A new typology of players is proposed based on the classification of actions as either instinctive or contemplative. A person’s type is the probability of him choosing a contemplative action. To test the typology, results of 10 games are analyzed. Actions in each game were classified depending on whether their response time was more or less, respectively, than the median response time of all subjects who played the game. It is argued that fast actions are more instinctive and slow actions are more contemplative. A subject’s contemplative index (CI) is defined as the proportion of games in which he chose a contemplative action. It is found that for 8 of the 10 games, the CI in the other 9 games is positively correlated with a player’s choice of a contemplative action in that game (average Spearman correlation of 9%). The CI is used to shed light on the nature of choice in five additional games. JEL Codes: C72, C91.
{"title":"A Typology of Players: Between Instinctive and Contemplative","authors":"A. Rubinstein","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJW008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJW008","url":null,"abstract":"A new typology of players is proposed based on the classification of actions as either instinctive or contemplative. A person’s type is the probability of him choosing a contemplative action. To test the typology, results of 10 games are analyzed. Actions in each game were classified depending on whether their response time was more or less, respectively, than the median response time of all subjects who played the game. It is argued that fast actions are more instinctive and slow actions are more contemplative. A subject’s contemplative index (CI) is defined as the proportion of games in which he chose a contemplative action. It is found that for 8 of the 10 games, the CI in the other 9 games is positively correlated with a player’s choice of a contemplative action in that game (average Spearman correlation of 9%). The CI is used to shed light on the nature of choice in five additional games. JEL Codes: C72, C91.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"131 1","pages":"859-890"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2016-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJW008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office. As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions. JEL Codes: D72, D82, H73, H77.
{"title":"Political Centralization and Government Accountability","authors":"F. Boffa, Amedeo Piolatto, G. Ponzetto","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJV035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJV035","url":null,"abstract":"This article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office. As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions. JEL Codes: D72, D82, H73, H77.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"131 1","pages":"381-422"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJV035","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Programs to encourage labor market activity among youth, including public employment programs and wage subsidies like the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, can be supported by three broad rationales. They may (i) provide contemporaneous income support to participants; (ii) encourage work experience that improves future employment and/or educational outcomes of participants; and/or (iii) keep participants "out of trouble." We study randomized lotteries for access to the New York City (NYC) Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP), the largest summer youth employment program in the United States, by merging SYEP administrative data on 294,100 lottery participants to IRS data on the universe of U.S. tax records; to New York State administrative incarceration data; and to NYC administrative cause of death data. In assessing the three rationales, we find that (i) SYEP participation causes average earnings and the probability of employment to increase in the year of program participation, with modest contemporaneous crowdout of other earnings and employment; (ii) SYEP participation causes a modest decrease in average earnings for three years following the program and has no impact on college enrollment; and (iii) SYEP participation decreases the probability of incarceration and decreases the probability of mortality, which has important and potentially pivotal implications for analyzing the net benefits of the program. JEL Codes: J13, J45, J38, J21.
{"title":"The Effects of Youth Employment: Evidence from New York City Lotteries","authors":"Alexander M. Gelber, A. Isen, Judd B. Kessler","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJV034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJV034","url":null,"abstract":"Programs to encourage labor market activity among youth, including public employment programs and wage subsidies like the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, can be supported by three broad rationales. They may (i) provide contemporaneous income support to participants; (ii) encourage work experience that improves future employment and/or educational outcomes of participants; and/or (iii) keep participants \"out of trouble.\" We study randomized lotteries for access to the New York City (NYC) Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP), the largest summer youth employment program in the United States, by merging SYEP administrative data on 294,100 lottery participants to IRS data on the universe of U.S. tax records; to New York State administrative incarceration data; and to NYC administrative cause of death data. In assessing the three rationales, we find that (i) SYEP participation causes average earnings and the probability of employment to increase in the year of program participation, with modest contemporaneous crowdout of other earnings and employment; (ii) SYEP participation causes a modest decrease in average earnings for three years following the program and has no impact on college enrollment; and (iii) SYEP participation decreases the probability of incarceration and decreases the probability of mortality, which has important and potentially pivotal implications for analyzing the net benefits of the program. JEL Codes: J13, J45, J38, J21.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"131 1","pages":"423-460"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJV034","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper develops an idea flows theory of trade and growth with heterogeneous firms. New firms learn from incumbent firms, but the diffusion technology ensures entrants learn not only from frontier technologies, but from the entire technology distribution. By shifting the productivity distribution upwards, selection on productivity causes technology diffusion and this complementarity generates endogenous growth without scale effects. On the balanced growth path, the productivity distribution is a traveling wave with an increasing lower bound. Growth of the lower bound causes dynamic selection. Free entry mandates that trade liberalization increases the rates of technology diffusion and dynamic selection to offset the profits from new export opportunities. Consequently, trade integration raises long-run growth. The dynamic selection effect is a new source of gains from trade not found when firms are homogeneous. Calibrating the model implies that dynamic selection approximately triples the gains from trade relative to heterogeneous firm economies with static steady states.
