件为目标的行动（以案件为重点的抗议），而非仅仅将该问题提上公共议程的抗议，与法官以符合运动要求的方式做出判决的可能性相关联。作为对上述数据的补充，我还对两起上诉案件的上诉情况进行了定性分析，这两起案件涉及类似的犯罪和一些相同的被告，但上诉法院的判决结果却不同：沙堡案（Castelo de Areia）和洗车案（Lava Jato）。通过对检察官和法官的 110 次访谈，以及对刑事指控和司法判决的文件分析，我发现以案件为中心的抗议会通过两种机制影响司法行为：威胁法官的个人声誉和法院的合法性。
{"title":"A Social Movement Model for Judicial Behavior: Evidence from Brazil’s Anti-Corruption Movements","authors":"Luiz Vilaça","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae065","url":null,"abstract":"While studies show that public opinion and educational workshops promoted by nonprofits affect judicial behavior, it remains unclear whether and how social movements affect judges’ decision-making through disruptive actions. I develop a framework to explain the conditions under which and the mechanisms through which social movement mobilization affects the decision-making of judges, drawing on a mixed-methods study of anti-corruption protests in Brazil. I constructed an original dataset of decisions of corruption cases at the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (2003–2016). Results showed that actions that target judicial cases (case-focused protests)—but not protests that simply put the issue on the public agenda—are associated with higher chances that judges will decide in ways that are aligned with the movements’ demands. I supplemented this data with a qualitative analysis of appeals on two investigations of similar crimes and some of the same defendants but with different outcomes in appellate courts: Sandcastle (Castelo de Areia) and Car Wash (Lava Jato). Drawing on 110 interviews with prosecutors and judges and document analysis of criminal charges and judicial decisions, I show that case-focused protests affect judicial behavior through two mechanisms: by threatening the personal reputation of judges and the legitimacy of courts.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"110 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140622858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Largely overlooked in research on criminal legal expansion is the rise of political polarization and its attendant consequences for crime policy. Drawing on theories of intergroup collaboration and policymaking research, I argue that network polarization—low frequencies of collaborative relations between lawmakers belonging to distinct political groups—negatively affects crime legislation passage by reducing information flows, increasing intergroup hostility, and creating opportunities for political attacks. To evaluate this perspective, I recreate dynamic legislative networks between 1979 and 2005 using data on 1,897,019 cosponsorship relationships between 1537 federal lawmakers and the outcomes of 5950 federal crime bills. Results illustrate that increases in partisan network segregation and the number of densely clustered subgroups both have negative effects on bill passage. These relationships are not moderated by majority party status and peak during the 1990s and early 2000s, a period when prison growth showed its first signs of slowing. These findings provide new insight to the relationship between polarization and policy and suggest that increases in network polarization may be partly responsible for declines in crime policy adoption observed in recent decades.
{"title":"“The Ties that Bind are those that Punish: Network Polarization and Federal Crime Policy Gridlock, 1979–2005”","authors":"Scott W Duxbury","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae052","url":null,"abstract":"Largely overlooked in research on criminal legal expansion is the rise of political polarization and its attendant consequences for crime policy. Drawing on theories of intergroup collaboration and policymaking research, I argue that network polarization—low frequencies of collaborative relations between lawmakers belonging to distinct political groups—negatively affects crime legislation passage by reducing information flows, increasing intergroup hostility, and creating opportunities for political attacks. To evaluate this perspective, I recreate dynamic legislative networks between 1979 and 2005 using data on 1,897,019 cosponsorship relationships between 1537 federal lawmakers and the outcomes of 5950 federal crime bills. Results illustrate that increases in partisan network segregation and the number of densely clustered subgroups both have negative effects on bill passage. These relationships are not moderated by majority party status and peak during the 1990s and early 2000s, a period when prison growth showed its first signs of slowing. These findings provide new insight to the relationship between polarization and policy and suggest that increases in network polarization may be partly responsible for declines in crime policy adoption observed in recent decades.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"100 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140622864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The rise of precarious work generates important questions about how this mode of employment might affect young workers’ transition to adulthood, particularly their decision to live independently. Existing demographic literature has considered the impact of unemployment on parental coresidence but overlooked the potential influence of precarious employment. Yet, features of precarious employment might matter for young adults’ residential arrangements. Our paper provides a theoretical framework linking precarious work to parental coresidence. Specifically, we outline three mechanisms that underlie this relationship: low pay, meager benefits, and short job tenure. Using longitudinal data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth from 2005 to 2017, we provide empirical support for our model. We found that precariously employed young adults are more likely than their peers in standard jobs to live with their parents. About a third of this effect can be accounted for by the three theorized mechanisms. Our research contributes to the growing literature demonstrating the impact of economic insecurity on the workplace and family, the two essential arenas of social life.
