The Drosophila blastoderm and the vertebrate neural tube are archetypal examples of morphogen-patterned tissues that create precise spatial patterns of different cell types. In both tissues, pattern formation is dependent on molecular gradients that emanate from opposite poles. Despite distinct evolutionary origins and differences in time scales, cell biology and molecular players, both tissues exhibit striking similarities in the regulatory systems that establish gene expression patterns that foreshadow the arrangement of cell types. First, signaling gradients establish initial conditions that polarize the tissue, but there is no strict correspondence between specific morphogen thresholds and boundary positions. Second, gradients initiate transcriptional networks that integrate broadly distributed activators and localized repressors to generate patterns of gene expression. Third, the correct positioning of boundaries depends on the temporal and spatial dynamics of the transcriptional networks. These similarities reveal design principles that are likely to be broadly applicable to morphogen-patterned tissues.
{"title":"Morphogen rules: design principles of gradient-mediated embryo patterning.","authors":"James Briscoe, Stephen Small","doi":"10.1242/dev.129452","DOIUrl":"10.1242/dev.129452","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The Drosophila blastoderm and the vertebrate neural tube are archetypal examples of morphogen-patterned tissues that create precise spatial patterns of different cell types. In both tissues, pattern formation is dependent on molecular gradients that emanate from opposite poles. Despite distinct evolutionary origins and differences in time scales, cell biology and molecular players, both tissues exhibit striking similarities in the regulatory systems that establish gene expression patterns that foreshadow the arrangement of cell types. First, signaling gradients establish initial conditions that polarize the tissue, but there is no strict correspondence between specific morphogen thresholds and boundary positions. Second, gradients initiate transcriptional networks that integrate broadly distributed activators and localized repressors to generate patterns of gene expression. Third, the correct positioning of boundaries depends on the temporal and spatial dynamics of the transcriptional networks. These similarities reveal design principles that are likely to be broadly applicable to morphogen-patterned tissues. </p>","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"62 1","pages":"3996-4009"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4712844/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90622830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The English Parliament’s struggle for supremacy against monarchical dictatorship during the Civil War (1642–1648) was crucial for the establishment of representative government, yet its lessons continue to be debated. I exploit novel data on individual MPs drawn from 1,842 biographies to show that the conflict was over overseas interests and other factors over which the executive enjoyed broad constitutional discretion, rather than over domestic property rights. I further exploit the coincidence of individual MPs’ ability to sign legally binding share contracts with novel share offerings by overseas companies to measure the effect of overseas share investment on their political attitudes. I show that overseas shareholding pushed moderates lacking prior mercantile interests to support reform. I interpret the effect of financial assetholding as allowing new investors to exploit emerging economic opportunities overseas, aligning their interests with traders. By consolidating a broad parliamentary majority that favored reform, the introduction of financial assets also broadened support for the institutionalization of parliamentary supremacy over dictatorial rule. JEL Codes: O10, G11, F10, K00, N23, P10.
{"title":"Financial Asset Holdings and Political Attitudes: Evidence from Revolutionary England*","authors":"Saumitra Jha","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJV019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJV019","url":null,"abstract":"The English Parliament’s struggle for supremacy against monarchical dictatorship during the Civil War (1642–1648) was crucial for the establishment of representative government, yet its lessons continue to be debated. I exploit novel data on individual MPs drawn from 1,842 biographies to show that the conflict was over overseas interests and other factors over which the executive enjoyed broad constitutional discretion, rather than over domestic property rights. I further exploit the coincidence of individual MPs’ ability to sign legally binding share contracts with novel share offerings by overseas companies to measure the effect of overseas share investment on their political attitudes. I show that overseas shareholding pushed moderates lacking prior mercantile interests to support reform. I interpret the effect of financial assetholding as allowing new investors to exploit emerging economic opportunities overseas, aligning their interests with traders. By consolidating a broad parliamentary majority that favored reform, the introduction of financial assets also broadened support for the institutionalization of parliamentary supremacy over dictatorial rule. JEL Codes: O10, G11, F10, K00, N23, P10.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"130 1","pages":"1485-1545"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJV019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In developing countries, the extent to which women possess property rights is shaped in large part by transfers received at the time of marriage. Focusing on dowry, we develop a simple model of the marriage market with intra-household bargaining in order to understand the incentives for brides’ parents to allocate the rights over the dowry between their daughter and her groom. In doing so, we clarify and formalize the ‘dual role’ of dowry ‐ as a pre-mortem bequest and as a market clearing price ‐ identified in the literature. We use the model to shed light on the intriguing observation that, in contrast to other rights, women’s rights over the dowry tend to deteriorate with development. We show how marriage payments are utilized even when they are inefficient, and how the marriage market mitigates changes in other dimensions of women’s rights even to the point where women are worse off following a strengthening of such rights. We also generate predictions for when marital transfers will disappear and highlight the importance of female human capital for the welfare of women.
