Abstract States frequently acquire proof of other states' norm violations, from nuclear proliferation to harboring terrorists to interfering in elections. Existing theories do not fully explain how states that catch others red-handed wield a form of coercive power over the wrongdoers. Discoverers may conceal proof of wrongdoing, share such proof with other actors privately, or reveal their proof to the world. States with more leverage over wrongdoers have two incentives to conceal proof of wrongdoing. They can blackmail wrongdoers by threatening to go public with proof of their guilt, and they can simultaneously allow wrongdoers to save face. States that possess proof of wrongdoing but have less leverage are more likely to share that proof with others. If a discoverer distrusts the intentions of states with more leverage, it will reveal evidence publicly, catalyzing others to act. Publicizing proof weaponizes the prospect that other states will pay reputation and hypocrisy costs if they do not follow through on punishing norm violations. Four case studies of nuclear proliferation (Taiwan, Libya, South Africa, and North Korea) probe this novel theory.
{"title":"Caught Red-Handed: How States Wield Proof to Coerce Wrongdoers","authors":"Cullen G. Nutt, Reid B C Pauly","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00421","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract States frequently acquire proof of other states' norm violations, from nuclear proliferation to harboring terrorists to interfering in elections. Existing theories do not fully explain how states that catch others red-handed wield a form of coercive power over the wrongdoers. Discoverers may conceal proof of wrongdoing, share such proof with other actors privately, or reveal their proof to the world. States with more leverage over wrongdoers have two incentives to conceal proof of wrongdoing. They can blackmail wrongdoers by threatening to go public with proof of their guilt, and they can simultaneously allow wrongdoers to save face. States that possess proof of wrongdoing but have less leverage are more likely to share that proof with others. If a discoverer distrusts the intentions of states with more leverage, it will reveal evidence publicly, catalyzing others to act. Publicizing proof weaponizes the prospect that other states will pay reputation and hypocrisy costs if they do not follow through on punishing norm violations. Four case studies of nuclear proliferation (Taiwan, Libya, South Africa, and North Korea) probe this novel theory.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"7-50"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79906948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C. A. Ford, J. Harvey, F. C. Miller, Keith B. Payne, B. H. Roberts, Scott D. Sagan, Allen S. Weiner
I enjoyed reading the thoughtful article by Scott Sagan and Allen Weiner.1 Yet, I write to point out some oaws in Sagan and Weiner’s assertion that the prohibition on civilian reprisals in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Protocol I) applies to the United States.2 In 1987, the United States objected to the reprisal ban in Protocol I3 because it would “remove a signiacant deterrent that protects civilians and war victims on all sides of a conoict.”4 Abraham D. Sofaer, legal adviser to the U.S. Department of State, provided
我喜欢阅读Scott萨根的深思熟虑的文章和艾伦Weiner.1然而,我写指出一些oaw萨根和维纳在断言禁止平民1977附加议定书报复我1949年日内瓦公约(我)协议适用于美国States.2早在1987年,美国反对在协议I3报复禁令,因为它将“删除signiacant威慑保护平民和战争受害者conoict的各方。美国国务院法律顾问亚伯拉罕·d·索费尔(Abraham D. Sofaer)表示
{"title":"Are Belligerent Reprisals against Civilians Legal?","authors":"C. A. Ford, J. Harvey, F. C. Miller, Keith B. Payne, B. H. Roberts, Scott D. Sagan, Allen S. Weiner","doi":"10.1162/isec_c_00422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_c_00422","url":null,"abstract":"I enjoyed reading the thoughtful article by Scott Sagan and Allen Weiner.1 Yet, I write to point out some oaws in Sagan and Weiner’s assertion that the prohibition on civilian reprisals in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Protocol I) applies to the United States.2 In 1987, the United States objected to the reprisal ban in Protocol I3 because it would “remove a signiacant deterrent that protects civilians and war victims on all sides of a conoict.”4 Abraham D. Sofaer, legal adviser to the U.S. Department of State, provided","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"27 1","pages":"166-172"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73562922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Donald Grasse, Melissa Pavlik, Hilary Matfess, Travis B. Curtice
Abstract Across the globe, states have attempted to contain COVID-19 by restricting movement, closing schools and businesses, and banning large gatherings. Such measures have expanded the degree of sanctioned state intervention into civilians' lives. But existing theories of preventive and responsive repression cannot explain why some countries experienced surges in repression after states in Africa initiated COVID-19-related lockdowns. While responsive repression occurs when states quell protests or riots, “opportunistic repression” arises when states use crises to suppress the political opposition. An examination of the relationship between COVID-19 shutdown policies and state violence against civilians in Africa tests this theory of opportunistic repression. Findings reveal a large and statistically significant relationship between shutdowns and repression, which holds after conditioning for the spread and lethality of the disease within-country and over time. A subnational case study of repression in Uganda provides evidence that the increase in repression appears to be concentrated in opposition areas that showed less support for Yoweri Museveni in the 2016 elections. Opportunistic repression provides a better explanation than theories of preventive or responsive repression for why Uganda experienced a surge in repression in 2020 and in what areas. The results have implications for theories of repression, authoritarian survival, the politics of emergency, and security.
