We examine international regulatory agreements that are negotiated under lobbying pressures from producer groups. The way in which lobbying influences the cooperative setting of regulatory policies, as well as the welfare impacts of international agreements, depend crucially on whether the interests of producers in different countries are aligned or in conflict. The former situation tends to occur for product standards, while the latter tends to occur for process standards. We find that, if producer lobbies are strong enough, agreements on product standards lead to excessive deregulation and decrease welfare, while agreements on process standards tighten regulations and enhance welfare. (JEL F13, F14, F15, L15, L51)
{"title":"The Political Economy of International Regulatory Cooperation","authors":"G. Maggi, Ralph Ossa","doi":"10.1257/aer.20200780","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200780","url":null,"abstract":"We examine international regulatory agreements that are negotiated under lobbying pressures from producer groups. The way in which lobbying influences the cooperative setting of regulatory policies, as well as the welfare impacts of international agreements, depend crucially on whether the interests of producers in different countries are aligned or in conflict. The former situation tends to occur for product standards, while the latter tends to occur for process standards. We find that, if producer lobbies are strong enough, agreements on product standards lead to excessive deregulation and decrease welfare, while agreements on process standards tighten regulations and enhance welfare. (JEL F13, F14, F15, L15, L51)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81766377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
L. Bach, Antoine Bozio, Arthur Guillouzouic, C. Malgouyres
Boissel and Matray (2022) find that investment increased after 2013 in French firms facing higher dividend taxes. We identify an alteration in the code plotting the event study of the effect of this reform on investment. Using identical data and removing this alteration, we find differential pre-trends between treated and control firms. We also establish that the controls referred to as “size growth,” used in all the difference-in-difference specifications, effectively are controls for lagged investment, i.e., the main outcome variable. Removing such controls attenuates differential pre-trends but leaves no clear event study evidence of a positive effect of dividend taxation on investment. (JEL D22, G31, G35, H25, H32)
{"title":"Dividend Taxes and the Allocation of Capital: Comment","authors":"L. Bach, Antoine Bozio, Arthur Guillouzouic, C. Malgouyres","doi":"10.1257/aer.20221432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20221432","url":null,"abstract":"Boissel and Matray (2022) find that investment increased after 2013 in French firms facing higher dividend taxes. We identify an alteration in the code plotting the event study of the effect of this reform on investment. Using identical data and removing this alteration, we find differential pre-trends between treated and control firms. We also establish that the controls referred to as “size growth,” used in all the difference-in-difference specifications, effectively are controls for lagged investment, i.e., the main outcome variable. Removing such controls attenuates differential pre-trends but leaves no clear event study evidence of a positive effect of dividend taxation on investment. (JEL D22, G31, G35, H25, H32)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79941431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This notice explains the authors’ reasons for retracting the published paper, Boissel and Matray (2022b). The authors are grateful for the data and code policies at the AER that make it possible to be entirely transparent. The code that accompanies the paper (Boissel and Matray 2022a) fully reproduces all of the published results and had been independently replicated under the AER’s policies prior to publication. The errors described in this notice, which are responsible for the retraction, are visible in that code and were brought to the authors’ attention by Bach et al. (2023). Boissel and Matray (2022b) studied the financial and real effects of a dividend tax policy change on firms in France. It contained four main results: first, firms exposed to the tax hike (treated firms) significantly reduced their dividend payouts; second, the increase in internal liquidity led treated firms to significantly increase their capital and labor; third, treated firms grew in other ways including in their average wages and sales; fourth, the investment effects were larger for firms with more profitable opportunities and with higher marginal product of capital ex ante. The authors are retracting the paper because Figure 4 of the published paper, which pertains to the second result on the increase in investment and which plots the event study difference-in-difference coefficients of the within-firm change in year-to-year investment flows by treated firms, relative to control firms, differs from the figure that was conditionally accepted by the handling editor in two ways. First, the firm size control variable in the conditionally accepted manuscript was coded in changes but was incorrectly written in the baseline specification as levels. This error was caught in the replication process when the data were rebuilt from scratch, and the variable was redescribed accordingly in the paper. This change in the baseline specification was not requested by the handling editor, and the authors did not notify the handling editor nor the data editor of the update. The authors used firm capital as a proxy for firm size so that in practice, the specification controlled for the change in capital, i.e., investment, in the pre-period. The authors regret that they did not recognize the significance of the modification at the time. Second, the code that plots Figure 4 in the publicly available code repository includes an alteration of two coefficients by a factor of 1.8, which was incorrect. This alteration affects the rendering of the figure, but not the underlying data. All the results reported in the tables and other figures are unaffected. The error in the rendering of the figure was not intentional. The data and the code for the analysis
