Pub Date : 2024-10-25DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105994
Pearl Han Li , Melissa A. Koenig
Recent research shows that children's moral judgments can be influenced by testimony, but it remains unclear whether certain types of testimony are more influential than others. Here we examined two specific types of moral testimony - one that appealed to the authority of the speaker and one that appealed to the consequence of the action - and measured how each type of testimony moved children's judgments about harm. Chinese (N = 181; 45.3 % girls; all ethnically Chinese, middle-class) and U.S children (N = 198; 55.6 % girls; predominantly White, middle-class) were presented with countervailing testimony that justified novel, distress-inducing actions as acceptable, either by appealing to the speaker's authority or by reasoning about the positive consequences of the action. Both types of explanations significantly influenced children's moral judgments, leading children from both cultures to judge harm-related actions as more morally permissible. However, with age, children across both cultures became less receptive towards authority-based explanations. Neither type of explanation affected adults' (N = 180, recruited online from across China and the U.S.) moral judgments. Together, these findings provide developmental evidence on the types of explanations that influence children's moral judgments about actions that cause harm.
{"title":"Appealing to consequences, or authority? The influence of explanations on children's moral judgments across two cultures","authors":"Pearl Han Li , Melissa A. Koenig","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105994","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105994","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Recent research shows that children's moral judgments can be influenced by testimony, but it remains unclear whether certain types of testimony are more influential than others. Here we examined two specific types of moral testimony - one that appealed to the authority of the speaker and one that appealed to the consequence of the action - and measured how each type of testimony moved children's judgments about harm. Chinese (<em>N</em> = 181; 45.3 % girls; all ethnically Chinese, middle-class) and U.S children (<em>N</em> = 198; 55.6 % girls; predominantly White, middle-class) were presented with countervailing testimony that justified novel, distress-inducing actions as acceptable, either by appealing to the speaker's authority or by reasoning about the positive consequences of the action. Both types of explanations significantly influenced children's moral judgments, leading children from both cultures to judge harm-related actions as more morally permissible. However, with age, children across both cultures became less receptive towards authority-based explanations. Neither type of explanation affected adults' (<em>N</em> = 180, recruited online from across China and the U.S.) moral judgments. Together, these findings provide developmental evidence on the types of explanations that influence children's moral judgments about actions that cause harm.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105994"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142510594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-25DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105977
Hao Yu , Fredrik Allenmark , Hermann J. Müller , Zhuanghua Shi
People can learn and use both static and dynamic (cross-trial) regularities in the positioning of target items during parallel, ‘pop-out’ visual search. Static target-location learning also works in serial search, however, acquiring dynamic regularities is hindered by the demands of item-by-item scanning. Also, questions have been raised regarding whether explicit awareness is necessary for using dynamic regularities to optimize performance. The present study re-examined if dynamic regularities can be learned in serial search when regular shifts of the target location occur frequently, and if such learning correlates with awareness of the dynamic rule. We adopted the same regularity used by Yu et al. (2023) to demonstrate dynamic learning in parallel search: a cross-trial shift of the target location in a (counter-)clockwise direction within a circular array in 80 % of the trials, compared to irregular shifts in the opposite direction (10 %) or some other random direction (10 %). The results showed that about 70 % of participants learned the dynamic regularity, with performance gains correlating with awareness: the more accurately they estimated the likelihood of the target shifting in the frequent direction, the greater their gains. Importantly, part of the gains accrued already early during the search: a large proportion of the very first and short-latency eye movements were directed to the predicted location, regardless of the target appeared there. We discuss whether this rule-driven behavior is causally mediated by conscious control.
