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Demagogues and the Economic Fragility of Democracies 煽动者和民主国家的经济脆弱性
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211125
D. Bernhardt, Stefan Krasa, Mehdi Shadmehr
We investigate the susceptibility of democracies to demagogues, studying tensions between representatives who guard voters’ long-run interests and demagogues who cater to voters’ short-run desires. Parties propose consumption and investment. Voters base choices on current-period consumption and valence shocks. Younger/poorer economies and economically disadvantaged voters are attracted to the demagogue’s disinvestment policies, forcing farsighted representatives to mimic them. This electoral competition can destroy democracy: if capital falls below a critical level, a death spiral ensues with capital stocks falling thereafter. We identify when economic development mitigates this risk and characterize how the death-spiral risk declines as capital grows large. (JEL D72, E21, E22, E32)
我们调查了民主国家对煽动家的敏感性,研究了保护选民长期利益的代表和迎合选民短期欲望的煽动家之间的紧张关系。各方提出消费和投资。选民的选择基于当期消费和价格冲击。年轻/贫穷的经济体和经济上处于不利地位的选民被煽动者的撤资政策所吸引,迫使有远见的代表效仿这些政策。这种选举竞争可以摧毁民主:如果资本低于临界水平,随之而来的是死亡螺旋,资本存量随后下降。我们确定了经济发展何时会减轻这种风险,并描述了死亡螺旋风险如何随着资本的增长而下降。(jel d72, e21, e22, e32)
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引用次数: 4
RELIGIOUS FESTIVALS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE TIMING OF MEXICAN SAINT DAY FESTIVALS. 宗教节日与经济发展:墨西哥圣人节时间的证据。
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211094
Eduardo Montero, Dean Yang

Does variation in how religious festivals are celebrated have economic consequences? We study the economic impacts of the timing of Catholic patron saint day festivals in Mexico. For causal identification, we exploit cross-locality variation in festival dates and in the timing of agricultural seasons. We estimate the impact of "agriculturally-coinciding" festivals (those coinciding with peak planting or harvest months) on long-run economic development of localities. Agriculturally-coinciding festivals lead to lower household income and worse development outcomes overall. These negative effects are likely due to lower agricultural productivity, which inhibits structural transformation out of agriculture. Agriculturally-coinciding festivals may nonetheless persist because they also lead to higher religiosity and social capital.

宗教节日庆祝方式的变化会产生经济后果吗?我们研究了墨西哥天主教守护神节的时间安排对经济的影响。为了确定因果关系,我们利用了节日日期和农季时间的跨地域差异。我们估算了 "与农业相吻合 "的节日(与播种或收获高峰期相吻合的节日)对当地长期经济发展的影响。与农业相吻合的节日会导致家庭收入降低,整体发展成果变差。造成这些负面影响的原因可能是农业生产率较低,从而抑制了农业结构转型。然而,与农业相关的节日可能会持续存在,因为这些节日也会带来更高的宗教信仰和社会资本。
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引用次数: 0
Methods Matter: p-Hacking and Publication Bias in Causal Analysis in Economics: Reply 方法:经济学因果分析中的p-Hacking和发表偏倚
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220277
A. Brodeur, Nikolai Cook, A. Heyes
In Brodeur, Cook, and Heyes (2020) we present evidence that instrumental variable (and to a lesser extent difference-in-difference) articles are more p-hacked than randomized controlled trial and regression discontinuity design articles. We also find no evidence that (i) articles published in the top five journals are different; (ii) the “revise and resubmit” process mitigates the problem; (iii) things are improving through time. Kranz and Pütz (2022) apply a novel adjustment to address rounding errors. They successfully replicate our results with the exception of our shakiest finding: after adjusting for rounding errors, bunching of test statistics for difference-in-difference articles is now smaller around the 5 percent level (and coincidentally larger at the 10 percent level). (JEL A14, C12, C52)
在Brodeur、Cook和Heyes(2020)中,我们提出证据表明,工具变量(以及较小程度上的差异中差异)文章比随机对照试验和回归不连续设计文章更具p-hack性。我们也没有发现证据表明:(1)在排名前五的期刊上发表的文章不同;(ii)“修订及重新提交”程序可减轻问题;(iii)随着时间的推移,情况正在改善。Kranz和p兹(2022)应用了一种新的调整来解决舍入误差。他们成功地复制了我们的结果,除了我们最不稳定的发现:在调整了舍入误差之后,差中差文章的测试统计数据现在在5%的水平上更小(巧合的是,在10%的水平上更大)。(jel a14, c12, c52)
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引用次数: 1
The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China 中国地方选举的兴衰
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181249
Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian, Yang Yao
