Pub Date : 2024-10-16DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105978
Fiona Laura Rosselet-Jordan , Marlène Abadie , Stéphanie Mariz Elsig , Pierre Barrouillet , Valérie Camos
The aim of this study was to investigate the nature of the processes involved in working memory (WM) retrieval by distinguishing between recollective (direct access) and non-recollective (reconstruction) recall. To this end, the trichotomous theory of recall (Brainerd et al., 2009) was applied to young adults' recall performance in a complex span task in which word lists were presented in three successive study-test trials. In three experiments, factors known to affect WM performance were manipulated, such as the cognitive load (CL) of the concurrent task and the involvement of long-term memory (LTM) knowledge through the associative relatedness of the memory items and the temporally spaced presentation of memory lists. The application of the trichotomous theory of recall proved effective and established that both recollective and non-recollective processes support WM recall, though recollective processes are predominant. The detrimental effect of increased CL on recall performance appeared to result from a reduction in direct access, while leaving reconstruction unaffected. Two manipulations aimed at increasing the involvement of LTM in recall had different effects on retrieval processes. Associative relatedness favored direct access, while spaced presentation reduced it. The implications of these findings for our understanding of the relationships between LTM and WM and for WM theories are discussed.
{"title":"Recollective and non-recollective processes in working memory retrieval","authors":"Fiona Laura Rosselet-Jordan , Marlène Abadie , Stéphanie Mariz Elsig , Pierre Barrouillet , Valérie Camos","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105978","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105978","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The aim of this study was to investigate the nature of the processes involved in working memory (WM) retrieval by distinguishing between recollective (direct access) and non-recollective (reconstruction) recall. To this end, the trichotomous theory of recall (Brainerd et al., 2009) was applied to young adults' recall performance in a complex span task in which word lists were presented in three successive study-test trials. In three experiments, factors known to affect WM performance were manipulated, such as the cognitive load (CL) of the concurrent task and the involvement of long-term memory (LTM) knowledge through the associative relatedness of the memory items and the temporally spaced presentation of memory lists. The application of the trichotomous theory of recall proved effective and established that both recollective and non-recollective processes support WM recall, though recollective processes are predominant. The detrimental effect of increased CL on recall performance appeared to result from a reduction in direct access, while leaving reconstruction unaffected. Two manipulations aimed at increasing the involvement of LTM in recall had different effects on retrieval processes. Associative relatedness favored direct access, while spaced presentation reduced it. The implications of these findings for our understanding of the relationships between LTM and WM and for WM theories are discussed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142441818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is well known that people will exert effort on a task if sufficiently motivated, but how they distribute these efforts across different strategies (e.g., efficiency vs. caution) remains uncertain. Past work has shown that people invest effort differently for potential positive outcomes (rewards) versus potential negative outcomes (penalties). However, this research failed to account for differences in the context in which negative outcomes motivate someone - either as punishment or reinforcement. It is therefore unclear whether effort profiles differ as a function of outcome valence, motivational context, or both. Using computational modeling and our novel Multi-Incentive Control Task, we show that the influence of aversive outcomes on one's effort profile is entirely determined by their motivational context. Participants (N:91) favored increased caution in response to larger penalties for incorrect responses, and favored increased efficiency in response to larger reinforcement for correct responses, whether positively or negatively incentivized.
Statement of relevance
People have to constantly decide how to allocate their mental effort, and in doing so can be motivated by both the positive outcomes that effort accrues and the negative outcomes that effort avoids. For example, someone might persist on a project for work in the hopes of being promoted or to avoid being reprimanded or even fired. Understanding how people weigh these different types of incentives is critical for understanding variability in human achievement as well as sources of motivational impairments (e.g., in major depression). We show that people not only consider both potential positive and negative outcomes when allocating mental effort, but that the profile of effort they engage under negative incentives differs depending on whether that outcome is contingent on sustaining good performance (negative reinforcement) or avoiding bad performance (punishment). Clarifying the motivational factors that determine effort exertion is an important step for understanding motivational impairments in psychopathology.