{"title":"Learning regular cross-trial shifts of the target location in serial search involves awareness – An eye-tracking study","authors":"Hao Yu , Fredrik Allenmark , Hermann J. Müller , Zhuanghua Shi","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105977","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105977","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>People can learn and use both static and dynamic (cross-trial) regularities in the positioning of <em>target</em> items during parallel, ‘pop-out’ visual search. Static target-location learning also works in serial search, however, acquiring dynamic regularities is hindered by the demands of item-by-item scanning. Also, questions have been raised regarding whether explicit awareness is necessary for using dynamic regularities to optimize performance. The present study re-examined if dynamic regularities can be learned in serial search when regular shifts of the target location occur frequently, and if such learning correlates with awareness of the dynamic rule. We adopted the same regularity used by <span><span>Yu et al. (2023)</span></span> to demonstrate dynamic learning in parallel search: a cross-trial shift of the target location in a (counter-)clockwise direction within a circular array in 80 % of the trials, compared to irregular shifts in the opposite direction (10 %) or some other random direction (10 %). The results showed that about 70 % of participants learned the dynamic regularity, with performance gains correlating with awareness: the more accurately they estimated the likelihood of the target shifting in the frequent direction, the greater their gains. Importantly, part of the gains accrued already early during the search: a large proportion of the very first and short-latency eye movements were directed to the predicted location, regardless of the target appeared there. We discuss whether this rule-driven behavior is causally mediated by conscious control.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105977"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142510596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-24DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105993
Uri Hertz , Raphael Köster , Marco A. Janssen , Joel Z. Leibo
Social-ecological systems, in which agents interact with each other and their environment are important both for sustainability applications and for under- standing how human cognition functions in context. In such systems, the en- vironment shapes the agents' experience and actions, and in turn collective action of agents changes social and physical aspects of the environment. Here we review current investigation approaches, which rely on a lean design, with discrete actions and outcomes and little scope for varying environmental pa- rameters and cognitive demands. We then introduce multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) approach, which builds on modern artificial intelligence tech- niques, which provides new avenues to model complex social worlds, while pre- serving more of their characteristics, and allowing them to capture a variety of social phenomena. These techniques can be fed back to the laboratory where they make it easier to design experiments in complex social situations without compromising their tractability for computational modeling. We showcase the potential MARL by discussing several recent studies that have used it, detail- ing the way environmental settings and cognitive constraints can lead to the emergence of complex cooperation strategies. This novel approach can help re- searchers bring together insights from human cognition, sustainability, and AI, to tackle real world problems of social-ecological systems.
{"title":"Beyond the matrix: Experimental approaches to studying cognitive agents in social-ecological systems","authors":"Uri Hertz , Raphael Köster , Marco A. Janssen , Joel Z. Leibo","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105993","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105993","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Social-ecological systems, in which agents interact with each other and their environment are important both for sustainability applications and for under- standing how human cognition functions in context. In such systems, the en- vironment shapes the agents' experience and actions, and in turn collective action of agents changes social and physical aspects of the environment. Here we review current investigation approaches, which rely on a lean design, with discrete actions and outcomes and little scope for varying environmental pa- rameters and cognitive demands. We then introduce multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) approach, which builds on modern artificial intelligence tech- niques, which provides new avenues to model complex social worlds, while pre- serving more of their characteristics, and allowing them to capture a variety of social phenomena. These techniques can be fed back to the laboratory where they make it easier to design experiments in complex social situations without compromising their tractability for computational modeling. We showcase the potential MARL by discussing several recent studies that have used it, detail- ing the way environmental settings and cognitive constraints can lead to the emergence of complex cooperation strategies. This novel approach can help re- searchers bring together insights from human cognition, sustainability, and AI, to tackle real world problems of social-ecological systems.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105993"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142510595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-24DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105992
Asaf Applebaum , Ophir Netzer , Yonatan Stern , Yair Zvilichovsky , Oz Mashiah , Roy Salomon
Sense of Agency (SoA) is the feeling of control over our actions. SoA has been suggested to arise from both implicit sensorimotor integration as well as higher-level decision processes. SoA is typically measured by collecting participants' subjective judgments, conflating both implicit and explicit processing. Consequently, the interplay between implicit sensorimotor processing and explicit agency judgments is not well understood. Here, we evaluated in one exploratory and one preregistered experiment (N = 60), using a machine learning approach, the relation between a well-known mechanism of implicit sensorimotor adaptation and explicit SoA judgments. Specifically, we examined whether subjective judgments of SoA and sensorimotor conflicts could be inferred from hand kinematics in a sensorimotor task using a virtual hand (VH). In both experiments participants performed a hand movement and viewed a virtual hand making a movement that could either be synchronous with their action or include a parametric temporal delay. After each movement, participants judged whether their actual movement was congruent with the movement they observed. Our results demonstrated that sensorimotor conflicts could be inferred from implicit motor kinematics on a trial by trial basis. Moreover, detection of sensorimotor conflicts from machine learning models of kinematic data provided more accurate classification of sensorimotor congruence than participants' explicit judgments. These results were replicated in a second, preregistered, experiment. These findings show evidence of diverging implicit and explicit processing for SoA and suggest that the brain holds high-quality information on sensorimotor conflicts that is not fully utilized in the inference of conscious agency.
