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Human Capital Depreciation and Returns to Experience 人力资本折旧与经验回报
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201571
Michael Dinerstein, Rigissa Megalokonomou, Constantine Yannelis
Human capital can depreciate if skills are unused. But estimating human capital depreciation is challenging, as worker skills are difficult to measure and less productive workers are more likely to spend time in nonemployment. We overcome these challenges with new administrative data on teachers’ assignments and their students’ outcomes, and quasi-random variation from the teacher assignment process in Greece. We find significant losses to output, as a one-year increase in time without formal employment lowers students’ test scores by 0.05 standard deviations. Using a simple production model, we estimate a skill depreciation rate of 4.3 percent and experience returns of 6.8 percent. (JEL I21, J24, J45, J64, J65)
如果技能未被使用,人力资本就会贬值。但估计人力资本折旧具有挑战性,因为工人技能难以衡量,而且生产率较低的工人更有可能花时间失业。我们利用有关教师作业和学生成绩的新行政数据,以及希腊教师作业过程的准随机变化,克服了这些挑战。我们发现产出的显著损失,因为一年没有正式就业的时间增加会使学生的考试成绩降低0.05个标准差。使用一个简单的生产模型,我们估计技能折旧率为4.3%,经验回报率为6.8%。(j21, j24, j45, j64, j65)
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引用次数: 5
Job Search and Hiring with Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills 关于求职者技能信息有限的求职和招聘
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200961
Eliana Carranza, R. Garlick, K. Orkin, Neil A. Rankin
We assess South African workseekers’ skills and disseminate the assessment results to explore how limited information affects firm and workseeker behavior. Giving workseekers assessment results that they can credibly share with firms increases workseekers’ employment and earnings and better aligns their skills, beliefs and search strategies. Giving workseekers assessment results that they cannot easily share with firms has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms shifts interview decisions. These findings show that getting credible skill information to the right agents can improve outcomes in the labor market. (JEL J22, J23, J24, J31, J41, J64, O15)
我们评估了南非求职者的技能,并传播评估结果,以探索有限的信息如何影响公司和求职者的行为。向求职者提供他们可以可靠地与公司分享的评估结果,可以增加求职者的就业和收入,并更好地调整他们的技能、信念和求职策略。给求职者提供他们无法轻易与公司分享的评估结果,对他们的信念和求职有类似的影响,但对就业和收入的影响较小。只向公司提供评估结果会改变面试决定。这些发现表明,向正确的代理人提供可靠的技能信息可以改善劳动力市场的结果。(j22, j23, j24, j31, j41, j64, j15)
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引用次数: 13
Persistent Polarizing Effects of Persuasion: Experimental Evidence from Turkey 说服的持续极化效应:来自土耳其的实验证据
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201892
C. Baysan
I evaluate randomly varied neighborhood exposure to information campaigns regarding either executive performance, or increases in executive power, prior to a Turkish referendum on weakening checks and balances on the executive. The campaigns increased voter polarization over the referendum, and subsequently changed party affiliation in national and local elections over the next two years, leading to partisan polarization. My results suggest that, when voters disagree on whether increasing executive power is a good policy, more information can increase voter polarization. Finally, I conclude that because potential polarization is often ignored, the impact of information campaigns on civil society is underestimated. (JEL D72, D83, O17)
在土耳其就削弱行政权力的制衡进行全民公决之前,我随机评估了不同社区对行政绩效或行政权力增加的信息宣传活动的曝光情况。这些运动在全民公决中加剧了选民的两极分化,随后在接下来的两年里,在全国和地方选举中改变了党派关系,导致党派分化。我的研究结果表明,当选民不同意增加行政权力是否是一项好政策时,更多的信息会增加选民的两极分化。最后,我的结论是,由于潜在的两极分化往往被忽视,信息运动对公民社会的影响被低估了。(jel d72, d83, d17)
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引用次数: 3
Posterior Separable Cost of Information 后验可分离信息代价
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211252
Tommaso Denti
We provide testable conditions under which the cost of acquiring information is given by the expected reduction of a measure of uncertainty (e.g., entropy). The assumption, under the name of posterior separability, is nearly universal in the literature of rational inattention; yet, a testable characterization has been lacking. In applications to experimental data, we indicate situations in which posterior separability is—and is not—a compelling assumption for the cost of information; we propose a generalization to address some of its shortcomings. We also show how to identify and estimate nonparametrically the cost of information from observable choice behavior. (JEL C91, D11, D12, D81, D91)
