Chloe N East, Sarah Miller, Marianne Page, Laura R Wherry
We examine multi-generational impacts of positive in utero health interventions using a new research design that exploits sharp increases in prenatal Medicaid eligibility that occurred in some states. Our analyses are based on U.S. Vital Statistics Natality files, which enables linkages between individuals' early life Medicaid exposure and the next generation's health at birth. We find evidence that the health benefits associated with treated generations' early life program exposure extend to later offspring. Our results suggest that the returns on early life health investments may be substantively underestimated.
{"title":"Multigenerational Impacts of Childhood Access to the Safety Net: Early Life Exposure to Medicaid and the Next Generation's Health.","authors":"Chloe N East, Sarah Miller, Marianne Page, Laura R Wherry","doi":"10.1257/aer.20210937","DOIUrl":"10.1257/aer.20210937","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We examine multi-generational impacts of positive in utero health interventions using a new research design that exploits sharp increases in prenatal Medicaid eligibility that occurred in some states. Our analyses are based on U.S. Vital Statistics Natality files, which enables linkages between individuals' early life Medicaid exposure and the next generation's health at birth. We find evidence that the health benefits associated with treated generations' early life program exposure extend to later offspring. Our results suggest that the returns on early life health investments may be substantively underestimated.</p>","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10168672/pdf/nihms-1886991.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9522114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does armed conflict reduce trade, even in noncombat areas, through the destruction of intergroup social capital? We analyze Ukrainian trade transactions before and after the 2014 Russia-Ukraine conflict. In a difference-in-differences framework, we find that Ukrainian firms from districts with fewer ethnic Russians experienced a deeper decline in trade with Russia. This decline is economically signifi-cant, persistent, and can be explained by erosion of intergroup trust. Affected Ukrainian firms suffered a decrease in performance and diverted trade to other countries. Our results suggest that, through social effects, conflict can be economically damaging even away from combat areas. (JEL D74, F14, F51, J15, P31, P33, Z13)
{"title":"Conflict and Intergroup Trade: Evidence from the 2014 Russia-Ukraine Crisis","authors":"V. Korovkin, Alexey Makarin","doi":"10.1257/aer.20191701","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191701","url":null,"abstract":"Does armed conflict reduce trade, even in noncombat areas, through the destruction of intergroup social capital? We analyze Ukrainian trade transactions before and after the 2014 Russia-Ukraine conflict. In a difference-in-differences framework, we find that Ukrainian firms from districts with fewer ethnic Russians experienced a deeper decline in trade with Russia. This decline is economically signifi-cant, persistent, and can be explained by erosion of intergroup trust. Affected Ukrainian firms suffered a decrease in performance and diverted trade to other countries. Our results suggest that, through social effects, conflict can be economically damaging even away from combat areas. (JEL D74, F14, F51, J15, P31, P33, Z13)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74078319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I study ultimatum bargaining with imperfectly observed offers. Imperfectly observed offers must be rejected with positive probability, even when the players’ preferences are common knowledge. Noisier observations imply a greater risk of rejection. In repeated ultimatum bargaining, the responding party can obtain a positive payoff if his signal of the opponent’s offer is also observed by the opponent herself, but not if his signal is private. In alternating-offers bargaining, a player is better off when her own offers are observed more precisely and her opponent’s offers are observed less precisely. Possible applications include international relations, regulation, principal-agency, and product quality provision. (JEL C73, C78, D82)
{"title":"Unobserved-Offers Bargaining","authors":"A. Wolitzky","doi":"10.1257/aer.20211524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211524","url":null,"abstract":"I study ultimatum bargaining with imperfectly observed offers. Imperfectly observed offers must be rejected with positive probability, even when the players’ preferences are common knowledge. Noisier observations imply a greater risk of rejection. In repeated ultimatum bargaining, the responding party can obtain a positive payoff if his signal of the opponent’s offer is also observed by the opponent herself, but not if his signal is private. In alternating-offers bargaining, a player is better off when her own offers are observed more precisely and her opponent’s offers are observed less precisely. Possible applications include international relations, regulation, principal-agency, and product quality provision. (JEL C73, C78, D82)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79758167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A regulator faces a stream of agents engaged in crimes with stochastic returns. The regulator designs an amnesty program, committing to a time path of punishments for criminals who report their crimes. In an optimal program, time variation in the returns from crime can generate time variation in the generosity of amnesty. I construct an optimal time path and show that it exhibits amnesty cycles. Amnesty becomes increasingly generous over time until it hits a bound, after which the cycle resets. Agents engaged in high return crime report at the end of each cycle, while agents engaged in low return crime report always. (JEL D82, D86, K42)