代理感（SoA）是指对自己行为的控制感。有人认为，SoA 来自于内隐的感觉运动整合以及更高层次的决策过程。SoA 通常是通过收集参与者的主观判断来测量的，这就混淆了内隐和外显的处理过程。因此，人们对内隐感觉运动处理和显性代理判断之间的相互作用还不甚了解。在这里，我们使用机器学习方法，在一个探索性实验和一个预先登记的实验（N = 60）中评估了众所周知的内隐感觉运动适应机制与显性代理判断之间的关系。具体来说，我们研究了在使用虚拟手（VH）的感觉运动任务中，是否可以从手部运动学推断出对 SoA 和感觉运动冲突的主观判断。在这两项实验中，参与者在做一个手部动作的同时，会看到一只虚拟手在做一个动作，这个动作可能与他们的动作同步，也可能包含一个参数时间延迟。每次动作结束后，参与者判断自己的实际动作是否与观察到的动作一致。我们的研究结果表明，感官运动冲突可以通过逐次试验从内隐运动运动学中推断出来。此外，从运动学数据的机器学习模型中检测感觉运动冲突比参与者的明确判断提供了更准确的感觉运动一致性分类。这些结果在第二个预先登记的实验中得到了验证。这些研究结果表明，SoA 的内隐和外显处理过程存在差异，并表明大脑拥有关于感觉运动冲突的高质量信息，但这些信息在推断有意识代理时并未得到充分利用。
{"title":"The Body Knows Better: Sensorimotor signals reveal the interplay between implicit and explicit Sense of Agency in the human mind","authors":"Asaf Applebaum , Ophir Netzer , Yonatan Stern , Yair Zvilichovsky , Oz Mashiah , Roy Salomon","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105992","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105992","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Sense of Agency (SoA) is the feeling of control over our actions. SoA has been suggested to arise from both implicit sensorimotor integration as well as higher-level decision processes. SoA is typically measured by collecting participants' subjective judgments, conflating both implicit and explicit processing. Consequently, the interplay between implicit sensorimotor processing and explicit agency judgments is not well understood. Here, we evaluated in one exploratory and one preregistered experiment (<em>N</em> = 60), using a machine learning approach, the relation between a well-known mechanism of implicit sensorimotor adaptation and explicit SoA judgments. Specifically, we examined whether subjective judgments of SoA and sensorimotor conflicts could be inferred from hand kinematics in a sensorimotor task using a virtual hand (VH). In both experiments participants performed a hand movement and viewed a virtual hand making a movement that could either be synchronous with their action or include a parametric temporal delay. After each movement, participants judged whether their actual movement was congruent with the movement they observed. Our results demonstrated that sensorimotor conflicts could be inferred from implicit motor kinematics on a trial by trial basis. Moreover, detection of sensorimotor conflicts from machine learning models of kinematic data provided more accurate classification of sensorimotor congruence than participants' explicit judgments. These results were replicated in a second, preregistered, experiment. These findings show evidence of diverging implicit and explicit processing for SoA and suggest that the brain holds high-quality information on sensorimotor conflicts that is not fully utilized in the inference of conscious agency.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105992"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142510597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-18DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105985
Ashley N. Gilliam, Angela Gutchess
Although cross-cultural research identifies cognitive differences when comparing across individuals, few studies have examined how acculturation, or cultural change over time within individuals, affects cognition. To address this gap, we investigated how acculturation and change in self-construal for Chinese students in the US impacts the self-reference effect in memory over two timepoints. Participants completed a self-referencing memory task and a set of questionnaires assessing acculturation orientation and self-construal over two time points, on average 16 months apart. As individuals' orientation towards host culture and independence increased over the two time points, they exhibited a larger self-reference effect (self vs. other) in memory and a smaller other-reference (other vs. control) effect. These patterns indicated that as Chinese students became more acculturated to US culture, they exhibited more US-like patterns of behavior in memory. In contrast, between-participant variability in acculturation orientation and independence were not related to self- or other-referencing.
