We develop new quasi-experimental tools to measure disparate impact, regardless of its source, in the context of bail decisions. We show that omitted variables bias in pretrial release rate comparisons can be purged by using the quasi-random assignment of judges to estimate average pretrial misconduct risk by race. We find that two-thirds of the release rate disparity between white and Black defendants in New York City is due to the disparate impact of release decisions. We then develop a hierarchical marginal treatment effect model to study the drivers of disparate impact, finding evidence of both racial bias and statistical discrimination.
{"title":"Measuring Racial Discrimination in Bail Decisions.","authors":"David Arnold, Will Dobbie, Peter Hull","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201653","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We develop new quasi-experimental tools to measure disparate impact, regardless of its source, in the context of bail decisions. We show that omitted variables bias in pretrial release rate comparisons can be purged by using the quasi-random assignment of judges to estimate average pretrial misconduct risk by race. We find that two-thirds of the release rate disparity between white and Black defendants in New York City is due to the disparate impact of release decisions. We then develop a hierarchical marginal treatment effect model to study the drivers of disparate impact, finding evidence of both racial bias and statistical discrimination.</p>","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"112 9","pages":"2992-3038"},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10289801/pdf/nihms-1855624.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9717732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We relate two main representations of the cost of acquiring information: a cost that depends on the experiment performed, as in statistical decision theory, and a cost that depends on the distribution of posterior beliefs, as in applications of rational inattention. We show that in many cases of interest, posterior-based costs are inconsistent with a primitive model of costly experimentation. The inconsistency is at the core of known limits to the application of rational inattention in games and, more broadly, in equilibrium analyses where beliefs are endogenous; we show that an experiment-based approach helps to understand and overcome these difficulties. (JEL D82, D83)
{"title":"Experimental Cost of Information","authors":"Tommaso Denti, M. Marinacci, A. Rustichini","doi":"10.1257/aer.20210879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210879","url":null,"abstract":"We relate two main representations of the cost of acquiring information: a cost that depends on the experiment performed, as in statistical decision theory, and a cost that depends on the distribution of posterior beliefs, as in applications of rational inattention. We show that in many cases of interest, posterior-based costs are inconsistent with a primitive model of costly experimentation. The inconsistency is at the core of known limits to the application of rational inattention in games and, more broadly, in equilibrium analyses where beliefs are endogenous; we show that an experiment-based approach helps to understand and overcome these difficulties. (JEL D82, D83)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79211096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Y. Algan, Elizabeth Beasley, S. Côté, Jungwee Park, R. Tremblay, F. Vitaro
A childhood intervention to improve the social skills and self-control of at-risk kindergarten boys in the 1980s had positive impacts over the life course: higher trust and self-control as adolescents; increased social group membership, education, and reduced criminality as young adults; and increased marriage and employment as adults. Using administrative data, we find this intervention increased average yearly employment income by about 20 percent and decreased average yearly social transfers by almost 40 percent. We estimate that $1 invested in this program around age 8 yields about $11 in benefits by age 39, with an internal rate of return of around 17 percent. (JEL I21, I26, I28, J13, J24, J31, Z13)
{"title":"The Impact of Childhood Social Skills and Self-Control Training on Economic and Noneconomic Outcomes: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment Using Administrative Data","authors":"Y. Algan, Elizabeth Beasley, S. Côté, Jungwee Park, R. Tremblay, F. Vitaro","doi":"10.1257/aer.20200224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200224","url":null,"abstract":"A childhood intervention to improve the social skills and self-control of at-risk kindergarten boys in the 1980s had positive impacts over the life course: higher trust and self-control as adolescents; increased social group membership, education, and reduced criminality as young adults; and increased marriage and employment as adults. Using administrative data, we find this intervention increased average yearly employment income by about 20 percent and decreased average yearly social transfers by almost 40 percent. We estimate that $1 invested in this program around age 8 yields about $11 in benefits by age 39, with an internal rate of return of around 17 percent. (JEL I21, I26, I28, J13, J24, J31, Z13)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91198082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper assesses the effects of capital gains taxes on investment in the Republic of Korea (hereafter, Korea), where capital gains tax rates vary at the firm level by firm size. Following a reform in 2014, firms with a tax cut increased investment by 34 log points and issued more equity by 9 cents per dollar of lagged revenue, relative to unaffected firms. Additionally, the effects were larger for firms that appeared more cash constrained or went public after the reform. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the “traditional view” predicting that lower payout taxes spur equity-financed investment by increasing marginal returns on investment. (JEL D25, G31, G32, H25, H32, L25)