本通知解释了作者撤回已发表论文Boissel and Matray (2022b)的原因。作者对AER的数据和代码策略表示感谢，这使得完全透明成为可能。论文附带的代码(Boissel和Matray 2022a)完全再现了所有已发表的结果，并在发表前根据AER的政策进行了独立复制。本通知中描述的错误是导致撤稿的原因，这些错误在该代码中可见，并且由Bach等人(2023)提请作者注意。Boissel和Matray (2022b)研究了法国股息税政策变化对公司的财务和实际影响。它包含了四个主要结果:首先，受增税影响的公司(被征税的公司)显著减少了派息;第二，内部流动性的增加导致被治疗企业显著增加资本和劳动力;第三，接受治疗的公司以其他方式增长，包括平均工资和销售额;第四，对于盈利机会越多、事前资本边际产出越高的企业，投资效应越大。作者撤回论文的原因是，发表论文的图4与投资增加的第二个结果有关，它绘制了被处理公司相对于控制公司的年度投资流动的公司内部变化的事件研究差异系数，与处理编辑在两个方面有条件地接受的数字不同。首先，在有条件接受的稿件中，公司规模控制变量被编码为变更，但在基线规范中被错误地写为级别。这个错误是在从头开始重建数据的复制过程中发现的，并且在论文中对变量进行了相应的重新描述。基线规范中的此更改不是由处理编辑器请求的，并且作者没有将更新通知处理编辑器或数据编辑器。作者使用公司资本作为公司规模的代理，因此在实践中，该规范控制了资本的变化，即投资，在前期。作者感到遗憾的是，他们当时没有认识到修改的重要性。其次，在公开可用的代码存储库中绘制图4的代码包括对两个系数的1.8倍的修改，这是不正确的。这种改变会影响图形的呈现，但不会影响底层数据。表格和其他数据中报告的所有结果不受影响。渲染图中的错误不是故意的。用于分析的数据和代码
{"title":"Retraction of “Dividend Taxes and the Allocation of Capital”","authors":"Adrien Matray, Charles Boissel","doi":"10.1257/aer.113.7.2053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.113.7.2053","url":null,"abstract":"This notice explains the authors’ reasons for retracting the published paper, Boissel and Matray (2022b). The authors are grateful for the data and code policies at the AER that make it possible to be entirely transparent. The code that accompanies the paper (Boissel and Matray 2022a) fully reproduces all of the published results and had been independently replicated under the AER’s policies prior to publication. The errors described in this notice, which are responsible for the retraction, are visible in that code and were brought to the authors’ attention by Bach et al. (2023). Boissel and Matray (2022b) studied the financial and real effects of a dividend tax policy change on firms in France. It contained four main results: first, firms exposed to the tax hike (treated firms) significantly reduced their dividend payouts; second, the increase in internal liquidity led treated firms to significantly increase their capital and labor; third, treated firms grew in other ways including in their average wages and sales; fourth, the investment effects were larger for firms with more profitable opportunities and with higher marginal product of capital ex ante. The authors are retracting the paper because Figure 4 of the published paper, which pertains to the second result on the increase in investment and which plots the event study difference-in-difference coefficients of the within-firm change in year-to-year investment flows by treated firms, relative to control firms, differs from the figure that was conditionally accepted by the handling editor in two ways. First, the firm size control variable in the conditionally accepted manuscript was coded in changes but was incorrectly written in the baseline specification as levels. This error was caught in the replication process when the data were rebuilt from scratch, and the variable was redescribed accordingly in the paper. This change in the baseline specification was not requested by the handling editor, and the authors did not notify the handling editor nor the data editor of the update. The authors used firm capital as a proxy for firm size so that in practice, the specification controlled for the change in capital, i.e., investment, in the pre-period. The authors regret that they did not recognize the significance of the modification at the time. Second, the code that plots Figure 4 in the publicly available code repository includes an alteration of two coefficients by a factor of 1.8, which was incorrect. This alteration affects the rendering of the figure, but not the underlying data. All the results reported in the tables and other figures are unaffected. The error in the rendering of the figure was not intentional. The data and the code for the analysis","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74659456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We provide evidence that banks distort the composition of credit supply in order to comply with ratio-based capital requirements in times of economic distress. An unexpected intervention by the European Banking Authority provides a natural experiment to study how banks respond to falling below minimum required capital ratios during an economic downturn. We show that affected banks respond by cutting lending but also by reallocating credit to distressed firms with underreported loan losses. We develop a method to detect underreported losses using loan-level data. The credit reallocation leads to a reallocation of inputs across firms. We calculate that the resulting increase in input misallocation accounts for about 22 percent of the decline in productivity in Portugal in 2012. (JEL E23, E32, G21, G28, G32, G38)