{"title":"Use of self-referencing memory strategies change over time with acculturation","authors":"Ashley N. Gilliam, Angela Gutchess","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105985","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105985","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Although cross-cultural research identifies cognitive differences when comparing across individuals, few studies have examined how acculturation, or cultural change over time within individuals, affects cognition. To address this gap, we investigated how acculturation and change in self-construal for Chinese students in the US impacts the self-reference effect in memory over two timepoints. Participants completed a self-referencing memory task and a set of questionnaires assessing acculturation orientation and self-construal over two time points, on average 16 months apart. As individuals' orientation towards host culture and independence increased over the two time points, they exhibited a larger self-reference effect (self vs. other) in memory and a smaller other-reference (other vs. control) effect. These patterns indicated that as Chinese students became more acculturated to US culture, they exhibited more US-like patterns of behavior in memory. In contrast, between-participant variability in acculturation orientation and independence were not related to self- or other-referencing.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105985"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142478037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-18DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105975
Elena Marx, Eva Wittenberg
How events are ordered in time is one of the most fundamental pieces of information guiding our understanding of the world. Linguistically, this order is often not mentioned explicitly. Here, we propose that the mental construal of temporal order in language comprehension is based on event-structural properties. This prediction is based on a central distinction between states and events both in event perception and language: In perception, dynamic events are more salient than static states. In language, stative and eventive predicates also differ, both in their grammatical behavior and how they are processed. Consistent with our predictions, data from seven pre-registered video-sentence matching experiments, each conducted in English and German (total N = 674), show that people draw temporal inferences based on this difference: States precede events. Our findings not only arbitrate between different theories of temporal language comprehension; they also advance theoretical models of how two different cognitive capacities - event cognition and language - integrate to form a mental representation of time.
{"title":"Temporal construal in sentence comprehension depends on linguistically encoded event structure","authors":"Elena Marx, Eva Wittenberg","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105975","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105975","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How events are ordered in time is one of the most fundamental pieces of information guiding our understanding of the world. Linguistically, this order is often not mentioned explicitly. Here, we propose that the mental construal of temporal order in language comprehension is based on event-structural properties. This prediction is based on a central distinction between states and events both in event perception and language: In perception, dynamic events are more salient than static states. In language, stative and eventive predicates also differ, both in their grammatical behavior and how they are processed. Consistent with our predictions, data from seven pre-registered video-sentence matching experiments, each conducted in English and German (total <em>N</em> = 674), show that people draw temporal inferences based on this difference: States precede events. Our findings not only arbitrate between different theories of temporal language comprehension; they also advance theoretical models of how two different cognitive capacities - event cognition and language - integrate to form a mental representation of time.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105975"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142478035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-18DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105986
Shaonan Wang , Songhee Kim , Jeffrey R. Binder , Liina Pylkkänen
Understanding the computational operations involved in conceptual composition is fundamental for theories of language. However, the existing literature on this topic remains fragmented, comprising disconnected theories from various fields. For instance, while formal semantic theories in Linguistics rely on type-driven interpretation without explicitly representing the conceptual content of lexical items, neurolinguistic research suggests that the brain is sensitive to conceptual factors during word composition. What is the relationship between these two types of theories? Do they describe two distinct aspects of composition, operating independently, or do they connect in some way during interpretation by our brain? To probe this, we explored how the mathematical operations explaining the combination of two words into a phrase are affected by the semantic content of items and the formal linguistic relations between the combining items. For six phrase types that varied properties relevant to type-driven interpretation such as modification vs. argument-saturation and modifier context sensitivity, we collected human ratings of experiential semantic features both for the phrases and for all the individual words within the phrases. We then compared the ability of different computational combination rules to explain the phrase ratings based on the individual word ratings. Our results indicate that composition operations are not one-size-fits-all but rather depend on both feature type and linguistic relation. For example, in intersective Adjective-Noun phrases, addition is used to merge attention-related features, while color features are predominantly determined by the first word's ratings. In the case of social features, the verb chiefly guides interpretation in Verb-Noun phrases, whereas in Noun-Noun phrases, the model employs multiplication to combine the social features of the nouns.
