Pub Date : 2026-01-14DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106441
Bertram Gawronski , Marta Rokosz , Michal M. Stefanczyk , Michał Białek
Using the CNI model to quantify three factors underlying moral-dilemma judgments, Rokosz et al. (2025) found that groups show greater concerns about outcomes than individuals, but do not differ in terms of norm adherence and general action tendencies. In a commentary on this work, Baron and Skovgaard-Olsen (2026) argue that (a) groups show less “nonsensical” judgments and (b) analyses controlling for this difference reveal that groups additionally show weaker concerns about moral norms. The current reply identifies conceptual and empirical problems with Baron and Skovgaard-Olsen's (2026) arguments. Expanding on this discussion, we present an alternative reanalysis of Rokosz et al.'s (2025) data to gauge the robustness of their findings against model specifications. Our reanalysis revealed (a) robust evidence that groups are more concerned about outcomes than individuals and (b) some evidence for differential concerns about moral norms, but this evidence is less reliable in that it depends on data-analytic choices.
{"title":"Many heads are more utilitarian than one, but are they also less deontological? Reply to Baron and Skovgaard-Olsen (2026)","authors":"Bertram Gawronski , Marta Rokosz , Michal M. Stefanczyk , Michał Białek","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106441","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106441","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using the CNI model to quantify three factors underlying moral-dilemma judgments, Rokosz et al. (2025) found that groups show greater concerns about outcomes than individuals, but do not differ in terms of norm adherence and general action tendencies. In a commentary on this work, Baron and Skovgaard-Olsen (2026) argue that (a) groups show less “nonsensical” judgments and (b) analyses controlling for this difference reveal that groups additionally show weaker concerns about moral norms. The current reply identifies conceptual and empirical problems with Baron and Skovgaard-Olsen's (2026) arguments. Expanding on this discussion, we present an alternative reanalysis of Rokosz et al.'s (2025) data to gauge the robustness of their findings against model specifications. Our reanalysis revealed (a) robust evidence that groups are more concerned about outcomes than individuals and (b) some evidence for differential concerns about moral norms, but this evidence is less reliable in that it depends on data-analytic choices.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"271 ","pages":"Article 106441"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2026-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145979898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-13DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106434
Mia Radovanovic , Jaemin Hwang , David M. Sobel , Jessica A. Sommerville
Concerns about fair resource exchanges are pervasive across development. However, existing work has focused primarily on resource distributions. The present experiments investigated whether 14- to 17-month-old North American infants demonstrate expectations for fair resource collection events, in contrast to expectations for resource distribution events. We found that infants' expectations for equal resource collections emerged by 16 months of age, whereas infants at all ages tested expected equal resource distributions. These findings suggest infants possess a broader, early-emerging understanding of fairness as it applies across resource exchanges, while highlighting a slight decalage in reasoning about resource collection versus distribution events.
{"title":"Origins of understanding fair resource collection","authors":"Mia Radovanovic , Jaemin Hwang , David M. Sobel , Jessica A. Sommerville","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106434","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106434","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Concerns about fair resource exchanges are pervasive across development. However, existing work has focused primarily on resource distributions. The present experiments investigated whether 14- to 17-month-old North American infants demonstrate expectations for fair resource collection events, in contrast to expectations for resource distribution events. We found that infants' expectations for equal resource collections emerged by 16 months of age, whereas infants at all ages tested expected equal resource distributions. These findings suggest infants possess a broader, early-emerging understanding of fairness as it applies across resource exchanges, while highlighting a slight decalage in reasoning about resource collection versus distribution events.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"271 ","pages":"Article 106434"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2026-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145979900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-13DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106440
Fritz Günther , Aliona Petrenco , Daniele Gatti
In verbal communication, speakers must encode meanings into signs such as words. Within a given language community, the correspondence between word forms and meanings can become conventionalized. However, speakers from different language communities cannot rely on these shared conventions. Here, we investigate whether purely verbal communication using single words is still possible in such a context, enabled by generalized form-meaning mappings. In a pre-registered experiment, we presented Italian speakers with words and instructed them to come up with corresponding German translations. The resulting German-like pseudowords were then shown to German speakers, who were asked to guess the original words. Supporting our hypotheses, results showed that the German participants’ guesses were semantically closer to the original words than to randomly selected control words. These findings highlight the remarkable human ability to spontaneously create and interpret meaningful signals, even across language boundaries and without relying on an established mutually-known lexicon.
