Cognition最新文献

It is widely acknowledged that opaque orthographies place additional demands on learning, often requiring many years to fully acquire. It is less widely recognized, however, that such opacity may offer certain benefits in the context of reading. For example, heterographic homophones such as ⟨knight⟩ and ⟨night⟩ (words that sound the same but which are spelled differently) impose additional costs in learning but reduce ambiguity in reading. Here, we consider the possibility that—left to evolve freely—writing systems will sometimes choose to forego some simplicity for the sake of informativeness when there is functional pressure to do so. We investigate this hypothesis by simulating the evolution of orthography as it is transmitted from one generation to the next, both with and without a communicative pressure for ambiguity avoidance. In addition, we consider two mechanisms by which informative heterography might be selected for: differentiation, in which new spellings are created to differentiate meaning (e.g., ⟨lite⟩ vs. ⟨light⟩), and conservation, in which heterography arises as a byproduct of sound change (e.g., ⟨meat⟩ vs. ⟨meet⟩). Under pressure from learning alone, orthographic systems become transparent, but when combined with communicative pressure, they tend to favor some additional informativeness. Nevertheless, our findings also suggest that, in the long term, simpler, transparent spellings may be preferred in the absence of top-down explicit teaching.

Adults with no knowledge of sign languages can perceive distinctive markers that signal event boundedness (telicity), suggesting that telicity is a cognitively natural semantic feature that can be marked iconically (Strickland et al., 2015). This study asks if non-signing children (5-year-olds) can also link telicity to iconic markers in sign. Experiment 1 attempted three close replications of Strickland et al. (2015) and found only limited success. However, Experiment 2 showed that children can both perceive the relevant visual feature and can succeed at linking the visual property to telicity semantics when allowed to filter their answer through their own linguistic choices. Children's performance demonstrates the cognitive naturalness and early availability of the semantics of telicity, supporting the idea that telicity helps guide the language acquisition process.

This study aimed to determine the unit for switching representational states in visual working memory (VWM). Two opposing hypotheses were investigated: (a) the unit of switching being a feature (feature-based hypothesis), and (b) the unit of switching being an object (object-based hypothesis). Participants (N = 180) were instructed to hold two features from either one or two objects in their VWM. The memory-driven attentional capture effect, suggesting that actively held information in VWM can cause attention to be drawn towards matched distractors, was employed to assess representational states of the first and second probed colors (indicated by a retro-cue). The results showed that only the feature indicated to be probed first could elicit memory related capture for the condition of separate objects. Importantly, features from an integrated object could guide attention regardless of the probe order. These findings were observed across three experiments involving features of different dimensions, same dimensions, or perceptual objects defined by Gestalt principles. They provide convergent evidence supporting the object-based hypothesis by indicating that features within a single object cannot exist in different states.

Regressions, or backward saccades, are common during reading, accounting for between 5% and 20% of all saccades. And yet, relatively little is known about what causes them. We provide an information-theoretic operationalization for two previous qualitative hypotheses about regressions, which we dub reactivation and reanalysis. We argue that these hypotheses make different predictions about the pointwise mutual information or pmi between a regression’s source and target. Intuitively, the pmi between two words measures how much more (or less) likely one word is to be present given the other. On one hand, the reactivation hypothesis predicts that regressions occur between words that are associated, implying high positive values of pmi. On the other hand, the reanalysis hypothesis predicts that regressions should occur between words that are not associated with each other, implying negative, low values of pmi. As a second theoretical contribution, we expand on previous theories by considering not only pmi but also expected values of pmi, $E$[pmi], where the expectation is taken over all possible realizations of the regression’s target. The rationale for this is that language processing involves making inferences under uncertainty, and readers may be uncertain about what they have read, especially if a previous word was skipped. To test both theories, we use contemporary language models to estimate pmi-based statistics over word pairs in three corpora of eye tracking data in English, as well as in six languages across three language families (Indo-European, Uralic, and Turkic). Our results are consistent across languages and models tested: Positive values of pmi and $E$[pmi] consistently help to predict the patterns of regressions during reading, whereas negative values of pmi and $E$[pmi] do not. Our information-theoretic interpretation increases the predictive scope of both theories and our studies present the first systematic crosslinguistic analysis of regressions in the literature. Our results support the reactivation hypothesis and, more broadly, they expand the number of language processing behaviors that can be linked to information-theoretic principles.