{"title":"Opportunistic Repression: Civilian Targeting by the State in Response to COVID-19","authors":"Donald Grasse, Melissa Pavlik, Hilary Matfess, Travis B. Curtice","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00419","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Across the globe, states have attempted to contain COVID-19 by restricting movement, closing schools and businesses, and banning large gatherings. Such measures have expanded the degree of sanctioned state intervention into civilians' lives. But existing theories of preventive and responsive repression cannot explain why some countries experienced surges in repression after states in Africa initiated COVID-19-related lockdowns. While responsive repression occurs when states quell protests or riots, “opportunistic repression” arises when states use crises to suppress the political opposition. An examination of the relationship between COVID-19 shutdown policies and state violence against civilians in Africa tests this theory of opportunistic repression. Findings reveal a large and statistically significant relationship between shutdowns and repression, which holds after conditioning for the spread and lethality of the disease within-country and over time. A subnational case study of repression in Uganda provides evidence that the increase in repression appears to be concentrated in opposition areas that showed less support for Yoweri Museveni in the 2016 elections. Opportunistic repression provides a better explanation than theories of preventive or responsive repression for why Uganda experienced a surge in repression in 2020 and in what areas. The results have implications for theories of repression, authoritarian survival, the politics of emergency, and security.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"146 1","pages":"130-165"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77458631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Strategic arms control is in crisis. The United States and Russia have retreated from agreements that formed the framework for post–Cold War arms cuts and strategic stability, such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The only strategic arms control agreement between the United States and Russia (i.e., New START) expires in 2026. The political forcefield that sustained the old framework has been altered by major technological revolutions and China's rise. Motives for strategic arms control are conventionally framed in terms of their potential to enhance stability by limiting certain weapons, avoiding costly arms races, or preserving military advantage. But states can also use strategic arms control to divide adversaries. Wedge strategy theory explains how arms control can do so by affecting adversaries' threat perceptions, their beliefs about the costs and benefits of formal commitments, and their degree of trust in one another. Three landmark strategic arms control negotiations (the Five-Power Treaty and the Four-Power Treaty at the Washington Naval Conference, the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) show how the wedge motive informed these negotiations and influenced great power relations. The wedge logic remains relevant today. For example, the United States may employ future arms control agreements to drive a wedge between China and Russia, and it must be cautious about arms control deals with North Korea that would negatively affect its relationship with South Korea.
{"title":"Arms Control as Wedge Strategy: How Arms Limitation Deals Divide Alliances","authors":"T. Crawford, Khang X. Vu","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00420","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Strategic arms control is in crisis. The United States and Russia have retreated from agreements that formed the framework for post–Cold War arms cuts and strategic stability, such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The only strategic arms control agreement between the United States and Russia (i.e., New START) expires in 2026. The political forcefield that sustained the old framework has been altered by major technological revolutions and China's rise. Motives for strategic arms control are conventionally framed in terms of their potential to enhance stability by limiting certain weapons, avoiding costly arms races, or preserving military advantage. But states can also use strategic arms control to divide adversaries. Wedge strategy theory explains how arms control can do so by affecting adversaries' threat perceptions, their beliefs about the costs and benefits of formal commitments, and their degree of trust in one another. Three landmark strategic arms control negotiations (the Five-Power Treaty and the Four-Power Treaty at the Washington Naval Conference, the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) show how the wedge motive informed these negotiations and influenced great power relations. The wedge logic remains relevant today. For example, the United States may employ future arms control agreements to drive a wedge between China and Russia, and it must be cautious about arms control deals with North Korea that would negatively affect its relationship with South Korea.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"238 1","pages":"91-129"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77625923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Although cyber conflict has existed for thirty years, the strategic utility of cyber operations remains unclear. Many expect cyber operations to provide independent utility in both warfare and low-intensity competition. Underlying these expectations are broadly shared assumptions that information technology increases operational effectiveness. But a growing body of research shows how cyber operations tend to fall short of their promise. The reason for this shortfall is their subversive mechanism of action. In theory, subversion provides a way to exert influence at lower risks than force because it is secret and indirect, exploiting systems to use them against adversaries. The mismatch between promise and practice is the consequence of the subversive trilemma of cyber operations, whereby speed, intensity, and control are negatively correlated. These constraints pose a trilemma for actors because a gain in one variable tends to produce losses across the other two variables. A case study of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict provides empirical support for the argument. Qualitative analysis leverages original data from field interviews, leaked documents, forensic evidence, and local media. Findings show that the subversive trilemma limited the strategic utility of all five major disruptive cyber operations in this conflict.