{"title":"Dynamic Selection: An Idea Flows Theory of Entry, Trade and Growth","authors":"T. Sampson","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJV032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJV032","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops an idea flows theory of trade and growth with heterogeneous firms. New firms learn from incumbent firms, but the diffusion technology ensures entrants learn not only from frontier technologies, but from the entire technology distribution. By shifting the productivity distribution upwards, selection on productivity causes technology diffusion and this complementarity generates endogenous growth without scale effects. On the balanced growth path, the productivity distribution is a traveling wave with an increasing lower bound. Growth of the lower bound causes dynamic selection. Free entry mandates that trade liberalization increases the rates of technology diffusion and dynamic selection to offset the profits from new export opportunities. Consequently, trade integration raises long-run growth. The dynamic selection effect is a new source of gains from trade not found when firms are homogeneous. Calibrating the model implies that dynamic selection approximately triples the gains from trade relative to heterogeneous firm economies with static steady states.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"131 1","pages":"315-380"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJV032","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How do individuals form expectations about future inflation? We propose that individuals overweight inflation experienced during their lifetimes. This approach modifies existing adaptive learning models to allow for age-dependent updating of expectations in response to inflation surprises. Young individuals update their expectations more strongly than older individuals since recent experiences account for a greater share of their accumulated lifetime history. We find support for these predictions using 57 years of microdata on inflation expectations from the Reuters/Michigan Survey of Consumers. Differences in experiences strongly predict differences in expectations, including the substantial disagreement between young and old individuals in periods of highly volatile inflation, such as the 1970s. It also explains household borrowing and lending behavior, including the choice of mortgages. JEL Codes: E03, G02, D03, E31, E37, D84, D83, D14.
{"title":"Learning from Inflation Experiences","authors":"Ulrike Malmendier, S. Nagel","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJV037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJV037","url":null,"abstract":"How do individuals form expectations about future inflation? We propose that individuals overweight inflation experienced during their lifetimes. This approach modifies existing adaptive learning models to allow for age-dependent updating of expectations in response to inflation surprises. Young individuals update their expectations more strongly than older individuals since recent experiences account for a greater share of their accumulated lifetime history. We find support for these predictions using 57 years of microdata on inflation expectations from the Reuters/Michigan Survey of Consumers. Differences in experiences strongly predict differences in expectations, including the substantial disagreement between young and old individuals in periods of highly volatile inflation, such as the 1970s. It also explains household borrowing and lending behavior, including the choice of mortgages. JEL Codes: E03, G02, D03, E31, E37, D84, D83, D14.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"131 1","pages":"53-87"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJV037","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Drosophila blastoderm and the vertebrate neural tube are archetypal examples of morphogen-patterned tissues that create precise spatial patterns of different cell types. In both tissues, pattern formation is dependent on molecular gradients that emanate from opposite poles. Despite distinct evolutionary origins and differences in time scales, cell biology and molecular players, both tissues exhibit striking similarities in the regulatory systems that establish gene expression patterns that foreshadow the arrangement of cell types. First, signaling gradients establish initial conditions that polarize the tissue, but there is no strict correspondence between specific morphogen thresholds and boundary positions. Second, gradients initiate transcriptional networks that integrate broadly distributed activators and localized repressors to generate patterns of gene expression. Third, the correct positioning of boundaries depends on the temporal and spatial dynamics of the transcriptional networks. These similarities reveal design principles that are likely to be broadly applicable to morphogen-patterned tissues.
