{"title":"Correspondence: Measuring Power in International Relations","authors":"Caleb Pomeroy, Michael Beckley","doi":"10.1162/isec_c_00355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_c_00355","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"59 1","pages":"197-200"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91006193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Newly available sources show how the 1993–95 debate over the best means of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization unfolded inside the Clinton administration. This evidence comes from documents recently declassified by the Clinton Presidential Library, the Defense Department, and the State Department because of appeals by the author. As President Bill Clinton repeatedly remarked, the two key questions about enlargement were when and how. The sources make apparent that, during a critical decisionmaking period twenty-five years ago, supporters of a relatively swift conferral of full membership to a narrow range of countries outmaneuvered proponents of a slower, phased conferral of limited membership to a wide range of states. Pleas from Central and Eastern European leaders, missteps by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and victory by the pro-expansion Republican Party in the 1994 U.S. congressional election all helped advocates of full-membership enlargement to win. The documents also reveal the surprising impact of Ukrainian politics on this debate and the complex roles played by both Strobe Talbott, a U.S. ambassador and later deputy secretary of state, and Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister. Finally, the sources suggest ways in which the debate's outcome remains significant for transatlantic and U.S.-Russian relations today.
{"title":"How to Enlarge NATO: The Debate inside the Clinton Administration, 1993–95","authors":"M. Sarotte","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00353","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Newly available sources show how the 1993–95 debate over the best means of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization unfolded inside the Clinton administration. This evidence comes from documents recently declassified by the Clinton Presidential Library, the Defense Department, and the State Department because of appeals by the author. As President Bill Clinton repeatedly remarked, the two key questions about enlargement were when and how. The sources make apparent that, during a critical decisionmaking period twenty-five years ago, supporters of a relatively swift conferral of full membership to a narrow range of countries outmaneuvered proponents of a slower, phased conferral of limited membership to a wide range of states. Pleas from Central and Eastern European leaders, missteps by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and victory by the pro-expansion Republican Party in the 1994 U.S. congressional election all helped advocates of full-membership enlargement to win. The documents also reveal the surprising impact of Ukrainian politics on this debate and the complex roles played by both Strobe Talbott, a U.S. ambassador and later deputy secretary of state, and Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister. Finally, the sources suggest ways in which the debate's outcome remains significant for transatlantic and U.S.-Russian relations today.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"10 1","pages":"7-41"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88602867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Max Abrahms, J. Acton, K. Adams, Fiona Adamson, Prakash Adhikari, Mansoor Ahmed, Holger Albrecht, Khalid Almezaini, Dan Altman, Nicholas Anderson, C. Anzalone, E. Araral, Aaron Arnold, R. Art, Tricia Bacon, Kristin Bakke, B. Balmer, Navin A. Bapat, Corinne Bara, Michael Beckley, Paul Welch, Davis Brown, Sarah, D. Byman, Austin Carson, Seth Carus, Jonathan D. Caverley, Michael Chase, J. I. Chong, Thomas Christensen, Tiffany Chu, A. Chubb, David Clark, D. Cohen, C. Coker, Ken Conca, Z. Cooper, Ethan Corbin, P. Cotta-Ramusino, M. Crenshaw, J. Crisp, P. Cronin, Kate Cronin-Furman, Fiona S. Cunningham, G. Dabelko, Toby F. Dalton, Erica De Bruin
manuscripts. International Security relies heavily on the evaluations and advice of external reviewers in making its editorial decisions. The editors thank the reviewers listed below for their invaluable assistance. As in previous years, we are recognizing outstanding reviewers for the exceptional quality, quantity, and timeliness of their reviews. Outstanding reviewers are denoted with an asterisk (*). Reviewers for Volume 43