{"title":"Cross-linguistic zero-shot communication via ad-hoc pseudowords","authors":"Fritz Günther , Aliona Petrenco , Daniele Gatti","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106440","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106440","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In verbal communication, speakers must encode meanings into signs such as words. Within a given language community, the correspondence between word forms and meanings can become conventionalized. However, speakers from different language communities cannot rely on these shared conventions. Here, we investigate whether purely verbal communication using single words is still possible in such a context, enabled by generalized form-meaning mappings. In a pre-registered experiment, we presented Italian speakers with words and instructed them to come up with corresponding German translations. The resulting German-like pseudowords were then shown to German speakers, who were asked to guess the original words. Supporting our hypotheses, results showed that the German participants’ guesses were semantically closer to the original words than to randomly selected control words. These findings highlight the remarkable human ability to spontaneously create and interpret meaningful signals, even across language boundaries and without relying on an established mutually-known lexicon.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"271 ","pages":"Article 106440"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2026-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145979903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-09DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106443
Yue Ji , Anna Papafragou
Event cognition is sensitive to whether an event is bounded (has a well-defined endpoint, e.g. build a sandcastle) or unbounded (lacks such an endpoint; e.g., play with sand). Boundedness interfaces with telicity in language: telic verb phrases denote events that include an inherent or natural endpoint while atelic verb phrases denote events that lack such an endpoint. Given that languages encode telicity in different ways, could these cross-linguistic differences influence the perception of event boundedness? We address this question by comparing English and Mandarin native speakers. We show that the two groups differ in their use of telicity in event descriptions (Experiment 1) but perform similarly when rating the likelihood of an event having a natural endpoint (Experiment 2) or attending to the temporal structure of bounded vs. unbounded events in a perceptual task (Experiment 3). These findings reveal commonalities in the representation of the temporal profile of events despite cross-linguistic differences.
{"title":"Representation of event boundedness in English and Mandarin speakers","authors":"Yue Ji , Anna Papafragou","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106443","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106443","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Event cognition is sensitive to whether an event is bounded (has a well-defined endpoint, e.g. build a sandcastle) or unbounded (lacks such an endpoint; e.g., play with sand). Boundedness interfaces with telicity in language: telic verb phrases denote events that include an inherent or natural endpoint while atelic verb phrases denote events that lack such an endpoint. Given that languages encode telicity in different ways, could these cross-linguistic differences influence the perception of event boundedness? We address this question by comparing English and Mandarin native speakers. We show that the two groups differ in their use of telicity in event descriptions (Experiment 1) but perform similarly when rating the likelihood of an event having a natural endpoint (Experiment 2) or attending to the temporal structure of bounded vs. unbounded events in a perceptual task (Experiment 3). These findings reveal commonalities in the representation of the temporal profile of events despite cross-linguistic differences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"271 ","pages":"Article 106443"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2026-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145928637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-09DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106439
Shachar Hochman , Mattan S. Ben-Shachar , Roi Cohen Kadosh , Avishai Henik
Numerical bias is the spontaneous tendency to base decisions on numerical rather than equally available non-numerical information. We introduce the Congruent Learning–Incongruent Probe (CLIP) task, a computerised paradigm for indexing numerical bias in adults. The task presents digit pairs that vary in numerical value and physical size, organised into blocks. In feedback-based learning trials, digits are congruent (larger number in larger font) and participants learn which stimulus is “correct” for that block. In subsequent no-feedback probe trials (test trials), the same pairs are presented incongruently, revealing whether choices are spontaneously driven by numerical or physical dimensions. A sample of 129 adults completed a multi-day battery to validate the CLIP task. Drift–diffusion modelling indicated substantial individual differences in numerical bias. Higher numerical bias correlated positively with maths fluency and quantitative reasoning, paralleling child findings on spontaneous focus on numerosity (SFON) and maths competence. To establish convergent validity, we also administered a numerical Stroop task that requires suppressing numerical information; individuals with stronger numerical bias showed larger interference and facilitation effects. These findings validate the CLIP task as a reliable measure of numerical bias and, more broadly, highlight how variability in spontaneous numerical processing shapes cognitive-control demands, illuminating the interplay between domain-specific biases and executive function.
