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Choice Simplification: A Theory of Mental Budgeting and Naive Diversification* 选择简化:心理预算理论与朴素多样化*
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2020-05-01 DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjz043
B. Kőszegi, Filip Matějka
We develop a theory of how an agent makes basic multiproduct consumption decisions in the presence of taste, consumption opportunity, and price shocks that are costly to attend to. We establish that the agent often simplifies her choices by restricting attention to a few important considerations, which depend on the decision at hand and affect her consumption patterns in specific ways. If the agent’s problem is to choose the consumption levels of many goods with different degrees of substitutability, then she may create mental budgets for more substitutable products (e.g., entertainment). In some situations, it is optimal to specify budgets in terms of consumption quantities, but when most products have an abundance of substitutes, specifying budgets in terms of nominal spending tends to be optimal. If the goods are complements, in contrast, then the agent may—consistent with naive diversification—choose a fixed, unconsidered mix of products. And if the agent’s problem is to choose one of multiple products to fulfill a given consumption need (e.g., for gasoline or a bed), then it is often optimal for her to allocate a fixed sum for the need. JEL Codes: D01, D11, D14
我们发展了一个理论,说明代理人如何在品味、消费机会和价格冲击的情况下做出基本的多产品消费决策,而这些因素需要付出高昂的代价。我们确定,代理人通常通过将注意力限制在几个重要的考虑因素上来简化她的选择,这些因素取决于手头的决定,并以特定的方式影响她的消费模式。如果代理商的问题是选择许多具有不同可替代性程度的商品的消费水平,那么她可能会为更具可替代性的产品(例如娱乐)创造心理预算。在某些情况下,根据消费量指定预算是最优的,但当大多数产品都有大量替代品时,根据名义支出指定预算往往是最优的。相反,如果商品是互补的,那么代理商可能会选择一种固定的、未经考虑的产品组合,这与天真的多样化一致。如果代理商的问题是从多种产品中选择一种来满足给定的消费需求(例如,汽油或床),那么她通常会为该需求分配固定的金额。JEL代码:D01、D11、D14
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引用次数: 41
Memory, Attention, and Choice* 记忆、注意力和选择*
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2020-04-24 DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjaa007
P. Bordalo, N. Gennaioli, A. Shleifer
Building on a textbook description of associative memory (Kahana 2012), we present a model of choice in which a choice option cues recall of similar past experiences. Memory shapes valuation and decisions in two ways. First, recalled experiences form a norm, which serves as an initial anchor for valuation. Second, salient quality and price surprises relative to the norm lead to large adjustments in valuation. The model unifies many well-documented choice puzzles, including the attribution and projection biases, inattention to hidden attributes, background contrast effects, and context-dependent willingness to pay. Unifying these puzzles on the basis of selective memory and attention to surprise yields multiple new predictions.
基于教科书中对联想记忆的描述(Kahana 2012),我们提出了一个选择模型,其中选择选项暗示对类似过去经历的回忆。记忆通过两种方式影响评估和决策。首先,回忆的经历形成了一种规范,作为估值的初始锚。其次,相对于标准,显著的质量和价格意外导致估值的大幅调整。该模型结合了许多有据可查的选择谜题,包括归因和投射偏见、对隐藏属性的忽视、背景对比效应和依赖于上下文的支付意愿。在选择性记忆和对惊喜的关注的基础上,将这些谜题统一起来,会产生多种新的预测。
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引用次数: 51
Sequential Bargaining in the Field: Evidence from Millions of Online Bargaining Interactions* 现场顺序议价:来自数百万在线议价互动的证据*
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2020-02-03 DOI: 10.1093/QJE/QJAA003
M. Backus, Thomas Blake, B. Larsen, S. Tadelis
We study patterns of behavior in bilateral bargaining situations using a rich, new dataset describing over 88 million listings from eBay's Best Offer platform, with back-and-forth bargaining occurring in over 25 million of these listings. We document patterns of behavior and relate them to "rational" and "psychological" theories of bargaining and find that bargaining patterns are consistent with elements of both approaches. Most notably, players with more bargaining strength typically receive better outcomes, and players exhibit equitable behavior by making offers that split-the-difference between negotiating positions. We are publicly releasing this new dataset to support additional empirical bargaining research.
我们使用一个丰富的新数据集来研究双边讨价还价情况下的行为模式,该数据集描述了eBay Best Offer平台上超过8800万件物品,其中超过2500万件物品中发生了来回讨价还价。我们记录了行为模式,并将其与议价的“理性”和“心理”理论联系起来,发现议价模式与两种方法的要素是一致的。最值得注意的是,具有更强议价能力的玩家通常会获得更好的结果,并且玩家通过在谈判立场之间提供折中方案而表现出公平的行为。我们公开发布这个新数据集,以支持额外的实证议价研究。
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引用次数: 37
The Return to Protectionism* 保护主义的回归*
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2020-02-01 DOI: 10.1093/QJE/QJZ036
Pablo D. Fajgelbaum, P. Goldberg, P. Kennedy, A. Khandelwal
After decades of supporting free trade, in 2018 the United States raised import tariffs and major trade partners retaliated. We analyze the short-run impact of this return to protectionism on the U.S. economy. Import and retaliatory tariffs caused large declines in imports and exports. Prices of imports targeted by tariffs did not fall, implying complete pass-through of tariffs to duty-inclusive prices. The resulting losses to U.S. consumers and firms that buy imports was $51 billion, or 0.27% of GDP. We embed the estimated trade elasticities in a general-equilibrium model of the U.S. economy. After accounting for tariff revenue and gains to domestic producers, the aggregate real income loss was $7.2 billion, or 0.04% of GDP. Import tariffs favored sectors concentrated in politically competitive counties, and the model implies that tradeable-sector workers in heavily Republican counties were the most negatively affected due to the retaliatory tariffs. JEL Code: F1.
