Pub Date : 2025-02-21DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106090
Greta Arancia Sanna, David Lagnado
This paper investigates the process of belief updating in the presence of contradictory and potentially misleading information, focusing on the impact of source reliability. Across four experiments, we examined how individuals revise their beliefs when confronted with retracted information and varying source credibility. Experiment 1 revealed that participants discounted retracted information and reverted to their prior beliefs, in contrast to the Continued Influence Effect commonly reported in the literature. Experiment 2 demonstrated that source reliability significantly influences belief updating: reliable sources led participants to discount initial allegations more effectively than unreliable sources. Experiments 3 and 4 examined how people update their beliefs given opposing sources of differing reliability; we found that participants appropriately incorporated source reliability and penalised sources that were corrected, regardless of the corrector's reliability. Additionally, in contrast to previous research, both trustworthiness and expertise contributed to judgments of source reliability. Our results resolve some of the mixed findings in previous research, and highlight that individuals' belief updating are rationally sensitive to differences in source reliability. Our findings have broad implications for correcting misinformation in political, medical, and other applied contexts, and further underscore the need to ground misinformation correction strategies in robust psychological research.
{"title":"Belief updating in the face of misinformation: The role of source reliability","authors":"Greta Arancia Sanna, David Lagnado","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106090","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106090","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the process of belief updating in the presence of contradictory and potentially misleading information, focusing on the impact of source reliability. Across four experiments, we examined how individuals revise their beliefs when confronted with retracted information and varying source credibility. Experiment 1 revealed that participants discounted retracted information and reverted to their prior beliefs, in contrast to the Continued Influence Effect commonly reported in the literature. Experiment 2 demonstrated that source reliability significantly influences belief updating: reliable sources led participants to discount initial allegations more effectively than unreliable sources. Experiments 3 and 4 examined how people update their beliefs given opposing sources of differing reliability; we found that participants appropriately incorporated source reliability and penalised sources that were corrected, regardless of the corrector's reliability. Additionally, in contrast to previous research, both trustworthiness and expertise contributed to judgments of source reliability. Our results resolve some of the mixed findings in previous research, and highlight that individuals' belief updating are rationally sensitive to differences in source reliability. Our findings have broad implications for correcting misinformation in political, medical, and other applied contexts, and further underscore the need to ground misinformation correction strategies in robust psychological research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"258 ","pages":"Article 106090"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143464662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-21DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106088
Laura J. Batterink, Sarah Hsiung, Daniela Herrera-Chaves, Stefan Köhler
The sensory input that we encounter while navigating through each day is highly structured, containing patterns that repeat over time. Statistical learning is the process of becoming attuned to these patterns and can facilitate online processing. These online facilitation effects are often ascribed to prediction, in which information about an upcoming event is represented before it occurs. However, previously observed facilitation effects could also be due to retrospective processing. Here, using a speech-based segmentation paradigm, we tested whether statistical learning leads to the prediction of upcoming syllables. Specifically, we probed for a behavioural hallmark of genuine prediction, in which a given prediction benefits online processing when confirmed, but incurs costs if disconfirmed. In line with the idea that prediction is a key outcome of statistical learning, we found a trade-off in which a greater benefit for processing predictable syllables was associated with a greater cost in processing syllables that occurred in a “mismatch” context, outside of their expected positions. This trade-off in making predictions was evident at both the participant and the item (i.e., individual syllable) level. Further, we found that prediction did not emerge indiscriminately to all syllables in the input stream, but was deployed selectively according to the trial-by-trial demands of the task. Explicit knowledge of a given word was not required for prediction to occur, suggesting that prediction operates largely implicitly. Overall, these results provide novel behavioural evidence that prediction arises as a natural consequence of statistical learning.