{"title":"A novel task for measuring numerical bias among adults","authors":"Shachar Hochman , Mattan S. Ben-Shachar , Roi Cohen Kadosh , Avishai Henik","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106439","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106439","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Numerical bias is the spontaneous tendency to base decisions on numerical rather than equally available non-numerical information. We introduce the Congruent Learning–Incongruent Probe (CLIP) task, a computerised paradigm for indexing numerical bias in adults. The task presents digit pairs that vary in numerical value and physical size, organised into blocks. In feedback-based learning trials, digits are congruent (larger number in larger font) and participants learn which stimulus is “correct” for that block. In subsequent no-feedback probe trials (test trials), the same pairs are presented incongruently, revealing whether choices are spontaneously driven by numerical or physical dimensions. A sample of 129 adults completed a multi-day battery to validate the CLIP task. Drift–diffusion modelling indicated substantial individual differences in numerical bias. Higher numerical bias correlated positively with maths fluency and quantitative reasoning, paralleling child findings on spontaneous focus on numerosity (SFON) and maths competence. To establish convergent validity, we also administered a numerical Stroop task that requires suppressing numerical information; individuals with stronger numerical bias showed larger interference and facilitation effects. These findings validate the CLIP task as a reliable measure of numerical bias and, more broadly, highlight how variability in spontaneous numerical processing shapes cognitive-control demands, illuminating the interplay between domain-specific biases and executive function.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"271 ","pages":"Article 106439"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2026-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145928635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-09DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106328
Branden J. Bio , Sangeet Khemlani
Effective communication depends on reasoning about what others know and believe, and failures in executive functioning can disrupt the way adults reason about mental states. Studies reveal that failures in interpreting premises, simulating possibilities, and formulating conclusions can all yield systematic errors in reasoning – but no account exists of the specific sorts of error people produce when these failures occur in the context of mental state reasoning. We developed such a theory to account for both rational and error-prone mental state reasoning. The theory makes three proposals: first, people build representations of possibilities, and tag those representations, to distinguish knowledge from belief; second, they update, inspect, and consolidate representations of possibilities to engage in mental state reasoning; and third, they can integrate semantic contents into their representations of belief states by constructing or else blocking the construction of alternative possibilities. We tested the theory by examining the patterns of conclusions reasoners produced using a novel sentence construction interface or else through free response. These generative tasks permitted analyses of participants' tendency to draw sensible epistemic conclusions as well as their systematic errors, and they corroborate the central tenets of the theory.