不稳定工作的兴起产生了一些重要问题，即这种就业模式会如何影响年轻工人向成年的过渡，特别是他们决定独立生活。现有的人口文献考虑了失业对父母共同生活的影响，但忽略了不稳定就业的潜在影响。然而，不稳定就业的特点可能会对年轻人的居住安排产生影响。我们的论文提供了一个将不稳定工作与父母共同居住联系起来的理论框架。具体来说，我们概述了支撑这种关系的三个机制：低薪、微薄的福利和较短的工作年限。利用 2005 年至 2017 年全国青年纵向调查（National Longitudinal Survey of Youth）的纵向数据，我们为我们的模型提供了实证支持。我们发现，与从事标准工作的同龄人相比，就业不稳定的年轻人更有可能与父母同住。这种影响的大约三分之一可以用三个理论机制来解释。越来越多的文献表明，经济不稳定会对工作场所和家庭这两个社会生活的重要领域产生影响，我们的研究为这些文献做出了贡献。
{"title":"Precarious Transitions: How Precarious Employment Shapes Parental Coresidence among Young Adults","authors":"Lei Lei, Quan D Mai","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae050","url":null,"abstract":"The rise of precarious work generates important questions about how this mode of employment might affect young workers’ transition to adulthood, particularly their decision to live independently. Existing demographic literature has considered the impact of unemployment on parental coresidence but overlooked the potential influence of precarious employment. Yet, features of precarious employment might matter for young adults’ residential arrangements. Our paper provides a theoretical framework linking precarious work to parental coresidence. Specifically, we outline three mechanisms that underlie this relationship: low pay, meager benefits, and short job tenure. Using longitudinal data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth from 2005 to 2017, we provide empirical support for our model. We found that precariously employed young adults are more likely than their peers in standard jobs to live with their parents. About a third of this effect can be accounted for by the three theorized mechanisms. Our research contributes to the growing literature demonstrating the impact of economic insecurity on the workplace and family, the two essential arenas of social life.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140622867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While the progress of the knowledge economy is inexorable, this paper argues that partisan politics and labor market institutions can affect the direction in which the knowledge economy progresses. In particular, a combination of corporatist industrial relations systems and left partisanship tends to foster greater wage restraint, and such a wage outcome tends to encourage the greater adoption of communications technology than information-processing technology in the economy. This reorientation of the knowledge economy toward communications technology, in turn, has egalitarian distributive implications. In particular, the greater adoption of communications technology reduces wage inequality across the board in lower 90–10, 50–10, as well as 90–50 wage ratios. These arguments are tested using data across 15–21 OECD countries (1970–2015).