{"title":"Implicit prediction as a consequence of statistical learning","authors":"Laura J. Batterink, Sarah Hsiung, Daniela Herrera-Chaves, Stefan Köhler","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106088","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106088","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The sensory input that we encounter while navigating through each day is highly structured, containing patterns that repeat over time. Statistical learning is the process of becoming attuned to these patterns and can facilitate online processing. These online facilitation effects are often ascribed to prediction, in which information about an upcoming event is represented before it occurs. However, previously observed facilitation effects could also be due to retrospective processing. Here, using a speech-based segmentation paradigm, we tested whether statistical learning leads to the prediction of upcoming syllables. Specifically, we probed for a behavioural hallmark of genuine prediction, in which a given prediction benefits online processing when confirmed, but incurs costs if disconfirmed. In line with the idea that prediction is a key outcome of statistical learning, we found a trade-off in which a greater benefit for processing predictable syllables was associated with a greater cost in processing syllables that occurred in a “mismatch” context, outside of their expected positions. This trade-off in making predictions was evident at both the participant and the item (i.e., individual syllable) level. Further, we found that prediction did not emerge indiscriminately to all syllables in the input stream, but was deployed selectively according to the trial-by-trial demands of the task. Explicit knowledge of a given word was not required for prediction to occur, suggesting that prediction operates largely implicitly. Overall, these results provide novel behavioural evidence that prediction arises as a natural consequence of statistical learning.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"258 ","pages":"Article 106088"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143464609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-21DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106089
Lucile Meunier-Duperray , Audrey Mazancieux , Céline Souchay , Stephen M. Fleming , Christine Bastin , Chris J.A. Moulin , Lucie Angel
According to previous research, the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in aging depends on the cognitive domain involved in the task, the experimental design, and the metacognitive index used. Older adults are frequently less accurate than younger adults in judging their episodic memory, while no difference is typically observed for semantic metamemory. In addition, age-related changes in metaperception appear to be highly task-dependent. Other metacognitive domains (such as metacognition of executive functioning) have been seldom explored. This study aimed to integrate methodological and theoretical advances in the study of metacognition to answer the question of whether metacognition is impaired in healthy aging. Data were collected in a large sample (n = 443) of participants aged 18 to 79. Participants provided retrospective confidence judgments in four domains: episodic memory, semantic memory, executive functioning, and visual perception. Our measure of accuracy, metacognitive efficiency, was estimated using a hierarchical Bayesian implementation of the meta-d’ model. Results showed that metacognitive efficiency decreased with age in the episodic task and increased with age in the semantic task. There was no effect of age on metacognitive efficiency in the executive and perception tasks. Moreover, metacognitive efficiency appeared to rely on a domain-general process in older adults. Explaining the episodic metamemory deficit in aging could help understand the difficulties of older adults to use inferential processes for memory search and retrieval as well as their difficulties to implement memory strategies.
{"title":"Does age affect metacognition? A cross-domain investigation using a hierarchical Bayesian framework","authors":"Lucile Meunier-Duperray , Audrey Mazancieux , Céline Souchay , Stephen M. Fleming , Christine Bastin , Chris J.A. Moulin , Lucie Angel","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106089","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106089","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>According to previous research, the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in aging depends on the cognitive domain involved in the task, the experimental design, and the metacognitive index used. Older adults are frequently less accurate than younger adults in judging their episodic memory, while no difference is typically observed for semantic metamemory. In addition, age-related changes in metaperception appear to be highly task-dependent. Other metacognitive domains (such as metacognition of executive functioning) have been seldom explored. This study aimed to integrate methodological and theoretical advances in the study of metacognition to answer the question of whether metacognition is impaired in healthy aging. Data were collected in a large sample (<em>n</em> = 443) of participants aged 18 to 79. Participants provided retrospective confidence judgments in four domains: episodic memory, semantic memory, executive functioning, and visual perception. Our measure of accuracy, metacognitive efficiency, was estimated using a hierarchical Bayesian implementation of the meta-<em>d’</em> model. Results showed that metacognitive efficiency decreased with age in the episodic task and increased with age in the semantic task. There was no effect of age on metacognitive efficiency in the executive and perception tasks. Moreover, metacognitive efficiency appeared to rely on a domain-general process in older adults. Explaining the episodic metamemory deficit in aging could help understand the difficulties of older adults to use inferential processes for memory search and retrieval as well as their difficulties to implement memory strategies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"258 ","pages":"Article 106089"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143452922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-20DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106086
