Pub Date : 2025-03-09DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106111
Eelke de Vries, Freek van Ede
Space provides a foundational scaffold for retaining and selecting visual information in working memory. It remains unclear, however, whether and how spatial organisation in visual working memory persists over temporally extended memory delays, particularly when the locations of memoranda are incidental and never probed for report. Studies using continuous spatial markers of working-memory retention often report a gradual decay over time, which may or may not reflect a genuine decay in spatial organisation within working memory. To examine this, we capitalised on two recently established spatial eye-movement (microsaccade) markers of ‘location-based mnemonic rehearsal’ and ‘location-based mnemonic selection’ that we here studied during and following short (1 s), medium (3 s), and long (5 s) working-memory delays. Our findings, replicated across two experiments, demonstrate that while markers of location-based rehearsal may diminish throughout the working-memory delay, mnemonic selection remains anchored to incidentally encoded object locations. This implies that spatial organisation in working memory is preserved even when markers of active spatial rehearsal have meanwhile decayed, suggesting the notion of a “silent spatial scaffold” for working memory.
{"title":"Microsaccades reveal preserved spatial organisation in visual working memory despite decay in location-based rehearsal","authors":"Eelke de Vries, Freek van Ede","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106111","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106111","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Space provides a foundational scaffold for retaining and selecting visual information in working memory. It remains unclear, however, whether and how spatial organisation in visual working memory persists over temporally extended memory delays, particularly when the locations of memoranda are incidental and never probed for report. Studies using continuous spatial markers of working-memory retention often report a gradual decay over time, which may or may not reflect a genuine decay in spatial organisation within working memory. To examine this, we capitalised on two recently established spatial eye-movement (microsaccade) markers of ‘location-based mnemonic rehearsal’ and ‘location-based mnemonic selection’ that we here studied during and following short (1 s), medium (3 s), and long (5 s) working-memory delays. Our findings, replicated across two experiments, demonstrate that while markers of location-based rehearsal may diminish throughout the working-memory delay, mnemonic selection remains anchored to incidentally encoded object locations. This implies that spatial organisation in working memory is preserved even when markers of active spatial rehearsal have meanwhile decayed, suggesting the notion of a “silent spatial scaffold” for working memory.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"259 ","pages":"Article 106111"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143580395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-08DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106107
Ohad Dan , Maya Leshkowitz , Ohad Livnat , Ran R. Hassin
More information today is becoming more accessible to more people at an ever-growing rate. How does epistemic curiosity operate in this expanding informational landscape? We test a novel theory which postulates that experienced curiosity is a function of two psychological factors: Interest, which is cognitive, “cool” and relatively stable in time, and Urge that is “hot” and quick to rise and decay. These factors determine one's experienced curiosity at any given point in time. Interestingly, these temporal dynamics may lead to time-dependent changes in epistemic choices. In a series of forced-choice experiments (n = 702), participants chose between receiving answers to either high-Urge or high-Interest questions. Consistent with predictions derived from our theory, we found a present-bias in preference for Urge. Our theory explains why, in stark contrast to individual interest and with the potential to derail public discourse, a competition for our attention inherently incentivizes the use of inciting and sensational information. We present and test a theory-based behavioral nudge that partially ameliorates these effects.
Statement of relevance
Understanding the fundamentals of epistemic choices has important individual, societal, and economic implications. We develop and test a two-factor model, which captures cognitive and motivational determinants of curiosity. The model accounts for a modern-day paradox: how we chronically defer the consumption of information we find interesting (e.g., works of art and science), by succumbing to epistemic urges (e.g., finding the whereabouts of celebrities). From a societal perspective, an abundance of information in an environment that monetizes attention motivates the engineering of information for immediate engagement. We provide a novel psychological framework to describe the information attraction governing our daily lives. We also show how our theory may be used to allow people to consume more of the information they actually want, rather than the information they are tempted to consume.