{"title":"Property Rights over Marital Transfers","authors":"Siwan Anderson, Chris Bidner","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJV014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJV014","url":null,"abstract":"In developing countries, the extent to which women possess property rights is shaped in large part by transfers received at the time of marriage. Focusing on dowry, we develop a simple model of the marriage market with intra-household bargaining in order to understand the incentives for brides’ parents to allocate the rights over the dowry between their daughter and her groom. In doing so, we clarify and formalize the ‘dual role’ of dowry ‐ as a pre-mortem bequest and as a market clearing price ‐ identified in the literature. We use the model to shed light on the intriguing observation that, in contrast to other rights, women’s rights over the dowry tend to deteriorate with development. We show how marriage payments are utilized even when they are inefficient, and how the marriage market mitigates changes in other dimensions of women’s rights even to the point where women are worse off following a strengthening of such rights. We also generate predictions for when marital transfers will disappear and highlight the importance of female human capital for the welfare of women.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"130 1","pages":"1421-1484"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJV014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
colonial Benin, we investigate the effect of education on living standards, occupation, and political participation. Since both school locations and student cohorts were selected with very little information, treatment and control groups are balanced on observables. We can therefore estimate the effect of education by comparing the treated to the untreated living in the same village, as well as those living in villages where no schools were set up. We find a significant positive treatment effect of education for the first generation of students, as well as their descendants: they have higher living standards, are less likely to be farmers, and are more likely to be politically active. We find large village-level externalities—descendants of the uneducated in villages with schools do better than those in control villages. We also find extended family externalities—nephews and nieces directly benefit from their uncle’s education—and show that this represents a ‘‘family tax,’’ as educated uncles transfer resources to the extended family.
{"title":"Education and Human Capital Externalities: Evidence from Colonial Benin","authors":"Léonard Wantchékon, Marko Klašnja, Natalija Novta","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJV004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJV004","url":null,"abstract":"colonial Benin, we investigate the effect of education on living standards, occupation, and political participation. Since both school locations and student cohorts were selected with very little information, treatment and control groups are balanced on observables. We can therefore estimate the effect of education by comparing the treated to the untreated living in the same village, as well as those living in villages where no schools were set up. We find a significant positive treatment effect of education for the first generation of students, as well as their descendants: they have higher living standards, are less likely to be farmers, and are more likely to be politically active. We find large village-level externalities—descendants of the uneducated in villages with schools do better than those in control villages. We also find extended family externalities—nephews and nieces directly benefit from their uncle’s education—and show that this represents a ‘‘family tax,’’ as educated uncles transfer resources to the extended family.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"130 1","pages":"703-757"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2015-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJV004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study legislators who have a present bias for spending: they want to increase current spending and procrastinate spending cuts. We show that disagreement in legislatures can lead to policy persistence that attenuates the temptation to overspend. Depending on the environment, legislators’ decisions to be fiscally responsible may either complement or substitute other legislators’ decisions. When legislators have low discount factors, their actions are strategic complements. Thus, changes of the political environment that induce fiscal responsibility are desirable as they generate a positive responsibility multiplier and reduce spending. However, when the discount factor is high, the same changes induce some legislators to free ride on others’ responsibility which may lead to higher spending. JEL Codes: D72-H00.
{"title":"Spending-Biased Legislators: Discipline Through Disagreement","authors":"F. Piguillem, Alessandro Riboni","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJV011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJV011","url":null,"abstract":"We study legislators who have a present bias for spending: they want to increase current spending and procrastinate spending cuts. We show that disagreement in legislatures can lead to policy persistence that attenuates the temptation to overspend. Depending on the environment, legislators’ decisions to be fiscally responsible may either complement or substitute other legislators’ decisions. When legislators have low discount factors, their actions are strategic complements. Thus, changes of the political environment that induce fiscal responsibility are desirable as they generate a positive responsibility multiplier and reduce spending. However, when the discount factor is high, the same changes induce some legislators to free ride on others’ responsibility which may lead to higher spending. JEL Codes: D72-H00.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"130 1","pages":"901-949"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2015-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJV011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using personnel data from nine large firms in three industries (call centers, trucking, and high-tech), we empirically assess the benefit to firms of hiring through employee referrals. Compared to nonreferred applicants, referred applicants are more likely to be hired and more likely to accept offers, even though referrals and nonreferrals have similar skill characteristics. Referred workers tend to have similar productivity compared to nonreferred workers on most measures, but referred workers have lower accident rates in trucking and produce more patents in high-tech. Referred workers are substantially less likely to quit and earn slightly higher wages than nonreferred workers. In call centers and trucking, the two industries for which we can calculate worker-level profits, referred workers yield substantially higher profits per worker than nonreferred workers. These profit differences are driven by lower turnover and lower recruiting costs for referrals. JEL Codes: J24, M51, J30, J63.