我们提供了可测试的条件,在这些条件下,获取信息的成本是由不确定性度量(例如,熵)的预期减少给出的。在后可分性的名义下的假设,在理性不注意的文献中几乎是普遍的;然而,缺乏可测试的特征描述。在实验数据的应用中,我们指出了后验可分性是(也不是)信息成本的一个令人信服的假设的情况;我们提出一个概括来解决它的一些缺点。我们还展示了如何从可观察的选择行为中识别和估计信息的非参数成本。(凝胶c91, d11, d12, d81, d91)
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引用次数: 34
Persistent Overconfidence and Biased Memory: Evidence from Managers 持续过度自信和偏见记忆:来自管理者的证据
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190668
David Huffman, Collin Raymond, J. Shvets
A long-standing puzzle is how overconfidence can persist in settings characterized by repeated feedback. This paper studies managers who participate repeatedly in a high-powered tournament incentive system, learning relative performance each time. Using reduced form and structural methods we find that (i) managers make over-confident predictions about future performance; (ii) managers have overly positive memories of past performance; (iii) the two phenomena are linked at an individual level. Our results are consistent with models of motivated beliefs in which individuals are motivated to distort memories of feedback and preserve unrealistic expectations. (JEL D82, D83, J33, L25, L81, M52, M54)
一个长期存在的难题是,过度自信是如何在以反复反馈为特征的环境中持续存在的。本文研究了多次参与高强度赛事激励系统,每次学习相对绩效的管理者。通过简化形式和结构方法,我们发现(1)管理者对未来绩效的预测过于自信;(2)管理者对过去业绩的记忆过于正面;(iii)这两种现象在个人层面上有联系。我们的研究结果与动机信念模型是一致的,在这种模型中,个体被动机扭曲对反馈的记忆,并保持不切实际的期望。(jel d82, d83, j33, l25, l81, m52, m54)
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引用次数: 43
Credit, Attention, and Externalities in the Adoption of Energy Efficient Technologies by Low-Income Households 低收入家庭采用节能技术的信贷、关注和外部性
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210766
Susanna Berkouwer, Joshua T. Dean
We study an energy efficient charcoal cookstove in an experiment with 1,000 households in Nairobi. We estimate a 39 percent reduction in charcoal spending, which matches engineering estimates, generating a 295 percent annual return. Despite fuel savings of $237 over the stove’s two-year lifespan—and $295 in emissions reductions—households are only willing to pay $12. Drawing attention to energy savings does not increase demand. However, a loan more than doubles willingness to pay: credit constraints prevent adoption of privately optimal technologies. Energy efficient technologies could drive sustainable development by slowing greenhouse emissions while saving households money. (JEL D12, D91, G51, O12, O13, O32, Q54)
我们在内罗毕对1000户家庭进行了实验,研究了一种节能木炭炉灶。我们估计减少39%的木炭支出,这与工程估计相符,产生295%的年回报。尽管在炉子的两年寿命中节省了237美元的燃料,减少了295美元的排放量,但家庭只愿意支付12美元。关注节能并不会增加需求。然而,一笔贷款会使支付意愿增加一倍以上:信贷限制阻碍了私人最优技术的采用。节能技术可以在减少温室气体排放的同时为家庭节省资金,从而推动可持续发展。(jel d12, d91, g51, o12, o13, o32, q54)
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引用次数: 28
Demagogues and the Economic Fragility of Democracies 煽动者和民主国家的经济脆弱性
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211125
D. Bernhardt, Stefan Krasa, Mehdi Shadmehr
We investigate the susceptibility of democracies to demagogues, studying tensions between representatives who guard voters’ long-run interests and demagogues who cater to voters’ short-run desires. Parties propose consumption and investment. Voters base choices on current-period consumption and valence shocks. Younger/poorer economies and economically disadvantaged voters are attracted to the demagogue’s disinvestment policies, forcing farsighted representatives to mimic them. This electoral competition can destroy democracy: if capital falls below a critical level, a death spiral ensues with capital stocks falling thereafter. We identify when economic development mitigates this risk and characterize how the death-spiral risk declines as capital grows large. (JEL D72, E21, E22, E32)
我们调查了民主国家对煽动家的敏感性,研究了保护选民长期利益的代表和迎合选民短期欲望的煽动家之间的紧张关系。各方提出消费和投资。选民的选择基于当期消费和价格冲击。年轻/贫穷的经济体和经济上处于不利地位的选民被煽动者的撤资政策所吸引,迫使有远见的代表效仿这些政策。这种选举竞争可以摧毁民主:如果资本低于临界水平,随之而来的是死亡螺旋,资本存量随后下降。我们确定了经济发展何时会减轻这种风险,并描述了死亡螺旋风险如何随着资本的增长而下降。(jel d72, e21, e22, e32)
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引用次数: 4
Methods Matter: p-Hacking and Publication Bias in Causal Analysis in Economics: Reply 方法:经济学因果分析中的p-Hacking和发表偏倚