{"title":"Urges now, interests later: On the factors and dynamics of epistemic curiosity","authors":"Ohad Dan , Maya Leshkowitz , Ohad Livnat , Ran R. Hassin","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106107","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106107","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>More information today is becoming more accessible to more people at an ever-growing rate. How does epistemic curiosity operate in this expanding informational landscape? We test a novel theory which postulates that experienced curiosity is a function of two psychological factors: Interest, which is cognitive, “cool” and relatively stable in time, and Urge that is “hot” and quick to rise and decay. These factors determine one's experienced curiosity at any given point in time. Interestingly, these temporal dynamics may lead to time-dependent changes in epistemic choices. In a series of forced-choice experiments (<em>n</em> = 702), participants chose between receiving answers to either high-Urge or high-Interest questions. Consistent with predictions derived from our theory, we found a present-bias in preference for Urge. Our theory explains why, in stark contrast to individual interest and with the potential to derail public discourse, a competition for our attention inherently incentivizes the use of inciting and sensational information. We present and test a theory-based behavioral nudge that partially ameliorates these effects.</div></div><div><h3>Statement of relevance</h3><div>Understanding the fundamentals of epistemic choices has important individual, societal, and economic implications. We develop and test a two-factor model, which captures cognitive and motivational determinants of curiosity. The model accounts for a modern-day paradox: how we chronically defer the consumption of information we find interesting (e.g., works of art and science), by succumbing to epistemic urges (e.g., finding the whereabouts of celebrities). From a societal perspective, an abundance of information in an environment that monetizes attention motivates the engineering of information for immediate engagement. We provide a novel psychological framework to describe the information attraction governing our daily lives. We also show how our theory may be used to allow people to consume more of the information they actually want, rather than the information they are tempted to consume.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"259 ","pages":"Article 106107"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143580394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-06DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106110
Tal Boger , Brent Strickland
Our minds consistently distort memories of objects and events. Oftentimes, these distortions serve to transform incoherent memories into coherent ones, as when we misremember partial events as whole (“event completion”). What mechanisms drive these distortions? Whereas extant work shows that representations of causality, continuity, familiarity, physical coherence, or event coherence create memory distortions, we suggest that a simpler and more fundamental mechanism may be at play: object persistence. Merely seeing an object take part in an event can create a persisting memory of its presence throughout that event. In 8 pre-registered experiments (N = 317 adults), participants performed a simple task where they watched an animation, then chose whether or not a frame from the animation contained an object. Participants falsely remembered seeing an object when it was not there (E1). These effects persisted in the absence of causality (E2), continuity (E3), event familiarity (E4), object familiarity (E5), even when the events violated physical laws (E6), and when the events themselves were not coherent (E7). However, the effect disappeared when we abolished object persistence (E8). Thus, object persistence alone creates rich, enduring, and coherent representations of objects and events.
{"title":"Object persistence explains event completion","authors":"Tal Boger , Brent Strickland","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106110","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106110","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Our minds consistently distort memories of objects and events. Oftentimes, these distortions serve to transform incoherent memories into coherent ones, as when we misremember partial events as whole (“event completion”). What mechanisms drive these distortions? Whereas extant work shows that representations of causality, continuity, familiarity, physical coherence, or event coherence create memory distortions, we suggest that a simpler and more fundamental mechanism may be at play: object persistence. Merely seeing an object take part in an event can create a persisting memory of its presence throughout that event. In 8 pre-registered experiments (<em>N</em> = 317 adults), participants performed a simple task where they watched an animation, then chose whether or not a frame from the animation contained an object. Participants falsely remembered seeing an object when it was not there (E1). These effects persisted in the absence of causality (E2), continuity (E3), event familiarity (E4), object familiarity (E5), even when the events violated physical laws (E6), and when the events themselves were not coherent (E7). However, the effect disappeared when we abolished object persistence (E8). Thus, object persistence alone creates rich, enduring, and coherent representations of objects and events.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"259 ","pages":"Article 106110"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143562820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-06DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106098
Puneeth N. Chakravarthula , Jacob E. Suffridge , Shuo Wang
Humans can rapidly memorize numerous images, which is surprising considering the limited visual sampling of each image. To enhance the probability of recognition, it is crucial to focus on previously sampled locations most likely to support memory. How does the visuomotor system achieve this? To study this, we analyzed the eye movements of a group of neurotypical observers while they performed a natural scene memorization task. Using comprehensive gaze analysis and computational modeling, we show that observers traded off visual exploration for exploiting information at the most memorable scene locations with repeated viewing. Furthermore, both the explore-exploit trade-off and gaze consistency predicted accurate recognition memory. Finally, false alarms were predicted by confusion of the incoming visual information at fixated locations with previously sampled information from other images. Together, our findings shed light on the symbiotic relationship between attention and memory in facilitating accurate natural scene memory.
