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Offshore Profit Shifting and Aggregate Measurement: Balance of Payments, Foreign Investment, Productivity, and the Labor Share 离岸利润转移和总量计量:国际收支、外国投资、生产率和劳动份额
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190285
Fatih Guvenen, R. Mataloni, Dylan G. Rassier, Kim J. Ruhl
We show how offshore profit shifting by US multinational enterprises affects several key measures of the US economy. Profits shifted out of the United States grew rapidly from the mid-1990s to 2010 and have since waned. From 1982–2016, on average, 38 percent of income attributed to US direct investment abroad is reattributable to the United States. We find that adjusting for profit shifting shrinks the trade deficit, decreases the return on US foreign direct investment abroad, boosts productivity growth rates in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and lowers labor’s share of income. (JEL E23, E25, F14, F23, H25, H87, L25)
我们展示了美国跨国企业的离岸利润转移如何影响美国经济的几个关键指标。从上世纪90年代中期到2010年,转移到美国以外的利润迅速增长,此后开始放缓。从1982年至2016年,美国海外直接投资的收入中,平均有38%可重新归属于美国。我们发现,对利润转移进行调整会缩小贸易逆差,降低美国对外直接投资的回报率,提高上世纪90年代末和本世纪初的生产率增长率,并降低劳动收入占比。(jel e23, e25, f14, f23, h25, h87, l25)
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引用次数: 27
Dividend Taxes and the Allocation of Capital 股息税和资本分配
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.3386/w30099
Charles Boissel, Adrien Matray
This paper investigates the 2013 threefold increase in the French dividend tax rate. Using administrative data covering the universe of firms from 2008 to 2017 and a quasi-experimental setting, we find that firms swiftly cut dividend payments and used this tax-induced increase in liquidity to invest more. Heterogeneity analyses show that firms with high demand and returns on capital responded most while no group of firms cut their investment. Our results reject models in which higher dividend taxes increase the cost of capital and show that the tax-induced increase in liquidity relaxes credit constraints, which can reduce capital misallocation. (JEL D22, G31, G35, H25, H32)
本文研究了2013年法国股息税率的三倍增长。利用涵盖2008年至2017年所有公司的行政数据和准实验环境,我们发现公司迅速削减股息支付,并利用这种税收引起的流动性增加来增加投资。异质性分析表明,在没有企业削减投资的情况下,资本需求高、回报高的企业做出的反应最多。我们的研究结果拒绝了高股息税增加资本成本的模型,并表明税收引起的流动性增加放松了信贷约束,这可以减少资本错配。(凝胶d22, g31, g35, h25, h32)
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引用次数: 18
Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysis 多维契约拍卖:一个实证分析
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200864
Yunmi Kong, I. Perrigne, Q. Vuong
In this paper, we conduct a structural analysis of multi-attribute auctions of contracts with a general allocation rule when private information is multidimensional. Upon modeling bidders’ contract value that accounts for their endogenous ex post actions, we nonparametrically identify bidders’ private information from their bids and estimate their joint distribution. Analyzing cash-royalty auctions of Louisiana oil leases, we find government revenue worse and development rates no better than in a cash auction with a fixed royalty in view of adverse selection and moral hazard. Our findings revise conventional wisdom on the optimality of multi-attribute auctions. (JEL D44, D82, D86, H82, Q35)
本文对私有信息是多维的情况下具有一般分配规则的契约多属性拍卖进行了结构分析。在建立投标人合同价值模型的基础上,考虑其事后行为,我们从投标人的投标中非参数地识别投标人的私人信息,并估计其联合分布。通过对路易斯安那州石油租赁权的现金权利金拍卖进行分析,我们发现,考虑到逆向选择和道德风险,与固定权利金的现金拍卖相比,政府收入更差,开发速度也并不好。我们的研究结果修订了关于多属性拍卖最优性的传统智慧。(jel d44, d82, d86, h82, q35)
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引用次数: 5
The Demand for Insurance and Rationale for a Mandate: Evidence from Workers' Compensation Insurance. 保险需求与强制保险的理由:来自工人赔偿保险的证据》(The Demand for Insurance and Rationale for a Mandate: Evidence from Workers' Compensation Insurance)。
IF 10.5 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190261
Marika Cabral, Can Cui, Michael Dworsky

Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure-such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities-may not justify a mandate in this setting.

