Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure-such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities-may not justify a mandate in this setting.
{"title":"The Demand for Insurance and Rationale for a Mandate: Evidence from Workers' Compensation Insurance.","authors":"Marika Cabral, Can Cui, Michael Dworsky","doi":"10.1257/aer.20190261","DOIUrl":"10.1257/aer.20190261","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure-such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities-may not justify a mandate in this setting.</p>","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"112 5","pages":"1621-1668"},"PeriodicalIF":10.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10881117/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139935124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We measure the overall influence of contextual versus individual factors (e.g., voting rules and media as opposed to race and education) on voter behavior, and explore underlying mechanisms. Using a US-wide voter-level panel, 2008–2018, we examine voters who relocate across state and county lines, tracking changes in registration, turnout, and party affiliation to estimate location and individual fixed effects in a value-added model. Location explains 37 percent of the cross-state variation in turnout (to 63 percent for individual characteristics) and an only slightly smaller share of variation in party affiliation. Place effects are larger for young and White voters. (JEL D12, D72, I20, J15, L82, R23)
{"title":"Does Context Outweigh Individual Characteristics in Driving Voting Behavior? Evidence from Relocations within the United States","authors":"Enrico Cantoni, V. Pons","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201660","url":null,"abstract":"We measure the overall influence of contextual versus individual factors (e.g., voting rules and media as opposed to race and education) on voter behavior, and explore underlying mechanisms. Using a US-wide voter-level panel, 2008–2018, we examine voters who relocate across state and county lines, tracking changes in registration, turnout, and party affiliation to estimate location and individual fixed effects in a value-added model. Location explains 37 percent of the cross-state variation in turnout (to 63 percent for individual characteristics) and an only slightly smaller share of variation in party affiliation. Place effects are larger for young and White voters. (JEL D12, D72, I20, J15, L82, R23)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"211 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77489185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A data broker sells market segmentations to a producer with private cost who sells a product to a unit mass of consumers. This paper characterizes the revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the data broker. Every optimal mechanism induces quasi-perfect price discrimination. All the consumers with values above a cost-dependent cutoff buy by paying their values while the rest of consumers do not buy. The characterization implies that market outcomes remain unchanged even if the data broker becomes more powerful—either by gaining the ability to sell access to consumers or by becoming a retailer who purchases the product and sells to the consumers exclusively. (JEL D42, D82, D83, L81, M31)
{"title":"Selling Consumer Data for Profit: Optimal Market-Segmentation Design and Its Consequences","authors":"K. Yang","doi":"10.1257/aer.20210616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210616","url":null,"abstract":"A data broker sells market segmentations to a producer with private cost who sells a product to a unit mass of consumers. This paper characterizes the revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the data broker. Every optimal mechanism induces quasi-perfect price discrimination. All the consumers with values above a cost-dependent cutoff buy by paying their values while the rest of consumers do not buy. The characterization implies that market outcomes remain unchanged even if the data broker becomes more powerful—either by gaining the ability to sell access to consumers or by becoming a retailer who purchases the product and sells to the consumers exclusively. (JEL D42, D82, D83, L81, M31)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79179929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine how strategic buyer behavior affects equilibrium outcomes in a model of dynamic price competition where sellers benefit from learning-by-doing by allowing each buyer to expect to capture a share of future buyer surplus. Many equilibria that exist when buyers consider only their immediate payoffs are eliminated when buyers expect to capture even a modest share of future surplus, and the equilibria that survive are those where long-run market competition is more likely to be preserved. Our results are relevant for antitrust policy and our approach may be useful for future analyses of dynamic competition. (JEL C73, D21, D43, D83, K21, L13, L40)