{"title":"Gaze dynamics during natural scene memorization and recognition","authors":"Puneeth N. Chakravarthula , Jacob E. Suffridge , Shuo Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106098","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106098","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Humans can rapidly memorize numerous images, which is surprising considering the limited visual sampling of each image. To enhance the probability of recognition, it is crucial to focus on previously sampled locations most likely to support memory. How does the visuomotor system achieve this? To study this, we analyzed the eye movements of a group of neurotypical observers while they performed a natural scene memorization task. Using comprehensive gaze analysis and computational modeling, we show that observers traded off visual exploration for exploiting information at the most memorable scene locations with repeated viewing. Furthermore, both the explore-exploit trade-off and gaze consistency predicted accurate recognition memory. Finally, false alarms were predicted by confusion of the incoming visual information at fixated locations with previously sampled information from other images. Together, our findings shed light on the symbiotic relationship between attention and memory in facilitating accurate natural scene memory.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"259 ","pages":"Article 106098"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143562821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Observing the world from another's perspective is a fundamental social cognitive ability essential for human cooperation. With the increasing prevalence of intelligent systems in our society, highly intelligent social robots such as R2-D2 in Star Wars is becoming a reality, thus it is compelling to explore how this capability can extend from humans to non-human agents. Although previous research indicates that a human-like appearance might facilitate this extension, our study contends that human-like actions are more critical. We conducted four experiments involving agents that did not resemble humans but could perform two human-like actions: reach and gaze, which exhibited the perceptual and behavioral abilities that were essential for social interaction. The experiments found that agents prompted spontaneous perspective-taking among participants when they displayed both actions. Importantly, perspective-taking was maintained only when gaze preceded reach, underscoring the causal relationship that behavior should be interpreted as the consequence of perception. These results highlight the importance of human-like actions rather than mere appearance in fostering spontaneous perspective-taking towards non-human agents, providing insights for improving human-agent interaction.
{"title":"Good to see you R2-D2: Inducing spontaneous perspective-taking towards non-human agents through human-like gaze and reach","authors":"Xucong Hu, Haokui Xu, Hui Chen, Mowei Shen, Jifan Zhou","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106101","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106101","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Observing the world from another's perspective is a fundamental social cognitive ability essential for human cooperation. With the increasing prevalence of intelligent systems in our society, highly intelligent social robots such as R2-D2 in Star Wars is becoming a reality, thus it is compelling to explore how this capability can extend from humans to non-human agents. Although previous research indicates that a human-like appearance might facilitate this extension, our study contends that human-like actions are more critical. We conducted four experiments involving agents that did not resemble humans but could perform two human-like actions: reach and gaze, which exhibited the perceptual and behavioral abilities that were essential for social interaction. The experiments found that agents prompted spontaneous perspective-taking among participants when they displayed both actions. Importantly, perspective-taking was maintained only when gaze preceded reach, underscoring the causal relationship that behavior should be interpreted as the consequence of perception. These results highlight the importance of human-like actions rather than mere appearance in fostering spontaneous perspective-taking towards non-human agents, providing insights for improving human-agent interaction.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"259 ","pages":"Article 106101"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143549545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-04DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106097
Nicolas Pillaud, François Ric
The existence of a close, if not direct, link between evaluation and action is widely assumed in the literature. Supporting this view, studies have shown that approach movements are executed faster in response to positive than negative stimuli, whereas avoidance responses are faster in response to negative than to positive stimuli (the often called “Approach/Avoidance—AA—compatibility effect”). However, this view has been challenged by proposals suggesting that this effect could be at least partially due to the use of affective information to answer the prevalent question individuals have in mind during the task. Consistent with these proposals, we report four preregistered studies showing that the AA compatibility effect can be moderated and even reversed by manipulating the question participants have in mind while doing an approach/avoidance task. In addition, results of a fifth experiment revealed that the AA compatibility effect emerged essentially among participants who reported simplifying the task by asking themselves whether they should approach (vs. not). These results suggest that the evaluation-action link is less direct than assumed and may be underlain by high-level cognitive processes.
