We provide an incomplete information bargaining framework that captures the effects of differential bargaining power in markets with multiple buyers and multiple suppliers. The market is modeled as a mechanism that maximizes the expected weighted welfare of the firms, subject to the constraints of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and no deficit. We show that, in this model, there is no basis for the presumption that vertical integration increases equally weighted social surplus, while it is possible that horizontal mergers that appropriately change bargaining weights increase social surplus. Moreover, efficient bargaining implies that in equilibrium noncontractible investments are efficient. (JEL C78, D82, D83, G34, K21, L22, L40)
{"title":"Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment, and Vertical Integration","authors":"S. Loertscher, L. Marx","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201092","url":null,"abstract":"We provide an incomplete information bargaining framework that captures the effects of differential bargaining power in markets with multiple buyers and multiple suppliers. The market is modeled as a mechanism that maximizes the expected weighted welfare of the firms, subject to the constraints of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and no deficit. We show that, in this model, there is no basis for the presumption that vertical integration increases equally weighted social surplus, while it is possible that horizontal mergers that appropriately change bargaining weights increase social surplus. Moreover, efficient bargaining implies that in equilibrium noncontractible investments are efficient. (JEL C78, D82, D83, G34, K21, L22, L40)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88015546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Health insurers increasingly compete on their networks of medical providers. Using data from Massachusetts’s insurance exchange, I find substantial adverse selection against plans covering the most prestigious and expensive “star” hospitals. I highlight a theoretically distinct selection channel: consumers loyal to star hospitals incur high spending, conditional on their medical state, because they use these hospitals’ expensive care. This implies heterogeneity in consumers’ incremental costs of gaining access to star hospitals, posing a challenge for standard selection policies. Along with selection on unobserved sickness, I find this creates strong incentives to exclude star hospitals, even with risk adjustment in place. (JEL D82, G22, H75, I11, I13, I18)
{"title":"Hospital Network Competition and Adverse Selection: Evidence from the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange","authors":"Mark Shepard","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201453","url":null,"abstract":"Health insurers increasingly compete on their networks of medical providers. Using data from Massachusetts’s insurance exchange, I find substantial adverse selection against plans covering the most prestigious and expensive “star” hospitals. I highlight a theoretically distinct selection channel: consumers loyal to star hospitals incur high spending, conditional on their medical state, because they use these hospitals’ expensive care. This implies heterogeneity in consumers’ incremental costs of gaining access to star hospitals, posing a challenge for standard selection policies. Along with selection on unobserved sickness, I find this creates strong incentives to exclude star hospitals, even with risk adjustment in place. (JEL D82, G22, H75, I11, I13, I18)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"510 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study how political turnover in mayoral elections in Brazil affects public service provision by local governments. Exploiting a regression discontinuity design for close elections, we find that municipalities with a new party in office experience upheavals in the municipal bureaucracy: new personnel are appointed across multiple service sectors, and at both managerial and non-managerial levels. In education, the increase in the replacement rate of personnel in schools controlled by the municipal government is accompanied by test scores that are 0.05–0.08 standard deviations lower. In contrast, turnover of the mayor’s party does not impact local (non-municipal) schools. These findings suggest that political turnover can adversely affect the quality of public services when the bureaucracy is not shielded from the political process. (JEL D72, D73, H75, H76, J45, O17)
{"title":"Political Turnover, Bureaucratic Turnover, and the Quality of Public Services","authors":"Mitra Akhtari, Diana Moreira, Laura Trucco","doi":"10.1257/aer.20171867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171867","url":null,"abstract":"We study how political turnover in mayoral elections in Brazil affects public service provision by local governments. Exploiting a regression discontinuity design for close elections, we find that municipalities with a new party in office experience upheavals in the municipal bureaucracy: new personnel are appointed across multiple service sectors, and at both managerial and non-managerial levels. In education, the increase in the replacement rate of personnel in schools controlled by the municipal government is accompanied by test scores that are 0.05–0.08 standard deviations lower. In contrast, turnover of the mayor’s party does not impact local (non-municipal) schools. These findings suggest that political turnover can adversely affect the quality of public services when the bureaucracy is not shielded from the political process. (JEL D72, D73, H75, H76, J45, O17)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"503 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What