{"title":"The Subversive Trilemma: Why Cyber Operations Fall Short of Expectations","authors":"Lennart Maschmeyer","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00418","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although cyber conflict has existed for thirty years, the strategic utility of cyber operations remains unclear. Many expect cyber operations to provide independent utility in both warfare and low-intensity competition. Underlying these expectations are broadly shared assumptions that information technology increases operational effectiveness. But a growing body of research shows how cyber operations tend to fall short of their promise. The reason for this shortfall is their subversive mechanism of action. In theory, subversion provides a way to exert influence at lower risks than force because it is secret and indirect, exploiting systems to use them against adversaries. The mismatch between promise and practice is the consequence of the subversive trilemma of cyber operations, whereby speed, intensity, and control are negatively correlated. These constraints pose a trilemma for actors because a gain in one variable tends to produce losses across the other two variables. A case study of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict provides empirical support for the argument. Qualitative analysis leverages original data from field interviews, leaked documents, forensic evidence, and local media. Findings show that the subversive trilemma limited the strategic utility of all five major disruptive cyber operations in this conflict.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"52 1","pages":"51-90"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78984192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Why do modern states recruit legionnaires—foreigners who are neither citizens nor subjects of the country whose military they serve? Rather than exclusively enlist citizens for soldiers, for the past two centuries states have mobilized legionnaires to help wage offensives, project power abroad, and suppress dissent. A supply-and-demand argument explains why states recruit these troops, framing the choice to mobilize legionnaires as a function of political factors that constrain the government's leeway to recruit domestically and its perceptions about the territorial threats it faces externally. A multimethod approach evaluates these claims, first by examining an original dataset of legionnaire recruitment from 1815 to 2020, then by employing congruence tests across World War II participants, and finally by conducting a detailed review of a hard test case for the argument—Nazi Germany. The prevalence of states’ recruitment of legionnaires calls for a reevaluation of existing narratives about the development of modern militaries and provides new insights into how states balance among the competing imperatives of identity, norms, and security. Legionnaire recruitment also underscores the need to recalibrate existing methods of calculating net assessments and preparing for strategic surprise. Far from being bound to a state's citizenry or borders, the theory and evidence show how governments use legionnaires to buttress their military power and to engineer rapid changes in the quality and quantity of the soldiers that they field.
{"title":"Leaning on Legionnaires: Why Modern States Recruit Foreign Soldiers","authors":"Elizabeth M.F. Grasmeder","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00411","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Why do modern states recruit legionnaires—foreigners who are neither citizens nor subjects of the country whose military they serve? Rather than exclusively enlist citizens for soldiers, for the past two centuries states have mobilized legionnaires to help wage offensives, project power abroad, and suppress dissent. A supply-and-demand argument explains why states recruit these troops, framing the choice to mobilize legionnaires as a function of political factors that constrain the government's leeway to recruit domestically and its perceptions about the territorial threats it faces externally. A multimethod approach evaluates these claims, first by examining an original dataset of legionnaire recruitment from 1815 to 2020, then by employing congruence tests across World War II participants, and finally by conducting a detailed review of a hard test case for the argument—Nazi Germany. The prevalence of states’ recruitment of legionnaires calls for a reevaluation of existing narratives about the development of modern militaries and provides new insights into how states balance among the competing imperatives of identity, norms, and security. Legionnaire recruitment also underscores the need to recalibrate existing methods of calculating net assessments and preparing for strategic surprise. Far from being bound to a state's citizenry or borders, the theory and evidence show how governments use legionnaires to buttress their military power and to engineer rapid changes in the quality and quantity of the soldiers that they field.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"15 1","pages":"147-195"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79117252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Reconstruction failed in the United States because white Southerners who were opposed to it effectively used violence to undermine Black political power and force uncommitted white Southerners to their side. Although structural factors made it harder to suppress this violence, a series of policy failures proved most important. The Radical Republican-led U.S. government did not deploy enough troops or use them aggressively. Nor did it pursue alternative paths that might have made success more likely, such as arming the Black community. The violence caused Reconstruction to fail, and the victorious white supremacists embedded structural racism into the post-Reconstruction political and social system in the South. Reconstruction's failure illustrates the dangers of half measures. The United States sought to reshape the American South at low cost, in terms of both troop levels and time. In addition, the failure indicates the importance of ensuring that democratization includes the rule of law, not just elections. Most important, Reconstruction demonstrates that a common policy recommendation—compromise with the losers after a civil war—is often fraught, with the price of peace being generations of injustice.