{"title":"Naïve epistemics: A theory of rational and error-prone mental state reasoning","authors":"Branden J. Bio , Sangeet Khemlani","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106328","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106328","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Effective communication depends on reasoning about what others know and believe, and failures in executive functioning can disrupt the way adults reason about mental states. Studies reveal that failures in interpreting premises, simulating possibilities, and formulating conclusions can all yield systematic errors in reasoning – but no account exists of the specific sorts of error people produce when these failures occur in the context of mental state reasoning. We developed such a theory to account for both rational and error-prone mental state reasoning. The theory makes three proposals: first, people build representations of possibilities, and tag those representations, to distinguish knowledge from belief; second, they update, inspect, and consolidate representations of possibilities to engage in mental state reasoning; and third, they can integrate semantic contents into their representations of belief states by constructing or else blocking the construction of alternative possibilities. We tested the theory by examining the patterns of conclusions reasoners produced using a novel sentence construction interface or else through free response. These generative tasks permitted analyses of participants' tendency to draw sensible epistemic conclusions as well as their systematic errors, and they corroborate the central tenets of the theory.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"271 ","pages":"Article 106328"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2026-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145928638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-09DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106435
Solveig Tonn , Viola Mocke , Moritz Schaaf , Wilfried Kunde
Because prevention actions result in the non-occurrence of certain events, it is rather unclear how action-event linkages can emerge for these action types. Here, we investigated whether verbal instructions alone can establish such linkages and how they influence behavior. Therefore, participants had to memorize propositional knowledge about prevention actions, and we tested how actions in a subsequent, unrelated task were impacted by this knowledge. Our results demonstrate that actions were facilitated by the very event they are known to prevent, not by the absence of this event. Thus, these action-event linkages were both (a) ‘propositional’, as they were established by verbal instructions alone, and also (b) ‘associative’, as they impacted behavior akin to unqualified, bidirectional associations.
{"title":"Instructed prevention actions reveal the associative nature of propositional response-effect contingency knowledge","authors":"Solveig Tonn , Viola Mocke , Moritz Schaaf , Wilfried Kunde","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106435","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106435","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Because prevention actions result in the <em>non</em>-occurrence of certain events, it is rather unclear how action-event linkages can emerge for these action types. Here, we investigated whether verbal instructions alone can establish such linkages and how they influence behavior. Therefore, participants had to memorize propositional knowledge about prevention actions, and we tested how actions in a subsequent, unrelated task were impacted by this knowledge. Our results demonstrate that actions were facilitated by the very event they are known to prevent, not by the absence of this event. Thus, these action-event linkages were both (a) ‘propositional’, as they were established by verbal instructions alone, and also (b) ‘associative’, as they impacted behavior akin to unqualified, bidirectional associations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"271 ","pages":"Article 106435"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2026-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145928636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-08DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106411
Ponrawee Prasertsom, Kenny Smith, Jennifer Culbertson
Languages appear limited in the range of concepts that are grammatically encoded. For example, person, number, and animacy distinctions are regularly found in e.g., grammatical agreement systems. But, despite their visual salience, colour distinctions are completely absent from such systems. Some have taken this to indicate domain-specific constraints on what can and cannot be part of grammars. Here, we test an alternative possibility, that domain-general cognitive capacities can explain these regularities. Using animacy- and colour-based agreement as our test cases, we show that a bias for animacy over colour indeed exists during learning of a miniature artificial agreement system. We then show that a parallel animacy-over-colour bias is found in a non-linguistic sorting task. Finally, we explore the cognitive roots of the animacy bias. Specifically, we ask whether it is driven by a domain-general categorisation principle favouring categorisation based on features that are highly predictive of other features. Using natural language corpus data, we find that animacy-based classification produces distinct and more compact categories, which are more easily learnable. We also find preliminary causal evidence for this explanation: when animacy is less predictive of other object features than colour, learners who notice this novel predictive structure learn animacy-based noun classes worse. Taken together, our results support the idea that domain-general principles may be responsible for the prevalence of certain semantic distinctions over others in grammar.