{"title":"The evaluation-behavior link revisited: It depends on the question you have in mind","authors":"Nicolas Pillaud, François Ric","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106097","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106097","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The existence of a close, if not direct, link between evaluation and action is widely assumed in the literature. Supporting this view, studies have shown that approach movements are executed faster in response to positive than negative stimuli, whereas avoidance responses are faster in response to negative than to positive stimuli (the often called “Approach/Avoidance—AA—compatibility effect”). However, this view has been challenged by proposals suggesting that this effect could be at least partially due to the use of affective information to answer the prevalent question individuals have in mind during the task. Consistent with these proposals, we report four preregistered studies showing that the AA compatibility effect can be moderated and even reversed by manipulating the question participants have in mind while doing an approach/avoidance task. In addition, results of a fifth experiment revealed that the AA compatibility effect emerged essentially among participants who reported simplifying the task by asking themselves whether they should approach (vs. not). These results suggest that the evaluation-action link is less direct than assumed and may be underlain by high-level cognitive processes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"259 ","pages":"Article 106097"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143535239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-28DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106099
Simone Gastaldon , Giulia Calignano
In this manuscript we provide a commentary and a complementary analysis of Cirillo et al.'s (2022) study on conceptual alignment in a joint picture naming task involving a social robot (Cognition, 227, 105,213). In their study, Cirillo and collaborators present evidence suggesting automatic alignment by examining response proportions, reflecting adaptation to the lexical choices made by the artificial agent (i.e., providing category names instead of basic names for specific semantic categories). Here, we conducted a complementary analysis using the openly available dataset, employing a multiverse approach and focusing on response times as a more nuanced measure of cognitive processing and automaticity. Our findings indicate that alignment in the Category condition (i.e., when the robot provided a superordinate label) is associated with longer response times and greater variability. When providing the basic label in the Basic condition, RTs are much shorter and variability is reduced, compatible with the Basic-level advantage phenomenon. Non-alignment to each condition completely reverses the pattern. This suggests that aligning when producing a superordinate label is a strategic and effortful rather than an automatic response mechanism. Furthermore, through comprehensive visual exploration of response proportions across potentially influential variables, we observed category naming alignment primarily emerging in specific semantic categories, and mostly for stimuli with basic labels at low lexical frequency and newly designed pictures not taken from the MultiPic database, thus suggesting a limited generalizability of the effect. These insights were confirmed using leave-one-out robustness checks. In conclusion, our contribution provides complementary evidence in support of strategic rather than automatic responses when aligning with Category labels in the analyzed dataset, with a limited generalizability despite all the balancing procedures the authors carefully implemented in the experimental material. This is likely to reflect individual task strategies rather than genuine alignment. Lastly, we suggest directions for future research on linguistic alignment, building on insights from both Cirillo et al.'s study and our commentary. We also briefly discuss the Open Science principles that shaped our approach to this work.