{"title":"Left Partisanship, Corporatism, and the Reorientation of the Knowledge Economy in Advanced Capitalist Societies","authors":"Jingjing Huo","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae048","url":null,"abstract":"While the progress of the knowledge economy is inexorable, this paper argues that partisan politics and labor market institutions can affect the direction in which the knowledge economy progresses. In particular, a combination of corporatist industrial relations systems and left partisanship tends to foster greater wage restraint, and such a wage outcome tends to encourage the greater adoption of communications technology than information-processing technology in the economy. This reorientation of the knowledge economy toward communications technology, in turn, has egalitarian distributive implications. In particular, the greater adoption of communications technology reduces wage inequality across the board in lower 90–10, 50–10, as well as 90–50 wage ratios. These arguments are tested using data across 15–21 OECD countries (1970–2015).","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140196126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stephanie Ternullo, Ángela Zorro-Medina, Robert Vargas
Classic models of urban inequality acknowledge the importance of politics for resource distribution and service provision. Yet, contemporary studies of spatial inequality rarely measure politics directly. In this paper, we introduce political dynasties as a way of integrating political economy approaches with ecological theory to better understand the political construction of urban spatial inequality. To do so, we examine the case of political dynasties within the Chicago city council. We show that, from 2011 to 2018, blocks in dynastic wards saw fewer homicides, assaults, robberies, and thefts relative to those in non-dynastic wards. We then leverage the 2015 ward redistricting to provide evidence that dynastic effects play some role in producing these outcomes: blocks annexed into dynastic wards experienced a decline in assaults and robberies and an increase in pothole coverings. While dynastic politicians improve outcomes for blocks they annex, they also withdraw power from those they displace; and displaced blocks had relatively higher levels of crime than annexed blocks in 2015. Taken together, our findings provide evidence that dynastic politicians are contributing to spatial inequalities within Chicago.
{"title":"How Political Dynasties Concentrate Advantage within Cities: Evidence from Crime and City Services in Chicago","authors":"Stephanie Ternullo, Ángela Zorro-Medina, Robert Vargas","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae029","url":null,"abstract":"Classic models of urban inequality acknowledge the importance of politics for resource distribution and service provision. Yet, contemporary studies of spatial inequality rarely measure politics directly. In this paper, we introduce political dynasties as a way of integrating political economy approaches with ecological theory to better understand the political construction of urban spatial inequality. To do so, we examine the case of political dynasties within the Chicago city council. We show that, from 2011 to 2018, blocks in dynastic wards saw fewer homicides, assaults, robberies, and thefts relative to those in non-dynastic wards. We then leverage the 2015 ward redistricting to provide evidence that dynastic effects play some role in producing these outcomes: blocks annexed into dynastic wards experienced a decline in assaults and robberies and an increase in pothole coverings. While dynastic politicians improve outcomes for blocks they annex, they also withdraw power from those they displace; and displaced blocks had relatively higher levels of crime than annexed blocks in 2015. Taken together, our findings provide evidence that dynastic politicians are contributing to spatial inequalities within Chicago.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140114597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
To modernize public service delivery, U.S. communities increasingly rely on 311 systems for residents to request government services. Research on 311 systems is relatively new, and there is mixed evidence on whether 311 can help bridge the gap between disadvantaged communities and governments. This study draws from research on immigration, race/ethnicity, and differential engagement to explore the link between immigrant concentration and 311 usage. We use longitudinal data on 311 requests in Baltimore City, Maryland (2014–2019) and spatial panel regression analysis to show that neighborhood racial/ethnic structure and the national policy environment can significantly influence whether immigrant concentration is a barrier for 311 service-seeking. Specifically, we find that immigrant concentration reduces 311 requests in high-immigrant neighborhoods with Latino or Black concentration, but not in high-immigrant neighborhoods with White/Asian concentration. We also find that in Latino high-immigrant neighborhoods, the relationship between immigrant concentration and 311 requests appears mainly after 2017, when the federal government adopted hostile immigration policies. By establishing and contextualizing the relationship between immigrant concentration and 311 usage, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of civic participation and the connection between immigrant communities and government.