{"title":"Unlocking the complexity of phrasal composition: An interplay between semantic features and linguistic relations","authors":"Shaonan Wang , Songhee Kim , Jeffrey R. Binder , Liina Pylkkänen","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105986","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105986","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Understanding the computational operations involved in conceptual composition is fundamental for theories of language. However, the existing literature on this topic remains fragmented, comprising disconnected theories from various fields. For instance, while formal semantic theories in Linguistics rely on type-driven interpretation without explicitly representing the conceptual content of lexical items, neurolinguistic research suggests that the brain is sensitive to conceptual factors during word composition. What is the relationship between these two types of theories? Do they describe two distinct aspects of composition, operating independently, or do they connect in some way during interpretation by our brain? To probe this, we explored how the mathematical operations explaining the combination of two words into a phrase are affected by the semantic content of items and the formal linguistic relations between the combining items. For six phrase types that varied properties relevant to type-driven interpretation such as modification vs. argument-saturation and modifier context sensitivity, we collected human ratings of experiential semantic features both for the phrases and for all the individual words within the phrases. We then compared the ability of different computational combination rules to explain the phrase ratings based on the individual word ratings. Our results indicate that composition operations are not one-size-fits-all but rather depend on both feature type and linguistic relation. For example, in intersective Adjective-Noun phrases, addition is used to merge attention-related features, while color features are predominantly determined by the first word's ratings. In the case of social features, the verb chiefly guides interpretation in Verb-Noun phrases, whereas in Noun-Noun phrases, the model employs multiplication to combine the social features of the nouns.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105986"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142478036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-18DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105962
Corina Strößner, Ulrike Hahn
Bayesianism, that is, the formal capturing of belief in terms of probabilities, has had a major impact in cognitive science. Decades of research have examined lay reasoners’ learning and reasoning with probabilities. The bulk of that research has concerned the response to new evidence. That response will depend on the conditional probabilities a reasoner assumes, yet little research has addressed the question of how reasoners respond when they are provided with new conditional probabilities. Furthermore, there are not just open empirical questions as to how lay reasoners actually respond, there are also open questions as to how they should respond. This is illustrated by philosophical debate about the so-called Judy Benjamin Problem. In this paper, we present experiments on belief revision problems in which the new information is a conditional probability. More specifically, we investigate two versions of these problems: one where basic probability theory (as the core of what it means ‘to be Bayesian’) provides a single correct answer, and one where that answer is under-constrained. The former provide a new type of evidence on the longstanding question of human probabilistic reasoning skill. The latter informs debate on how to expand the Bayesian toolbox to deal with the issues raised by the Judy Benjamin Problem.
{"title":"Learning from conditional probabilities","authors":"Corina Strößner, Ulrike Hahn","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105962","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105962","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Bayesianism, that is, the formal capturing of belief in terms of probabilities, has had a major impact in cognitive science. Decades of research have examined lay reasoners’ learning and reasoning with probabilities. The bulk of that research has concerned the response to new evidence. That response will depend on the conditional probabilities a reasoner assumes, yet little research has addressed the question of how reasoners respond when they are provided with new conditional probabilities. Furthermore, there are not just open empirical questions as to how lay reasoners actually respond, there are also open questions as to how they <em>should</em> respond. This is illustrated by philosophical debate about the so-called Judy Benjamin Problem. In this paper, we present experiments on belief revision problems in which the new information is a conditional probability. More specifically, we investigate two versions of these problems: one where basic probability theory (as the core of what it means ‘to be Bayesian’) provides a single correct answer, and one where that answer is under-constrained. The former provide a new type of evidence on the longstanding question of human probabilistic reasoning skill. The latter informs debate on how to expand the Bayesian toolbox to deal with the issues raised by the Judy Benjamin Problem.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105962"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142478034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-16DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105980
Iqra Shahzad , Valeria Occelli , Eléonore Giraudet , Elena Azañón , Matthew R. Longo , André Mouraux , Olivier Collignon
We do not have a veridical representation of our body in our mind. For instance, tactile distances of equal measure along the medial-lateral axis of our limbs are generally perceived as larger than those running along the proximal-distal axis. This anisotropy in tactile distances reflects distortions in body-shape representation, such that the body parts are perceived as wider than they are. While the origin of such anisotropy remains unknown, it has been suggested that visual experience could partially play a role in its manifestation. To causally test the role of visual experience on body shape representation, we investigated tactile distance perception in sighted and early blind individuals comparing medial-lateral and proximal-distal tactile distances of stimuli presented on the ventral and dorsal part of the forearm, wrist, and hand. Overestimation of distances in the medial-lateral over proximal-distal body axes were found in both sighted and blind people, but the magnitude of the anisotropy was significantly reduced in the forearms of blind people. We conclude that vision does not drive the emergence of tactile distance anisotropies, but visual experience can however modulate its expression on some specific body parts.