Matthew H.C. Mak , Lewis V. Ball , Alice O'Hagan , Catherine R. Walsh , M. Gareth Gaskell
Recent experience with a word significantly influences its subsequent interpretation. For instance, encountering bank in a river-related context biases future interpretations toward ‘side of a river’ (vs. ‘financial bank’). To explain this effect, the episodic context account posits that episodic memory helps bind word meanings in the language input, creating a temporary, context-specific representation that can bias subsequent lexical interpretation. This account predicts that even unrelated words would be linked together in episodic memory, potentially altering their interpretation. In Experiments 1–3, participants read unrelated word pairs (e.g., sword—microwave, privacy—export) embedded in meaningful sentences, then completed a speeded relatedness judgement task after delays of 5 min, 20 min, or 12 h (including sleep). Results showed that sentence exposure increased the likelihood of the unrelated pairs being judged as related—a robust effect observed across all delay intervals. Experiment 4 showed that this exposure effect was abolished when words in a target pair were read in separate sentences, suggesting that the exposure effect may be dependent on lexical co-occurrence. Experiment 5, also with a 12-h delay (including sleep), additionally used an innovative word arrangement task to assess word relatedness without presenting the target pairs simultaneously or successively. In line with relatedness judgement, sentence exposure pushed the unrelated words closer in semantic space. Overall, our findings suggest that a context-specific representation, supported by episodic memory, is generated during language comprehension, and in turn, these representations can influence lexical interpretation for at least 12 h and across different linguistic circumstances. We argue that these representations endow the mental lexicon with the efficiency to deal with word burstiness and the dynamic nature of language.
{"title":"Involvement of episodic memory in language comprehension: Naturalistic comprehension pushes unrelated words closer in semantic space for at least 12 h","authors":"Matthew H.C. Mak , Lewis V. Ball , Alice O'Hagan , Catherine R. Walsh , M. Gareth Gaskell","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106086","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106086","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Recent experience with a word significantly influences its subsequent interpretation. For instance, encountering <em>bank</em> in a river-related context biases future interpretations toward ‘side of a river’ (vs. ‘financial bank’). To explain this effect, the <em>episodic context</em> account posits that episodic memory helps bind word meanings in the language input, creating a temporary, context-specific representation that can bias subsequent lexical interpretation. This account predicts that even <em>unrelated</em> words would be linked together in episodic memory, potentially altering their interpretation. In Experiments 1–3, participants read unrelated word pairs (e.g., <em>sword—microwave</em>, <em>privacy—export</em>) embedded in meaningful sentences, then completed a speeded relatedness judgement task after delays of 5 min, 20 min, or 12 h (including sleep). Results showed that sentence exposure increased the likelihood of the unrelated pairs being judged as related—a robust effect observed across all delay intervals. Experiment 4 showed that this exposure effect was abolished when words in a target pair were read in separate sentences, suggesting that the exposure effect may be dependent on lexical co-occurrence. Experiment 5, also with a 12-h delay (including sleep), additionally used an innovative word arrangement task to assess word relatedness without presenting the target pairs simultaneously or successively. In line with relatedness judgement, sentence exposure pushed the unrelated words closer in semantic space. Overall, our findings suggest that a context-specific representation, supported by episodic memory, is generated during language comprehension, and in turn, these representations can influence lexical interpretation for at least 12 h and across different linguistic circumstances. We argue that these representations endow the mental lexicon with the efficiency to deal with word burstiness and the dynamic nature of language.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"258 ","pages":"Article 106086"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143452921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-20DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106083
Xiuyuan Zhang , Samuel D. McDougle , Julia A. Leonard
Decades of research have shown that skill learning often unfolds exponentially — people improve rapidly early on, and then performance gradually levels off. Given how important expectations of learning are for actual learning, we explored whether people accurately intuit this canonical time course of skill learning. Across six preregistered experiments (n = 500), we find that people correctly predict that skill learning curves (error reductions over time) on a novel visuomotor task will follow an exponential decay function, both for an imagined naïve player and for themselves, before engaging with the task. Moreover, people are sensitive to conditions that merit exponential learning within a bounded time frame and only predict these curves when an imagined player puts in effort and the task is not too difficult. However, people systematically misestimate specific parameters of skill learning (e.g., initial and average performance, and rate of improvement), which relates to reduced affect at the beginning of learning. Critically, these negative effects can be ameliorated by practice: Providing people with minimal practice reduces their prediction errors and, in turn, buffers them from negative feelings at the beginning of learning.