{"title":"Reviewers for Volume 43","authors":"Max Abrahms, J. Acton, K. Adams, Fiona Adamson, Prakash Adhikari, Mansoor Ahmed, Holger Albrecht, Khalid Almezaini, Dan Altman, Nicholas Anderson, C. Anzalone, E. Araral, Aaron Arnold, R. Art, Tricia Bacon, Kristin Bakke, B. Balmer, Navin A. Bapat, Corinne Bara, Michael Beckley, Paul Welch, Davis Brown, Sarah, D. Byman, Austin Carson, Seth Carus, Jonathan D. Caverley, Michael Chase, J. I. Chong, Thomas Christensen, Tiffany Chu, A. Chubb, David Clark, D. Cohen, C. Coker, Ken Conca, Z. Cooper, Ethan Corbin, P. Cotta-Ramusino, M. Crenshaw, J. Crisp, P. Cronin, Kate Cronin-Furman, Fiona S. Cunningham, G. Dabelko, Toby F. Dalton, Erica De Bruin","doi":"10.1162/isec_x_00357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_x_00357","url":null,"abstract":"manuscripts. International Security relies heavily on the evaluations and advice of external reviewers in making its editorial decisions. The editors thank the reviewers listed below for their invaluable assistance. As in previous years, we are recognizing outstanding reviewers for the exceptional quality, quantity, and timeliness of their reviews. Outstanding reviewers are denoted with an asterisk (*). Reviewers for Volume 43","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"69 1","pages":"201-203"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86600018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Since 1990, China has used coercion in its maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, despite adverse implications for its image. China is curiously selective in its timing, targets, and tools of coercion: China rarely employs military coercion, and it does not coerce all countries that pose similar threats. An examination of newly available primary documents and hundreds of hours of interviews with Chinese officials to trace the decisionmaking processes behind China's use and nonuse of coercion reveals a new theory of when, why, and how China employs coercion against other states, especially in the South China Sea. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the findings show that China is a cautious bully that does not use coercion frequently. In addition, when China becomes stronger, it tends to use military coercion less often, choosing instead nonmilitary tools. Moreover, concerns with its reputation for resolve and with economic cost are critical elements of Chinese decisionmaking regarding the costs and benefits of coercing its neighbors. China often coerces one target to deter others—“killing the chicken to scare the monkey.” These findings have important implications for how scholars understand states' coercive strategies and the future of Chinese behavior in the region and beyond.
{"title":"Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea","authors":"Ketian Zhang","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00354","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00354","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Since 1990, China has used coercion in its maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, despite adverse implications for its image. China is curiously selective in its timing, targets, and tools of coercion: China rarely employs military coercion, and it does not coerce all countries that pose similar threats. An examination of newly available primary documents and hundreds of hours of interviews with Chinese officials to trace the decisionmaking processes behind China's use and nonuse of coercion reveals a new theory of when, why, and how China employs coercion against other states, especially in the South China Sea. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the findings show that China is a cautious bully that does not use coercion frequently. In addition, when China becomes stronger, it tends to use military coercion less often, choosing instead nonmilitary tools. Moreover, concerns with its reputation for resolve and with economic cost are critical elements of Chinese decisionmaking regarding the costs and benefits of coercing its neighbors. China often coerces one target to deter others—“killing the chicken to scare the monkey.” These findings have important implications for how scholars understand states' coercive strategies and the future of Chinese behavior in the region and beyond.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"338 1","pages":"117-159"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84302059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Liberals claim that globalization has led to fragmentation and decentralized networks of power relations. This does not explain how states increasingly “weaponize interdependence” by leveraging global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic advantage. The theoretical literature on network topography shows how standard models predict that many networks grow asymmetrically so that some nodes are far more connected than others. This model nicely describes several key global economic networks, centering on the United States and a few other states. Highly asymmetric networks allow states with (1) effective jurisdiction over the central economic nodes and (2) appropriate domestic institutions and norms to weaponize these structural advantages for coercive ends. In particular, two mechanisms can be identified. First, states can employ the “panopticon effect” to gather strategically valuable information. Second, they can employ the “chokepoint effect” to deny network access to adversaries. Tests of the plausibility of these arguments across two extended case studies that provide variation both in the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and in the presence of domestic institutions—the SWIFT financial messaging system and the internet—confirm the framework's expectations. A better understanding of the policy implications of the use and potential overuse of these tools, as well as the response strategies of targeted states, will recast scholarly debates on the relationship between economic globalization and state coercion.