{"title":"The Value of Hiring through Employee Referrals","authors":"S. Burks, Bo Cowgill, M. Hoffman, M. Housman","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJV010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJV010","url":null,"abstract":"Using personnel data from nine large firms in three industries (call centers, trucking, and high-tech), we empirically assess the benefit to firms of hiring through employee referrals. Compared to nonreferred applicants, referred applicants are more likely to be hired and more likely to accept offers, even though referrals and nonreferrals have similar skill characteristics. Referred workers tend to have similar productivity compared to nonreferred workers on most measures, but referred workers have lower accident rates in trucking and produce more patents in high-tech. Referred workers are substantially less likely to quit and earn slightly higher wages than nonreferred workers. In call centers and trucking, the two industries for which we can calculate worker-level profits, referred workers yield substantially higher profits per worker than nonreferred workers. These profit differences are driven by lower turnover and lower recruiting costs for referrals. JEL Codes: J24, M51, J30, J63.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"130 1","pages":"805-839"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2015-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJV010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Meghan R. Busse, Devin G. Pope, Jaren C. Pope, Jorge M. Silva-Risso
When buying durable goods, consumers must forecast how much utility they will derive from future consumption, including consumption in different states of the world. This can be complicated for consumers because making intertemporal evaluations may expose them to a variety of psychological biases such as present bias, projection bias, and salience effects. We investigate whether consumers are affected by such intertemporal biases when they purchase automobiles. Using data for more than 40 million vehicle transactions, we explore the impact of weather on purchasing decisions. We find that the choice to purchase a convertible or a four-wheel-drive is highly dependent on the weather at the time of purchase in a way that is inconsistent with classical utility theory. We consider a range of rational explanations for the empirical effects we find, but none can explain fully the effects we estimate. We then discuss and explore projection bias and salience as two primary psychological mechanisms that are consistent with our results. JEL Codes: D03; D12.
{"title":"The Psychological Effect of Weather on Car Purchases","authors":"Meghan R. Busse, Devin G. Pope, Jaren C. Pope, Jorge M. Silva-Risso","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJU033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJU033","url":null,"abstract":"When buying durable goods, consumers must forecast how much utility they will derive from future consumption, including consumption in different states of the world. This can be complicated for consumers because making intertemporal evaluations may expose them to a variety of psychological biases such as present bias, projection bias, and salience effects. We investigate whether consumers are affected by such intertemporal biases when they purchase automobiles. Using data for more than 40 million vehicle transactions, we explore the impact of weather on purchasing decisions. We find that the choice to purchase a convertible or a four-wheel-drive is highly dependent on the weather at the time of purchase in a way that is inconsistent with classical utility theory. We consider a range of rational explanations for the empirical effects we find, but none can explain fully the effects we estimate. We then discuss and explore projection bias and salience as two primary psychological mechanisms that are consistent with our results. JEL Codes: D03; D12.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"130 1","pages":"371-414"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2015-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJU033","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One long-standing motivation for low-income housing programs is the possibility that housing affordability and housing conditions generate externalities, including on children’s behavior and long-term life outcomes. We take advantage of a randomized housing voucher lottery in Chicago in 1997 to examine the long-term impact of housing assistance on a wide variety of child outcomes, including schooling, health, and criminal involvement. In contrast to most prior work focusing on families in public housing, we focus on families living in unsubsidized private housing at baseline, for whom voucher receipt generates large changes in both housing and nonhousing consumption. We find that the receipt of housing assistance has little, if any, impact on neighborhood or school quality or on a wide range of important child outcomes. JEL Codes: D10, H23, I38.