explains the central role of the dollar in world trade? Will the US currency retain its dominant status in the future? This paper develops a quantitative general equilibrium framework with endogenous currency choice that can address these questions. Complementarities in price setting and input-output linkages across firms generate complementarities in currency choice making exporters coordinate on the same currency of invoicing. The dollar is more likely to play this role because of the large size of the US economy, a widespread peg to the dollar, and the history dependence in currency choice. Calibrated using the world input-output tables and exchange rate moments, the model can successfully replicate the key empirical facts about the use of currencies at the global level, across countries, and over time. According to the counterfactual analysis, the peg to the dollar in other economies ensures that the US currency is unlikely to lose its global status because of the falling US share in the world economy, but can be replaced by the renminbi in case of a negative shock in the US economy. If the peg is abandoned, the world is likely to move to a new equilibrium with multiple regional currencies. (JEL D21, E31, E42, F14, F31, F33)
{"title":"An Equilibrium Model of the International Price System","authors":"Dmitry Mukhin","doi":"10.1257/aer.20181550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181550","url":null,"abstract":"What explains the central role of the dollar in world trade? Will the US currency retain its dominant status in the future? This paper develops a quantitative general equilibrium framework with endogenous currency choice that can address these questions. Complementarities in price setting and input-output linkages across firms generate complementarities in currency choice making exporters coordinate on the same currency of invoicing. The dollar is more likely to play this role because of the large size of the US economy, a widespread peg to the dollar, and the history dependence in currency choice. Calibrated using the world input-output tables and exchange rate moments, the model can successfully replicate the key empirical facts about the use of currencies at the global level, across countries, and over time. According to the counterfactual analysis, the peg to the dollar in other economies ensures that the US currency is unlikely to lose its global status because of the falling US share in the world economy, but can be replaced by the renminbi in case of a negative shock in the US economy. If the peg is abandoned, the world is likely to move to a new equilibrium with multiple regional currencies. (JEL D21, E31, E42, F14, F31, F33)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"497 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
David M. Cutler, Kaushik Ghosh, Kassandra L. Messer, Trivellore Raghunathan, Allison B. Rosen, Susan T. Stewart
This paper develops a satellite account for the US health sector and measures productivity growth in health care for the elderly population between 1999 and 2012. We measure the change in medical spending and health outcomes for a comprehensive set of 80 conditions. Medical care has positive productivity growth over the time period, with aggregate productivity growth of 1.5 percent per year. However, there is significant heterogeneity in productivity growth. Care for cardiovascular disease has had very high productivity growth. In contrast, care for people with musculoskeletal conditions has been costly but has not led to improved outcomes. (JEL E01, H51, I10)
{"title":"A Satellite Account for Health in the United States","authors":"David M. Cutler, Kaushik Ghosh, Kassandra L. Messer, Trivellore Raghunathan, Allison B. Rosen, Susan T. Stewart","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201480","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a satellite account for the US health sector and measures productivity growth in health care for the elderly population between 1999 and 2012. We measure the change in medical spending and health outcomes for a comprehensive set of 80 conditions. Medical care has positive productivity growth over the time period, with aggregate productivity growth of 1.5 percent per year. However, there is significant heterogeneity in productivity growth. Care for cardiovascular disease has had very high productivity growth. In contrast, care for people with musculoskeletal conditions has been costly but has not led to improved outcomes. (JEL E01, H51, I10)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"528 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized. (JEL D63, D72, H23, H24)
{"title":"Taxes and Turnout: When the Decisive Voter Stays at Home","authors":"Felix Bierbrauer, Aleh Tsyvinski, Nicolas Werquin","doi":"10.1257/aer.20171927","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171927","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized. (JEL D63, D72, H23, H24)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"513 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.51558/2303-680x.2022.20.1.41
M. Brogi
Pandemic risks, such as Covid-19, are difficult to insure as they are characterized by multiple factor risks and losses and involve different types of businesses and people simultaneously. The scarcity of time series and statistical data prevents insurers from developing correct pricing. We propose a model of catastrophe risk with Non-Damage Business Interruption (NDBI) policies to manage the pandemic risk due to the spread of Covid-19. The model employs a Monte Carlo simulation of different lockdown scenarios: the frequency and severity distributions of losses of Italian SMEs. The main results show the importance of a Covid-19 lockdown exposure NDBI policy, which benefits not only SMEs but also the insurer.