{"title":"People accurately predict the shape but not the parameters of skill learning curves","authors":"Xiuyuan Zhang , Samuel D. McDougle , Julia A. Leonard","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106083","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106083","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Decades of research have shown that skill learning often unfolds exponentially — people improve rapidly early on, and then performance gradually levels off. Given how important expectations of learning are for actual learning, we explored whether people accurately intuit this canonical time course of skill learning. Across six preregistered experiments (<em>n</em> = 500), we find that people correctly predict that skill learning curves (error reductions over time) on a novel visuomotor task will follow an exponential decay function, both for an imagined naïve player and for themselves, before engaging with the task. Moreover, people are sensitive to conditions that merit exponential learning within a bounded time frame and only predict these curves when an imagined player puts in effort and the task is not too difficult. However, people systematically misestimate specific parameters of skill learning (e.g., initial and average performance, and rate of improvement), which relates to reduced affect at the beginning of learning. Critically, these negative effects can be ameliorated by practice: Providing people with minimal practice reduces their prediction errors and, in turn, buffers them from negative feelings at the beginning of learning.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"258 ","pages":"Article 106083"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143445875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-18DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106085
Fatih Bayrak , Vahdet Sümer , Burak Dogruyol , S. Adil Saribay , Sinan Alper , Ozan Isler , Onurcan Yilmaz
Recent research indicates a generally negative relationship between reflection and conspiracy beliefs. However, most of the existing research relies on correlational data on WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) populations. The few existing experimental studies are limited by weak manipulation techniques that fail to reliably activate cognitive reflection. Hence, questions remain regarding (1) the consistency of the negative relationship between conspiracy beliefs and cognitive reflection, (2) the extent of cross-cultural variation and potential moderating factors, and (3) the presence of a causal link between cognitive reflection and conspiracy beliefs. In two preregistered studies, we investigated the association between cognitive reflection and conspiracy beliefs. First, we studied the correlation between two variables across 48 cultures and investigated whether factors such as WEIRDness and narcissism (personal and collective) moderate this relationship. In the second study, we tested the causal effect of reflection using a reliable and effective manipulation technique—debiasing training—on both generic and specific conspiracy beliefs. The first study confirmed the negative association between reflection and belief in conspiracy theories across cultures, with the association being notably stronger in non-WEIRD societies. Both personal and collective narcissism played significant moderating roles. The second study demonstrated that debiasing training significantly decreases both generic and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs in a non-WEIRD context, with more pronounced effects for general conspiracy beliefs. Our research supports that reflection is a consistent cross-cultural predictor of conspiracy beliefs and that activating reflection can reduce such beliefs through rigorous experimental interventions.