{"title":"How visual experience shapes body representation","authors":"Iqra Shahzad , Valeria Occelli , Eléonore Giraudet , Elena Azañón , Matthew R. Longo , André Mouraux , Olivier Collignon","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105980","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105980","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We do not have a veridical representation of our body in our mind. For instance, tactile distances of equal measure along the medial-lateral axis of our limbs are generally perceived as larger than those running along the proximal-distal axis. This anisotropy in tactile distances reflects distortions in body-shape representation, such that the body parts are perceived as wider than they are. While the origin of such anisotropy remains unknown, it has been suggested that visual experience could partially play a role in its manifestation. To causally test the role of visual experience on body shape representation, we investigated tactile distance perception in sighted and early blind individuals comparing medial-lateral and proximal-distal tactile distances of stimuli presented on the ventral and dorsal part of the forearm, wrist, and hand. Overestimation of distances in the medial-lateral over proximal-distal body axes were found in both sighted and blind people, but the magnitude of the anisotropy was significantly reduced in the forearms of blind people. We conclude that vision does not drive the emergence of tactile distance anisotropies, but visual experience can however modulate its expression on some specific body parts.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142441819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-16DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105981
Louisa Huff, Tindaya Déniz, Linda Gronem, Sebastian Grueneisen
The impartial enforcement of norms and laws is a hallmark of fair societies, yet partial, unequal norm enforcement is common, for example as a result of corruption. While children condemn norm violations and value impartiality in resource allocation contexts, children's understanding of unequal norm enforcement is currently underexplored. In three vignette studies, we investigated 4- to 8-year-old's (N = 192) developing recognition and condemnation of unequal norm enforcement, which presupposes a sensitivity to impartiality as a meta-norm. Children evaluated the actions of characters who enforced different norms equally or unequally. From age 5, children disapproved of unequal norm enforcement but approved of unequal treatment when justified (Study 1). Children of all ages accepted a lack of punishment when applied equally to all transgressors, suggesting that their negative evaluations of unequal norm enforcement were specifically guided by the element of partiality and not the desire to see transgressors sanctioned (Study 2). Further, children aged 6 years and older were sensitive to the reasons behind unequal punishment, condemning instances of favoritism while accepting selective leniency due to mitigating circumstances (Study 3). The findings show that, from around 5 to 6 years of age, children condemn unequal sanctions for equal transgressions, thereby demonstrating a deep appreciation of impartiality as a foundational principle of fair norm enforcement.
{"title":"Children recognize and reject favoritism in norm enforcement","authors":"Louisa Huff, Tindaya Déniz, Linda Gronem, Sebastian Grueneisen","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105981","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105981","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The impartial enforcement of norms and laws is a hallmark of fair societies, yet partial, unequal norm enforcement is common, for example as a result of corruption. While children condemn norm violations and value impartiality in resource allocation contexts, children's understanding of unequal norm enforcement is currently underexplored. In three vignette studies, we investigated 4- to 8-year-old's (<em>N</em> = 192) developing recognition and condemnation of unequal norm enforcement, which presupposes a sensitivity to impartiality as a meta-norm. Children evaluated the actions of characters who enforced different norms equally or unequally. From age 5, children disapproved of unequal norm enforcement but approved of unequal treatment when justified (Study 1). Children of all ages accepted a lack of punishment when applied equally to all transgressors, suggesting that their negative evaluations of unequal norm enforcement were specifically guided by the element of partiality and not the desire to see transgressors sanctioned (Study 2). Further, children aged 6 years and older were sensitive to the reasons behind unequal punishment, condemning instances of favoritism while accepting selective leniency due to mitigating circumstances (Study 3). The findings show that, from around 5 to 6 years of age, children condemn unequal sanctions for equal transgressions, thereby demonstrating a deep appreciation of impartiality as a foundational principle of fair norm enforcement.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"254 ","pages":"Article 105981"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2024-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142441817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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