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Quantifying the Gap Between Equilibrium and Optimum under Monopolistic Competition* 垄断竞争下均衡与最优差距的量化研究*
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2020-11-01 DOI: 10.1093/QJE/QJAA017
K. Behrens, Giordano Mion, Yasusada Murata, Jens Suedekum
Equilibria and optima generally differ in imperfectly competitive markets. While this is well understood theoretically, it is unclear how large the welfare distortions are in the aggregate economy. Do they matter quantitatively? To answer this question, we develop a multi-sector monopolistic competition model with endogenous firm entry and selection, productivity, and markups. Using French and British data, we quantify the gap between the equilibrium and optimal allocations. In our preferred specification, inefficiencies in the labor allocation and entry between sectors, as well as inefficient selection and output per firm within sectors, generate welfare losses of about 6–10% of GDP.
在不完全竞争市场中,均衡和最优通常是不同的。虽然这在理论上得到了很好的理解,但目前尚不清楚福利扭曲在整体经济中有多大。它们在数量上重要吗?为了回答这个问题,我们建立了一个包含内生企业进入和选择、生产率和加价的多部门垄断竞争模型。利用法国和英国的数据,我们量化了均衡分配和最优分配之间的差距。在我们首选的规范中,部门之间劳动力配置和进入的低效率,以及部门内每个企业的低效率选择和产出,产生的福利损失约占GDP的6-10%。
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引用次数: 17
The Making of the Modern Metropolis: Evidence from London* 现代都市的形成:来自伦敦的证据*
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2020-11-01 DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjaa014
Stephan Heblich, S. Redding, D. Sturm
Using newly constructed spatially disaggregated data for London from 1801 to 1921, we show that the invention of the steam railway led to the first large-scale separation of workplace and residence. We show that a class of quantitative urban models is remarkably successful in explaining this reorganization of economic activity. We structurally estimate one of the models in this class and find substantial agglomeration forces in both production and residence. In counterfactuals, we find that removing the whole railway network reduces the population and the value of land and buildings in London by up to 51.5% and 53.3% respectively, and decreases net commuting into the historical center of London by more than 300,000 workers.
使用1801年至1921年新构建的伦敦空间分类数据,我们发现蒸汽铁路的发明导致了工作场所和住宅的首次大规模分离。我们证明了一类定量城市模型在解释这种经济活动重组方面是非常成功的。我们从结构上估计了这类模型中的一个,并发现生产和居住中都存在巨大的集聚力。相反,我们发现,拆除整个铁路网将使伦敦的人口和土地及建筑价值分别减少51.5%和53.3%,并使前往伦敦历史中心的净通勤减少了30多万工人。
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引用次数: 38
The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments* 协调惩罚的使用与滥用*
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2020-10-10 DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjaa035
Daniel Barron, Yingni Guo
Communication facilitates cooperation by ensuring that deviators are collectively punished. We explore how players might misuse communication to threaten one another, and we identify ways that organizations can deter misuse and restore cooperation. In our model, a principal plays trust games with a sequence of short-run agents who communicate with one another. An agent can shirk and then extort pay by threatening to report that the principal deviated. We show that these threats can completely undermine cooperation. Investigations of agents’ efforts, or dyadic relationships between the principal and each agent, can deter extortion and restore some cooperation. Investigations of the principal’s action, on the other hand, typically do not help. Our analysis suggests that collective punishments are vulnerable to misuse unless they are designed with an eye towards discouraging it. JEL: C73, D02, D70. ∗Corresponding author: Daniel Barron, Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Evanston IL 60208; email: d-barron@kellogg.northwestern.edu. The authors would like to thank Nageeb Ali, Charles Angelucci, Nemanja Antic, Alessandro Bonatti, Renee Bowen, Joyee Deb, Wouter Dessein, Matthias Fahn, Benjamin Friedrich, George Georgiadis, Marina Halac, Johannes Hörner, Peter Klibanov, Ilan Kremer, Nicolas Lambert, Stephan Lauermann, Jin Li, Elliot Lipnowski, Shuo Liu, Bentley MacLeod, David Miller, Joshua Mollner, Dilip Mookherjee, Arijit Mukherjee, Jacopo Perego, Michael Powell, Luis Rayo, Jonah Rockoff, Mark Satterthwaite, Andy Skrzypacz, Takuo Sugaya, Jeroen Swinkels, Joel Watson, and audiences at many conferences, workshops, and seminars. We thank the UCSD theory reading group for comments on a draft of this paper, and Andres Espitia for excellent research assistance.