{"title":"When Losses Turn into Loans: The Cost of Weak Banks","authors":"Laura Blattner, Luísa Farinha, Francisca Rebelo","doi":"10.1257/aer.20190149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190149","url":null,"abstract":"We provide evidence that banks distort the composition of credit supply in order to comply with ratio-based capital requirements in times of economic distress. An unexpected intervention by the European Banking Authority provides a natural experiment to study how banks respond to falling below minimum required capital ratios during an economic downturn. We show that affected banks respond by cutting lending but also by reallocating credit to distressed firms with underreported loan losses. We develop a method to detect underreported losses using loan-level data. The credit reallocation leads to a reallocation of inputs across firms. We calculate that the resulting increase in input misallocation accounts for about 22 percent of the decline in productivity in Portugal in 2012. (JEL E23, E32, G21, G28, G32, G38)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73659044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study differences in exposure to factor-biased technical change among occupations by providing the first measures of capital-embodied technical change (CETC) and of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor at the occupational level. We document sizable occupational heterogeneity in both measures, but quantitatively, it is the heterogeneity in factor substitutability that fuels workers’ exposure to CETC. In a general equilibrium model of worker sorting across occupations, CETC accounts for almost all of the observed labor reallocation in the US between 1984 and 2015. Absent occupational heterogeneity in factor substitutability, CETC accounts for only 17 percent of it (JEL I26, J16, J24, J31, O33)
{"title":"Occupational Exposure to Capital-Embodied Technical Change","authors":"J. Caunedo, David Jaume, Elisa Keller","doi":"10.1257/aer.20211478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211478","url":null,"abstract":"We study differences in exposure to factor-biased technical change among occupations by providing the first measures of capital-embodied technical change (CETC) and of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor at the occupational level. We document sizable occupational heterogeneity in both measures, but quantitatively, it is the heterogeneity in factor substitutability that fuels workers’ exposure to CETC. In a general equilibrium model of worker sorting across occupations, CETC accounts for almost all of the observed labor reallocation in the US between 1984 and 2015. Absent occupational heterogeneity in factor substitutability, CETC accounts for only 17 percent of it (JEL I26, J16, J24, J31, O33)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84826077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study health-care provider agency and optimal payments, considering an expensive medication for dialysis patients. Using Medicare claims data we estimate a structural model of treatment decisions, in which providers differ in their altruism and marginal costs, and this heterogeneity is unobservable to the government. In a novel application of nonlinear pricing methods, we empirically characterize the optimal contracts in this environment. The optimal contracts eliminate medically excessive dosages and reduce expenditures, resulting in approximately $300 million in annual gains from better contracting. This approach could be applied to a broad class of problems in health-care payment policy. (JEL D64, D86, H51, I11, I13, J33, L21)
{"title":"Optimal Contracting with Altruistic Agents: Medicare Payments for Dialysis Drugs","authors":"M. Gaynor, N. Mehta, Seth Richards-Shubik","doi":"10.1257/aer.20210208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210208","url":null,"abstract":"We study health-care provider agency and optimal payments, considering an expensive medication for dialysis patients. Using Medicare claims data we estimate a structural model of treatment decisions, in which providers differ in their altruism and marginal costs, and this heterogeneity is unobservable to the government. In a novel application of nonlinear pricing methods, we empirically characterize the optimal contracts in this environment. The optimal contracts eliminate medically excessive dosages and reduce expenditures, resulting in approximately $300 million in annual gains from better contracting. This approach could be applied to a broad class of problems in health-care payment policy. (JEL D64, D86, H51, I11, I13, J33, L21)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75677938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
E. Esposito, T. Rotesi, Alessandro Saia, Mathias Thoenig
We study how the spread of the Lost Cause narrative—a revisionist and racist retelling of the US Civil War—shifted opinions and behaviors toward national reunification and racial discrimination against African Americans. Looking at screenings of The Birth of a Nation, a blockbuster movie that greatly popularized the Lost Cause after 1915, we find that the film shifted the public discourse toward a more patriotic and less divisive language, increased military enlistment, and fostered cultural convergence between former enemies. We document how the racist content of the narrative connects to reconciliation through a “common-enemy” type of argument. (JEL J15, L82, N31, N32, N41, Z13)
我们研究了“失败的原因”叙事(一种对美国内战的修正主义和种族主义重述)的传播如何改变了人们对国家统一和对非裔美国人的种族歧视的看法和行为。回顾《一个国家的诞生》(The Birth of a Nation)的放映，我们发现这部电影将公共话语转向了一种更爱国、更少分裂的语言，增加了军事征兵，并促进了昔日敌人之间的文化融合。《一个国家的诞生》是一部轰动一时的电影，在1915年之后极大地推广了失败的事业。我们记录了叙事中的种族主义内容是如何通过“共同敌人”类型的论点与和解联系在一起的。(jj15, l82, n31, n32, n41, z13)