{"title":"Are High-Immigrant Neighborhoods Disadvantaged in Seeking Local Government Services? Evidence from Baltimore City, Maryland","authors":"Min Xie, David McDowall, Sean Houlihan","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae030","url":null,"abstract":"To modernize public service delivery, U.S. communities increasingly rely on 311 systems for residents to request government services. Research on 311 systems is relatively new, and there is mixed evidence on whether 311 can help bridge the gap between disadvantaged communities and governments. This study draws from research on immigration, race/ethnicity, and differential engagement to explore the link between immigrant concentration and 311 usage. We use longitudinal data on 311 requests in Baltimore City, Maryland (2014–2019) and spatial panel regression analysis to show that neighborhood racial/ethnic structure and the national policy environment can significantly influence whether immigrant concentration is a barrier for 311 service-seeking. Specifically, we find that immigrant concentration reduces 311 requests in high-immigrant neighborhoods with Latino or Black concentration, but not in high-immigrant neighborhoods with White/Asian concentration. We also find that in Latino high-immigrant neighborhoods, the relationship between immigrant concentration and 311 requests appears mainly after 2017, when the federal government adopted hostile immigration policies. By establishing and contextualizing the relationship between immigrant concentration and 311 usage, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of civic participation and the connection between immigrant communities and government.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"83 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140114498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article utilizes the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to demonstrate how disadvantages in healthy life expectancies accumulated across generations create disparate kin structures among African American families in the United States. The analysis quantifies the overlap in parents’ healthy years with their adult children’s healthy life expectancies and examines how much the overlap coincides with the adult children’s childrearing years. Non-Hispanic Black adults experienced parental illness and death sooner than non-Hispanic White adults, and their parents’ poor health coincided longer with their own health declines. Non-Hispanic White adults, on the other hand, enjoyed more years in good health with two healthy parents. The intergenerational accumulation of unequal healthy life expectancies directly translated into unequal kin structures for the subsequent third generation. Race inequities in the intergenerational kin structure and health were greater among women than among men, and non-Hispanic Black women spent the most years raising children in poor health with unhealthy or deceased parents. Disparities in the intergenerational tempos of fertility, mortality, and morbidity are building profound structural racial inequities within a fundamental social institution—the family.
本文利用《收入动态面板研究》（Panel Study of Income Dynamics）来说明，在美国的非裔美国人家庭中，跨代积累的健康预期寿命方面的劣势是如何造成不同的亲属结构的。分析量化了父母的健康预期寿命与成年子女健康预期寿命的重叠程度，并考察了重叠程度与成年子女育儿期的吻合程度。非西班牙裔黑人成人比非西班牙裔白人成人更早经历父母的疾病和死亡，他们父母的健康状况不佳与他们自身健康状况下降的时间更长。另一方面，非西班牙裔白人成年人在父母健康的情况下，享受健康的年限更长。不平等的健康预期寿命的代际积累直接转化为随后第三代不平等的亲属结构。与男性相比，女性在代际亲属结构和健康方面的种族不平等更大，非西班牙裔黑人女性抚养子女的年数最多，她们的父母不健康或已故。生育率、死亡率和发病率的代际节奏差异正在一个基本的社会机构--家庭--内形成深刻的结构性种族不平等。
{"title":"Structural Disadvantages to the Kin Network from Intergenerational Racial Health Inequities","authors":"Heeju Sohn","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae032","url":null,"abstract":"This article utilizes the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to demonstrate how disadvantages in healthy life expectancies accumulated across generations create disparate kin structures among African American families in the United States. The analysis quantifies the overlap in parents’ healthy years with their adult children’s healthy life expectancies and examines how much the overlap coincides with the adult children’s childrearing years. Non-Hispanic Black adults experienced parental illness and death sooner than non-Hispanic White adults, and their parents’ poor health coincided longer with their own health declines. Non-Hispanic White adults, on the other hand, enjoyed more years in good health with two healthy parents. The intergenerational accumulation of unequal healthy life expectancies directly translated into unequal kin structures for the subsequent third generation. Race inequities in the intergenerational kin structure and health were greater among women than among men, and non-Hispanic Black women spent the most years raising children in poor health with unhealthy or deceased parents. Disparities in the intergenerational tempos of fertility, mortality, and morbidity are building profound structural racial inequities within a fundamental social institution—the family.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140064330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gender and racial pay penalties are well-known: women (of all races) and people of color (of all genders) earn less, on average, even when they gain access to occupations historically reserved for White men. Studies of social mobility show that people from working-class backgrounds in the US have also been excluded from top professional and managerial occupations. But do working-class-origin people who attain top US jobs face a class-origin pay penalty? Despite evidence of class-origin pay gaps in higher professional and managerial occupations elsewhere, we might expect that the central role of race and racism in US stratification processes, along with the relatively low salience of class identities, would render class origins irrelevant to earnings in exclusive occupations, at least within racial groups. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to link childhood class position to adult occupation and earnings, we describe the racial and class-origin composition of different high-status occupations and the earnings of people within them. We show that when people who are from working-class backgrounds are upwardly mobile into high-status occupations, they earn almost $20,000 per year less, on average, than individuals who are themselves from privileged backgrounds. The difference is partly explained by the upwardly mobile being less likely to have college degrees, but it remains substantial (around $11,700) even after accounting for education, race and other important predictors of earnings. The gap is largest among White people; there is a class-origin penalty in top US occupations that is distinct from the racial pay gap.