{"title":"Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion","authors":"H. Farrell, Abraham L. Newman","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Liberals claim that globalization has led to fragmentation and decentralized networks of power relations. This does not explain how states increasingly “weaponize interdependence” by leveraging global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic advantage. The theoretical literature on network topography shows how standard models predict that many networks grow asymmetrically so that some nodes are far more connected than others. This model nicely describes several key global economic networks, centering on the United States and a few other states. Highly asymmetric networks allow states with (1) effective jurisdiction over the central economic nodes and (2) appropriate domestic institutions and norms to weaponize these structural advantages for coercive ends. In particular, two mechanisms can be identified. First, states can employ the “panopticon effect” to gather strategically valuable information. Second, they can employ the “chokepoint effect” to deny network access to adversaries. Tests of the plausibility of these arguments across two extended case studies that provide variation both in the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and in the presence of domestic institutions—the SWIFT financial messaging system and the internet—confirm the framework's expectations. A better understanding of the policy implications of the use and potential overuse of these tools, as well as the response strategies of targeted states, will recast scholarly debates on the relationship between economic globalization and state coercion.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"39 1","pages":"42-79"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77256377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Permanent world peace is beginning to emerge. States with developed market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination of all states as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. Among other states, weaker powers, fearing those that are stronger, tend to bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers. The result is a powerful liberal global hierarchy that is unwittingly, but systematically, buttressing states' embrace of market norms and values, moving the world toward perpetual peace. Analysis of voting preferences of members of the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 2010 corroborates the influence of the liberal global hierarchy: states with weak internal markets tend to disagree with the foreign policy preferences of the largest market power (i.e., the United States), but more so if they have stronger rather than weaker military and economic capabilities. Market-oriented states, in contrast, align with the market leader regardless of their capabilities. Barring some dark force that brings about the collapse of the global economy (such as climate change), the world is now in the endgame of a five-century-long trajectory toward permanent peace and prosperity.
{"title":"The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual World Peace","authors":"M. Mousseau","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00352","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Permanent world peace is beginning to emerge. States with developed market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination of all states as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. Among other states, weaker powers, fearing those that are stronger, tend to bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers. The result is a powerful liberal global hierarchy that is unwittingly, but systematically, buttressing states' embrace of market norms and values, moving the world toward perpetual peace. Analysis of voting preferences of members of the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 2010 corroborates the influence of the liberal global hierarchy: states with weak internal markets tend to disagree with the foreign policy preferences of the largest market power (i.e., the United States), but more so if they have stronger rather than weaker military and economic capabilities. Market-oriented states, in contrast, align with the market leader regardless of their capabilities. Barring some dark force that brings about the collapse of the global economy (such as climate change), the world is now in the endgame of a five-century-long trajectory toward permanent peace and prosperity.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"15 1","pages":"160-196"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85591113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The liberal international order, erected after the Cold War, was crumbling by 2019. It was flawed from the start and thus destined to fail. The spread of liberal democracy around the globe—essential for building that order—faced strong resistance because of nationalism, which emphasizes self-determination. Some targeted states also resisted U.S. efforts to promote liberal democracy for security-related reasons. Additionally, problems arose because a liberal order calls for states to delegate substantial decisionmaking authority to international institutions and to allow refugees and immigrants to move easily across borders. Modern nation-states privilege sovereignty and national identity, however, which guarantees trouble when institutions become powerful and borders porous. Furthermore, the hyperglobalization that is integral to the liberal order creates economic problems among the lower and middle classes within the liberal democracies, fueling a backlash against that order. Finally, the liberal order accelerated China's rise, which helped transform the system from unipolar to multipolar. A liberal international order is possible only in unipolarity. The new multipolar world will feature three realist orders: a thin international order that facilitates cooperation, and two bounded orders—one dominated by China, the other by the United States—poised for waging security competition between them.