{"title":"White Supremacy, Terrorism, and the Failure of Reconstruction in the United States","authors":"D. Byman","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00410","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Reconstruction failed in the United States because white Southerners who were opposed to it effectively used violence to undermine Black political power and force uncommitted white Southerners to their side. Although structural factors made it harder to suppress this violence, a series of policy failures proved most important. The Radical Republican-led U.S. government did not deploy enough troops or use them aggressively. Nor did it pursue alternative paths that might have made success more likely, such as arming the Black community. The violence caused Reconstruction to fail, and the victorious white supremacists embedded structural racism into the post-Reconstruction political and social system in the South. Reconstruction's failure illustrates the dangers of half measures. The United States sought to reshape the American South at low cost, in terms of both troop levels and time. In addition, the failure indicates the importance of ensuring that democratization includes the rule of law, not just elections. Most important, Reconstruction demonstrates that a common policy recommendation—compromise with the losers after a civil war—is often fraught, with the price of peace being generations of injustice.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"25 1","pages":"53-103"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87326732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Why do states trade with their enemies during war? States make deliberate choices when setting their wartime commercial policies, and tailoring policies to match the type of war the states are expecting to fight. Specifically, states seek to balance two goals–maximizing revenue from continued trade during the war and minimizing the ability of the opponent to benefit militarily from trade. As a result, states trade with the enemy in (1) products that their opponents take a long time to convert into military capability, and (2) products that are essential to the domestic economy. Furthermore, states revise their wartime commercial policies based on how well they are doing on the battlefield. An analysis of British wartime commercial policy in World War I finds that a product's conversion time into military capabilities determines if and when that product will be prohibited from trade during the war. Alternatively, domestic political pressures play only a marginal role in wartime commercial policy decisions.
{"title":"Wartime Commercial Policy and Trade between Enemies","authors":"Mariya Grinberg","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00412","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Why do states trade with their enemies during war? States make deliberate choices when setting their wartime commercial policies, and tailoring policies to match the type of war the states are expecting to fight. Specifically, states seek to balance two goals–maximizing revenue from continued trade during the war and minimizing the ability of the opponent to benefit militarily from trade. As a result, states trade with the enemy in (1) products that their opponents take a long time to convert into military capability, and (2) products that are essential to the domestic economy. Furthermore, states revise their wartime commercial policies based on how well they are doing on the battlefield. An analysis of British wartime commercial policy in World War I finds that a product's conversion time into military capabilities determines if and when that product will be prohibited from trade during the war. Alternatively, domestic political pressures play only a marginal role in wartime commercial policy decisions.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"2 1","pages":"9-52"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72904106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael McFaul’s article “Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy” is well timed and likely to play a big role in shaping the debate about contemporary Russian foreign policy.1 The core argument is straightforward: President Vladimir Putin’s illiberal worldviews are a major driver of Russia’s international behavior. To be clear, McFaul acknowledges that other factors inouence Russian behavior as well. In particular, he stresses that the balance of power enables Putin to pursue a confrontational foreign policy, but the balance of power does not motivate or cause his actions (pp. 102–105). Similarly, Russia’s increasingly authoritarian political system serves as a permissive condition, concentrating decisionmaking authority in the hands of Putin (pp. 114–117). Thus, while McFaul recognizes that power and regime-type variables affect Russia’s international behavior, the heavy causal lifting is done by Putin’s illiberal conservatism and anti-Western mindset. The argument is intuitively compelling. On closer inspection, however, it fails to convince for four reasons. First, the article’s research design is oawed. By exploring only cases of Russian interventionism (e.g., Syria and Ukraine), McFaul is selecting on the dependent variable. In effect, he omits cases in which Russia abstained from intervention—although Putin’s anti-liberal mindset would have pushed him to interfere. Consider, for example, Russia’s response to the Velvet Revolution in Armenia. In May 2018, a wave of street protests erupted in Yerevan, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Serzh Sargasyan, who had been in power for ten years. The opposition made it clear that its ambition was to move the country in a more democratic direction. Thus, according to McFaul’s thesis, Putin should have provided assistance to the Sargasyan regime to crack down on the protesters. This, however, did not happen. Instead, Putin adopted a wait-and-see policy and, after Sargasyan’s resignation, established cordial relations
