Journal of Accounting Research最新文献

Hematopoietic and lymphoid tumors are a heterogeneous group of diseases including lymphomas, multiple myeloma (MM), and leukemias. These diseases are associated with systemic involvement and various clinical presentations including acute neurological deficits. Adult patients with hematologic malignancies (HM) are at risk for developing a wide array of acute conditions involving the nervous system. HM in adults may present as tumoral masses responsible for mass effect, possibly resulting in acute neurological signs and symptoms caused by tumor growth with compression of central nervous system (CNS) structures. Moreover, as result of the hematologic disease itself or due to systemic treatments, hematologic patients are at risk for vascular pathologies, such as ischemic, thrombotic, and hemorrhagic disorders due to the abnormal coagulation status. The onset of these disorders is often with acute neurologic signs or symptoms. Lastly, it is well known that patients with HM can have impaired function of the immune system. Thus, CNS involvement due to immune-related diseases such as mycotic, parasitic, bacterial, and viral infections linked to immunodeficiency, together with immune reconstitution inflammatory syndrome, are frequently seen in hematologic patients. Knowledge of the etiology and expected CNS imaging findings in patients with HM is of great importance to reach a fast and correct diagnosis and guide treatment choices. In this manuscript, we review the computed tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance findings of these conditions which can be related to the disease itself and/or to their treatments.

Can culture explain regional differences in minority shareholder expropriation? Examining regional variation in China, we document that the influence of historical Confucian values persists, despite decades of political movements clamping down on these values, and that these values reduce minority shareholder expropriation in local public firms. The effect on minority shareholder expropriation, in part, operates through the establishment of oversight mechanisms (i.e., greater financial reporting quality and dividend payouts) that constrain expropriation. The findings have important implications for understanding the origins of enduring regional differences in minority shareholder expropriation and capital market development.

We use an agency model to address the benefits and costs of transparency in a hierarchical organization in which the principal employs a manager entrusted with contracting authority and several workers, all under conditions of moral hazard. We define the principal's transparency choices as a decision to allow workers to observe their coworkers’ performances (observability) and as an investment in monitoring worker performance (precision). We find that whereas precision alleviates agency conflicts as expected, observability can exacerbate agency conflicts, especially if the manager's interests are misaligned sufficiently with those of the principal. Our results suggest several testable hypotheses including predictions that opaque performance measurement practices are well suited for small organizational units at lower hierarchical ranks, and in settings where the sensitivity-precision of the available measures is low, workers’ performances are correlated positively, and managerial productivity is modest.

GAAP provisions in loan contracts specify how to address the effect of accounting changes on financial covenants. I document a pronounced upward trend in and the dominance of frozen-on-request (FOR) GAAP provisions, which incorporate accounting changes unless either the borrower or the lender requests a freeze. FOR GAAP streamlines the process of incorporating accounting changes into covenant calculations by obviating the need for renegotiations and prevents opportunistic GAAP freezes by requiring good faith renegotiations. Therefore, FOR GAAP is more likely to incorporate accounting changes beneficial to covenant informativeness, leading to lower false positives (i.e., Type I errors of financial covenant violations) and false negatives (i.e., Type II errors of financial covenant violations). Based on a large sample of loan contracts, I find that FOR GAAP decreases false positives and false negatives after controlling for self-selection bias and that the decrease is more pronounced when accounting changes relevant to financial covenants are more significant. My study provides new evidence of the role accounting standards and GAAP provisions play in debt contracting efficiency.