在支持自由贸易几十年后,2018年,美国提高了进口关税,主要贸易伙伴进行了报复。我们分析了保护主义回归对美国经济的短期影响。进口和报复性关税导致进出口大幅下降。关税所针对的进口商品价格没有下降,这意味着关税完全转嫁到含税价格。由此给美国消费者和购买进口产品的公司造成的损失为510亿美元,占GDP的0.27%。我们将估计的贸易弹性嵌入美国经济的一般均衡模型中。在计入关税收入和国内生产商收益后,实际收入损失总额为72亿美元,占GDP的0.04%。进口关税有利于集中在政治竞争县的行业,该模型表明,由于报复性关税,共和党占多数的县的可贸易行业工人受到的负面影响最大。JEL代码:F1。
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引用次数: 173
How Acquisitions Affect Firm Behavior and Performance: Evidence from the Dialysis Industry* 收购如何影响企业行为和绩效:来自透析行业的证据*
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2020-02-01 DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjz034
Paul J. Eliason, Benjamin Heebsh, R. McDevitt, James W. Roberts
Many industries have become increasingly concentrated through mergers and acquisitions, which in health care may have important consequences for spending and outcomes. Using a rich panel of Medicare claims data for nearly one million dialysis patients, we advance the literature on the effects of mergers and acquisitions by studying the precise ways providers change their behavior following an acquisition. We base our empirical analysis on more than 1,200 acquisitions of independent dialysis facilities by large chains over a 12-year period and find that chains transfer several prominent strategies to the facilities they acquire. Most notably, acquired facilities converge to the behavior of their new parent companies by increasing patients’ doses of highly reimbursed drugs, replacing high-skill nurses with less-skilled technicians, and waitlisting fewer patients for kidney transplants. We then show that patients fare worse as a result of these changes: outcomes such as hospitalizations and mortality deteriorate, with our long panel allowing us to identify these effects from within-facility or within-patient variation around the acquisitions. Because overall Medicare spending increases at acquired facilities, mostly as a result of higher drug reimbursements, this decline in quality corresponds to a decline in value for payers. We conclude the article by considering the channels through which acquisitions produce such large changes in provider behavior and outcomes, finding that increased market power cannot explain the decline in quality. Rather, the adoption of the acquiring firm’s strategies and practices drives our main results, with greater economies of scale for drug purchasing responsible for more than half of the change in profits following an acquisition.
许多行业通过并购变得越来越集中,在医疗保健领域,并购可能会对支出和结果产生重要影响。利用近100万透析患者的丰富医疗保险索赔数据,我们通过研究供应商在收购后改变行为的确切方式,推进了关于并购影响的文献。我们的实证分析基于大型连锁店在12年内对1200多家独立透析设施的收购,发现连锁店将几个突出的战略转移到了他们收购的设施上。最值得注意的是,收购的设施通过增加患者的™ 剂量的高报销药物,用技术水平较低的技术人员取代高技能护士,等待肾移植的患者减少。然后,我们发现,由于这些变化,患者的情况更糟:住院和死亡率等结果恶化,我们的长小组使我们能够从机构内部或患者内部的采集变化中识别这些影响。由于收购设施的总体医疗保险支出增加,主要是由于药品报销增加,因此这种质量的下降与支付者的价值下降相对应。我们通过考虑收购对供应商行为和结果产生如此大变化的渠道来总结这篇文章,发现市场力量的增加并不能解释质量的下降。相反,收购公司™s的战略和实践推动了我们的主要成果,药品采购的规模经济占收购后利润变化的一半以上。
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引用次数: 22
Political Advertising and Election Results 政治广告和选举结果
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2018-11-01 DOI: 10.1093/QJE/QJY010
Jörg L. Spenkuch, D. Toniatti
We study the persuasive effects of political advertising. Our empirical strategy exploits FCC regulations that result in plausibly exogenous variation in the number of impressions across the borders of neighboring counties. Applying this approach to detailed data on television advertisement broadcasts and viewership patterns during the 2004–12 presidential campaigns, our results indicate that total political advertising has almost no impact on aggregate turnout. By contrast, we find a positive and economically meaningful effect of advertising on candidates’ vote shares. Taken at face value, our estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in the partisan difference in advertising raises the partisan difference in vote shares by about 0.5 percentage points. Evidence from a regression discontinuity design suggests that advertising affects election results by altering the partisan composition of the electorate.
