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Capital Gains Taxes and Real Corporate Investment: Evidence from Korea 资本利得税与实体企业投资:来自韩国的证据
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-08-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201272
Terry S. Moon
This paper assesses the effects of capital gains taxes on investment in the Republic of Korea (hereafter, Korea), where capital gains tax rates vary at the firm level by firm size. Following a reform in 2014, firms with a tax cut increased investment by 34 log points and issued more equity by 9 cents per dollar of lagged revenue, relative to unaffected firms. Additionally, the effects were larger for firms that appeared more cash constrained or went public after the reform. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the “traditional view” predicting that lower payout taxes spur equity-financed investment by increasing marginal returns on investment. (JEL D25, G31, G32, H25, H32, L25)
本文评估了资本利得税对大韩民国(以下简称韩国)投资的影响,资本利得税税率因公司规模而异。在2014年的改革之后,与未受影响的公司相比,减税的公司增加了34个百分点的投资,每1美元滞后收入发行9美分的股票。此外,对于那些现金短缺或改革后上市的公司,这种影响更大。综上所述,这些发现与“传统观点”一致,即较低的派息税通过提高投资边际回报来刺激股权融资投资。(凝胶d25, g31, g32, h25, h32, l25)
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引用次数: 10
Market Access and Quality Upgrading: Evidence from Four Field Experiments 市场准入与质量提升:来自四个实地实验的证据
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-08-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210122
Tessa Bold, Selene Ghisolfi, F. Nsonzi, J. Svensson
Smallholder farming in many developing countries is characterized by low productivity and low-quality output. Low quality limits the price farmers can command and their potential income. We conduct a series of experiments among maize farmers in Uganda to shed light on the barriers to quality upgrading and to study its potential. We find that the causal return to quality is zero. Providing access to a market where quality is paid a market premium led to an increase in farm productivity and income from farming. Our findings reveal the importance of demand-side constraints in limiting rural income and productivity growth. (JEL C93, L14, L15, L22, O13, Q12, Q13)
许多发展中国家的小农农业的特点是生产率低、产出质量低。低质量限制了农民可以控制的价格和他们的潜在收入。我们在乌干达种植玉米的农民中进行了一系列实验,以揭示质量升级的障碍并研究其潜力。我们发现质量的因果回归为零。提供进入市场的机会,以市场溢价支付质量,从而提高了农业生产力和农业收入。我们的研究结果揭示了需求侧约束在限制农村收入和生产率增长方面的重要性。(jel c93, l14, l15, l22, o13, q12, q13)
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引用次数: 15
The Economic Effects of Mafia: Firm Level Evidence 黑手党的经济效应:公司层面的证据
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-08-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201015
Litterio Mirenda, S. Mocetti, L. Rizzica
We analyze the effects of Mafia infiltration in the legal economy. Combining information from investigative records with panel data on firms’ governance and balance sheets, we build an indicator of infiltration in firms located in an area with no tradition of Mafia. We show that Mafia targets young and less efficient firms and that infiltration generates a significant rise in firms’ revenues, with no proportionate growth in production inputs and a deterioration of the firm’s financial situation leading to market exit. These findings are consistent with a story of predatory behavior in which infiltration is used for money laundering or rent extraction. (JEL D22, G32, G34, K42, L25)
我们分析了黑手党渗透对合法经济的影响。将调查记录信息与公司治理和资产负债表的面板数据相结合,我们建立了一个指标,表明位于没有黑手党传统的地区的公司的渗透情况。我们表明,黑手党的目标是年轻和效率较低的企业,渗透使企业收入显著增加,而生产投入没有成比例的增长,企业财务状况的恶化导致市场退出。这些发现与掠夺性行为的故事是一致的,其中渗透被用来洗钱或榨取租金。(jel d22, g32, g34, k42, l25)
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引用次数: 15
All Eyes on Them: A Field Experiment on Citizen Oversight and Electoral Integrity 众目睽睽:公民监督与选举诚信的实地实验
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-08-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210778
Natalia Garbiras-Díaz, Mateo Montenegro