{"title":"Capital Gains Taxes and Real Corporate Investment: Evidence from Korea","authors":"Terry S. Moon","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201272","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201272","url":null,"abstract":"This paper assesses the effects of capital gains taxes on investment in the Republic of Korea (hereafter, Korea), where capital gains tax rates vary at the firm level by firm size. Following a reform in 2014, firms with a tax cut increased investment by 34 log points and issued more equity by 9 cents per dollar of lagged revenue, relative to unaffected firms. Additionally, the effects were larger for firms that appeared more cash constrained or went public after the reform. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the “traditional view” predicting that lower payout taxes spur equity-financed investment by increasing marginal returns on investment. (JEL D25, G31, G32, H25, H32, L25)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81347373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tessa Bold, Selene Ghisolfi, F. Nsonzi, J. Svensson
Smallholder farming in many developing countries is characterized by low productivity and low-quality output. Low quality limits the price farmers can command and their potential income. We conduct a series of experiments among maize farmers in Uganda to shed light on the barriers to quality upgrading and to study its potential. We find that the causal return to quality is zero. Providing access to a market where quality is paid a market premium led to an increase in farm productivity and income from farming. Our findings reveal the importance of demand-side constraints in limiting rural income and productivity growth. (JEL C93, L14, L15, L22, O13, Q12, Q13)
{"title":"Market Access and Quality Upgrading: Evidence from Four Field Experiments","authors":"Tessa Bold, Selene Ghisolfi, F. Nsonzi, J. Svensson","doi":"10.1257/aer.20210122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210122","url":null,"abstract":"Smallholder farming in many developing countries is characterized by low productivity and low-quality output. Low quality limits the price farmers can command and their potential income. We conduct a series of experiments among maize farmers in Uganda to shed light on the barriers to quality upgrading and to study its potential. We find that the causal return to quality is zero. Providing access to a market where quality is paid a market premium led to an increase in farm productivity and income from farming. Our findings reveal the importance of demand-side constraints in limiting rural income and productivity growth. (JEL C93, L14, L15, L22, O13, Q12, Q13)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"137 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89500410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze the effects of Mafia infiltration in the legal economy. Combining information from investigative records with panel data on firms’ governance and balance sheets, we build an indicator of infiltration in firms located in an area with no tradition of Mafia. We show that Mafia targets young and less efficient firms and that infiltration generates a significant rise in firms’ revenues, with no proportionate growth in production inputs and a deterioration of the firm’s financial situation leading to market exit. These findings are consistent with a story of predatory behavior in which infiltration is used for money laundering or rent extraction. (JEL D22, G32, G34, K42, L25)
{"title":"The Economic Effects of Mafia: Firm Level Evidence","authors":"Litterio Mirenda, S. Mocetti, L. Rizzica","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201015","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the effects of Mafia infiltration in the legal economy. Combining information from investigative records with panel data on firms’ governance and balance sheets, we build an indicator of infiltration in firms located in an area with no tradition of Mafia. We show that Mafia targets young and less efficient firms and that infiltration generates a significant rise in firms’ revenues, with no proportionate growth in production inputs and a deterioration of the firm’s financial situation leading to market exit. These findings are consistent with a story of predatory behavior in which infiltration is used for money laundering or rent extraction. (JEL D22, G32, G34, K42, L25)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81180196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Can information and communication technologies help citizens monitor their elections? We analyze a large-scale field experiment designed to answer this question in Colombia. We leveraged Facebook advertisements sent to over 4 million potential voters to encourage citizen reporting of electoral irregularities. We also cross-randomized whether candidates were informed about the campaign in a subset of municipalities. Total reports, and evidence-backed ones, experienced a large increase. Across a wide array of measures, electoral irregularities decreased. Finally, the reporting campaign reduced the vote share of candidates dependent on irregularities. This light-touch intervention is more cost-effective than monitoring efforts traditionally used by policymakers. (JEL C93, D12, D72, D83, O17)
{"title":"All Eyes on Them: A Field Experiment on Citizen Oversight and Electoral Integrity","authors":"Natalia Garbiras-Díaz, Mateo Montenegro","doi":"10.1257/aer.20210778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210778","url":null,"abstract":"Can information and communication technologies help citizens monitor their elections? We analyze a large-scale field experiment designed to answer this question in Colombia. We leveraged Facebook advertisements sent to over 4 million potential voters to encourage citizen reporting of electoral irregularities. We also cross-randomized whether candidates were informed about the campaign in a subset of municipalities. Total reports, and evidence-backed ones, experienced a large increase. Across a wide array of measures, electoral irregularities decreased. Finally, the reporting campaign reduced the vote share of candidates dependent on irregularities. This light-touch intervention is more cost-effective than monitoring efforts traditionally used by policymakers. (JEL C93, D12, D72, D83, O17)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79628353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper quantifies employer market power in US manufacturing and how it has changed over time. Using administrative data, we estimate plant-level markdowns—the ratio between a plant’s marginal revenue product of labor and its wage. We find most manufacturing plants operate in a monopsonistic environment, with an average markdown of 1.53, implying a worker earning only 65 cents on the marginal dollar generated. To investigate long-term trends for the entire sector, we propose a novel, theoretically grounded measure for the aggregate markdown. We find that it decreased between the late 1970s and the early 2000s, but has been sharply increasing since. (JEL J24, J31, J38, J42, L13, L60)