性别和种族薪酬惩罚是众所周知的：女性（所有种族）和有色人种（所有性别）的平均收入较低，即使她们获得了历史上专属于白人男性的职业。对社会流动性的研究表明，美国工人阶级出身的人也被排除在顶级专业和管理职业之外。但是，获得美国顶尖工作的工人阶级出身的人是否会面临阶级出身的薪酬惩罚呢？尽管有证据表明，在其他地方的高级专业和管理职业中存在阶级出身的薪酬差距，但我们可能会认为，种族和种族主义在美国分层过程中的核心作用，以及相对较低的阶级身份显著性，会使阶级出身与专属职业的收入无关，至少在种族群体内部是如此。我们利用《收入动态面板研究》（Panel Study of Income Dynamics）将童年时期的阶级地位与成年后的职业和收入联系起来，描述了不同高地位职业的种族和阶级出身构成以及这些职业中人们的收入情况。我们的研究表明，当工人阶级出身的人向上流动进入高地位职业时，他们的年收入平均比出身优越的人少将近 2 万美元。造成这种差距的部分原因是上进阶层拥有大学学位的可能性较低，但即使考虑到教育、种族和其他重要的收入预测因素，这种差距仍然很大（约 11,700 美元）。这种差距在白人中最大；在美国的顶级职业中，存在着不同于种族薪酬差距的阶级出身惩罚。
{"title":"The Class Ceiling in the United States: Class-Origin Pay Penalties in Higher Professional and Managerial Occupations","authors":"Daniel Laurison, Sam Friedman","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae025","url":null,"abstract":"Gender and racial pay penalties are well-known: women (of all races) and people of color (of all genders) earn less, on average, even when they gain access to occupations historically reserved for White men. Studies of social mobility show that people from working-class backgrounds in the US have also been excluded from top professional and managerial occupations. But do working-class-origin people who attain top US jobs face a class-origin pay penalty? Despite evidence of class-origin pay gaps in higher professional and managerial occupations elsewhere, we might expect that the central role of race and racism in US stratification processes, along with the relatively low salience of class identities, would render class origins irrelevant to earnings in exclusive occupations, at least within racial groups. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to link childhood class position to adult occupation and earnings, we describe the racial and class-origin composition of different high-status occupations and the earnings of people within them. We show that when people who are from working-class backgrounds are upwardly mobile into high-status occupations, they earn almost $20,000 per year less, on average, than individuals who are themselves from privileged backgrounds. The difference is partly explained by the upwardly mobile being less likely to have college degrees, but it remains substantial (around $11,700) even after accounting for education, race and other important predictors of earnings. The gap is largest among White people; there is a class-origin penalty in top US occupations that is distinct from the racial pay gap.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140015604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In response to women’s changing roles in labor markets, couples have adopted varied strategies to reconcile career and family needs. Yet, most studies on the gendered division of labor focus almost exclusively on changes either in work or family domain. Doing so neglects the process through which couples negotiate and contest traditional work and family responsibilities. Studies that do examine these tradeoffs have highlighted how work–family strategies range far beyond simple traditional-egalitarian dichotomies but are limited to specific points in time or population subgroups. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and latent-class analysis, this article provides the first population-based estimates of the couple-level tradeoffs inherent in work–family strategies in the United States, documents trends in the share of couples who fall into each of these strategies, and considers social stratification by gender and college education in these trends. Specifically, I identify seven distinct work–family strategies (traditional, neotraditional, her-second-shift, egalitarian, his-second-shift, female-breadwinner, and neither-full-time couples). Egalitarian couples experienced the fastest increase in prevalence among college-educated couples, whereas couples that lacked two full-time earners increased among less-educated couples. Still, about a quarter of all couples adopted “her-second-shift” strategies, with no variation across time, making it the modal work–family strategy among dual-earner couples. The long-run, couple-level results support the view that the gender revolution has stalled and suggest that this stall may be caused partly by strong traditional gender preferences, whereas structural resources appear to facilitate gender equality among a selected few.
为了应对妇女在劳动力市场中不断变化的角色，夫妻双方采取了各种策略来协调事业和家庭的需要。然而，大多数关于性别分工的研究几乎只关注工作或家庭领域的变化。这样做忽视了夫妻对传统工作和家庭责任进行协商和争论的过程。考察这些权衡的研究强调了工作与家庭策略的范围如何远远超出了简单的传统-平等二分法，但却局限于特定的时间点或人口亚群。本文利用《收入动态面板研究》（Panel Study of Income Dynamics）的数据和潜在阶层分析，首次以人口为基础对美国工作-家庭策略中夫妇层面的内在权衡进行了估算，记录了属于每种工作-家庭策略的夫妇所占比例的变化趋势，并考虑了这些变化趋势中的性别和大学教育等社会分层因素。具体而言，我确定了七种不同的工作-家庭策略（传统型、新传统型、她-二班制、平等型、他-二班制、女性面包赢家和非全职夫妻）。在受过大学教育的夫妇中，平等主义夫妇的比例增长最快，而在受教育程度较低的夫妇中，缺少两个全职收入者的夫妇比例有所上升。尽管如此，大约四分之一的夫妇采取了 "她-第二班 "策略，而且在不同时期没有变化，这使得 "她-第二班 "策略成为双职工夫妇中最常见的工作-家庭策略。夫妻层面的长期结果支持了性别革命已经停滞的观点，并表明这种停滞可能部分是由强烈的传统性别偏好造成的，而结构性资源似乎促进了少数特定人群的性别平等。
{"title":"Gender Equality for Whom? The Changing College Education Gradients of the Division of Paid Work and Housework Among US Couples, 1968–2019","authors":"Léa Pessin","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae028","url":null,"abstract":"In response to women’s changing roles in labor markets, couples have adopted varied strategies to reconcile career and family needs. Yet, most studies on the gendered division of labor focus almost exclusively on changes either in work or family domain. Doing so neglects the process through which couples negotiate and contest traditional work and family responsibilities. Studies that do examine these tradeoffs have highlighted how work–family strategies range far beyond simple traditional-egalitarian dichotomies but are limited to specific points in time or population subgroups. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and latent-class analysis, this article provides the first population-based estimates of the couple-level tradeoffs inherent in work–family strategies in the United States, documents trends in the share of couples who fall into each of these strategies, and considers social stratification by gender and college education in these trends. Specifically, I identify seven distinct work–family strategies (traditional, neotraditional, her-second-shift, egalitarian, his-second-shift, female-breadwinner, and neither-full-time couples). Egalitarian couples experienced the fastest increase in prevalence among college-educated couples, whereas couples that lacked two full-time earners increased among less-educated couples. Still, about a quarter of all couples adopted “her-second-shift” strategies, with no variation across time, making it the modal work–family strategy among dual-earner couples. The long-run, couple-level results support the view that the gender revolution has stalled and suggest that this stall may be caused partly by strong traditional gender preferences, whereas structural resources appear to facilitate gender equality among a selected few.