Can information and communication technologies help citizens monitor their elections? We analyze a large-scale field experiment designed to answer this question in Colombia. We leveraged Facebook advertisements sent to over 4 million potential voters to encourage citizen reporting of electoral irregularities. We also cross-randomized whether candidates were informed about the campaign in a subset of municipalities. Total reports, and evidence-backed ones, experienced a large increase. Across a wide array of measures, electoral irregularities decreased. Finally, the reporting campaign reduced the vote share of candidates dependent on irregularities. This light-touch intervention is more cost-effective than monitoring efforts traditionally used by policymakers. (JEL C93, D12, D72, D83, O17)
信息和通讯技术能帮助公民监督他们的选举吗?为了回答这个问题,我们在哥伦比亚分析了一个大规模的实地实验。我们利用Facebook向400多万潜在选民发送广告,鼓励公民举报选举违规行为。我们还交叉随机化了候选人是否在一个城市的子集中被告知竞选活动。报告总数和有证据支持的报告数量大幅增加。通过一系列广泛的措施,选举违规行为有所减少。最后,报告运动减少了依赖于违规行为的候选人的选票份额。这种轻触式干预比决策者传统上使用的监测措施更具成本效益。(凝胶c93, d12, d72, d83, o17)
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引用次数: 5
Monopsony in the US Labor Market 美国劳动力市场的垄断
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-07-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200025
Chen Yeh, Claudia Macaluso, Brad J. Hershbein
This paper quantifies employer market power in US manufacturing and how it has changed over time. Using administrative data, we estimate plant-level markdowns—the ratio between a plant’s marginal revenue product of labor and its wage. We find most manufacturing plants operate in a monopsonistic environment, with an average markdown of 1.53, implying a worker earning only 65 cents on the marginal dollar generated. To investigate long-term trends for the entire sector, we propose a novel, theoretically grounded measure for the aggregate markdown. We find that it decreased between the late 1970s and the early 2000s, but has been sharply increasing since. (JEL J24, J31, J38, J42, L13, L60)
本文量化了美国制造业的雇主市场力量,以及它是如何随时间变化的。利用管理数据,我们估计了工厂层面的降价——工厂劳动力边际收入产品与工资之间的比率。我们发现,大多数制造工厂都是在垄断的环境中运作的,平均降价幅度为1.53,这意味着一名工人在边际产出的1美元中只能赚到65美分。为了研究整个行业的长期趋势,我们提出了一种新颖的、理论上有根据的总降价措施。我们发现,从20世纪70年代末到21世纪初,这一比例有所下降,但此后又急剧上升。(j24, j31, j38, j42, l13, l60)
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引用次数: 51
Design-Based Research in Empirical Microeconomics 基于设计的实证微观经济学研究
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.112.6.1773
David Card
I briefly review the emergence of “ design-based” research methods in labor economics in the 1980s and early 1990s. These methods were seen as a partial solution to the problems of credible inference identified by Ashenfelter (1974), Leamer (1978), Hendry (1980), and others. Designed-based studies typically use a simplified one-equation model of the outcome of interest—in contrast to model-based studies that specify a data generating process for all factors determining the outcome. I discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of the design-based approach and the value of such research in the field. (JEL C20, J01, J24, J31, J38, J51, J53)
我简要回顾了20世纪80年代和90年代初劳动经济学中出现的“基于设计”的研究方法。这些方法被视为部分解决了Ashenfelter(1974)、Leamer(1978)、Hendry(1980)等人提出的可信推理问题。基于设计的研究通常使用感兴趣结果的简化单方程模型-与基于模型的研究相反,该研究为决定结果的所有因素指定了数据生成过程。我讨论了基于设计的方法的一些优点和缺点,以及这类研究在该领域的价值。(jj20, j01, j24, j31, j38, j51, j53)
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引用次数: 15
Spreading Gangs: Exporting US Criminal Capital to El Salvador 蔓延帮派:向萨尔瓦多输出美国犯罪资本
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201540
María Micaela Sviatschi
This paper shows how deportation policies can backfire by disseminating not only ideas between countries but also criminal networks, spreading gangs, in this case, across El Salvador, and spurring migration back to the United States. In 1996, the US Illegal Immigration Responsibility Act increased the number of criminal deportations. In particular, the members of large Salvadoran gangs developed in Los Angeles were sent back to El Salvador. Using variation in criminal deportations over time and across cohorts, combined with geographical variation in US gangs’ location, I find that these deportations led to an increase in homicide rates and gang activity, as well as an increase in gang recruitment and migration of children. (JEL J15, J18, K37, K42, O17)