{"title":"Motivational context determines the impact of aversive outcomes on mental effort allocation","authors":"Mahalia Prater Fahey , Debbie M. Yee , Xiamin Leng , Maisy Tarlow , Amitai Shenhav","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105973","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105973","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>It is well known that people will exert effort on a task if sufficiently motivated, but how they distribute these efforts across different strategies (e.g., efficiency vs. caution) remains uncertain. Past work has shown that people invest effort differently for potential positive outcomes (rewards) versus potential negative outcomes (penalties). However, this research failed to account for differences in the context in which negative outcomes motivate someone - either as punishment or reinforcement. It is therefore unclear whether effort profiles differ as a function of outcome valence, motivational context, or both. Using computational modeling and our novel Multi-Incentive Control Task, we show that the influence of aversive outcomes on one's effort profile is entirely determined by their motivational context. Participants (N:91) favored increased caution in response to larger penalties for incorrect responses, and favored increased efficiency in response to larger reinforcement for correct responses, whether positively or negatively incentivized.</div></div><div><h3>Statement of relevance</h3><div>People have to constantly decide how to allocate their mental effort, and in doing so can be motivated by both the positive outcomes that effort accrues and the negative outcomes that effort avoids. For example, someone might persist on a project for work in the hopes of being promoted or to avoid being reprimanded or even fired. Understanding how people weigh these different types of incentives is critical for understanding variability in human achievement as well as sources of motivational impairments (e.g., in major depression). We show that people not only consider both potential positive and negative outcomes when allocating mental effort, but that the profile of effort they engage under negative incentives differs depending on whether that outcome is contingent on sustaining good performance (negative reinforcement) or avoiding bad performance (punishment). Clarifying the motivational factors that determine effort exertion is an important step for understanding motivational impairments in psychopathology.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105973"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142438380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-14DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105979
Alina Schaffer , Alvaro L. Caicoya , Anja Widdig , Ruben Holland , Federica Amici
The ability to discriminate quantities is crucial for humans and other animals, by allowing individuals to maximize food intake and successfully navigate in their social environment. Here, we used a comprehensive approach to compare quantity discrimination abilities (i.e. ability to compare sets with different quantities of identical items, reliance on item size and spatial distribution, existence of irrational biases) in 9 different species of ungulates and provide novel insight into the socio-ecological conditions that might favor their emergence. We tested a total of 37 captive subjects including goats (Capra aegagrus hircus), llamas (Lama glama), guanacos (Lama guanicoe), Grevy's zebras (Equus grevyi), Chapman's zebras (Equus burchelli chapmanni), rhinos (Diceros bicornis michaeli), giraffes (Giraffa camelopardalis rothschildi), bison (Bison bonasus) and buffalos (Syncerus caffer nanus). Our results revealed that subjects were able to discriminate quantities when presented with two sets of food items that could differ in number, size and partially density. When presented with sets containing a different number of identical food items, subjects successfully selected the set with more items, with performance overall decreasing when sets had higher ratios (e.g., 1:3 vs 1:5). In addition, subjects could successfully maximize their food intake when both sets had the same number of items, but items had different sizes. However, performance decreased at chance levels when varying both the number of items and their size or distribution. Giraffes performed better than other species in most conditions, and we found no evidence for an irrational bias toward sets with more, smaller items or denser distributions. Overall, our study provides a first comparative assessment of quantity discrimination skills in several ungulate species.