{"title":"The Impact of Housing Assistance on Child Outcomes: Evidence from a Randomized Housing Lottery","authors":"B. Jacob, Max Kapustin, J. Ludwig","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJU030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJU030","url":null,"abstract":"One long-standing motivation for low-income housing programs is the possibility that housing affordability and housing conditions generate externalities, including on children’s behavior and long-term life outcomes. We take advantage of a randomized housing voucher lottery in Chicago in 1997 to examine the long-term impact of housing assistance on a wide variety of child outcomes, including schooling, health, and criminal involvement. In contrast to most prior work focusing on families in public housing, we focus on families living in unsubsidized private housing at baseline, for whom voucher receipt generates large changes in both housing and nonhousing consumption. We find that the receipt of housing assistance has little, if any, impact on neighborhood or school quality or on a wide range of important child outcomes. JEL Codes: D10, H23, I38.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"130 1","pages":"465-506"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2015-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJU030","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We use a lab experiment to explore the factors that predict an individual’s decision to contribute her idea to a group. We find that contribution decisions depend on the interaction of gender and the gender stereotype associated with the decision-making domain: conditional on measured ability, individuals are less willing to contribute ideas in areas that are stereotypically outside of their gender’s domain. Importantly, these decisions are largely driven by self-assessments, rather than fear of discrimination. Individuals are less confident in gender-incongruent areas and are thus less willing to contribute their ideas. Because even very knowledgeable group members undercontribute in gender-incongruent categories, group performance suffers and, ex post, groups have difficulty recognizing who their most talented members are. Our results show that even in an environment where other group members show no bias, women in male-typed areas and men in female-typed areas may be less influential. An intervention that provides feedback about a woman’s (man’s) strength in a male-typed (female-typed) area does not significantly increase the probability that she contributes her ideas to the group. A back-of-the-envelope calculation reveals that a “lean in”–style policy that increases contribution by women would significantly improve group performance in male-typed domains. JEL Codes: J16, C92.
{"title":"Evidence on Self-Stereotyping and the Contribution of Ideas","authors":"K. Coffman","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJU023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJU023","url":null,"abstract":"We use a lab experiment to explore the factors that predict an individual’s decision to contribute her idea to a group. We find that contribution decisions depend on the interaction of gender and the gender stereotype associated with the decision-making domain: conditional on measured ability, individuals are less willing to contribute ideas in areas that are stereotypically outside of their gender’s domain. Importantly, these decisions are largely driven by self-assessments, rather than fear of discrimination. Individuals are less confident in gender-incongruent areas and are thus less willing to contribute their ideas. Because even very knowledgeable group members undercontribute in gender-incongruent categories, group performance suffers and, ex post, groups have difficulty recognizing who their most talented members are. Our results show that even in an environment where other group members show no bias, women in male-typed areas and men in female-typed areas may be less influential. An intervention that provides feedback about a woman’s (man’s) strength in a male-typed (female-typed) area does not significantly increase the probability that she contributes her ideas to the group. A back-of-the-envelope calculation reveals that a “lean in”–style policy that increases contribution by women would significantly improve group performance in male-typed domains. JEL Codes: J16, C92.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"129 1","pages":"1625-1660"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2014-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJU023","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rationality leads people to imitate those with similar tastes but different information. But people who imitate common sources develop correlated beliefs, and rationality demands that later social learners take this redundancy into account. This implies severe limits to rational imitation. We show that (i) in most natural observation structures besides the canonical single-file case, full rationality dictates that people must anti-imitate" some of those they observe; and (ii) in every observation structure full rationality dictates that people who do not anti-imitate can, in essence, imitate at most one person among predecessors who share common information. We also show that in a very broad class of settings, virtually any learning rule in which people regularly do imitate more than one person without anti-imitating others will lead to a positive (and, in some environments, arbitrarily high) probability of people converging to confident and wrong long-run beliefs. When testing either the rationality or the efficiency of social learning, researchers should not focus on whether people follow others' behaviour but instead whether they follow it too much.
{"title":"Extensive Imitation is Irrational and Harmful","authors":"Erik Eyster, M. Rabin","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJU021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJU021","url":null,"abstract":"Rationality leads people to imitate those with similar tastes but different information. But people who imitate common sources develop correlated beliefs, and rationality demands that later social learners take this redundancy into account. This implies severe limits to rational imitation. We show that (i) in most natural observation structures besides the canonical single-file case, full rationality dictates that people must anti-imitate\" some of those they observe; and (ii) in every observation structure full rationality dictates that people who do not anti-imitate can, in essence, imitate at most one person among predecessors who share common information. We also show that in a very broad class of settings, virtually any learning rule in which people regularly do imitate more than one person without anti-imitating others will lead to a positive (and, in some environments, arbitrarily high) probability of people converging to confident and wrong long-run beliefs. When testing either the rationality or the efficiency of social learning, researchers should not focus on whether people follow others' behaviour but instead whether they follow it too much.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"129 1","pages":"1861-1898"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2014-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJU021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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