{"title":"NON-DAMAGE BUSINESS INTERRUPTION INSURANCE POLICIES DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC","authors":"M. Brogi","doi":"10.51558/2303-680x.2022.20.1.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.51558/2303-680x.2022.20.1.41","url":null,"abstract":"Pandemic risks, such as Covid-19, are difficult to insure as they are characterized by multiple factor risks and losses and involve different types of businesses and people simultaneously. The scarcity of time series and statistical data prevents insurers from developing correct pricing. We propose a model of catastrophe risk with Non-Damage Business Interruption (NDBI) policies to manage the pandemic risk due to the spread of Covid-19. The model employs a Monte Carlo simulation of different lockdown scenarios: the frequency and severity distributions of losses of Italian SMEs. The main results show the importance of a Covid-19 lockdown exposure NDBI policy, which benefits not only SMEs but also the insurer.","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72524059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I study how the relative efficiency of high- and low-skill labor varies across countries. Using microdata for countries at different stages of development, I document that differences in relative quantities and wages are consistent with high-skill workers being relatively more productive in rich countries. I exploit variation in the skill premia of foreign-educated migrants to discriminate between two possible drivers of this pattern: cross-country differences in the skill bias of technology and in the relative human capital of skilled labor. I find that the former is quantitatively more important, and discuss the implications of this result for development accounting. (JEL I26, J24, J31, J61, L16, O15)
{"title":"The Relative Efficiency of Skilled Labor across Countries: Measurement and Interpretation","authors":"Federico M. Rossi","doi":"10.1257/aer.20191852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191852","url":null,"abstract":"I study how the relative efficiency of high- and low-skill labor varies across countries. Using microdata for countries at different stages of development, I document that differences in relative quantities and wages are consistent with high-skill workers being relatively more productive in rich countries. I exploit variation in the skill premia of foreign-educated migrants to discriminate between two possible drivers of this pattern: cross-country differences in the skill bias of technology and in the relative human capital of skilled labor. I find that the former is quantitatively more important, and discuss the implications of this result for development accounting. (JEL I26, J24, J31, J61, L16, O15)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79858619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper aims to improve the practical applicability of the classic theory of incentive contracts under moral hazard. We establish conditions under which the information provided by an A/B test of incentive contracts is sufficient for answering the question of how best to improve a status quo incentive contract, given a priori knowledge of the agent’s monetary preferences. We assess the empirical relevance of this result using data from DellaVigna and Pope’s (2018) study of a variety of incentive contracts. Finally, we discuss how our framework can be extended to incorporate additional considerations beyond those in the classic theory. (JEL D82, D86, D91)
{"title":"A/B Contracts","authors":"G. Georgiadis, M. Powell","doi":"10.1257/aer.20200732","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200732","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to improve the practical applicability of the classic theory of incentive contracts under moral hazard. We establish conditions under which the information provided by an A/B test of incentive contracts is sufficient for answering the question of how best to improve a status quo incentive contract, given a priori knowledge of the agent’s monetary preferences. We assess the empirical relevance of this result using data from DellaVigna and Pope’s (2018) study of a variety of incentive contracts. Finally, we discuss how our framework can be extended to incorporate additional considerations beyond those in the classic theory. (JEL D82, D86, D91)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"79 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75203395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.51558/2303-680x.2022.20.1.17
Nowadays, when operating in an unstable market, organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are also facing a continuous outflow of qualified employees to the countries of the European Union. In order to properly respond to the challenges from the environment, the organizations in BiH are forced to take adequate measures so as to become competitive in the market, which may prove to be difficult if they do not retain skilled workforce. This paper attempts to show that by implementing appropriate human resource management (HRM) practices and policies, organizations in BiH can affect employee organizational commitment, which will result not only in market survival but also in increased competitiveness, as the experience of the organizations in the surrounding countries shows that human resources is what gives these companies a competitive advantage. The paper aimed at examining the impact of characteristics, organizational characteristics, and HRM practices focused on performance appraisal, job security, employee participation, and career planning on employee organizational commitment in BiH companies with more than 50 employees in four sectors. The empirical research was conducted on a sample of 128 companies. The results show that when it comes to employee organizational commitment, HRM practices and policies bear more importance than demographic and organizational characteristics and that there is a statistically significant positive impact of HRM practices and policies on employee organizational commitment.
{"title":"HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES AND EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA COMPANIES","authors":"","doi":"10.51558/2303-680x.2022.20.1.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.51558/2303-680x.2022.20.1.17","url":null,"abstract":"Nowadays, when operating in an unstable market, organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are also facing a continuous outflow of qualified employees to the countries of the European Union. In order to properly respond to the challenges from the environment, the organizations in BiH are forced to take adequate measures so as to become competitive in the market, which may prove to be difficult if they do not retain skilled workforce. This paper attempts to show that by implementing appropriate human resource management (HRM) practices and policies, organizations in BiH can affect employee organizational commitment, which will result not only in market survival but also in increased competitiveness, as the experience of the organizations in the surrounding countries shows that human resources is what gives these companies a competitive advantage. The paper aimed at examining the impact of characteristics, organizational characteristics, and HRM practices focused on performance appraisal, job security, employee participation, and career planning on employee organizational commitment in BiH companies with more than 50 employees in four sectors. The empirical research was conducted on a sample of 128 companies. The results show that when it comes to employee organizational commitment, HRM practices and policies bear more importance than demographic and organizational characteristics and that there is a statistically significant positive impact of HRM practices and policies on employee organizational commitment.","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"166 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78073497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：