{"title":"Quantity discrimination in 9 ungulate species: Individuals take item number and size into account to discriminate quantities","authors":"Alina Schaffer , Alvaro L. Caicoya , Anja Widdig , Ruben Holland , Federica Amici","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105979","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105979","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The ability to discriminate quantities is crucial for humans and other animals, by allowing individuals to maximize food intake and successfully navigate in their social environment. Here, we used a comprehensive approach to compare quantity discrimination abilities (i.e. ability to compare sets with different quantities of identical items, reliance on item size and spatial distribution, existence of irrational biases) in 9 different species of ungulates and provide novel insight into the socio-ecological conditions that might favor their emergence. We tested a total of 37 captive subjects including goats (<em>Capra aegagrus hircus)</em>, llamas (<em>Lama glama)</em>, guanacos (<em>Lama guanicoe)</em>, Grevy's zebras (<em>Equus grevyi),</em> Chapman's zebras (<em>Equus burchelli chapmanni)</em>, rhinos (<em>Diceros bicornis michaeli)</em>, giraffes (<em>Giraffa camelopardalis rothschildi)</em>, bison (<em>Bison bonasus)</em> and buffalos (<em>Syncerus caffer nanus</em>). Our results revealed that subjects were able to discriminate quantities when presented with two sets of food items that could differ in number, size and partially density. When presented with sets containing a different number of identical food items, subjects successfully selected the set with more items, with performance overall decreasing when sets had higher ratios (e.g., 1:3 vs 1:5). In addition, subjects could successfully maximize their food intake when both sets had the same number of items, but items had different sizes. However, performance decreased at chance levels when varying both the number of items and their size or distribution. Giraffes performed better than other species in most conditions, and we found no evidence for an irrational bias toward sets with more, smaller items or denser distributions. Overall, our study provides a first comparative assessment of quantity discrimination skills in several ungulate species.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105979"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142433553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-09DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105972
Elaine Kearney , Katie L. McMahon , Frank Guenther , Joanne Arciuli , Greig I. de Zubicaray
How do we represent and process abstract and concrete concepts? The “concreteness effect”, in which words with more concrete meanings are processed more quickly and accurately across a range of language tasks compared to abstract ones, suggests a differential conceptual organization of these words in the brain. However, concrete words tend to be marked by specific phonotactic features, such as having fewer syllables and more phonological neighbours. It is unclear whether these non-arbitrary form-meaning relationships that systematically denote the concreteness of a word impact language processing. In the current study, we first establish the extent of systematic mappings between phonological/phonetic features and concreteness ratings in a large set of monosyllabic and polysyllabic English words (i.e., concreteness form typicality), then demonstrate that they significantly influence lexical processing using behavioural megastudy datasets. Surface form features predicted a significant proportion of variance in concreteness ratings of monomorphemic words (25 %) which increased with the addition of polymorphemic forms (43 %). In addition, concreteness form typicality was a significant predictor of performance on visual and auditory lexical decision, naming, and semantic (concrete/abstract) decision tasks, after controlling for a range of psycholinguistic variables and concreteness ratings. Overall, our results provide the first evidence that concreteness form typicality influences lexical processing. We discuss theoretical implications for interpretations of the concreteness effect and models of language processing that have yet to incorporate non-arbitrary relationships between form and meaning into their feature sets.
{"title":"Revisiting the concreteness effect: Non-arbitrary mappings between form and concreteness of English words influence lexical processing","authors":"Elaine Kearney , Katie L. McMahon , Frank Guenther , Joanne Arciuli , Greig I. de Zubicaray","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105972","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105972","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How do we represent and process abstract and concrete concepts? The “concreteness effect”, in which words with more concrete meanings are processed more quickly and accurately across a range of language tasks compared to abstract ones, suggests a differential conceptual organization of these words in the brain. However, concrete words tend to be marked by specific phonotactic features, such as having fewer syllables and more phonological neighbours. It is unclear whether these non-arbitrary form-meaning relationships that systematically denote the concreteness of a word impact language processing. In the current study, we first establish the extent of systematic mappings between phonological/phonetic features and concreteness ratings in a large set of monosyllabic and polysyllabic English words (i.e., concreteness form typicality), then demonstrate that they significantly influence lexical processing using behavioural megastudy datasets. Surface form features predicted a significant proportion of variance in concreteness ratings of monomorphemic words (25 %) which increased with the addition of polymorphemic forms (43 %). In addition, concreteness form typicality was a significant predictor of performance on visual and auditory lexical decision, naming, and semantic (concrete/abstract) decision tasks, after controlling for a range of psycholinguistic variables and concreteness ratings. Overall, our results provide the first evidence that concreteness form typicality influences lexical processing. We discuss theoretical implications for interpretations of the concreteness effect and models of language processing that have yet to incorporate non-arbitrary relationships between form and meaning into their feature sets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105972"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142401640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-08DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105965
Kelly Hoogervorst , Leah Banellis , Micah G. Allen
Metacognitive self-monitoring is thought to be largely domain-general, with numerous prior studies providing evidence of a metacognitive g-factor. The observation of shared inter-individual variance across different measures of metacognition does not however preclude the possibility that some aspects may nevertheless be domain-specific. In particular, it is unknown the degree to which explicit metacognitive beliefs regarding one's own abilities may exhibit domain generality. Similarly, little is known about how such prior self-beliefs are maintained and updated in the face of new metacognitive experiences. In this study of 330 healthy individuals, we explored metacognitive belief updating across memory, visual, and general knowledge domains spanning nutritional and socioeconomic facts. We find that across all domains, participants strongly reduced their self-belief (i.e., expressed less confidence in their abilities) after completing a multi-domain metacognition test battery. Using psychological network and cross-correlation analyses, we further found that while metacognitive confidence exhibited strong domain generality, metacognitive belief updating was highly domain-specific, such that participants shifted their confidence specifically according to their performance on each domain. Overall, our findings suggest that metacognitive experiences prompt a shift in self-priors from a more general to a more specific focus.