工伤保险为工伤提供无过失保险,几乎在所有州都是强制性的。我们利用一个没有强制保险的独特市场的行政数据来估算对工伤保险的需求,并利用监管保费的更新来进行识别。我们发现,保费每增加 1%,投保率就会下降约 0.3%。根据这些估算值和成本数据,我们研究了政府干预以提高保险覆盖率的潜在理由。分析表明,在这种情况下,几种形式的市场失灵--如逆向选择、市场支配力和外部性--可能并不能证明强制措施的合理性。
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引用次数: 0
Does Context Outweigh Individual Characteristics in Driving Voting Behavior? Evidence from Relocations within the United States 在推动投票行为中,背景是否大于个人特征?来自美国境内重新安置的证据
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201660
Enrico Cantoni, V. Pons
We measure the overall influence of contextual versus individual factors (e.g., voting rules and media as opposed to race and education) on voter behavior, and explore underlying mechanisms. Using a US-wide voter-level panel, 2008–2018, we examine voters who relocate across state and county lines, tracking changes in registration, turnout, and party affiliation to estimate location and individual fixed effects in a value-added model. Location explains 37 percent of the cross-state variation in turnout (to 63 percent for individual characteristics) and an only slightly smaller share of variation in party affiliation. Place effects are larger for young and White voters. (JEL D12, D72, I20, J15, L82, R23)
我们衡量了环境因素与个人因素(例如,投票规则和媒体,而不是种族和教育)对选民行为的总体影响,并探索了潜在的机制。利用2008-2018年全美选民层面的调查小组,我们研究了跨州和县迁移的选民,跟踪登记、投票率和党派关系的变化,以估计增值模型中的地点和个人固定效应。地理位置解释了37%的州际投票率差异(个人特征为63%),党派关系差异的比例略小。地域效应在年轻人和白人选民中更大。(jel d12, d72, i20, j15, l82, r23)
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引用次数: 14
Selling Consumer Data for Profit: Optimal ­Market-Segmentation Design and Its Consequences 为利润出售消费者数据:最优市场细分设计及其后果
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210616
K. Yang
A data broker sells market segmentations to a producer with private cost who sells a product to a unit mass of consumers. This paper characterizes the revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the data broker. Every optimal mechanism induces quasi-perfect price discrimination. All the consumers with values above a cost-dependent cutoff buy by paying their values while the rest of consumers do not buy. The characterization implies that market outcomes remain unchanged even if the data broker becomes more powerful—either by gaining the ability to sell access to consumers or by becoming a retailer who purchases the product and sells to the consumers exclusively. (JEL D42, D82, D83, L81, M31)
数据经纪人以私人成本将市场细分卖给生产者,生产者将产品卖给单位数量的消费者。本文描述了数据代理的收益最大化机制。每一种最优机制都会诱发准完美价格歧视。所有价值高于成本依赖临界值的消费者都通过支付他们的价值来购买,而其他消费者则不购买。这一特征表明,即使数据代理变得更强大——要么获得向消费者出售访问权限的能力,要么成为购买产品并专门向消费者销售的零售商——市场结果也不会改变。(凝胶d42, d82, d83, l81, m31)
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引用次数: 10
Dynamic Price Competition, Learning-by-Doing, and Strategic Buyers 动态价格竞争、边做边学与战略买家
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20202016
Andrew Sweeting,Dun Jia,Shen Hui,Xinlu Yao
We examine how strategic buyer behavior affects equilibrium outcomes in a model of dynamic price competition where sellers benefit from learning-by-doing by allowing each buyer to expect to capture a share of future buyer surplus. Many equilibria that exist when buyers consider only their immediate payoffs are eliminated when buyers expect to capture even a modest share of future surplus, and the equilibria that survive are those where long-run market competition is more likely to be preserved. Our results are relevant for antitrust policy and our approach may be useful for future analyses of dynamic competition. (JEL C73, D21, D43, D83, K21, L13, L40)
在动态价格竞争模型中,我们研究了战略买家行为如何影响均衡结果。在动态价格竞争模型中,卖家通过允许每个买家期望获得未来买家剩余的份额,从而受益于边做边学。当买家只考虑他们的即时收益时,许多均衡存在,当买家期望获得哪怕是适度的未来剩余份额时,均衡就会被消除,而存活下来的均衡是那些更有可能保持长期市场竞争的均衡。我们的结果与反垄断政策相关,我们的方法可能对未来的动态竞争分析有用。(凝胶c73, d21, d43, d83, k21, l13, l40)
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引用次数: 0