We posit that autocrats introduce local elections when their bureaucratic capacity is low. Local elections exploit citizens’ informational advantage in keeping local officials accountable, but they also weaken vertical control. As bureaucratic capacity increases, the autocrat limits the role of elected bodies to regain vertical control. We argue that these insights can explain the introduction of village elections in rural China and the subsequent erosion of village autonomy years later. We construct a novel dataset to document political reforms, policy outcomes, and de facto power for almost four decades. We find that the introduction of elections improves popular policies and weakens unpopular ones. Increases in regional government resources lead to loss of village autonomy, but less so in remote villages. These patterns are consistent with an organizational view of local elections within autocracies. (JEL D72, D73, D83, O17, O18, P25, P26)
我们假设独裁者在其官僚能力较低时引入地方选举。地方选举利用公民的信息优势让地方官员负起责任,但也削弱了垂直控制。随着官僚能力的增加,独裁者限制民选机构的作用,以重新获得垂直控制。我们认为,这些洞见可以解释中国农村引入村委会选举,以及多年后村委会自治权遭到侵蚀的原因。我们构建了一个新的数据集来记录近四十年来的政治改革、政策结果和事实上的权力。我们发现,选举的引入改善了受欢迎的政策,削弱了不受欢迎的政策。地方政府资源的增加导致村级自治权的丧失,但在偏远村级自治权的丧失程度较低。这些模式与专制国家内部地方选举的组织观点是一致的。(jel d72, d73, d83, o17, o18, p25, p26)
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引用次数: 18
Methods Matter: p-Hacking and Publication Bias in Causal Analysis in Economics: Comment 方法:《经济学》因果分析中的p-Hacking和发表偏倚
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210121
Sebastian Kranz, Peter Pütz
Brodeur, Cook, and Heyes (2020) study hypothesis tests from economic articles and find evidence for p-hacking and publication bias, in particular for instrumental variable and difference-in-difference studies. When adjusting for rounding errors (introducing a novel method), statistical evidence for p-hacking from randomization tests and caliper tests at the 5 percent significance threshold vanishes for difference-in-differnce studies but remains for instrumental variable studies. Results at the 1 percent and 10 percent significance thresholds remain largely similar. In addition, Brodeur, Cook, and Heyes derive latent distributions of z-statistics absent publication bias using two different approaches. We establish for each approach a result that challenges its applicability. (JEL A14, C12, C52)
Brodeur、Cook和Heyes(2020)研究了经济文章中的假设检验,并找到了p-hacking和发表偏倚的证据,特别是在工具变量和差异中差异研究中。当调整舍入误差(引入一种新方法)时,随机化检验和卡尺检验在5%显著性阈值下的p-hacking的统计证据在差异研究中消失,但在工具变量研究中仍然存在。1%和10%显著性阈值的结果大致相似。此外,Brodeur、Cook和Heyes使用两种不同的方法得出了不存在发表偏倚的z统计量的潜在分布。我们为每种方法建立了一个挑战其适用性的结果。(jel a14, c12, c52)
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引用次数: 4
Belief Elicitation and Behavioral Incentive Compatibility 信念启发与行为激励相容性
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201248
David Nils Danz, L. Vesterlund, Alistair J. Wilson
Subjective beliefs are crucial for economic inference, yet behavior can challenge the elicitation. We propose that belief elicitation should be incentive compatible not only theoretically but also in a de facto behavioral sense. To demonstrate, we show that the binarized scoring rule, a state-of-the-art elicitation, violates two weak conditions for behavioral incentive compatibility: (i) within the elicitation, information on the incentives increases deviations from truthful reporting; and (ii) in a pure choice over the set of incentives, most deviate from the theorized maximizer. Moreover, we document that deviations are systematic and center-biased, and that the elicited beliefs substantially distort inference. (JEL D83, D91)
主观信念对经济推理至关重要,但行为可能会挑战这种推断。我们提出,信念的启发应该是激励相容的,不仅在理论上,而且在事实上的行为意义。为了证明这一点,我们证明了二值化评分规则,一种最先进的启发,违反了行为激励兼容性的两个弱条件:(i)在启发中,关于激励的信息增加了对真实报告的偏差;(2)在对一组激励进行纯选择时,大多数人偏离了理论化的最大化者。此外,我们证明偏差是系统性的和中心偏见的,并且引发的信念实质上扭曲了推理。(凝胶d83, d91)
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引用次数: 35
Separating Ownership and Information 分离所有权和信息
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211069
P. Voss, Marius Kulms