{"title":"Reflection predicts and leads to decreased conspiracy belief","authors":"Fatih Bayrak , Vahdet Sümer , Burak Dogruyol , S. Adil Saribay , Sinan Alper , Ozan Isler , Onurcan Yilmaz","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106085","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106085","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Recent research indicates a generally negative relationship between reflection and conspiracy beliefs. However, most of the existing research relies on correlational data on WEIRD (<u>W</u>estern, <u>E</u>ducated, <u>I</u>ndustrialized, <u>R</u>ich, <u>D</u>emocratic) populations. The few existing experimental studies are limited by weak manipulation techniques that fail to reliably activate cognitive reflection. Hence, questions remain regarding (1) the consistency of the negative relationship between conspiracy beliefs and cognitive reflection, (2) the extent of cross-cultural variation and potential moderating factors, and (3) the presence of a causal link between cognitive reflection and conspiracy beliefs. In two preregistered studies, we investigated the association between cognitive reflection and conspiracy beliefs. First, we studied the correlation between two variables across 48 cultures and investigated whether factors such as WEIRDness and narcissism (personal and collective) moderate this relationship. In the second study, we tested the causal effect of reflection using a reliable and effective manipulation technique—debiasing training—on both generic and specific conspiracy beliefs. The first study confirmed the negative association between reflection and belief in conspiracy theories across cultures, with the association being notably stronger in non-WEIRD societies. Both personal and collective narcissism played significant moderating roles. The second study demonstrated that debiasing training significantly decreases both generic and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs in a non-WEIRD context, with more pronounced effects for general conspiracy beliefs. Our research supports that reflection is a consistent cross-cultural predictor of conspiracy beliefs and that activating reflection can reduce such beliefs through rigorous experimental interventions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"258 ","pages":"Article 106085"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143430326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-17DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106087
Omid Ghasemi , Adam J.L. Harris , Ben R. Newell
The framing effect is a highly robust phenomenon, wherein logically equivalent options (e.g., 90 % chance of winning vs. 10 % chance of losing) trigger different preferences. The Information Leakage account provides a rational interpretation of this effect by suggesting that choice of frame ‘leaks’ information to decision-makers, making the frames informationally non-equivalent. For example, decision-makers might interpret a positive frame (e.g., 90 % chance of winning) as an implicit recommendation to take a risk. In a series of six preregistered experiments (total N = 1211), we manipulated the informativeness of frames by 1) reducing the perceived freedom of a speaker to choose a frame (the Choice Limitation manipulation), and 2) varying the communication context between the speaker and the listener from collaborative to competitive (the Interest Alignment manipulation). We expected a diminished framing effect in scenarios where the leaked information conveys no useful or trustworthy cues. While the Choice Limitation manipulation occasionally attenuated the framing effect, particularly in within-subject designs, the Interest Alignment manipulation consistently led to a reduction in the framing effect in both within-subject and between-subject designs. These findings show that individuals can be adaptable and sensitive to the informational value of frames and suggest that competition prompts inferences more readily than a speaker's agency over the choice of frame. The implications of these results for rational accounts of framing effects are discussed.
{"title":"From preference shifts to information leaks: Examining Individuals' sensitivity to information leakage in the framing effect","authors":"Omid Ghasemi , Adam J.L. Harris , Ben R. Newell","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106087","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106087","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The framing effect is a highly robust phenomenon, wherein logically equivalent options (e.g., 90 % chance of winning vs. 10 % chance of losing) trigger different preferences. The Information Leakage account provides a rational interpretation of this effect by suggesting that choice of frame ‘leaks’ information to decision-makers, making the frames informationally non-equivalent. For example, decision-makers might interpret a positive frame (e.g., 90 % chance of winning) as an implicit recommendation to take a risk. In a series of six preregistered experiments (total <em>N</em> = 1211), we manipulated the informativeness of frames by 1) reducing the perceived freedom of a speaker to choose a frame (the Choice Limitation manipulation), and 2) varying the communication context between the speaker and the listener from collaborative to competitive (the Interest Alignment manipulation). We expected a diminished framing effect in scenarios where the leaked information conveys no useful or trustworthy cues. While the Choice Limitation manipulation occasionally attenuated the framing effect, particularly in within-subject designs, the Interest Alignment manipulation consistently led to a reduction in the framing effect in both within-subject and between-subject designs. These findings show that individuals can be adaptable and sensitive to the informational value of frames and suggest that competition prompts inferences more readily than a speaker's agency over the choice of frame. The implications of these results for rational accounts of framing effects are discussed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"258 ","pages":"Article 106087"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143430327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-14DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106084
Claudia Mazzuca , Caterina Villani , Tommaso Lamarra , Marianna Marcella Bolognesi , Anna M. Borghi
Conversation topics may vary in abstractness. This might impact the effort required by speakers to reach a common ground and, ultimately, an interactive alignment. In fact, people typically feel less confident with abstract concepts and single-words rating studies suggest abstract concepts are more associated with social interactions than concrete concepts—hence suggesting increasing levels of abstractness enhance inner and mutual monitoring processes. However, experimental studies addressing conversational dynamics afforded by abstract concepts are still sparse. In three preregistered experiments we ask whether abstract sentences are associated with specific constructs in dialogue, i.e., higher uncertainty, more curiosity and willingness to continue a conversation, and more questions related to causal and agency aspects. We do so by asking participants to evaluate the plausibility of linguistic exchanges referring to concrete and abstract concepts. Results support theories proposing that abstract concepts involve more inner monitoring and social dynamics compared to concrete concepts and suggest that reaching alignment in dialogue is more effortful with abstract than with concrete concepts.