{"title":"Dynamic Price Competition, Learning-by-Doing, and Strategic Buyers","authors":"Andrew Sweeting,Dun Jia,Shen Hui,Xinlu Yao","doi":"10.1257/aer.20202016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20202016","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how strategic buyer behavior affects equilibrium outcomes in a model of dynamic price competition where sellers benefit from learning-by-doing by allowing each buyer to expect to capture a share of future buyer surplus. Many equilibria that exist when buyers consider only their immediate payoffs are eliminated when buyers expect to capture even a modest share of future surplus, and the equilibria that survive are those where long-run market competition is more likely to be preserved. Our results are relevant for antitrust policy and our approach may be useful for future analyses of dynamic competition. (JEL C73, D21, D43, D83, K21, L13, L40)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"59 1","pages":"1311-1333"},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138541207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper documents that the earnings cost of job loss is concentrated among workers who find reemployment in lower-skill occupations, and that the cost and incidence of such occupation displacement is higher for workers who lose their job during a recession. I propose a model where hiring is endogenously more selective during recessions, leading some unemployed workers to optimally search for reemployment in lower-skill jobs. The model accounts for existing estimates of the size and cyclicality of the present value cost of job loss, and the cost of entering the labor market during a recession. (JEL E24, E32, J23, J24, J31, J63, J64)
{"title":"Understanding the Scarring Effect of Recessions","authors":"C. Huckfeldt","doi":"10.1257/aer.20160449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160449","url":null,"abstract":"This paper documents that the earnings cost of job loss is concentrated among workers who find reemployment in lower-skill occupations, and that the cost and incidence of such occupation displacement is higher for workers who lose their job during a recession. I propose a model where hiring is endogenously more selective during recessions, leading some unemployed workers to optimally search for reemployment in lower-skill jobs. The model accounts for existing estimates of the size and cyclicality of the present value cost of job loss, and the cost of entering the labor market during a recession. (JEL E24, E32, J23, J24, J31, J63, J64)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81534323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Peter Schwardmann, E. Tripodi, Joel J. van der Weele
Laboratory evidence shows that when people have to argue for a given position, they persuade themselves about the position’s factual and moral superiority. Such self-persuasion limits the potential of communication to resolve conflict and reduce polarization. We test for this phenomenon in a field setting, at international debating competitions that randomly assign experienced and motivated debaters to argue one side of a topical motion. We find self-persuasion in factual beliefs and confidence in one’s position. Effect sizes are smaller than in the laboratory, but robust to a one-hour exchange of arguments and a tenfold increase in incentives for accuracy. (JEL C93, D12, D72, D83, D91, I23)
{"title":"Self-Persuasion: Evidence from Field Experiments at International Debating Competitions","authors":"Peter Schwardmann, E. Tripodi, Joel J. van der Weele","doi":"10.1257/aer.20200372","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200372","url":null,"abstract":"Laboratory evidence shows that when people have to argue for a given position, they persuade themselves about the position’s factual and moral superiority. Such self-persuasion limits the potential of communication to resolve conflict and reduce polarization. We test for this phenomenon in a field setting, at international debating competitions that randomly assign experienced and motivated debaters to argue one side of a topical motion. We find self-persuasion in factual beliefs and confidence in one’s position. Effect sizes are smaller than in the laboratory, but robust to a one-hour exchange of arguments and a tenfold increase in incentives for accuracy. (JEL C93, D12, D72, D83, D91, I23)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84321279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine a new dataset of public procurement laws, practice, and outcomes in 187 countries. We measure regulation as restrictions on the discretion of the procuring entities. We find that laws and practice are highly correlated with each other across countries, and better practice is correlated with better outcomes, but laws themselves are not correlated with outcomes. A closer look shows that stricter laws correlate with improved outcomes, but only in countries with low public sector capacity. We present a model of procurement in which both regulatory rules and public sector capacity determine procurement outcomes. In the model, regulation is effective in countries with low public sector capacity, but not in countries with high capacity because it inhibits the socially optimal exercise of discretion to exclude low quality bidders. (JEL D73, H11, H57, K12, K42, O17)
{"title":"Public Procurement in Law and Practice","authors":"Erica Bosio,Simeon Djankov,Edward Glaeser,Andrei Shleifer","doi":"10.1257/aer.20200738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200738","url":null,"abstract":"We examine a new dataset of public procurement laws, practice, and outcomes in 187 countries. We measure regulation as restrictions on the discretion of the procuring entities. We find that laws and practice are highly correlated with each other across countries, and better practice is correlated with better outcomes, but laws themselves are not correlated with outcomes. A closer look shows that stricter laws correlate with improved outcomes, but only in countries with low public sector capacity. We present a model of procurement in which both regulatory rules and public sector capacity determine procurement outcomes. In the model, regulation is effective in countries with low public sector capacity, but not in countries with high capacity because it inhibits the socially