{"title":"Linguistic alignment with an artificial agent: A commentary and re-analysis","authors":"Simone Gastaldon , Giulia Calignano","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106099","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106099","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this manuscript we provide a commentary and a complementary analysis of <span><span>Cirillo et al.'s (2022)</span></span> study on conceptual alignment in a joint picture naming task involving a social robot (<em>Cognition</em>, 227, 105,213). In their study, Cirillo and collaborators present evidence suggesting <em>automatic</em> alignment by examining response proportions, reflecting adaptation to the lexical choices made by the artificial agent (i.e., providing category names instead of basic names for specific semantic categories). Here, we conducted a complementary analysis using the openly available dataset, employing a multiverse approach and focusing on response times as a more nuanced measure of cognitive processing and automaticity. Our findings indicate that alignment in the Category condition (i.e., when the robot provided a superordinate label) is associated with longer response times and greater variability. When providing the basic label in the Basic condition, RTs are much shorter and variability is reduced, compatible with the Basic-level advantage phenomenon. Non-alignment to each condition completely reverses the pattern. This suggests that aligning when producing a superordinate label is a <em>strategic</em> and <em>effortful</em> rather than an automatic response mechanism. Furthermore, through comprehensive visual exploration of response proportions across potentially influential variables, we observed category naming alignment primarily emerging in specific semantic categories, and mostly for stimuli with basic labels at low lexical frequency and newly designed pictures not taken from the MultiPic database, thus suggesting a limited generalizability of the effect. These insights were confirmed using leave-one-out robustness checks. In conclusion, our contribution provides complementary evidence in support of strategic rather than automatic responses when aligning with Category labels in the analyzed dataset, with a limited generalizability despite all the balancing procedures the authors carefully implemented in the experimental material. This is likely to reflect individual task strategies rather than genuine alignment. Lastly, we suggest directions for future research on linguistic alignment, building on insights from both Cirillo et al.'s study and our commentary. We also briefly discuss the Open Science principles that shaped our approach to this work.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"259 ","pages":"Article 106099"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143518925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-26DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106076
Sunghyun Kim, Yang Seok Cho
Internalizing regularities between motor responses and stimuli is crucial for adaptive functioning. However, the influence of these regularities on attentional selection remains poorly understood. This study explored whether responses, which predict the locations of search targets, direct attention toward these associated locations, a phenomenon termed response-induced attention. The experiments consist of acquisition and test phases. In the acquisition phase, participants performed a dual task involving an identification task followed by a search task. In the identification task, participants responded to the color of an object presented at the center. Immediately after this response, a search target appeared on either the left or right side. Critically, the response for the identification target predicted a more probable location of the search target. Faster responses for search targets were observed at the response-cued location than the other location, suggesting an attentional bias toward the response-cued location. In the test phase, the colors of identification targets were changed, and the responses for the identification targets were no longer informative about the search target locations. Nevertheless, search remained faster when targets appeared at the response-cued location, suggesting that responses, not colors, guided attention. This response-induced attention effect was observed in Experiment 1, where responses predicted spatially compatible target locations, as well as in Experiments 2 and 3, where they predicted incompatible locations. Experiment 4 confirmed that the observed effects resulted from the spatial distribution of attention. These findings provide new insights into the ability to learn response-stimulus regularities for the intelligent allocation of attention, demonstrating the significant role of the motor dimension in attentional selection.