元认知自我监控被认为在很大程度上具有领域通用性,之前的许多研究都提供了元认知 g 因子的证据。然而,在元认知的不同测量中观察到共同的个体间差异,并不排除某些方面可能是特定领域的。特别是,人们还不知道对自身能力的明确元认知信念在多大程度上会表现出领域普遍性。同样,人们对这种先前的自我信念在面对新的元认知经验时是如何保持和更新的也知之甚少。在这项对 330 名健康人进行的研究中,我们探讨了元认知信念在记忆、视觉和常识领域的更新情况,这些领域涵盖了营养和社会经济事实。我们发现,在所有领域中,参与者在完成多领域元认知测试后都会强烈地降低自我信念(即对自己的能力表示信心不足)。通过心理网络和交叉相关分析,我们进一步发现,虽然元认知信心表现出很强的领域普遍性,但元认知信念的更新却具有很强的领域特异性,因此,参与者会根据他们在每个领域的表现来改变他们的信心。总之,我们的研究结果表明,元认知经验会促使自我先验从更普遍的关注转向更具体的关注。
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Pub Date : 2024-10-05DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105974
Silvia Serino, Rossana Actis-Grosso, Marta Maisto, Paola Ricciardelli, Patrizia Steca
While abundant literature suggests that both performing congruent actions and emotional stimuli can enhance memory, their combined impact on memory for action phrases remains underexplored. This study investigated the effects of enactment with emotionally charged stimuli on memory performance. Sixty participants encoded action sentences with negative, neutral, or positive emotional connotations using either enactment or verbal-reading methods. Memory performance was assessed through immediate free recall tasks and a delayed yes-no recognition task. Results demonstrated a significant memory advantage for action-enacted sentences compared to verbal reading in recall and recognition tasks. Moreover, recall accuracy was higher for negative action sentences, while recognition performance was enhanced for negative and positive sentences. No interaction was found between encoding type and emotional connotation in memory tasks. Our findings revealed that both enactment and valence independently enhance memory performance, extending the benefits of enactment to emotional stimuli. Furthermore, our results highlight the differential effects of valence on free recall and recognition tasks, suggesting task-specific processes related to memory for negative and positive stimuli.
{"title":"Emotion in action: A study on the enactment effect on emotional action sentences","authors":"Silvia Serino, Rossana Actis-Grosso, Marta Maisto, Paola Ricciardelli, Patrizia Steca","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105974","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105974","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>While abundant literature suggests that both performing congruent actions and emotional stimuli can enhance memory, their combined impact on memory for action phrases remains underexplored. This study investigated the effects of enactment with emotionally charged stimuli on memory performance. Sixty participants encoded action sentences with negative, neutral, or positive emotional connotations using either enactment or verbal-reading methods. Memory performance was assessed through immediate free recall tasks and a delayed yes-no recognition task. Results demonstrated a significant memory advantage for action-enacted sentences compared to verbal reading in recall and recognition tasks. Moreover, recall accuracy was higher for negative action sentences, while recognition performance was enhanced for negative and positive sentences. No interaction was found between encoding type and emotional connotation in memory tasks. Our findings revealed that both enactment and valence independently enhance memory performance, extending the benefits of enactment to emotional stimuli. Furthermore, our results highlight the differential effects of valence on free recall and recognition tasks, suggesting task-specific processes related to memory for negative and positive stimuli.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105974"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142382037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-05DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105971
Samuel Debray , Stanislas Dehaene
Mathematics is an underexplored domain of human cognition. While many studies have focused on subsets of math concepts such as numbers, fractions, or geometric shapes, few have ventured beyond these elementary domains. Here, we attempted to map out the full space of math concepts and to answer two specific questions: can distributed semantic models, such a GloVe, provide a satisfactory fit to human semantic judgements in mathematics? And how does this fit vary with education? We first analyzed all of the French and English Wikipedia pages with math contents, and used a semi-automatic procedure to extract the 1000 most frequent math terms in both languages. In a second step, we collected extensive behavioral judgements of familiarity and semantic similarity between them. About half of the variance in human similarity judgements was explained by vector embeddings that attempt to capture latent semantic structures based on cooccurence statistics. Participants' self-reported level of education modulated familiarity and similarity, allowing us to create a partial hierarchy among high-level math concepts. Our results converge onto the proposal of a map of math space, organized as a database of math terms with information about their frequency, familiarity, grade of acquisition, and entanglement with other concepts.