{"title":"Monopsony in the US Labor Market","authors":"Chen Yeh, Claudia Macaluso, Brad J. Hershbein","doi":"10.1257/aer.20200025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200025","url":null,"abstract":"This paper quantifies employer market power in US manufacturing and how it has changed over time. Using administrative data, we estimate plant-level markdowns—the ratio between a plant’s marginal revenue product of labor and its wage. We find most manufacturing plants operate in a monopsonistic environment, with an average markdown of 1.53, implying a worker earning only 65 cents on the marginal dollar generated. To investigate long-term trends for the entire sector, we propose a novel, theoretically grounded measure for the aggregate markdown. We find that it decreased between the late 1970s and the early 2000s, but has been sharply increasing since. (JEL J24, J31, J38, J42, L13, L60)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85588207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01Epub Date: 2022-06-13DOI: 10.1007/s00359-022-01555-0
Hermann Wagner, Ina Pappe, Sandra Brill, Hans-Ortwin Nalbach
Adult barn owls and primates possess an almost symmetric monocular rotational horizontal optocollic reflex. In primates, the reflex is initially asymmetric and becomes symmetric with time after birth. The condition in barn owls has not been studied so far. Here, we present data on the development of this reflex in this bird. We tested juvenile barn owls from the time before they open their eyes after hatching to the time they reach adult feather length. Wide-field visual patterns served as stimuli. They were presented at different rotational speeds in binocular and monocular settings. The binocular horizontal optocollic responses of juvenile barn owls were symmetric and adult-like on the first day that the birds responded to the stimulus. The monocular responses showed different rates of development in respect to stimulus velocity and stimulus direction. For velocities up to 20 deg/s, the monocular reflex was also adult-like on the first day that the birds responded to the stimulus. An initially higher asymmetry for 30 deg/s compared to adults disappeared within about two weeks. The development at even higher velocities remained unclear.
{"title":"Development of the horizontal optocollic reflex in juvenile barn owls (Tyto furcata pratincola).","authors":"Hermann Wagner, Ina Pappe, Sandra Brill, Hans-Ortwin Nalbach","doi":"10.1007/s00359-022-01555-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s00359-022-01555-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Adult barn owls and primates possess an almost symmetric monocular rotational horizontal optocollic reflex. In primates, the reflex is initially asymmetric and becomes symmetric with time after birth. The condition in barn owls has not been studied so far. Here, we present data on the development of this reflex in this bird. We tested juvenile barn owls from the time before they open their eyes after hatching to the time they reach adult feather length. Wide-field visual patterns served as stimuli. They were presented at different rotational speeds in binocular and monocular settings. The binocular horizontal optocollic responses of juvenile barn owls were symmetric and adult-like on the first day that the birds responded to the stimulus. The monocular responses showed different rates of development in respect to stimulus velocity and stimulus direction. For velocities up to 20 deg/s, the monocular reflex was also adult-like on the first day that the birds responded to the stimulus. An initially higher asymmetry for 30 deg/s compared to adults disappeared within about two weeks. The development at even higher velocities remained unclear.</p>","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"103 1","pages":"479-492"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9250920/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88252239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper shows how deportation policies can backfire by disseminating not only ideas between countries but also criminal networks, spreading gangs, in this case, across El Salvador, and spurring migration back to the United States. In 1996, the US Illegal Immigration Responsibility Act increased the number of criminal deportations. In particular, the members of large Salvadoran gangs developed in Los Angeles were sent back to El Salvador. Using variation in criminal deportations over time and across cohorts, combined with geographical variation in US gangs’ location, I find that these deportations led to an increase in homicide rates and gang activity, as well as an increase in gang recruitment and migration of children. (JEL J15, J18, K37, K42, O17)
{"title":"Spreading Gangs: Exporting US Criminal Capital to El Salvador","authors":"María Micaela Sviatschi","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201540","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows how deportation policies can backfire by disseminating not only ideas between countries but also criminal networks, spreading gangs, in this case, across El Salvador, and spurring migration back to the United States. In 1996, the US Illegal Immigration Responsibility Act increased the number of criminal deportations. In particular, the members of large Salvadoran gangs developed in Los Angeles were sent back to El Salvador. Using variation in criminal deportations over time and across cohorts, combined with geographical variation in US gangs’ location, I find that these deportations led to an increase in homicide rates and gang activity, as well as an increase in gang recruitment and migration of children. (JEL J15, J18, K37, K42, O17)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74727971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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