Understanding the Scarring Effect of Recessions 理解经济衰退的伤疤效应
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20160449
C. Huckfeldt
This paper documents that the earnings cost of job loss is concentrated among workers who find reemployment in lower-skill occupations, and that the cost and incidence of such occupation displacement is higher for workers who lose their job during a recession. I propose a model where hiring is endogenously more selective during recessions, leading some unemployed workers to optimally search for reemployment in lower-skill jobs. The model accounts for existing estimates of the size and cyclicality of the present value cost of job loss, and the cost of entering the labor market during a recession. (JEL E24, E32, J23, J24, J31, J63, J64)
本文证明,失业的收入成本集中在那些在低技能职业中找到再就业的工人身上,而在经济衰退期间失业的工人,这种职业转移的成本和发生率更高。我提出了一个模型,在这个模型中,在经济衰退期间,招聘在内在上更具选择性,导致一些失业工人在低技能工作中寻找最佳的再就业机会。该模型考虑了对失业的现值成本的规模和周期性的现有估计,以及在经济衰退期间进入劳动力市场的成本。(jel e24, e32, j23, j24, j31, j63, j64)
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引用次数: 55
Self-Persuasion: Evidence from Field Experiments at International Debating Competitions 自我说服:来自国际辩论比赛现场实验的证据
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200372
Peter Schwardmann, E. Tripodi, Joel J. van der Weele
Laboratory evidence shows that when people have to argue for a given position, they persuade themselves about the position’s factual and moral superiority. Such self-persuasion limits the potential of communication to resolve conflict and reduce polarization. We test for this phenomenon in a field setting, at international debating competitions that randomly assign experienced and motivated debaters to argue one side of a topical motion. We find self-persuasion in factual beliefs and confidence in one’s position. Effect sizes are smaller than in the laboratory, but robust to a one-hour exchange of arguments and a tenfold increase in incentives for accuracy. (JEL C93, D12, D72, D83, D91, I23)
实验证据表明,当人们不得不为某一特定立场辩护时,他们会说服自己该立场在事实和道德上具有优越性。这种自我说服限制了沟通解决冲突和减少两极分化的潜力。我们在国际辩论比赛的现场环境中测试了这种现象,这些比赛随机分配有经验和有动力的辩手来辩论一个主题运动的一方。我们在事实信仰和对自己立场的自信中找到自我说服。效应大小比实验室小,但对一个小时的争论和十倍的准确性激励是强有力的。(jel c93, d12, d72, d83, d91, i23)
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引用次数: 14
Public Procurement in Law and Practice 法律与实践中的公共采购
IF 10.7 1区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Pub Date : 2022-04-01 DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200738
Erica Bosio,Simeon Djankov,Edward Glaeser,Andrei Shleifer
We examine a new dataset of public procurement laws, practice, and outcomes in 187 countries. We measure regulation as restrictions on the discretion of the procuring entities. We find that laws and practice are highly correlated with each other across countries, and better practice is correlated with better outcomes, but laws themselves are not correlated with outcomes. A closer look shows that stricter laws correlate with improved outcomes, but only in countries with low public sector capacity. We present a model of procurement in which both regulatory rules and public sector capacity determine procurement outcomes. In the model, regulation is effective in countries with low public sector capacity, but not in countries with high capacity because it inhibits the socially optimal exercise of discretion to exclude low quality bidders. (JEL D73, H11, H57, K12, K42, O17)
我们研究了187个国家的公共采购法律、实践和成果的新数据集。我们将监管视为对采购实体自由裁量权的限制。我们发现,各国的法律和实践高度相关,更好的实践与更好的结果相关,但法律本身与结果无关。更仔细的研究表明,更严格的法律与改善的结果相关,但仅在公共部门能力较低的国家。我们提出了一个采购模型,其中监管规则和公共部门能力都决定了采购结果。在该模型中,监管在公共部门能力较低的国家是有效的,但在能力较高的国家则不然,因为它抑制了社会最优的自由裁量权行使,以排除低质量的投标人。(凝胶d73, h11, h57, k12, k42, o17)
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引用次数: 0
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American Economic Review
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