沟通有助于合作,确保破坏者受到集体惩罚。我们探讨了参与者如何滥用通信来威胁彼此,并确定了组织可以阻止滥用和恢复合作的方法。在我们的模型中,委托人与一系列相互沟通的短期代理人进行信任游戏。代理人可以通过威胁报告委托人的行为来推卸责任,然后勒索报酬。我们表明,这些威胁会完全破坏合作。调查代理人的努力,或者委托人和每个代理人之间的二元关系,可以阻止勒索并恢复一些合作。另一方面,对校长行为的调查通常没有帮助。我们的分析表明,集体惩罚很容易被滥用,除非它们的设计着眼于劝阻。JEL:C73,D02,D70。*通讯作者:Daniel Barron,西北大学凯洛格管理学院,伊利诺伊州埃文斯顿60208;电子邮件:d-barron@kellogg.northwestern.edu.作者感谢Nageeb Ali、Charles Angelucci、Nemanja Antic、Alessandro Bonatti、Renee Bowen、Joyee Deb、Wouter Dessein、Matthias Fahn、Benjamin Friedrich、George Georgiadis、Marina Halac、Johannes Hörner、Peter Klibanov、Ilan Kremer、Nicolas Lambert、Stephan Lauermann、Jin Li、Elliot Lipnowski、Shuo Liu、Bentley MacLeod、David Miller、Joshua Mollner、Dilip Mookherjee,Arijit Mukherjee、Jacobo Perego、Michael Powell、Luis Rayo、Jonah Rockoff、Mark Satterthwaite、Andy Skrzypacz、Takuo Sugaya、Jeroen Swinkels、Joel Watson以及许多会议、研讨会和研讨会的观众。我们感谢加州大学可持续发展学院理论阅读小组对本文草稿的评论,并感谢Andres Espitia的出色研究协助。
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引用次数: 8
Minimum Wages and Racial Inequality* 最低工资与种族不平等*
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2020-09-14 DOI: 10.1093/QJE/QJAA031
Ellora Derenoncourt, Claire Montialoux
The earnings difference between white and black workers fell dramatically in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This article shows that the expansion of the minimum wage played a critical role in this decline. The 1966 Fair Labor Standards Act extended federal minimum wage coverage to agriculture, restaurants, nursing homes, and other services that were previously uncovered and where nearly a third of black workers were employed. We digitize over 1,000 hourly wage distributions from Bureau of Labor Statistics industry wage reports and use CPS microdata to investigate the effects of this reform on wages, employment, and racial inequality. Using a cross-industry difference-in-differences design, we show that earnings rose sharply for workers in the newly covered industries. The impact was nearly twice as large for black workers as for white workers. Within treated industries, the racial gap adjusted for observables fell from 25 log points prereform to 0 afterward. We can rule out significant disemployment effects for black workers. Using a bunching design, we find no aggregate effect of the reform on employment. The 1967 extension of the minimum wage can explain more than 20% of the reduction in the racial earnings and income gap during the civil rights era. Our findings shed new light on the dynamics of labor market inequality in the United States and suggest that minimum wage policy can play a critical role in reducing racial economic disparities. JEL Codes: J38, J23, J15, J31
20世纪60年代末和70年代初,美国白人和黑人工人的收入差距急剧下降。这篇文章表明,最低工资的扩大在这一下降中发挥了关键作用。1966年的《公平劳动标准法》将联邦最低工资覆盖范围扩大到农业、餐馆、疗养院和其他服务业,这些服务业以前没有被覆盖,近三分之一的黑人工人受雇于这些服务业。我们将劳工统计局行业工资报告中的1000多个小时工资分布数字化,并使用CPS微观数据来调查这项改革对工资、就业和种族不平等的影响。使用跨行业差异设计,我们发现新覆盖行业的工人收入大幅增长。对黑人工人的影响几乎是白人工人的两倍。在经过处理的行业中,经可观察性调整后的种族差距从之前的25个对数点下降到之后的0。我们可以排除黑人工人失业的严重影响。使用集群设计,我们没有发现改革对就业的总体影响。1967年最低工资的延长可以解释民权时代种族收入和收入差距缩小20%以上的原因。我们的研究结果为美国劳动力市场不平等的动态提供了新的线索,并表明最低工资政策可以在减少种族经济差异方面发挥关键作用。JEL代码:J38、J23、J15、J31
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引用次数: 90
What You See Is All There Is* 你所看到的就是一切*
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2020-08-01 DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjaa012
B. Enke
News reports and communication are inherently constrained by space, time, and attention. As a result, news sources often condition the decision of whether to share a piece of information on the similarity between the signal and the prior belief of the audience, which generates a sample selection problem. This article experimentally studies how people form beliefs in these contexts, in particular the mechanisms behind errors in statistical reasoning. I document that a substantial fraction of experimental participants follows a simple “what you see is all there is” heuristic, according to which participants exclusively consider information that is right in front of them, and directly use the sample mean to estimate the population mean. A series of treatments aimed at identifying mechanisms suggests that for many participants, unobserved signals do not even come to mind. I provide causal evidence that the frequency of such incorrect mental models is a function of the computational complexity of the decision problem. These results point to the context dependence of what comes to mind and the resulting errors in belief updating.