{"title":"Morphogen rules: design principles of gradient-mediated embryo patterning.","authors":"James Briscoe, Stephen Small","doi":"10.1242/dev.129452","DOIUrl":"10.1242/dev.129452","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The Drosophila blastoderm and the vertebrate neural tube are archetypal examples of morphogen-patterned tissues that create precise spatial patterns of different cell types. In both tissues, pattern formation is dependent on molecular gradients that emanate from opposite poles. Despite distinct evolutionary origins and differences in time scales, cell biology and molecular players, both tissues exhibit striking similarities in the regulatory systems that establish gene expression patterns that foreshadow the arrangement of cell types. First, signaling gradients establish initial conditions that polarize the tissue, but there is no strict correspondence between specific morphogen thresholds and boundary positions. Second, gradients initiate transcriptional networks that integrate broadly distributed activators and localized repressors to generate patterns of gene expression. Third, the correct positioning of boundaries depends on the temporal and spatial dynamics of the transcriptional networks. These similarities reveal design principles that are likely to be broadly applicable to morphogen-patterned tissues. </p>","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"62 1","pages":"3996-4009"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4712844/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90622830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The English Parliament’s struggle for supremacy against monarchical dictatorship during the Civil War (1642–1648) was crucial for the establishment of representative government, yet its lessons continue to be debated. I exploit novel data on individual MPs drawn from 1,842 biographies to show that the conflict was over overseas interests and other factors over which the executive enjoyed broad constitutional discretion, rather than over domestic property rights. I further exploit the coincidence of individual MPs’ ability to sign legally binding share contracts with novel share offerings by overseas companies to measure the effect of overseas share investment on their political attitudes. I show that overseas shareholding pushed moderates lacking prior mercantile interests to support reform. I interpret the effect of financial assetholding as allowing new investors to exploit emerging economic opportunities overseas, aligning their interests with traders. By consolidating a broad parliamentary majority that favored reform, the introduction of financial assets also broadened support for the institutionalization of parliamentary supremacy over dictatorial rule. JEL Codes: O10, G11, F10, K00, N23, P10.
{"title":"Financial Asset Holdings and Political Attitudes: Evidence from Revolutionary England*","authors":"Saumitra Jha","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJV019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJV019","url":null,"abstract":"The English Parliament’s struggle for supremacy against monarchical dictatorship during the Civil War (1642–1648) was crucial for the establishment of representative government, yet its lessons continue to be debated. I exploit novel data on individual MPs drawn from 1,842 biographies to show that the conflict was over overseas interests and other factors over which the executive enjoyed broad constitutional discretion, rather than over domestic property rights. I further exploit the coincidence of individual MPs’ ability to sign legally binding share contracts with novel share offerings by overseas companies to measure the effect of overseas share investment on their political attitudes. I show that overseas shareholding pushed moderates lacking prior mercantile interests to support reform. I interpret the effect of financial assetholding as allowing new investors to exploit emerging economic opportunities overseas, aligning their interests with traders. By consolidating a broad parliamentary majority that favored reform, the introduction of financial assets also broadened support for the institutionalization of parliamentary supremacy over dictatorial rule. JEL Codes: O10, G11, F10, K00, N23, P10.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"130 1","pages":"1485-1545"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJV019","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In developing countries, the extent to which women possess property rights is shaped in large part by transfers received at the time of marriage. Focusing on dowry, we develop a simple model of the marriage market with intra-household bargaining in order to understand the incentives for brides’ parents to allocate the rights over the dowry between their daughter and her groom. In doing so, we clarify and formalize the ‘dual role’ of dowry ‐ as a pre-mortem bequest and as a market clearing price ‐ identified in the literature. We use the model to shed light on the intriguing observation that, in contrast to other rights, women’s rights over the dowry tend to deteriorate with development. We show how marriage payments are utilized even when they are inefficient, and how the marriage market mitigates changes in other dimensions of women’s rights even to the point where women are worse off following a strengthening of such rights. We also generate predictions for when marital transfers will disappear and highlight the importance of female human capital for the welfare of women.