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"170 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140015700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When commercial real estate becomes a highly coveted investment commodity, tensions intensify between those whose interest lies in extracting maximum profits from their properties and those who utilize the very same spaces for making a livelihood. Through ethnographic research with a tenant shopkeepers’ social movement organization (SMO) in Korea, I analyze the new collective consciousness forming among tenant shopkeepers who are defending their livelihoods against their landlords’ rapacious use of rent hikes and evictions to fully realize the speculative potential of their properties. Examining how the SMO brings together geographically scattered tenant shopkeepers based primarily in the larger metropolitan area of Seoul, I ask, more broadly: How can the self-employed facing precaritization overcome their fragmentation and generate a new collective consciousness based on a politics of solidarity? Drawing from my case study of tenant shopkeepers and the literature on livelihood struggles elsewhere around the globe, I identify the practice of occupying livelihood spaces as playing a pivotal role in the development of a sense of collective among those previously atomized in their struggles. I advance existing scholarship by scrutinizing both the challenges and the transformative potential of the solidarity cultivated through the occupy sites in bridging divergent interests, cultural sensibilities, and political beliefs of the previously unorganized.
当商业地产成为令人垂涎的投资商品时，那些希望从其房产中获取最大利润的人与那些利用这些空间谋生的人之间的紧张关系就会加剧。通过对韩国一个租户店主社会运动组织（SMO）的人种学研究，我分析了租户店主之间正在形成的新的集体意识，他们正在捍卫自己的生计，抵制房东为充分发挥其房产的投机潜力而采取的涨租和驱逐等贪婪手段。通过考察 SMO 如何将主要位于首尔大都会区、地理位置分散的租户店主聚集在一起，我提出了一个更广泛的问题：面临不稳定的自营职业者如何才能克服各自为政的状况，并在团结政治的基础上形成新的集体意识？根据我对租户店主的案例研究以及有关全球其他地方生计斗争的文献，我发现占据生计空间的做法在发展那些以前在斗争中被孤立的人的集体意识方面发挥了关键作用。我仔细研究了通过占领场所培养的团结精神在弥合以往无组织者的不同利益、文化情感和政治信仰方面所面临的挑战和变革潜力，从而推进了现有的学术研究。
{"title":"Occupying Shops to Defend Spaces of Livelihoods: From Tenant Shopkeepers’ Fragmentation to Collective Consciousness in Urban Korea","authors":"Yewon Andrea Lee","doi":"10.1093/sf/soae026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soae026","url":null,"abstract":"When commercial real estate becomes a highly coveted investment commodity, tensions intensify between those whose interest lies in extracting maximum profits from their properties and those who utilize the very same spaces for making a livelihood. Through ethnographic research with a tenant shopkeepers’ social movement organization (SMO) in Korea, I analyze the new collective consciousness forming among tenant shopkeepers who are defending their livelihoods against their landlords’ rapacious use of rent hikes and evictions to fully realize the speculative potential of their properties. Examining how the SMO brings together geographically scattered tenant shopkeepers based primarily in the larger metropolitan area of Seoul, I ask, more broadly: How can the self-employed facing precaritization overcome their fragmentation and generate a new collective consciousness based on a politics of solidarity? Drawing from my case study of tenant shopkeepers and the literature on livelihood struggles elsewhere around the globe, I identify the practice of occupying livelihood spaces as playing a pivotal role in the development of a sense of collective among those previously atomized in their struggles. I advance existing scholarship by scrutinizing both the challenges and the transformative potential of the solidarity cultivated through the occupy sites in bridging divergent interests, cultural sensibilities, and political beliefs of the previously unorganized.","PeriodicalId":48400,"journal":{"name":"Social Forces","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140015681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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