{"title":"Abstractness impacts conversational dynamics","authors":"Claudia Mazzuca , Caterina Villani , Tommaso Lamarra , Marianna Marcella Bolognesi , Anna M. Borghi","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106084","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106084","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Conversation topics may vary in abstractness. This might impact the effort required by speakers to reach a common ground and, ultimately, an interactive alignment. In fact, people typically feel less confident with abstract concepts and single-words rating studies suggest abstract concepts are more associated with social interactions than concrete concepts—hence suggesting increasing levels of abstractness enhance inner and mutual monitoring processes. However, experimental studies addressing conversational dynamics afforded by abstract concepts are still sparse. In three preregistered experiments we ask whether abstract sentences are associated with specific constructs in dialogue, i.e., higher uncertainty, more curiosity and willingness to continue a conversation, and more questions related to causal and agency aspects. We do so by asking participants to evaluate the plausibility of linguistic exchanges referring to concrete and abstract concepts. Results support theories proposing that abstract concepts involve more inner monitoring and social dynamics compared to concrete concepts and suggest that reaching alignment in dialogue is more effortful with abstract than with concrete concepts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"258 ","pages":"Article 106084"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143419342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-11DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106081
Kadi Tulver, Karl Kristjan Kaup, Jaan Aru
We present a novel framework for understanding the diverse spectrum of mental breakthrough events, ranging from problem-solving insights to profound personal transformations. We propose that these events, while varied in expression and impact, share common underlying mechanisms of representational change. We also hypothesise that the differences in phenomenological intensity can be conceptualized along a continuum. Central to our model are three core components – tension, altered salience, and enhanced flexibility – which we identify as essential prerequisites for significant cognitive restructuring. These components interact within an iterative cycle, influencing both the emergence and nature of insight experiences. Drawing on examples from different fields, we explore how a conflict between existing models can trigger this cycle, wherein mechanisms of attention allocation and relaxation of constraints work in tandem to facilitate the emergence of insights. Furthermore, we propose that the intensity of the “aha-moment” and the breadth of its impact are contingent on how central the conflict is within one's conceptual landscape and the extent to which existing mental models are challenged. Thus, the model accounts for both the subtle, momentary insights in problem-solving and the transformative realizations that reshape core beliefs and self-perception. By synthesising insights from various domains, including psychotherapy, contemplative science, and psychedelic research, we present a theoretical account with broad scope, aiming to shed light on the complex processes that can lead to a wide array of mental breakthroughs, thereby contributing to the understanding of insight phenomena across disciplines.