{"title":"Dynamic Amnesty Programs","authors":"Samuel Kapon","doi":"10.1257/aer.20211428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211428","url":null,"abstract":"A regulator faces a stream of agents engaged in crimes with stochastic returns. The regulator designs an amnesty program, committing to a time path of punishments for criminals who report their crimes. In an optimal program, time variation in the returns from crime can generate time variation in the generosity of amnesty. I construct an optimal time path and show that it exhibits amnesty cycles. Amnesty becomes increasingly generous over time until it hits a bound, after which the cycle resets. Agents engaged in high return crime report at the end of each cycle, while agents engaged in low return crime report always. (JEL D82, D86, K42)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82591797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael Dinerstein, Rigissa Megalokonomou, Constantine Yannelis
Human capital can depreciate if skills are unused. But estimating human capital depreciation is challenging, as worker skills are difficult to measure and less productive workers are more likely to spend time in nonemployment. We overcome these challenges with new administrative data on teachers’ assignments and their students’ outcomes, and quasi-random variation from the teacher assignment process in Greece. We find significant losses to output, as a one-year increase in time without formal employment lowers students’ test scores by 0.05 standard deviations. Using a simple production model, we estimate a skill depreciation rate of 4.3 percent and experience returns of 6.8 percent. (JEL I21, J24, J45, J64, J65)
{"title":"Human Capital Depreciation and Returns to Experience","authors":"Michael Dinerstein, Rigissa Megalokonomou, Constantine Yannelis","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201571","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201571","url":null,"abstract":"Human capital can depreciate if skills are unused. But estimating human capital depreciation is challenging, as worker skills are difficult to measure and less productive workers are more likely to spend time in nonemployment. We overcome these challenges with new administrative data on teachers’ assignments and their students’ outcomes, and quasi-random variation from the teacher assignment process in Greece. We find significant losses to output, as a one-year increase in time without formal employment lowers students’ test scores by 0.05 standard deviations. Using a simple production model, we estimate a skill depreciation rate of 4.3 percent and experience returns of 6.8 percent. (JEL I21, J24, J45, J64, J65)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85460066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eliana Carranza, R. Garlick, K. Orkin, Neil A. Rankin
We assess South African workseekers’ skills and disseminate the assessment results to explore how limited information affects firm and workseeker behavior. Giving workseekers assessment results that they can credibly share with firms increases workseekers’ employment and earnings and better aligns their skills, beliefs and search strategies. Giving workseekers assessment results that they cannot easily share with firms has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms shifts interview decisions. These findings show that getting credible skill information to the right agents can improve outcomes in the labor market. (JEL J22, J23, J24, J31, J41, J64, O15)
{"title":"Job Search and Hiring with Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills","authors":"Eliana Carranza, R. Garlick, K. Orkin, Neil A. Rankin","doi":"10.1257/aer.20200961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200961","url":null,"abstract":"We assess South African workseekers’ skills and disseminate the assessment results to explore how limited information affects firm and workseeker behavior. Giving workseekers assessment results that they can credibly share with firms increases workseekers’ employment and earnings and better aligns their skills, beliefs and search strategies. Giving workseekers assessment results that they cannot easily share with firms has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms shifts interview decisions. These findings show that getting credible skill information to the right agents can improve outcomes in the labor market. (JEL J22, J23, J24, J31, J41, J64, O15)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89511695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I evaluate randomly varied neighborhood exposure to information campaigns regarding either executive performance, or increases in executive power, prior to a Turkish referendum on weakening checks and balances on the executive. The campaigns increased voter polarization over the referendum, and subsequently changed party affiliation in national and local elections over the next two years, leading to partisan polarization. My results suggest that, when voters disagree on whether increasing executive power is a good policy, more information can increase voter polarization. Finally, I conclude that because potential polarization is often ignored, the impact of information campaigns on civil society is underestimated. (JEL D72, D83, O17)