我们研究政治广告的说服效果。我们的经验策略利用FCC法规,导致在相邻县的边界上的印象数量的似是而非的外生变化。将此方法应用于2004-12年总统竞选期间电视广告广播和观众模式的详细数据,我们的结果表明,政治广告总量对总投票率几乎没有影响。相比之下,我们发现广告对候选人的投票份额有积极的和有经济意义的影响。从表面上看,我们的估计表明,广告中的党派差异每增加一个标准差,投票份额的党派差异就会增加约0.5个百分点。来自回归不连续设计的证据表明,广告通过改变选民的党派组成来影响选举结果。
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引用次数: 119
Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning 推荐系统作为社会学习机制
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2018-05-01 DOI: 10.1093/QJE/QJX044
Yeon-Koo Che, Johannes Hörner
This article studies how a recommender system may incentivize users to learn about a product collaboratively. To improve the incentives for early exploration, the optimal design trades off fully transparent disclosure by selectively overrecommending the product (or “spamming”) to a fraction of users. Under the optimal scheme, the designer spams very little on a product immediately after its release but gradually increases its frequency; she stops it altogether when she becomes sufficiently pessimistic about the product. The recommender’s product research and intrinsic/naive users “seed” incentives for user exploration and determine the speed and trajectory of social learning. Potential applications for various Internet recommendation platforms and implications for review/ratings inflation are discussed.
本文研究了推荐系统如何激励用户协同学习产品。为了提高早期探索的动机,最佳设计通过选择性地向一小部分用户过度推荐产品(或“垃圾邮件”)来换取完全透明的披露。在最优方案下,设计师在产品发布后立即对其进行垃圾邮件处理,但频率逐渐增加;当她对产品变得足够悲观时,她就完全停止了。推荐人的产品研究和内在/天真用户为用户探索“种子”激励,并决定社交学习的速度和轨迹。讨论了各种互联网推荐平台的潜在应用以及对审查/评级膨胀的影响。
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引用次数: 95
Distributional,National,Accounts: Methods,and,Estimates,for,the,United,States 分配、国民账户:美国的方法和估计
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2018-05-01 DOI: 10.1093/QJE/QJX043
T. Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, G. Zucman
This paper combines tax, survey, and national accounts data to estimate the distribution of national income in the United States since 1913. Our distributional national accounts capture 100% of national income, allowing us to compute growth rates for each quantile of the income distribution consistent with macroeconomic growth. We estimate the distribution of both pre-tax and post-tax income, making it possible to provide a comprehensive view of how government redistribution affects inequality. Average pre-tax national income per adult has increased 60% since 1980, but we find that it has stagnated for the bottom 50% of the distribution at about $16,000 a year. The pre-tax income of the middle class—adults between the median and the 90th percentile—has grown 40% since 1980, faster than what tax and survey data suggest, due in particular to the rise of tax-exempt fringe benefits. Income has boomed at the top: in 1980, top 1% adults earned on average 27 times more than bottom 50% adults, while they earn 81 times more today. The upsurge of top incomes was first a labor income phenomenon but has mostly been a capital income phenomenon since 2000. The government has offset only a small fraction of the increase in inequality. The reduction of the gender gap in earnings has mitigated the increase in inequality among adults. The share of women, however, falls steeply as one moves up the labor income distribution, and is only 11% in the top 0.1% today.
本文结合税收、调查和国民账户数据来估计自1913年以来美国的国民收入分布。我们的分配国民账户占国民收入的100%,使我们能够计算与宏观经济增长一致的收入分配的每个分位数的增长率。我们估计了税前和税后收入的分布,从而有可能全面了解政府再分配如何影响不平等。自1980年以来,每个成年人的平均税前国民收入增长了60%,但我们发现,在分配的最后50%,这一数字停滞不前,每年约为16000美元。自1980年以来,中产阶级(介于中位数和第90百分位之间的成年人)的税前收入增长了40%,比税收和调查数据显示的要快,特别是由于免税附加福利的增加。收入在顶端激增:1980年,收入最高的1%成年人的平均收入是收入最低的50%成年人的27倍,而今天他们的收入是收入的81倍。最高收入的激增最初是一种劳动收入现象,但自2000年以来,主要是资本收入现象。政府只抵消了不平等加剧的一小部分。收入中性别差距的缩小缓解了成年人之间不平等的加剧。然而,随着劳动力收入分配的增加,女性的比例急剧下降,目前在前0.1%中仅占11%。
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引用次数: 816
Erratum to “Leveraging Lotteries for School Value-Added: Testing and Estimation” 《利用奖券促进学校增值:测试与评估》的勘误
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2017-11-01 DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjx036
J. Angrist, Peter Hull, Parag A. Pathak, Christopher R. Walters
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引用次数: 1
Erratum to “Field of Study, Earnings, and Self-Selection” “学习领域、收入和自我选择”勘误表
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2017-08-01 DOI: 10.1093/QJE/QJX025
L. Kirkebøen, E. Leuven, M. Mogstad
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引用次数: 3
期刊
Quarterly Journal of Economics
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