{"title":"Property Rights over Marital Transfers","authors":"Siwan Anderson, Chris Bidner","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJV014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJV014","url":null,"abstract":"In developing countries, the extent to which women possess property rights is shaped in large part by transfers received at the time of marriage. Focusing on dowry, we develop a simple model of the marriage market with intra-household bargaining in order to understand the incentives for brides’ parents to allocate the rights over the dowry between their daughter and her groom. In doing so, we clarify and formalize the ‘dual role’ of dowry ‐ as a pre-mortem bequest and as a market clearing price ‐ identified in the literature. We use the model to shed light on the intriguing observation that, in contrast to other rights, women’s rights over the dowry tend to deteriorate with development. We show how marriage payments are utilized even when they are inefficient, and how the marriage market mitigates changes in other dimensions of women’s rights even to the point where women are worse off following a strengthening of such rights. We also generate predictions for when marital transfers will disappear and highlight the importance of female human capital for the welfare of women.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"130 1","pages":"1421-1484"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJV014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
colonial Benin, we investigate the effect of education on living standards, occupation, and political participation. Since both school locations and student cohorts were selected with very little information, treatment and control groups are balanced on observables. We can therefore estimate the effect of education by comparing the treated to the untreated living in the same village, as well as those living in villages where no schools were set up. We find a significant positive treatment effect of education for the first generation of students, as well as their descendants: they have higher living standards, are less likely to be farmers, and are more likely to be politically active. We find large village-level externalities—descendants of the uneducated in villages with schools do better than those in control villages. We also find extended family externalities—nephews and nieces directly benefit from their uncle’s education—and show that this represents a ‘‘family tax,’’ as educated uncles transfer resources to the extended family.
{"title":"Education and Human Capital Externalities: Evidence from Colonial Benin","authors":"Léonard Wantchékon, Marko Klašnja, Natalija Novta","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJV004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJV004","url":null,"abstract":"colonial Benin, we investigate the effect of education on living standards, occupation, and political participation. Since both school locations and student cohorts were selected with very little information, treatment and control groups are balanced on observables. We can therefore estimate the effect of education by comparing the treated to the untreated living in the same village, as well as those living in villages where no schools were set up. We find a significant positive treatment effect of education for the first generation of students, as well as their descendants: they have higher living standards, are less likely to be farmers, and are more likely to be politically active. We find large village-level externalities—descendants of the uneducated in villages with schools do better than those in control villages. We also find extended family externalities—nephews and nieces directly benefit from their uncle’s education—and show that this represents a ‘‘family tax,’’ as educated uncles transfer resources to the extended family.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"130 1","pages":"703-757"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2015-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJV004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study legislators who have a present bias for spending: they want to increase current spending and procrastinate spending cuts. We show that disagreement in legislatures can lead to policy persistence that attenuates the temptation to overspend. Depending on the environment, legislators’ decisions to be fiscally responsible may either complement or substitute other legislators’ decisions. When legislators have low discount factors, their actions are strategic complements. Thus, changes of the political environment that induce fiscal responsibility are desirable as they generate a positive responsibility multiplier and reduce spending. However, when the discount factor is high, the same changes induce some legislators to free ride on others’ responsibility which may lead to higher spending. JEL Codes: D72-H00.
{"title":"Spending-Biased Legislators: Discipline Through Disagreement","authors":"F. Piguillem, Alessandro Riboni","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJV011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJV011","url":null,"abstract":"We study legislators who have a present bias for spending: they want to increase current spending and procrastinate spending cuts. We show that disagreement in legislatures can lead to policy persistence that attenuates the temptation to overspend. Depending on the environment, legislators’ decisions to be fiscally responsible may either complement or substitute other legislators’ decisions. When legislators have low discount factors, their actions are strategic complements. Thus, changes of the political environment that induce fiscal responsibility are desirable as they generate a positive responsibility multiplier and reduce spending. However, when the discount factor is high, the same changes induce some legislators to free ride on others’ responsibility which may lead to higher spending. JEL Codes: D72-H00.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"130 1","pages":"901-949"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2015-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJV011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61199473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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