Journal of Accounting Research最新文献

We investigate the impact of observing peers’ information acquisition on financial analysts’ allocation of attention. Using the timely disclosure mandate by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a setting, we find that, shortly after analysts observe that a firm has been visited by peer analysts, they reduce short-term attention to that firm, as indicated by a reduced tendency to conduct follow-up visits. Nonvisiting analysts who do not conduct follow-up visits are more likely to discontinue coverage of the visited firm. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that the timely disclosure reveals the first-mover advantage of visiting analysts, leading nonvisiting ones to reallocate their limited attention. We also find that, compared with the pre-mandate period, the information environments of visited firms deteriorate immediately after an analyst's visit but not over the longer term. Further evidence suggests that the timely disclosure mandate has positive externalities in the form of increased immediate attention to and improved short-term information environments of unvisited peer firms.

I study how the disclosure of the liquidity coverage ratio mandated for a group of systemically important U.S. banks affects peer banks' liquidity holdings. I predict that the disclosure mitigates uncertainty about aggregate liquidity risk by providing insight into the likelihood of market-wide liquidity shocks and specific sources of liquidity stress. This uncertainty resolution, in turn, reduces nondisclosing banks' precautionary demand for liquidity. Using bank business interactions to measure the treatment intensity of the disclosure, I find that more treated nondisclosing banks cut their liquidity significantly more in response to the disclosure. In addition, the disclosure rule was followed by lower overall liquidity and a build-up of systemic risk, indicating an economically considerable disclosure spillover effect in the aggregate. My paper reveals a new economic force, the spillover effect of mandated liquidity disclosure, that shapes banks' liquidity holdings.

Upward influencers, employees who are more favorably perceived by their supervisors than their peers and subordinates, are predicted by economic and accounting theories and are found to be ubiquitous in many organizations. Despite their prevalence, the role of upward influencers in teams remains underexplored. This paper fills this void by using proprietary data from a service-providing organization that allows for the identification of upward influencers based on its 360-degree person evaluation. We find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the fraction of upward influencers in a team and team performance. In cross-sectional analyses, we show that this relationship is driven by conditions when the need for collaboration and information sharing is high and when managers are less experienced. Additional tests exploring the mechanisms for the role of upward influencers in teams suggest that they impair team horizontal relationships through lowering the willingness to communicate, share knowledge, and offer mutual assistance among team members. Yet, teams with upward influencers build better vertical relationships with supervisors, which, in return, is associated with supervisors allocating more of their time to provide team members with feedback and guidance. Taken together, this study contributes to the understanding of upward influencers in teams.

This paper investigates how U.S. private firms communicate with investors around private securities offerings. Using multiple research methods including survey, interview, and archival analysis, I provide systematic evidence on private firms' public and private disclosure practices. I find that despite engaging in a low level of public disclosures, private firms actively communicate with investors through private communication channels, with notable variation across firms in terms of content and frequency. Consistent with managers providing relevant information, financial information is disclosed when it is particularly useful for investors' decision-making. Furthermore, I explore the relation between private communication and public disclosure preferences and find a substitutive effect, suggesting that private firms may strategically manage communication channels to effectively engage with investors. This study contributes to the literature by describing the existing disclosure landscape of private firms.

We introduce the idea of cross-regulatory disclosure avoidance, whereby firms attempt to counteract expansions of disclosure under one regulation through actions that reduce disclosure under a different one. We study whether firms redact information from material contracts when they face new rules to disclose segment information. Using SFAS No. 131 as a plausibly exogenous shock to segment disclosure, we find that firms increasing the number of reported segments after the rule change exhibit a greater increase in redaction than firms maintaining the same number of segments. Consistent with proprietary cost motives, the increases are concentrated among firms with greater divergence in profitability across segments, higher abnormal segment profitability, and more negative abnormal stock returns in response to the finalization of the rule. Also, treated firms that redact after the rule change have abnormally profitable segments that they previously did not disclose. Firms that observables predict would increase redaction but did not experience declines in sales growth and profit margin. We find no evidence that agency cost motives drive the increases in redaction or, more generally, nondisclosure of segment performance before SFAS No. 131.

We estimate the prevalence and drivers of short squeezes after short-selling attacks. Positive returns after attacks have a disproportionate tendency to fully reverse and are accompanied by heightened short covering, consistent with the presence of short squeezes. We assess and find no support for non-squeeze drivers of these positive return reversals and show they are more likely to be accompanied by squeeze-related news articles, increased stock volatility, and disruptions in the stock lending market. Using positive return reversals as a proxy for short squeezes, we estimate that 15% of short attacks experience squeezes, and squeeze risk increases with short sellers’ visibility but decreases with the credibility of their evidence. Additionally, squeezes appear to be precipitated by actions of firms and investors, including insider purchases, share recalls, retail investor trading, and firm disclosures. Our findings quantify a material risk and check on activist short selling and are especially timely given recent proposed short-selling restrictions.