{"title":"Responses guide attention","authors":"Sunghyun Kim, Yang Seok Cho","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106076","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106076","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Internalizing regularities between motor responses and stimuli is crucial for adaptive functioning. However, the influence of these regularities on attentional selection remains poorly understood. This study explored whether responses, which predict the locations of search targets, direct attention toward these associated locations, a phenomenon termed <em>response-induced attention.</em> The experiments consist of acquisition and test phases. In the acquisition phase, participants performed a dual task involving an identification task followed by a search task. In the identification task, participants responded to the color of an object presented at the center. Immediately after this response, a search target appeared on either the left or right side. Critically, the response for the identification target predicted a more probable location of the search target. Faster responses for search targets were observed at the response-cued location than the other location, suggesting an attentional bias toward the response-cued location. In the test phase, the colors of identification targets were changed, and the responses for the identification targets were no longer informative about the search target locations. Nevertheless, search remained faster when targets appeared at the response-cued location, suggesting that responses, not colors, guided attention. This response-induced attention effect was observed in Experiment 1, where responses predicted spatially compatible target locations, as well as in Experiments 2 and 3, where they predicted incompatible locations. Experiment 4 confirmed that the observed effects resulted from the spatial distribution of attention. These findings provide new insights into the ability to learn response-stimulus regularities for the intelligent allocation of attention, demonstrating the significant role of the motor dimension in attentional selection.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"258 ","pages":"Article 106076"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143487543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-21DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106090
Greta Arancia Sanna, David Lagnado
This paper investigates the process of belief updating in the presence of contradictory and potentially misleading information, focusing on the impact of source reliability. Across four experiments, we examined how individuals revise their beliefs when confronted with retracted information and varying source credibility. Experiment 1 revealed that participants discounted retracted information and reverted to their prior beliefs, in contrast to the Continued Influence Effect commonly reported in the literature. Experiment 2 demonstrated that source reliability significantly influences belief updating: reliable sources led participants to discount initial allegations more effectively than unreliable sources. Experiments 3 and 4 examined how people update their beliefs given opposing sources of differing reliability; we found that participants appropriately incorporated source reliability and penalised sources that were corrected, regardless of the corrector's reliability. Additionally, in contrast to previous research, both trustworthiness and expertise contributed to judgments of source reliability. Our results resolve some of the mixed findings in previous research, and highlight that individuals' belief updating are rationally sensitive to differences in source reliability. Our findings have broad implications for correcting misinformation in political, medical, and other applied contexts, and further underscore the need to ground misinformation correction strategies in robust psychological research.
{"title":"Belief updating in the face of misinformation: The role of source reliability","authors":"Greta Arancia Sanna, David Lagnado","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106090","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106090","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the process of belief updating in the presence of contradictory and potentially misleading information, focusing on the impact of source reliability. Across four experiments, we examined how individuals revise their beliefs when confronted with retracted information and varying source credibility. Experiment 1 revealed that participants discounted retracted information and reverted to their prior beliefs, in contrast to the Continued Influence Effect commonly reported in the literature. Experiment 2 demonstrated that source reliability significantly influences belief updating: reliable sources led participants to discount initial allegations more effectively than unreliable sources. Experiments 3 and 4 examined how people update their beliefs given opposing sources of differing reliability; we found that participants appropriately incorporated source reliability and penalised sources that were corrected, regardless of the corrector's reliability. Additionally, in contrast to previous research, both trustworthiness and expertise contributed to judgments of source reliability. Our results resolve some of the mixed findings in previous research, and highlight that individuals' belief updating are rationally sensitive to differences in source reliability. Our findings have broad implications for correcting misinformation in political, medical, and other applied contexts, and further underscore the need to ground misinformation correction strategies in robust psychological research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"258 ","pages":"Article 106090"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2025-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143464662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-21DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106088
Laura J. Batterink, Sarah Hsiung, Daniela Herrera-Chaves, Stefan Köhler
The sensory input that we encounter while navigating through each day is highly structured, containing patterns that repeat over time. Statistical learning is the process of becoming attuned to these patterns and can facilitate online processing. These online facilitation effects are often ascribed to prediction, in which information about an upcoming event is represented before it occurs. However, previously observed facilitation effects could also be due to retrospective processing. Here, using a speech-based segmentation paradigm, we tested whether statistical learning leads to the prediction of upcoming syllables. Specifically, we probed for a behavioural hallmark of genuine prediction, in which a given prediction benefits online processing when confirmed, but incurs costs if disconfirmed. In line with the idea that prediction is a key outcome of statistical learning, we found a trade-off in which a greater benefit for processing predictable syllables was associated with a greater cost in processing syllables that occurred in a “mismatch” context, outside of their expected positions. This trade-off in making predictions was evident at both the participant and the item (i.e., individual syllable) level. Further, we found that prediction did not emerge indiscriminately to all syllables in the input stream, but was deployed selectively according to the trial-by-trial demands of the task. Explicit knowledge of a given word was not required for prediction to occur, suggesting that prediction operates largely implicitly. Overall, these results provide novel behavioural evidence that prediction arises as a natural consequence of statistical learning.
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