新闻报道和传播本质上受到空间、时间和注意力的限制。因此,新闻来源经常根据信号和观众先前的信念之间的相似性来决定是否共享一条信息,这会产生样本选择问题。本文通过实验研究了人们如何在这些背景下形成信念,特别是统计推理中错误背后的机制。我记录了相当一部分实验参与者遵循一个简单的“你所看到的就是一切”启发式,根据这个启发式,参与者只考虑眼前的信息,并直接使用样本均值来估计总体均值。一系列旨在识别机制的治疗表明,对于许多参与者来说,他们甚至不会想到未观察到的信号。我提供了因果证据,证明这种不正确的心理模型的频率是决策问题计算复杂性的函数。这些结果指出了脑海中浮现的内容的上下文依赖性,以及由此产生的信念更新错误。
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引用次数: 31
Rational Inattention, Competitive Supply, and Psychometrics* 理性疏忽、竞争性供给与心理计量学*
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2020-08-01 DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjaa011
Andrew Caplin, Dániel Csaba, John Leahy, O. Nov
We introduce a simple method of recovering attention costs from choice data. Our method rests on a precise analogy with production theory. Costs of attention determine consumer demand and consumer welfare, just as a competitive firm’s technology determines its supply curve and profits. We implement our recovery method experimentally, outline applications, and link our work to the broader literature on inattention and mistaken decisions.
我们介绍了一种从选择数据中恢复注意力成本的简单方法。我们的方法建立在与生产理论精确类比的基础上。关注成本决定了消费者需求和消费者福利,就像一家有竞争力的公司的技术决定了其供应曲线和利润一样。我们通过实验实现了我们的恢复方法,概述了应用程序,并将我们的工作与更广泛的关于疏忽和错误决策的文献联系起来。
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引用次数: 15
Income Segregation and Intergenerational Mobility Across Colleges in the United States* 美国大学之间的收入隔离和代际流动*
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2020-08-01 DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjaa005
Raj Chetty, John N Friedman, Emmanuel Saez, Nicholas Turner, Danny Yagan
We construct publicly available statistics on parents’ incomes and students’ earnings outcomes for each college in the United States using deidentified data from tax records. These statistics reveal that the degree of parental income segregation across colleges is very high, similar to that across neighborhoods. Differences in postcollege earnings between children from low- and high-income families are much smaller among students who attend the same college than across colleges. Colleges with the best earnings outcomes predominantly enroll students from high-income families, although a few mid-tier public colleges have both low parent income levels and high student earnings. Linking these income data to SAT and ACT scores, we simulate how changes in the allocation of students to colleges affect segregation and intergenerational mobility. Equalizing application, admission, and matriculation rates across parental income groups conditional on test scores would reduce segregation substantially, primarily by increasing the representation of middle-class students at more selective colleges. However, it would have little effect on the fraction of low-income students at elite private colleges because there are relatively few students from low-income families with sufficiently high SAT/ACT scores. Differences in parental income distributions across colleges could be eliminated by giving low- and middle-income students a sliding-scale preference in the application and admissions process similar to that implicitly given to legacy students at elite private colleges. Assuming that 80% of observational differences in students’ earnings conditional on test scores, race, and parental income are due to colleges’ causal effects—a strong assumption, but one consistent with prior work—such changes could reduce intergenerational income persistence among college students by about 25%. We conclude that changing how students are allocated to colleges could substantially reduce segregation and increase intergenerational mobility, even without changing colleges’ educational programs.