{"title":"Domain-general categorisation explains constrained cross-linguistic variation in noun classification","authors":"Ponrawee Prasertsom, Kenny Smith, Jennifer Culbertson","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106411","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106411","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Languages appear limited in the range of concepts that are grammatically encoded. For example, person, number, and animacy distinctions are regularly found in e.g., grammatical agreement systems. But, despite their visual salience, colour distinctions are completely absent from such systems. Some have taken this to indicate domain-specific constraints on what can and cannot be part of grammars. Here, we test an alternative possibility, that domain-general cognitive capacities can explain these regularities. Using animacy- and colour-based agreement as our test cases, we show that a bias for animacy over colour indeed exists during learning of a miniature artificial agreement system. We then show that a parallel animacy-over-colour bias is found in a non-linguistic sorting task. Finally, we explore the cognitive roots of the animacy bias. Specifically, we ask whether it is driven by a domain-general categorisation principle favouring categorisation based on features that are highly predictive of other features. Using natural language corpus data, we find that animacy-based classification produces distinct and more compact categories, which are more easily learnable. We also find preliminary causal evidence for this explanation: when animacy is less predictive of other object features than colour, learners who notice this novel predictive structure learn animacy-based noun classes worse. Taken together, our results support the idea that domain-general principles may be responsible for the prevalence of certain semantic distinctions over others in grammar.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"271 ","pages":"Article 106411"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2026-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145928639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-07DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106423
Nadine Lavan , Andrey Anikin
Listeners rapidly form trait impressions from voices, inferring multiple person characteristics within milliseconds. We employed a novel method, Self-Steered Sound Synthesis (S4), to identify and compare the acoustic signatures underlying these impressions. Participants interactively used S4 to synthesise voices expressing six person characteristics - age, masculinity, health, attractiveness, dominance, and trustworthiness - by manipulating four perceptually salient acoustic dimensions: mean pitch, pitch excursion, breathiness, and formant spacing. Masculinity, older age, and dominance were conveyed by lowering mean pitch and formant spacing, consistent with projecting the impression of a large person, and by flattening the intonation. Physical health, attractiveness, and trustworthiness were conveyed by choosing less extreme and more “typical” acoustic properties. A second perceptual experiment confirmed that the synthesised voices from Experiment 1 indeed conveyed the intended person characteristics to an independent sample of listeners, and that listeners relied on similar acoustic cues for their evaluations. From a methodological perspective, we demonstrate the robustness of S4 and present convergent evidence from two drastically different approaches, thus providing a comprehensive account of impression formation that bridges voice production (or synthesis) and perception. From a theoretical perspective, our findings agree with the hypothesis that trait impressions occur within a continuous “trait space”, highlighting the graded and intercorrelated nature of different person characteristics on a perceptual and conceptual level. We extend this framework by showing that not only perceptual judgements, but also the acoustic signatures of person characteristics show intercorrelations, thus integrating acoustic cues into perceptual models of voice perception.
{"title":"Making an impression: Participant-led voice synthesis reveals the acoustic signatures of trait impressions","authors":"Nadine Lavan , Andrey Anikin","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106423","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106423","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Listeners rapidly form trait impressions from voices, inferring multiple person characteristics within milliseconds. We employed a novel method, Self-Steered Sound Synthesis (S4), to identify and compare the acoustic signatures underlying these impressions. Participants interactively used S4 to synthesise voices expressing six person characteristics - age, masculinity, health, attractiveness, dominance, and trustworthiness - by manipulating four perceptually salient acoustic dimensions: mean pitch, pitch excursion, breathiness, and formant spacing. Masculinity, older age, and dominance were conveyed by lowering mean pitch and formant spacing, consistent with projecting the impression of a large person, and by flattening the intonation. Physical health, attractiveness, and trustworthiness were conveyed by choosing less extreme and more “typical” acoustic properties. A second perceptual experiment confirmed that the synthesised voices from Experiment 1 indeed conveyed the intended person characteristics to an independent sample of listeners, and that listeners relied on similar acoustic cues for their evaluations. From a methodological perspective, we demonstrate the robustness of S4 and present convergent evidence from two drastically different approaches, thus providing a comprehensive account of impression formation that bridges voice production (or synthesis) and perception. From a theoretical perspective, our findings agree with the hypothesis that trait impressions occur within a continuous “trait space”, highlighting the graded and intercorrelated nature of different person characteristics on a perceptual and conceptual level. We extend this framework by showing that not only perceptual judgements, but also the acoustic signatures of person characteristics show intercorrelations, thus integrating acoustic cues into perceptual models of voice perception.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"271 ","pages":"Article 106423"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2026-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145928641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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