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220277
A. Brodeur, Nikolai Cook, A. Heyes
In Brodeur, Cook, and Heyes (2020) we present evidence that instrumental variable (and to a lesser extent difference-in-difference) articles are more p-hacked than randomized controlled trial and regression discontinuity design articles. We also find no evidence that (i) articles published in the top five journals are different; (ii) the “revise and resubmit” process mitigates the problem; (iii) things are improving through time. Kranz and Pütz (2022) apply a novel adjustment to address rounding errors. They successfully replicate our results with the exception of our shakiest finding: after adjusting for rounding errors, bunching of test statistics for difference-in-difference articles is now smaller around the 5 percent level (and coincidentally larger at the 10 percent level). (JEL A14, C12, C52)
在Brodeur、Cook和Heyes(2020)中,我们提出证据表明,工具变量(以及较小程度上的差异中差异)文章比随机对照试验和回归不连续设计文章更具p-hack性。我们也没有发现证据表明:(1)在排名前五的期刊上发表的文章不同;(ii)“修订及重新提交”程序可减轻问题;(iii)随着时间的推移,情况正在改善。Kranz和p兹(2022)应用了一种新的调整来解决舍入误差。他们成功地复制了我们的结果,除了我们最不稳定的发现:在调整了舍入误差之后,差中差文章的测试统计数据现在在5%的水平上更小(巧合的是,在10%的水平上更大)。(jel a14, c12, c52)
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引用次数: 1
The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China 中国地方选举的兴衰
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181249
Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian, Yang Yao
We posit that autocrats introduce local elections when their bureaucratic capacity is low. Local elections exploit citizens’ informational advantage in keeping local officials accountable, but they also weaken vertical control. As bureaucratic capacity increases, the autocrat limits the role of elected bodies to regain vertical control. We argue that these insights can explain the introduction of village elections in rural China and the subsequent erosion of village autonomy years later. We construct a novel dataset to document political reforms, policy outcomes, and de facto power for almost four decades. We find that the introduction of elections improves popular policies and weakens unpopular ones. Increases in regional government resources lead to loss of village autonomy, but less so in remote villages. These patterns are consistent with an organizational view of local elections within autocracies. (JEL D72, D73, D83, O17, O18, P25, P26)
我们假设独裁者在其官僚能力较低时引入地方选举。地方选举利用公民的信息优势让地方官员负起责任,但也削弱了垂直控制。随着官僚能力的增加,独裁者限制民选机构的作用,以重新获得垂直控制。我们认为,这些洞见可以解释中国农村引入村委会选举,以及多年后村委会自治权遭到侵蚀的原因。我们构建了一个新的数据集来记录近四十年来的政治改革、政策结果和事实上的权力。我们发现,选举的引入改善了受欢迎的政策,削弱了不受欢迎的政策。地方政府资源的增加导致村级自治权的丧失,但在偏远村级自治权的丧失程度较低。这些模式与专制国家内部地方选举的组织观点是一致的。(jel d72, d73, d83, o17, o18, p25, p26)
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引用次数: 18
Methods Matter: p-Hacking and Publication Bias in Causal Analysis in Economics: Comment 方法:《经济学》因果分析中的p-Hacking和发表偏倚
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210121
Sebastian Kranz, Peter Pütz
Brodeur, Cook, and Heyes (2020) study hypothesis tests from economic articles and find evidence for p-hacking and publication bias, in particular for instrumental variable and difference-in-difference studies. When adjusting for rounding errors (introducing a novel method), statistical evidence for p-hacking from randomization tests and caliper tests at the 5 percent significance threshold vanishes for difference-in-differnce studies but remains for instrumental variable studies. Results at the 1 percent and 10 percent significance thresholds remain largely similar. In addition, Brodeur, Cook, and Heyes derive latent distributions of z-statistics absent publication bias using two different approaches. We establish for each approach a result that challenges its applicability. (JEL A14, C12, C52)
Brodeur、Cook和Heyes(2020)研究了经济文章中的假设检验,并找到了p-hacking和发表偏倚的证据,特别是在工具变量和差异中差异研究中。当调整舍入误差(引入一种新方法)时,随机化检验和卡尺检验在5%显著性阈值下的p-hacking的统计证据在差异研究中消失,但在工具变量研究中仍然存在。1%和10%显著性阈值的结果大致相似。此外,Brodeur、Cook和Heyes使用两种不同的方法得出了不存在发表偏倚的z统计量的潜在分布。我们为每种方法建立了一个挑战其适用性的结果。(jel a14, c12, c52)
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引用次数: 4
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American Economic Review
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