{"title":"Mapping and modeling the semantic space of math concepts","authors":"Samuel Debray , Stanislas Dehaene","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105971","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105971","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Mathematics is an underexplored domain of human cognition. While many studies have focused on subsets of math concepts such as numbers, fractions, or geometric shapes, few have ventured beyond these elementary domains. Here, we attempted to map out the full space of math concepts and to answer two specific questions: can distributed semantic models, such a GloVe, provide a satisfactory fit to human semantic judgements in mathematics? And how does this fit vary with education? We first analyzed all of the French and English Wikipedia pages with math contents, and used a semi-automatic procedure to extract the 1000 most frequent math terms in both languages. In a second step, we collected extensive behavioral judgements of familiarity and semantic similarity between them. About half of the variance in human similarity judgements was explained by vector embeddings that attempt to capture latent semantic structures based on cooccurence statistics. Participants' self-reported level of education modulated familiarity and similarity, allowing us to create a partial hierarchy among high-level math concepts. Our results converge onto the proposal of a map of math space, organized as a database of math terms with information about their frequency, familiarity, grade of acquisition, and entanglement with other concepts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105971"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142382038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-04DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105969
George Blackburne , Chris D. Frith , Daniel Yon
Action allows us to shape the world around us. But to act effectively we need to accurately sense what we can and cannot control. Classic theories across cognitive science suppose that this ‘sense of agency’ is constructed from the sensorimotor signals we experience as we interact with our surroundings. But these sensorimotor signals are inherently ambiguous, and can provide us with a distorted picture of what we can and cannot influence. Here we investigate one way that agents like us might overcome the inherent ambiguity of these signals: by combining noisy sensorimotor evidence with prior beliefs about control acquired through explicit communication with others. Using novel tools to measure and model control decisions, we find that explicit beliefs about the controllability of the environment alter both the sensitivity and bias of agentic choices; meaning that we are both better at detecting and more biased to feel control when we are told to expect it. These seemingly paradoxical effects on agentic choices can be captured by a computational model where expecting to be in control exaggerates the sensitivity or ‘gain’ of the mechanisms we use to detect our influence over our surroundings – making us increasingly sensitised to both true and illusory signs of agency. In combination, these results reveal a cognitive and computational mechanism that allows public communication about what we can and cannot influence to reshape our private sense of control.
{"title":"Communicated priors tune the perception of control","authors":"George Blackburne , Chris D. Frith , Daniel Yon","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105969","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105969","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Action allows us to shape the world around us. But to act effectively we need to accurately sense what we can and cannot control. Classic theories across cognitive science suppose that this ‘sense of agency’ is constructed from the sensorimotor signals we experience as we interact with our surroundings. But these sensorimotor signals are inherently ambiguous, and can provide us with a distorted picture of what we can and cannot influence. Here we investigate one way that agents like us might overcome the inherent ambiguity of these signals: by combining noisy sensorimotor evidence with prior beliefs about control acquired through explicit communication with others. Using novel tools to measure and model control decisions, we find that explicit beliefs about the controllability of the environment alter both the sensitivity and bias of agentic choices; meaning that we are both better at detecting <em>and</em> more biased to feel control when we are told to expect it. These seemingly paradoxical effects on agentic choices can be captured by a computational model where expecting to be in control exaggerates the sensitivity or ‘gain’ of the mechanisms we use to detect our influence over our surroundings – making us increasingly sensitised to both true and illusory signs of agency. In combination, these results reveal a cognitive and computational mechanism that allows public communication about what we can and cannot influence to reshape our private sense of control.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105969"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142378378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-04DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105966
Lucas Battich , Elisabeth Pacherie , Julie Grèzes
We often effortlessly take the perceptual perspective of others: we represent some aspect of the environment that others currently perceive. However, taking someone's perspective can interfere with one's perceptual processing: another person's gaze can spontaneously affect our ability to detect stimuli in a scene. But it is still unclear whether our cognitive evaluation of those judgements is also affected. In this study, we investigated whether social perspective-taking can influence participants' metacognitive judgements about their perceptual responses. Participants performed a contrast detection task with a task-irrelevant avatar oriented either congruently or incongruently to the stimulus location. By “blindfolding” the avatar, we tested the influence of social perspective-taking versus domain-general directional orienting. Participants had higher accuracy and perceptual sensitivity with a congruent avatar regardless of the blindfold, suggesting a directional cueing effect. However, their metacognitive efficiency was modulated only by the congruency of a seeing avatar. These results suggest that perceptual metacognitive ability can be socially enhanced by sharing perception of the same objects with others.