我们构建了关于父母的公开统计数据™ 收入和学生™ 使用税务记录中未识别的数据对美国每所大学的收入结果进行分析。这些统计数据表明,大学之间的父母收入隔离程度非常高,与社区之间的情况类似。来自低收入和高收入家庭的孩子在上同一所大学的学生中的毕业后收入差异要比不同大学的学生小得多。收入最好的大学主要招收来自高收入家庭的学生,尽管一些中等水平的公立大学的父母收入水平较低,学生收入较高。将这些收入数据与SAT和ACT成绩联系起来,我们模拟了大学学生分配的变化如何影响种族隔离和代际流动。以考试成绩为条件,使父母收入群体的申请、录取和入学率相等,将大大减少种族隔离,主要是通过增加中产阶级学生在更具选择性的大学中的代表性。然而,这对精英私立大学的低收入学生比例影响不大,因为来自低收入家庭的SAT/ACT分数足够高的学生相对较少。可以通过在申请和录取过程中给予低收入和中等收入学生滑动比例的偏好来消除大学之间父母收入分配的差异,类似于精英私立大学传统学生的偏好。假设80%的学生的观察差异™ 以考试成绩、种族和父母收入为条件的收入来自大学™ 因果效应“这是一个强有力的假设,但与之前的工作一致”这种变化可能会使大学生的代际收入持续性降低约25%。我们得出的结论是,改变学生分配到大学的方式可以大大减少种族隔离,增加代际流动性,即使不改变大学™ 教育项目。
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引用次数: 160
Optimal Timing of Policy Announcements in Dynamic Election Campaigns* 动态选举活动中公布政策的最佳时机*
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2020-08-01 DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjaa010
Yuichiro Kamada, Takuo Sugaya
We construct a dynamic model of election campaigns. In the model, opportunities for candidates to refine/clarify their policy positions are limited and arrive stochastically along the course of the campaign until the predetermined election date. We show that this simple friction leads to rich and subtle campaign dynamics. We first demonstrate these effects in a series of canonical static models of elections that we extend to dynamic settings, including models with valence and a multi-dimensional policy space. We then present general principles that underlie the results from those models. In particular, we establish that candidates spend a long time using ambiguous language during the election campaign in equilibrium. ∗Kamada: Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720, e-mail: y.cam.24@gmail.com. Sugaya: Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, CA, 94305, e-mail: tsugaya@stanford.edu; We thank Ernesto Dal Bo, Itay Fainmesser, Drew Fudenberg, Michihiro Kandori, Akitada Kasahara, Kei Kawai, Fuhito Kojima, David Laibson, John B. Londregan, Shih-En Lu, Francisco Mart́ınez-Mora, Adam H. Meirowitz, Stephen Morris, Kristopher Ramsay, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Ken Shepsle, Yuki Takagi, Satoru Takahashi, and the seminar participants at the Harvard University Department of Economics and Department of Government, the Princeton University Department of Economics and Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, Yale University, the 21st Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, and the Urrutia Elejalde Workshop on Information, Dynamics and Political Decision Making for helpful comments. In addition, Steven Callander and Josh Gottlieb read through the previous versions of this paper and gave us very detailed comments, which significantly improved the paper. We also thank the careful reading and suggestions by the Editor and the referees. Judith Levi provided a superb professional editorial assistance, which again significantly improved the paper. We thank Emily Her, Douglas Hong, Omair Butt, and especially Lingxuan Wu for their excellent research assistantship. This paper subsumes and supersedes part of our unpublished working paper “Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Platforms in Policy Announcement Games” and its earlier version circulated as “Policy Announcement Game: Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Policies,” which Sugaya first presented at the 21st Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory in 2010.