optimal exercise of discretion to exclude low quality bidders. (JEL D73, H11, H57, K12, K42, O17)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"13 1","pages":"1091-1117"},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138541204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2020 the Environmental Protection Agency narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States,” significantly limiting wetland protection under the Clean Water Act. Current policy debates center on the uncertainty around wetland benefits. We estimate the value of wet-lands for flood mitigation across the United States using detailed flood claims and land use data. We find the average hectare of wetland lost between 2001 and 2016 cost society $1,840 annually, and over $8,000 in developed areas. We document significant spatial heterogeneity in wetland benefits, with implications for flood insurance policy and the 50 percent of “isolated ” wetlands at risk of losing federal protection. (JEL K32, Q24, Q25, Q53, Q58)
{"title":"Wetlands, Flooding, and the Clean Water Act","authors":"C. Taylor, Hannah Druckenmiller","doi":"10.1257/aer.20210497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210497","url":null,"abstract":"In 2020 the Environmental Protection Agency narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States,” significantly limiting wetland protection under the Clean Water Act. Current policy debates center on the uncertainty around wetland benefits. We estimate the value of wet-lands for flood mitigation across the United States using detailed flood claims and land use data. We find the average hectare of wetland lost between 2001 and 2016 cost society $1,840 annually, and over $8,000 in developed areas. We document significant spatial heterogeneity in wetland benefits, with implications for flood insurance policy and the 50 percent of “isolated ” wetlands at risk of losing federal protection. (JEL K32, Q24, Q25, Q53, Q58)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86061623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stefano DellaVigna,John A. List,Ulrike Malmendier,Gautam Rao
We design three field experiments to estimate how workers' social preferences toward their employer motivates their work effort. We vary the pay rates offered to workers, the return to the employer, and employer generosity demonstrated via unexpected gifts. Workers exert effort even without private incentives, but their effort is insensitive to the return to the employer. This is consistent with “warm glow” but not pure altruism. The gifts have no effect on productivity, but engender extra work. This difference is explained partly by the finding that extra work is much more responsive to incentives than is productivity. (JEL C93, J24, J28, J33, M52)
{"title":"Estimating Social Preferences and Gift Exchange at Work","authors":"Stefano DellaVigna,John A. List,Ulrike Malmendier,Gautam Rao","doi":"10.1257/aer.20190920","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190920","url":null,"abstract":"We design three field experiments to estimate how workers' social preferences toward their employer motivates their work effort. We vary the pay rates offered to workers, the return to the employer, and employer generosity demonstrated via unexpected gifts. Workers exert effort even without private incentives, but their effort is insensitive to the return to the employer. This is consistent with “warm glow” but not pure altruism. The gifts have no effect on productivity, but engender extra work. This difference is explained partly by the finding that extra work is much more responsive to incentives than is productivity. (JEL C93, J24, J28, J33, M52)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"9 1","pages":"1038-1074"},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138541206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Disadvantaged students perform differentially worse when randomly given a financially salient mathematics exam. For students with socioeconomic indicators below the national median, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of monetary themed questions depresses exam performance by 0.026 standard deviations, about 6 percent of their performance gap. Using question-level data, I confirm the role of financial salience by comparing performance on monetary and highly similar non-monetary questions. Leveraging the randomized ordering of questions, I identify an effect on subsequent questions, providing evidence that the attention capture effects of poverty affect policy relevant outcomes outside of experimental settings. (JEL G53, I21, I24, I32, J13, O15)
{"title":"Fictional Money, Real Costs: Impacts of Financial Salience on Disadvantaged Students","authors":"Claire Duquennois","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201661","url":null,"abstract":"Disadvantaged students perform differentially worse when randomly given a financially salient mathematics exam. For students with socioeconomic indicators below the national median, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of monetary themed questions depresses exam performance by 0.026 standard deviations, about 6 percent of their performance gap. Using question-level data, I confirm the role of financial salience by comparing performance on monetary and highly similar non-monetary questions. Leveraging the randomized ordering of questions, I identify an effect on subsequent questions, providing evidence that the attention capture effects of poverty affect policy relevant outcomes outside of experimental settings. (JEL G53, I21, I24, I32, J13, O15)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80735749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}