This paper identifies an upside of the separation of ownership and control, typically the source of inefficiencies in the theory of the firm. Because insiders obtain private information by exercising control, the separation of ownership and control leads to a separation of ownership and information. We show that this separation is necessary for efficient trade in the market for corporate control. The analysis reveals how strategic communication between inside and outside shareholders facilitates takeovers by eliciting external bidders’ private information. Our results call into question mandatory disclosure requirements during takeovers. (JEL D21, D82, G32, G34)
本文确定了所有权和控制权分离的一个好处,这通常是公司理论中低效的根源。由于内部人通过行使控制权获得私人信息,所有权和控制权的分离导致所有权和信息的分离。我们表明,这种分离对于公司控制权市场的有效交易是必要的。分析揭示了内外股东之间的战略沟通如何通过引出外部竞购者的私人信息来促进收购。我们的结果对收购期间的强制性披露要求提出了质疑。(凝胶d21, d82, g32, g34)
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引用次数: 2
Measuring Racial Discrimination in Bail Decisions. 衡量保释决定中的种族歧视。
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201653
David Arnold, Will Dobbie, Peter Hull

We develop new quasi-experimental tools to measure disparate impact, regardless of its source, in the context of bail decisions. We show that omitted variables bias in pretrial release rate comparisons can be purged by using the quasi-random assignment of judges to estimate average pretrial misconduct risk by race. We find that two-thirds of the release rate disparity between white and Black defendants in New York City is due to the disparate impact of release decisions. We then develop a hierarchical marginal treatment effect model to study the drivers of disparate impact, finding evidence of both racial bias and statistical discrimination.

我们开发了新的准实验工具来衡量保释决定背景下的不同影响,无论其来源如何。我们表明,在审前释放率比较中遗漏的变量偏差可以通过使用法官的准随机分配来估计按种族划分的审前不当行为的平均风险来消除。我们发现,纽约市白人和黑人被告释放率差异的三分之二是由于释放决定的不同影响。然后,我们开发了一个分层边际处理效应模型来研究差别化影响的驱动因素,找到种族偏见和统计歧视的证据。
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引用次数: 0
Experimental Cost of Information 实验信息成本
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210879
Tommaso Denti, M. Marinacci, A. Rustichini
We relate two main representations of the cost of acquiring information: a cost that depends on the experiment performed, as in statistical decision theory, and a cost that depends on the distribution of posterior beliefs, as in applications of rational inattention. We show that in many cases of interest, posterior-based costs are inconsistent with a primitive model of costly experimentation. The inconsistency is at the core of known limits to the application of rational inattention in games and, more broadly, in equilibrium analyses where beliefs are endogenous; we show that an experiment-based approach helps to understand and overcome these difficulties. (JEL D82, D83)
我们将获取信息成本的两种主要表现形式联系起来:一种成本取决于所进行的实验,如在统计决策理论中,另一种成本取决于后验信念的分布,如在理性不注意的应用中。我们表明,在许多感兴趣的情况下,基于后验的成本与昂贵实验的原始模型不一致。这种不一致性是在游戏中应用理性注意力不集中的核心限制,更广泛地说,是在信念是内生的平衡分析中;我们表明,基于实验的方法有助于理解和克服这些困难。(凝胶d82, d83)
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引用次数: 20
The Impact of Childhood Social Skills and Self-Control Training on Economic and Noneconomic Outcomes: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment Using Administrative Data 儿童社会技能和自我控制训练对经济和非经济结果的影响:来自行政数据的随机实验证据
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-08-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200224
Y. Algan, Elizabeth Beasley, S. Côté, Jungwee Park, R. Tremblay, F. Vitaro
A childhood intervention to improve the social skills and self-control of at-risk kindergarten boys in the 1980s had positive impacts over the life course: higher trust and self-control as adolescents; increased social group membership, education, and reduced criminality as young adults; and increased marriage and employment as adults. Using administrative data, we find this intervention increased average yearly employment income by about 20 percent and decreased average yearly social transfers by almost 40 percent. We estimate that $1 invested in this program around age 8 yields about $11 in benefits by age 39, with an internal rate of return of around 17 percent. (JEL I21, I26, I28, J13, J24, J31, Z13)
一项儿童干预对80年代幼儿园高危男孩社会技能和自我控制能力的改善在整个生命历程中具有积极的影响:青少年时期具有更高的信任和自我控制能力;增加社会团体成员,教育和减少犯罪的年轻人;成年人结婚和就业的增加。利用行政数据,我们发现这种干预使平均年就业收入增加了约20%,并使平均年社会转移支付减少了近40%。我们估计,8岁左右在这个项目上投资1美元,到39岁时将获得约11美元的收益,内部回报率约为17%。(j21, j26, j28, j13, j24, j31, z13)
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引用次数: 12
期刊
American Economic Review
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