Journal of Accounting Research最新文献

We provide the first evidence that conflicts of interest arising from commercial ties lead to bias in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings. Using the acquisitions of Vigeo Eiris and RobecoSAM by Moody's and S&P as shocks to the commercial ties between ESG rating agencies and their rated firms, we show that, after their acquisitions by the credit rating agencies (CRAs), ESG rating agencies issue higher ratings to existing paying clients of the CRAs. This effect is greater for firms that have more intensive business relationships with the CRAs, but weaker for firms with more transparent ESG disclosures or higher long-term institutional ownership. The upwardly biased ESG ratings help client firms issue more green bonds and enable the CRAs to maintain credit rating business. Finally, the upwardly biased ESG ratings are less informative of future ESG news. Overall, the business incentives of rating providers appear to engender ESG rating bias.

Patent applications often reveal proprietary information to competitors, but does such disclosure harm firms or also benefit them? We develop and empirically support a theory showing that when firms patent enhancements to incumbent, nondisruptive technologies, they can cooperate more easily on these technologies, increasing their profitability. The downside of cooperating on nondisruptive technologies is that the investment in and commitment to disruptive technologies decline. To improve their commitment to disruptive technologies, some firms rely more on trade secrecy. We provide empirical support for these predictions. We document that after a patent reform that made information about patent applications widely accessible, firms cooperate more and charge higher markups. Furthermore, the nature of patented innovation has changed, with the proportion of nondisruptive patents increasing substantially. Finally, while some firms start patenting more, others patent less and rely more on trade secrecy, with the response depending on the attractiveness of firms' innovation prospects.

This paper studies whether firms opportunistically make proprietary claims in mandatory environmental disclosure programs with trade secret exemption rules. Examining the mandatory chemical disclosure program in the fracking industry, I find evidence of opportunistic withholding of information among operators that are less likely to have trade secrets. Specifically, I find that these operators claim fewer chemicals as trade secrets when the operating site is in close proximity to water quality monitors. This is only observed among publicly traded operators that face a higher cost of societal backlash when disclosing pollutant information. Further analyses suggest that these operators are concerned about external environmental monitoring, which deters them from opportunistic information withholding. Regarding public and private operators that are more likely to have trade secrets, I do not find strong evidence that their information withholding varies with the monitoring conditions.

We provide prevalence estimates for five forms of earnings manipulation based on executives’ reports about their firms’ actual reporting practices. After preregistering our methods and analyses via the Journal of Accounting Research’s registration-based editorial process, we recruit nearly a thousand executives from firms listed in the Russell 3000 Index to participate in either a survey or a list experiment; the hallmark of the latter being additional privacy protections designed to promote honest disclosure about self-incriminating information. In our survey, 26.8% of executives disclose at least one form of earnings manipulation at their firm in the 2018–2023 period: 18.0% report changing an operational activity to meet a near-term earnings target at the expense of long-term value (i.e., real earnings management), 8.8% report intentionally obfuscating unfavorable information, 6.6% report manipulating accruals, 3.9% report withholding material information, and 0.0% report accounting fraud. Our list experiment produces an economically higher result in two cases, estimating that 29.9% of firms engaged in real earnings management and 12.4% committed accounting fraud over the same time period. We conclude that while a traditional survey can provide credible lower-bound estimates for the prevalence of many forms of earnings manipulation, list experiments encourage more honest disclosure in some cases.