我们构建了一个动态的竞选模型。在该模型中,候选人完善/澄清其政策立场的机会是有限的,并且在竞选过程中随机到达,直到预定的选举日期。我们表明,这种简单的摩擦导致了丰富而微妙的竞选动态。我们首先在一系列规范的静态选举模型中证明了这些影响,这些模型被扩展到动态环境中,包括具有效价和多维政策空间的模型。然后,我们提出了这些模型结果的一般原则。特别是,我们确定,候选人在均衡的竞选活动中花了很长时间使用模棱两可的语言。*Kamada:加州大学伯克利分校哈斯商学院,邮编94720,电子邮箱:y.cam.24@gmail.com.Sugaya:斯坦福大学商学院,加利福尼亚州斯坦福,94305,电子邮件:tsugaya@stanford.edu;我们感谢Ernesto Dal Bo、Itay Fainmesser、Drew Fudenberg、Michihiro Kandori、Akitada Kasahara、Kei Kawai、Fuhito Kojima、David Laibson、John B.Londregan、Shih-En Lu、Francisco Mart́ınez-Mora、Adam H.Meirowitz、Stephen Morris、Kristopher Ramsay、Andrzej Skrzypacz、Ken Shepsle、Yuki Takagi、Satoru Takahashi、,哈佛大学经济系和政府系、普林斯顿大学经济系与政治学系、加州大学伯克利分校、耶鲁大学、第21届石溪国际博弈论会议和Urrutia Elejalde信息研讨会的与会者,动态和政治决策,以获得有用的评论。此外,Steven Callander和Josh Gottlieb通读了本文的前几个版本,并给了我们非常详细的评论,这大大改进了论文。我们也感谢编辑和裁判的仔细阅读和建议。朱迪斯·李维(Judith Levi)提供了出色的专业编辑协助,这再次显著改善了报纸。我们感谢Emily Her、Douglas Hong、Omair Butt,特别是吴凌萱的出色研究协助。本文包含并取代了我们未发表的工作论文《政策公告游戏中的价格候选人和模棱两可的平台》的一部分,以及Sugaya在2010年第21届石溪国际博弈论会议上首次发表的早期版本《政策公告博弈:价格候选人和含糊不清的政策》。
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引用次数: 6
The Effect of the Credit Crunch on Output Price Dynamics: The Corporate Inventory and Liquidity Management Channel* 信贷紧缩对产出价格动态的影响:企业库存和流动性管理渠道*
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2020-07-08 DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjaa025
Ryan Kim
I study how a credit crunch affects output price dynamics. I build a unique micro-level data set that combines scanner-level prices and quantities with producer information, including the producer’s banking relationships, inventory, and cash holdings. I exploit the Lehman Brothers failure as a quasi-experiment and find that the firms facing a negative credit supply shock decrease their output prices approximately 15% more than their unaffected counterparts. I hypothesize that such firms reduce prices to liquidate inventory and generate additional cash flow from the product market. I find strong empirical support for this hypothesis: (i) the firms that face a negative bank shock temporarily decrease their prices and inventory and increase their market share and cash holdings relative to their counterparts, and (ii) this effect is stronger for the firms and sectors with a high initial inventory or small initial cash holdings.
我研究信贷紧缩如何影响产出价格动态。我构建了一个独特的微观层面数据集,将扫描仪层面的价格和数量与生产商信息相结合,包括生产商的银行关系、库存和现金持有量。我利用雷曼兄弟的失败作为一个准实验,发现面临负信贷供应冲击的公司的产出价格比未受影响的同行下降了约15%。我假设这些公司降低价格以清算库存,并从产品市场产生额外的现金流。我发现这一假设得到了强有力的实证支持:(I)面临负面银行冲击的公司相对于同行暂时降低了价格和库存,增加了市场份额和现金持有量,(ii)这种影响对初始库存高或初始现金持有量小的公司和部门更为强烈。
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引用次数: 20
Optimal Spatial Policies, Geography, and Sorting* 最优空间策略、地理和排序*
IF 13.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2020-05-01 DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjaa001
Pablo D. Fajgelbaum, C. Gaubert
We study optimal spatial policies in a quantitative trade and geography framework with spillovers and spatial sorting of heterogeneous workers. We characterize the spatial transfers that must hold in efficient allocations, as well as labor subsidies that can implement them. There exists scope for welfare-enhancing spatial policies even when spillovers are common across locations. Using data on U.S. cities and existing estimates of the spillover elasticities, we find that the U.S. economy would benefit from a reallocation of workers to currently low-wage cities. The optimal allocation features a greater share of high-skill workers in smaller cities relative to the observed allocation. Inefficient sorting may lead to substantial welfare costs.
我们研究了具有溢出效应和异质工人空间排序的量化贸易和地理框架下的最优空间政策。我们描述了必须保持有效分配的空间转移,以及可以实施这些转移的劳动力补贴。即使溢出效应在各个地区普遍存在,也存在提高福利的空间政策的空间。利用美国城市的数据和现有的溢出弹性估计,我们发现,将工人重新分配到目前的低工资城市将使美国经济受益。最优分配的特点是,与观察到的分配相比,小城市的高技能工人所占比例更大。低效的分拣可能会导致大量的福利成本。
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引用次数: 27
期刊
Quarterly Journal of Economics
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