{"title":"Persistent Polarizing Effects of Persuasion: Experimental Evidence from Turkey","authors":"C. Baysan","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201892","url":null,"abstract":"I evaluate randomly varied neighborhood exposure to information campaigns regarding either executive performance, or increases in executive power, prior to a Turkish referendum on weakening checks and balances on the executive. The campaigns increased voter polarization over the referendum, and subsequently changed party affiliation in national and local elections over the next two years, leading to partisan polarization. My results suggest that, when voters disagree on whether increasing executive power is a good policy, more information can increase voter polarization. Finally, I conclude that because potential polarization is often ignored, the impact of information campaigns on civil society is underestimated. (JEL D72, D83, O17)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80351611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A long-standing puzzle is how overconfidence can persist in settings characterized by repeated feedback. This paper studies managers who participate repeatedly in a high-powered tournament incentive system, learning relative performance each time. Using reduced form and structural methods we find that (i) managers make over-confident predictions about future performance; (ii) managers have overly positive memories of past performance; (iii) the two phenomena are linked at an individual level. Our results are consistent with models of motivated beliefs in which individuals are motivated to distort memories of feedback and preserve unrealistic expectations. (JEL D82, D83, J33, L25, L81, M52, M54)
{"title":"Persistent Overconfidence and Biased Memory: Evidence from Managers","authors":"David Huffman, Collin Raymond, J. Shvets","doi":"10.1257/aer.20190668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190668","url":null,"abstract":"A long-standing puzzle is how overconfidence can persist in settings characterized by repeated feedback. This paper studies managers who participate repeatedly in a high-powered tournament incentive system, learning relative performance each time. Using reduced form and structural methods we find that (i) managers make over-confident predictions about future performance; (ii) managers have overly positive memories of past performance; (iii) the two phenomena are linked at an individual level. Our results are consistent with models of motivated beliefs in which individuals are motivated to distort memories of feedback and preserve unrealistic expectations. (JEL D82, D83, J33, L25, L81, M52, M54)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81460967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We provide testable conditions under which the cost of acquiring information is given by the expected reduction of a measure of uncertainty (e.g., entropy). The assumption, under the name of posterior separability, is nearly universal in the literature of rational inattention; yet, a testable characterization has been lacking. In applications to experimental data, we indicate situations in which posterior separability is—and is not—a compelling assumption for the cost of information; we propose a generalization to address some of its shortcomings. We also show how to identify and estimate nonparametrically the cost of information from observable choice behavior. (JEL C91, D11, D12, D81, D91)
{"title":"Posterior Separable Cost of Information","authors":"Tommaso Denti","doi":"10.1257/aer.20211252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211252","url":null,"abstract":"We provide testable conditions under which the cost of acquiring information is given by the expected reduction of a measure of uncertainty (e.g., entropy). The assumption, under the name of posterior separability, is nearly universal in the literature of rational inattention; yet, a testable characterization has been lacking. In applications to experimental data, we indicate situations in which posterior separability is—and is not—a compelling assumption for the cost of information; we propose a generalization to address some of its shortcomings. We also show how to identify and estimate nonparametrically the cost of information from observable choice behavior. (JEL C91, D11, D12, D81, D91)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83913447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study an energy efficient charcoal cookstove in an experiment with 1,000 households in Nairobi. We estimate a 39 percent reduction in charcoal spending, which matches engineering estimates, generating a 295 percent annual return. Despite fuel savings of $237 over the stove’s two-year lifespan—and $295 in emissions reductions—households are only willing to pay $12. Drawing attention to energy savings does not increase demand. However, a loan more than doubles willingness to pay: credit constraints prevent adoption of privately optimal technologies. Energy efficient technologies could drive sustainable development by slowing greenhouse emissions while saving households money. (JEL D12, D91, G51, O12, O13, O32, Q54)
{"title":"Credit, Attention, and Externalities in the Adoption of Energy Efficient Technologies by Low-Income Households","authors":"Susanna Berkouwer, Joshua T. Dean","doi":"10.1257/aer.20210766","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210766","url":null,"abstract":"We study an energy efficient charcoal cookstove in an experiment with 1,000 households in Nairobi. We estimate a 39 percent reduction in charcoal spending, which matches engineering estimates, generating a 295 percent annual return. Despite fuel savings of $237 over the stove’s two-year lifespan—and $295 in emissions reductions—households are only willing to pay $12. Drawing attention to energy savings does not increase demand. However, a loan more than doubles willingness to pay: credit constraints prevent adoption of privately optimal technologies. Energy efficient technologies could drive sustainable development by slowing greenhouse emissions while saving households money. (JEL D12, D91, G51, O12, O13, O32, Q54)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84471137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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