{"title":"The road to Aha: A recipe for mental breakthroughs","authors":"Kadi Tulver, Karl Kristjan Kaup, Jaan Aru","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106081","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106081","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We present a novel framework for understanding the diverse spectrum of mental breakthrough events, ranging from problem-solving insights to profound personal transformations. We propose that these events, while varied in expression and impact, share common underlying mechanisms of representational change. We also hypothesise that the differences in phenomenological intensity can be conceptualized along a continuum. Central to our model are three core components – tension, altered salience, and enhanced flexibility – which we identify as essential prerequisites for significant cognitive restructuring. These components interact within an iterative cycle, influencing both the emergence and nature of insight experiences. Drawing on examples from different fields, we explore how a conflict between existing models can trigger this cycle, wherein mechanisms of attention allocation and relaxation of constraints work in tandem to facilitate the emergence of insights. Furthermore, we propose that the intensity of the “aha-moment” and the breadth of its impact are contingent on how central the conflict is within one's conceptual landscape and the extent to which existing mental models are challenged. Thus, the model accounts for both the subtle, momentary insights in problem-solving and the transformative realizations that reshape core beliefs and self-perception. By synthesising insights from various domains, including psychotherapy, contemplative science, and psychedelic research, we present a theoretical account with broad scope, aiming to shed light on the complex processes that can lead to a wide array of mental breakthroughs, thereby contributing to the understanding of insight phenomena across disciplines.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"257 ","pages":"Article 106081"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143379033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-11DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106082
Joanna M. Smieja, Tomasz Zaleskiewicz, Agata Gasiorowska
This research investigates the specific effects of mental imagery on people's emotional responses and risk-taking decisions. We present findings across four studies, including three experiments, that highlight emotions as a mediator between the valence of mental images related to risk and subsequent risk-taking propensity. Our research identifies two key factors that moderate this relationship: the category of cognitive process (analytical thinking vs. visual mental imagery) and the vividness of mental imagery. In Study 1, we found an effect of the valence of mental images on the intensity of emotional reactions, which in turn were linked to risk-taking willingness. Positive imagery corresponded with stronger positive emotions and increased declared risk taking. The experimental Study 2 provided causal evidence for these associations, showing that participants positively imagining risk-related behaviors reported more intense positive feelings and a greater inclination to take risks than those imagining risk taking in a negative manner. Subsequent preregistered experiments (Studies 3 and 4) corroborated our central hypothesis that mental imagery is a distinct driver of emotional responses in risk-related decision making and showed potential boundary conditions for this effect. Study 3 emphasized that decisions influenced by mental imagery had greater emotional strength than those based on analytical reasoning. The final Study 4 demonstrated that vividness of mental imagery further moderates this effect: more vivid images led to stronger emotions, thus affecting risk-taking propensity. These results underscore the significance of emotions in decision making, particularly when decisions are based on mental imagery rather than analysis, and point to the amplifying effect of image vividness on emotional and decision-making processes.
{"title":"Mental imagery shapes emotions in people's decisions related to risk taking","authors":"Joanna M. Smieja, Tomasz Zaleskiewicz, Agata Gasiorowska","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106082","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106082","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This research investigates the specific effects of mental imagery on people's emotional responses and risk-taking decisions. We present findings across four studies, including three experiments, that highlight emotions as a mediator between the valence of mental images related to risk and subsequent risk-taking propensity. Our research identifies two key factors that moderate this relationship: the category of cognitive process (analytical thinking vs. visual mental imagery) and the vividness of mental imagery. In Study 1, we found an effect of the valence of mental images on the intensity of emotional reactions, which in turn were linked to risk-taking willingness. Positive imagery corresponded with stronger positive emotions and increased declared risk taking. The experimental Study 2 provided causal evidence for these associations, showing that participants positively imagining risk-related behaviors reported more intense positive feelings and a greater inclination to take risks than those imagining risk taking in a negative manner. Subsequent preregistered experiments (Studies 3 and 4) corroborated our central hypothesis that mental imagery is a distinct driver of emotional responses in risk-related decision making and showed potential boundary conditions for this effect. Study 3 emphasized that decisions influenced by mental imagery had greater emotional strength than those based on analytical reasoning. The final Study 4 demonstrated that vividness of mental imagery further moderates this effect: more vivid images led to stronger emotions, thus affecting risk-taking propensity. These results underscore the significance of emotions in decision making, particularly when decisions are based on mental imagery rather than analysis, and point to the amplifying effect of image vividness on emotional and decision-making processes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"257 ","pages":"Article 106082"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143379034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}