{"title":"The Power of Putin in Russian Foreign Policy","authors":"Elias Götz, Michael Mcfaul","doi":"10.1162/isec_c_00414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_c_00414","url":null,"abstract":"Michael McFaul’s article “Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy” is well timed and likely to play a big role in shaping the debate about contemporary Russian foreign policy.1 The core argument is straightforward: President Vladimir Putin’s illiberal worldviews are a major driver of Russia’s international behavior. To be clear, McFaul acknowledges that other factors inouence Russian behavior as well. In particular, he stresses that the balance of power enables Putin to pursue a confrontational foreign policy, but the balance of power does not motivate or cause his actions (pp. 102–105). Similarly, Russia’s increasingly authoritarian political system serves as a permissive condition, concentrating decisionmaking authority in the hands of Putin (pp. 114–117). Thus, while McFaul recognizes that power and regime-type variables affect Russia’s international behavior, the heavy causal lifting is done by Putin’s illiberal conservatism and anti-Western mindset. The argument is intuitively compelling. On closer inspection, however, it fails to convince for four reasons. First, the article’s research design is oawed. By exploring only cases of Russian interventionism (e.g., Syria and Ukraine), McFaul is selecting on the dependent variable. In effect, he omits cases in which Russia abstained from intervention—although Putin’s anti-liberal mindset would have pushed him to interfere. Consider, for example, Russia’s response to the Velvet Revolution in Armenia. In May 2018, a wave of street protests erupted in Yerevan, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Serzh Sargasyan, who had been in power for ten years. The opposition made it clear that its ambition was to move the country in a more democratic direction. Thus, according to McFaul’s thesis, Putin should have provided assistance to the Sargasyan regime to crack down on the protesters. This, however, did not happen. Instead, Putin adopted a wait-and-see policy and, after Sargasyan’s resignation, established cordial relations","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"113 1","pages":"196-200"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85490193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Why is it that international ideological enemies—states governed by leaders engaged in deep disputes about preferred domestic institutions and values—are sometimes able to overcome their ideological differences and ally to counter shared threats, and sometimes they are not? Alliances among ideological enemies confronting a common foe are unlike coalitions among ideologically similar states facing comparable threats. Members of these alliances are perpetually torn by two sets of powerful contending forces. Shared material threats push these states together, while the effects of ideological differences pull them apart. To predict when ideological enemies are and are not likely to ally in the pursuit of common interests, it is necessary to know which of these contending forces is likely to dominate at a particular time. The values of two ideological variables beyond that of ideological enmity play the key role in determining outcomes: (1) states’ susceptibility to major domestic ideological changes and (2) the nature of the ideological differences among countries. Similar levels of ideological enmity and material threats will have vastly different effects on leaders’ alliance policies as the values of these additional ideological variables alter.
{"title":"When Do Ideological Enemies Ally?","authors":"Mark L. Haas","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00413","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Why is it that international ideological enemies—states governed by leaders engaged in deep disputes about preferred domestic institutions and values—are sometimes able to overcome their ideological differences and ally to counter shared threats, and sometimes they are not? Alliances among ideological enemies confronting a common foe are unlike coalitions among ideologically similar states facing comparable threats. Members of these alliances are perpetually torn by two sets of powerful contending forces. Shared material threats push these states together, while the effects of ideological differences pull them apart. To predict when ideological enemies are and are not likely to ally in the pursuit of common interests, it is necessary to know which of these contending forces is likely to dominate at a particular time. The values of two ideological variables beyond that of ideological enmity play the key role in determining outcomes: (1) states’ susceptibility to major domestic ideological changes and (2) the nature of the ideological differences among countries. Similar levels of ideological enmity and material threats will have vastly different effects on leaders’ alliance policies as the values of these additional ideological variables alter.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"33 1","pages":"104-146"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83957332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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