{"title":"Reconciliation Narratives: The Birth of a Nation after the US Civil War","authors":"E. Esposito, T. Rotesi, Alessandro Saia, Mathias Thoenig","doi":"10.1257/aer.20210413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210413","url":null,"abstract":"We study how the spread of the Lost Cause narrative—a revisionist and racist retelling of the US Civil War—shifted opinions and behaviors toward national reunification and racial discrimination against African Americans. Looking at screenings of The Birth of a Nation, a blockbuster movie that greatly popularized the Lost Cause after 1915, we find that the film shifted the public discourse toward a more patriotic and less divisive language, increased military enlistment, and fostered cultural convergence between former enemies. We document how the racist content of the narrative connects to reconciliation through a “common-enemy” type of argument. (JEL J15, L82, N31, N32, N41, Z13)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86547378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Credit markets, including the market for bank loans, are characterized by imperfect and asymmetric information. These informational frictions can interact with other economic forces to produce periods of credit-market stress, in which intermediation is unusually costly and households and businesses have difficulty obtaining credit. A high level of credit-market stress, as in a severe financial crisis, may in turn produce a deep and prolonged recession. I present evidence that financial distress and disrupted credit markets were important sources of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession of 2007–2009. Changes in the state of credit markets also play a role in “ garden-variety” business cycles and in the transmission of monetary policy to the economy. (JEL D82, E32, E44, E52, G21, N22)
{"title":"Nobel Lecture: Banking, Credit, and Economic Fluctuations","authors":"Ben S. Bernanke","doi":"10.1257/aer.113.5.1143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.113.5.1143","url":null,"abstract":"Credit markets, including the market for bank loans, are characterized by imperfect and asymmetric information. These informational frictions can interact with other economic forces to produce periods of credit-market stress, in which intermediation is unusually costly and households and businesses have difficulty obtaining credit. A high level of credit-market stress, as in a severe financial crisis, may in turn produce a deep and prolonged recession. I present evidence that financial distress and disrupted credit markets were important sources of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession of 2007–2009. Changes in the state of credit markets also play a role in “ garden-variety” business cycles and in the transmission of monetary policy to the economy. (JEL D82, E32, E44, E52, G21, N22)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84288395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the intergenerational consequences of social exclusion on prosociality. A lab-in-the-field approach in the historical region of Colombia’s leper colony reveals that descendants of socially excluded individuals are locally altruistic and extend such altruism to outsiders who have undergone similar circumstances. These individuals also display mistrust toward those who have, historically, been exclusionary—in this case, doctors. The content of historical narratives shared by ancestors who were excluded, which emphasize the endured mistreatment and doctors’ historical misinformation, is one mechanism that partially explains the intergenerational patterns. (JEL D64, H51, I12, I18, N36, N96, Z13)
{"title":"Social Exclusion and Social Preferences: Evidence from Colombia’s Leper Colony","authors":"Diego Ramos-Toro","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201332","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the intergenerational consequences of social exclusion on prosociality. A lab-in-the-field approach in the historical region of Colombia’s leper colony reveals that descendants of socially excluded individuals are locally altruistic and extend such altruism to outsiders who have undergone similar circumstances. These individuals also display mistrust toward those who have, historically, been exclusionary—in this case, doctors. The content of historical narratives shared by ancestors who were excluded, which emphasize the endured mistreatment and doctors’ historical misinformation, is one mechanism that partially explains the intergenerational patterns. (JEL D64, H51, I12, I18, N36, N96, Z13)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72500566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T. Brzustowski, Alkis Georgiadis-Harris, Balázs Szentes
This paper reconsiders the problem of a durable-good monopolist who cannot make intertemporal commitments. The buyer’s valuation is binary and his private information. The seller has access to dynamic contracts and, in each period, decides whether to deploy the previous period’s contract or to replace it with a new one. The main result of the paper is that the Coase conjecture fails: the monopo-list’s payoff is bounded away from the low valuation irrespective of the discount factor. (JEL D42, D82, D86, L12)
{"title":"Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture","authors":"T. Brzustowski, Alkis Georgiadis-Harris, Balázs Szentes","doi":"10.1257/aer.20220357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20220357","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reconsiders the problem of a durable-good monopolist who cannot make intertemporal commitments. The buyer’s valuation is binary and his private information. The seller has access to dynamic contracts and, in each period, decides whether to deploy the previous period’s contract or to replace it with a new one. The main result of the paper is that the Coase conjecture fails: the monopo-list’s payoff is bounded away from the low valuation irrespective of the discount factor. (JEL D42, D82, D86, L12)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76564476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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