In language comprehension, we use perceptual cues to infer meanings. Some of these cues reside on perceptual dimensions. For example, the difference between bear and pear is cued by a difference in voice onset time (VOT), which is a continuous perceptual dimension. The present paper asks whether, and when, experience with a single value on a dimension behaving unexpectedly is used by the learner to reweight the whole dimension. We show that learners reweight the whole VOT dimension when exposed to a single VOT value (e.g., 45 ms) and provided with feedback indicating that the speaker intended to produce a /b/ 50% of the time and a /p/ the other 50% of the time. Importantly, dimensional reweighting occurs only if 1) the 50/50 feedback is unexpected for the VOT value, and 2) there is another dimension that is predictive of feedback. When no predictive dimension is available, listeners reassociate the experienced VOT value with the more surprising outcome but do not downweight the entire VOT dimension. These results provide support for perceptual representations of speech sounds that combine cues and dimensions, for viewing perceptual learning in speech as a combination of error-driven cue reassociation and dimensional reweighting, and for considering dimensional reweighting to be reallocation of attention that occurs only when there is evidence that reallocating attention would improve prediction accuracy (Harmon, Z., Idemaru, K., & Kapatsinski, V. 2019. Learning mechanisms in cue reweighting. Cognition, 189, 76–88.).

Successful interactions require not only representing others’ mental states but also flexibly updating them, whenever one’s original inferences may no longer hold. Such situations arise, for instance, when a partner’s behavior is incongruent with one’s expectations. Although these situations are rather common, the question whether people update others’ mental states spontaneously upon encountering unexpected behaviors and whether they use the updated mental states in novel contexts, has been largely unexplored. We addressed these issues in two experiments. In each experiment participants first performed an anticipatory looking task, reacting to a virtual ‘partner’, who categorized pictures based on their ambiguous or non-ambiguous color. Importantly, to perform the task participants did not have to track their partner’s perspective. Following a correct categorization phase, the ‘partner’ started to systematically miscategorize one of the ambiguous colors (e.g., as if she would now believe that the greenish blue is green). We measured how participants’ anticipatory looking preceding the partner’s categorization changed across trials. Afterward, we asked whether participants implicitly transferred their knowledge about the partner’s updated perspective to a new task. Finally, they performed an explicit perspective-taking task, to test whether they selectively updated the partner’s perspective, but not their own. Results revealed that correct anticipations started to emerge only after a few miscategorizations, indicating the spontaneous updating of the other’s perspective regarding the miscategorized color. Signatures of updating emerged somewhat earlier when the partner made similarity judgments (Experiment 2), highlighting the subjective nature of her decisions, compared to when following an explicit color-categorization rule (Experiment 1). In the explicit perspective-taking task of both experiments, roughly half of the participants could categorize items according to the partner’s (spontaneously updated) perspective and also used their partner’s updated perspective in the implicit transfer task to some degree, while they were the ones who displayed more pronounced anticipatory patterns as well. Such data provides strong evidence that the observed changes in anticipatory looking reflect spontaneous and flexible mental state updating. In addition, the findings also point to a high individual variability both in the updating of attributed mental states and the use of the updated mental state content.