这篇论文表明,驱逐政策不仅会在国家之间传播思想,还会传播犯罪网络,在这种情况下,在萨尔瓦多各地传播帮派,并刺激移民回到美国,从而产生适得其反的效果。1996年,美国《非法移民责任法案》增加了刑事驱逐的数量。特别是,在洛杉矶发展起来的大型萨尔瓦多帮派的成员被遣返回萨尔瓦多。通过对不同时期和不同群体的犯罪驱逐的变化,结合美国帮派所在地的地理变化,我发现这些驱逐导致了凶杀率和帮派活动的增加,以及帮派招募和儿童移民的增加。(j15, j18, k37, k42, o17)
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引用次数: 7
Bargaining with Mechanisms 与机制讨价还价
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210626
Marcin Peski
Two players bargain over a single indivisible good and a transfer, with one-sided incomplete information about preferences. Both players can offer arbitrary mechanisms to determine the allocation. We show that there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. In the equilibrium, one of the players proposes a menu that is optimal for the uninformed player among all menus, such that each type of the informed player receives at least her payoff under complete information. The optimal menu can be implemented with at most three allocations. Under a natural assumption on the uninformed player’s beliefs, the optimal menu coincides with the Myerson’s neutral solution to the bargaining problem in this environment. (JEL C78, D82, D83)
两个参与者在关于偏好的片面不完全信息的情况下,就一个不可分割的商品和一个转移进行讨价还价。双方都可以提供任意机制来决定分配。我们证明了存在一个唯一的完美贝叶斯均衡结果。在均衡中,一个玩家在所有菜单中为不知情的玩家提供最优的菜单,这样每种类型的知情玩家在完全信息下都能获得至少自己的收益。最优菜单最多可以通过三种分配来实现。在不知情玩家信念的自然假设下,最优菜单与该环境下议价问题的迈尔森中立解决方案一致。(凝胶c78, d82, d83)
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引用次数: 2
Concentration Thresholds for Horizontal Mergers 横向并购的集中度阈值
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201038
Volker Nocke, M. Whinston
Concentration-based thresholds for horizontal mergers, such as those in the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, play a central role in merger analysis but their basis remains unclear. We show that there is both a theoretical and an empirical basis for focusing solely on the change in concentration, and ignoring its level, in screening mergers for whether their unilateral price effects will harm consumers. We also argue that current threshold levels likely are too lax, unless one expects efficiency gains of 5 percent or greater, or other factors such as entry and product repositioning to significantly constrain the exercise of market power postmerger. (JEL D43, G34, G38, K21, L13, L41)
以集中度为基础的横向并购门槛,如美国《横向并购指南》中的门槛,在并购分析中发挥着核心作用,但其基础尚不清楚。我们表明,在筛选并购是否会对消费者造成单方面的价格影响时,只关注集中度的变化,而忽略其水平,既有理论基础,也有实证基础。我们还认为,目前的门槛水平可能过于宽松,除非人们期望效率提高5%或更高,或者其他因素,如进入和产品重新定位,将显著限制合并后市场力量的行使。(jel d43, g34, g38, k21, l13, l41)
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引用次数: 18
Efficient Matching in the School Choice Problem 择校问题中的有效匹配
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210240
P. Reny
Stable matchings in school choice needn’t be Pareto efficient and can leave thousands of students worse off than necessary. Call a matching μ priority-neutral if no matching can make any student whose priority is violated by μ better off without violating the priority of some student who is made worse off. Call a matching priority-efficient if it is priority-neutral and Pareto efficient. We show that there is a unique priority-efficient matching and that it dominates every priority-neutral matching and every stable matching. Moreover, truth-telling is a maxmin optimal strategy for every student in the mechanism that selects the priority-efficient matching. (JEL C78, I21, I28)
学校选择中的稳定匹配不一定是帕累托有效的,可能会让成千上万的学生陷入不必要的困境。如果没有匹配可以使任何优先级被μ违反的学生的优先级更好,而不会违反某些优先级更差的学生的优先级,则调用匹配μ优先级中立。如果匹配的优先级中立且帕累托有效,则称其为优先级高效。我们证明了存在唯一的优先级高效匹配,并且它支配着所有优先级中立匹配和所有稳定匹配。此外,在选择优先级有效匹配的机制中,讲真话是每个学生的最大最优策略。(jel c78, i21, i28)
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引用次数: 8
期刊
American Economic Review
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