{"title":"Social perspective-taking influences on metacognition","authors":"Lucas Battich , Elisabeth Pacherie , Julie Grèzes","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105966","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105966","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We often effortlessly take the perceptual perspective of others: we represent some aspect of the environment that others currently perceive. However, taking someone's perspective can interfere with one's perceptual processing: another person's gaze can spontaneously affect our ability to detect stimuli in a scene. But it is still unclear whether our cognitive evaluation of those judgements is also affected. In this study, we investigated whether social perspective-taking can influence participants' metacognitive judgements about their perceptual responses. Participants performed a contrast detection task with a task-irrelevant avatar oriented either congruently or incongruently to the stimulus location. By “blindfolding” the avatar, we tested the influence of social perspective-taking versus domain-general directional orienting. Participants had higher accuracy and perceptual sensitivity with a congruent avatar regardless of the blindfold, suggesting a directional cueing effect. However, their metacognitive efficiency was modulated only by the congruency of a seeing avatar. These results suggest that perceptual metacognitive ability can be socially enhanced by sharing perception of the same objects with others.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105966"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142378379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-04DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105967
Jing-Jing Li , Anne G.E. Collins
Learning structures that effectively abstract decision policies is key to the flexibility of human intelligence. Previous work has shown that humans use hierarchically structured policies to efficiently navigate complex and dynamic environments. However, the computational processes that support the learning and construction of such policies remain insufficiently understood. To address this question, we tested 1026 human participants, who made over 1 million choices combined, in a decision-making task where they could learn, transfer, and recompose multiple sets of hierarchical policies. We propose a novel algorithmic account for the learning processes underlying observed human behavior. We show that humans rely on compressed policies over states in early learning, which gradually unfold into hierarchical representations via meta-learning and Bayesian inference. Our modeling evidence suggests that these hierarchical policies are structured in a temporally backward, rather than forward, fashion. Taken together, these algorithmic architectures characterize how the interplay between reinforcement learning, policy compression, meta-learning, and working memory supports structured decision-making and compositionality in a resource-rational way.
{"title":"An algorithmic account for how humans efficiently learn, transfer, and compose hierarchically structured decision policies","authors":"Jing-Jing Li , Anne G.E. Collins","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105967","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105967","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Learning structures that effectively abstract decision policies is key to the flexibility of human intelligence. Previous work has shown that humans use hierarchically structured policies to efficiently navigate complex and dynamic environments. However, the computational processes that support the learning and construction of such policies remain insufficiently understood. To address this question, we tested 1026 human participants, who made over 1 million choices combined, in a decision-making task where they could learn, transfer, and recompose multiple sets of hierarchical policies. We propose a novel algorithmic account for the learning processes underlying observed human behavior. We show that humans rely on compressed policies over states in early learning, which gradually unfold into hierarchical representations via meta-learning and Bayesian inference. Our modeling evidence suggests that these hierarchical policies are structured in a temporally backward, rather than forward, fashion. Taken together, these algorithmic architectures characterize how the interplay between reinforcement learning, policy compression, meta-learning, and working memory supports structured decision-making and compositionality in a resource-rational way.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105967"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142378376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}