We expect children to learn new words, skills, and ideas from various technologies. When learning from humans, children prefer people who are reliable and trustworthy, yet children also forgive people's occasional mistakes. Are the dynamics of children learning from technologies, which can also be unreliable, similar to learning from humans? We tackle this question by focusing on early childhood, an age at which children are expected to master foundational academic skills. In this project, 168 4–7-year-old children (Study 1) and 168 adults (Study 2) played a word-guessing game with either a human or robot. The partner first gave a sequence of correct answers, but then followed this with a sequence of wrong answers, with a reaction following each one. Reactions varied by condition, either expressing an accident, an accident marked with an apology, or an unhelpful intention. We found that older children were less trusting than both younger children and adults and were even more skeptical after errors. Trust decreased most rapidly when errors were intentional, but only children (and especially older children) outright rejected help from intentionally unhelpful partners. As an exception to this general trend, older children maintained their trust for longer when a robot (but not a human) apologized for its mistake. Our work suggests that educational technology design cannot be one size fits all but rather must account for developmental changes in children's learning goals.

Faces are highly informative social stimuli, yet before any information can be accessed, the face must first be detected in the visual field. A detection template that serves this purpose must be able to accommodate the wide variety of face images we encounter, but how this generality could be achieved remains unknown. In this study, we investigate whether statistical averages of previously encountered faces can form the basis of a general face detection template. We provide converging evidence from a range of methods—human similarity judgements and PCA-based image analysis of face averages (Experiment 1–3), human detection behaviour for faces embedded in complex scenes (Experiment 4 and 5), and simulations with a template-matching algorithm (Experiment 6 and 7)—to examine the formation, stability and robustness of statistical image averages as cognitive templates for human face detection. We integrate these findings with existing knowledge of face identification, ensemble coding, and the development of face perception.

Eyes are active in memory recall and visual imagination, yet our grasp of the underlying qualities and factors of these internally coupled eye movements is limited. To explore this, we studied 50 participants, examining how workload, spatial reference availability, and imagined movement direction influence internal coupling of eye movements. We designed a visuospatial working memory task in which participants mentally moved a black patch along a path within a matrix and each trial involved one step along this path (presented via speakers: up, down, left, or right). We varied workload by adjusting matrix size (3 × 3 vs. 5 × 5), manipulated availability of a spatial frame of reference by presenting either a blank screen (requiring participants to rely solely on their mental representation of the matrix) or spatial reference in the form of an empty matrix, and contrasted active task performance to two control conditions involving only active or passive listening. Our findings show that eye movements consistently matched the imagined movement of the patch in the matrix, not driven solely by auditory or semantic cues. While workload influenced pupil diameter, perceived demand, and performance, it had no observable impact on internal coupling. The availability of spatial reference enhanced coupling of eye movements, leading more frequent, precise, and resilient saccades against noise and bias. The absence of workload effects on coupled saccades in our study, in combination with the relatively high degree of coupling observed even in the invisible matrix condition, indicates that eye movements align with shifts in attention across both visually and internally represented information. This suggests that coupled eye movements are not merely strategic efforts to reduce workload, but rather a natural response to where attention is directed.

Absolute pitch is the name given to the rare ability to identify a musical note in an automatic and effortless manner without the need for a reference tone. Those individuals with absolute pitch can, for example, name the note they hear, identify all of the tones of a given chord, and/or name the pitches of everyday sounds, such as car horns or sirens. Hence, absolute pitch can be seen as providing a rare example of absolute sensory judgment in audition. Surprisingly, however, the intriguing question of whether such an ability presents unique features in the domain of sensory perception, or whether instead similar perceptual skills also exist in other sensory domains, has not been explicitly addressed previously. In this paper, this question is addressed by systematically reviewing research on absolute pitch using the PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) method. Thereafter, we compare absolute pitch with two rare types of sensory experience, namely synaesthesia and eidetic memory, to understand if and how these phenomena exhibit similar features to absolute pitch. Furthermore, a common absolute perceptual ability that has been often compared to absolute pitch, namely colour perception, is also discussed. Arguments are provided supporting the notion that none of the examined abilities can be considered like absolute pitch. Therefore, we conclude by suggesting that absolute pitch does indeed appear to constitute a unique kind of absolute sensory judgment in humans, and we discuss some open issues and novel directions for future research in absolute pitch.