{"title":"Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order","authors":"J. Mearsheimer","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The liberal international order, erected after the Cold War, was crumbling by 2019. It was flawed from the start and thus destined to fail. The spread of liberal democracy around the globe—essential for building that order—faced strong resistance because of nationalism, which emphasizes self-determination. Some targeted states also resisted U.S. efforts to promote liberal democracy for security-related reasons. Additionally, problems arose because a liberal order calls for states to delegate substantial decisionmaking authority to international institutions and to allow refugees and immigrants to move easily across borders. Modern nation-states privilege sovereignty and national identity, however, which guarantees trouble when institutions become powerful and borders porous. Furthermore, the hyperglobalization that is integral to the liberal order creates economic problems among the lower and middle classes within the liberal democracies, fueling a backlash against that order. Finally, the liberal order accelerated China's rise, which helped transform the system from unipolar to multipolar. A liberal international order is possible only in unipolarity. The new multipolar world will feature three realist orders: a thin international order that facilitates cooperation, and two bounded orders—one dominated by China, the other by the United States—poised for waging security competition between them.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"20 1","pages":"7-50"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81977753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Jordan, Stephen G. Brooks, Brian Greenhill, Mark L. Haas, Matthew Adam, Adria Lawrence, Nuno P. Monteiro
Bartz, Eric, and Khalid Momand, “Correspondence: Debating the Rule of Law in Afghanistan” [re: Swenson 42:1], 43:1 (Summer 2018), pp. 181–185. Beckley, Michael, “The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters,” 43:2 (Fall 2018), pp. 7–44. Beckley, Michael, “Correspondence: Will East Asia Balance against Beijing?” [reply to Sharp and Meyers], 43:3 (Winter 2018/19), pp. 194–197. Brands, Hal, see Feaver, Peter D., and Hal Brands. Brooks, Deborah Jordan, Stephen G. Brooks, Brian D. Greenhill, and Mark L. Haas, “The Demographic Transition Theory of War: Why Young Societies Are Conoict Prone and Old Societies Are the Most Peaceful,” 43:3 (Winter 2018/19), pp. 53–95. Brooks, Stephen G., see Brooks, Deborah Jordan, Stephen G. Brooks, Brian D. Greenhill, and Mark L. Haas.
Bartz, Eric, Khalid Momand，“通信:辩论阿富汗的法治”[re: Swenson 42:1]， 43:1(夏季2018)，第181-185页。贝克利，迈克尔，“国家的力量:衡量什么是重要的，”43:2(2018年秋季)，第7-44页。迈克尔·贝克利，《通信:东亚会制衡北京吗?》[回复夏普和迈耶斯]，43:3(冬季2018/19)，第194-197页。布兰兹，哈尔，见菲弗，彼得·D和哈尔·布兰兹。布鲁克斯、黛博拉·乔丹、斯蒂芬·g·布鲁克斯、布莱恩·d·格林希尔、马克·l·哈斯:《战争的人口转型理论:为什么年轻社会容易发生冲突，而年老社会最和平》，第43卷第3期(2018/19冬季)，第53-95页。Stephen G. Brooks，参见Brooks, Deborah Jordan, Stephen G. Brooks, Brian D. Greenhill和Mark L. Haas。
{"title":"Index to International Security: Volume 43 (Summer 2018–Spring 2019)","authors":"D. Jordan, Stephen G. Brooks, Brian Greenhill, Mark L. Haas, Matthew Adam, Adria Lawrence, Nuno P. Monteiro","doi":"10.1162/isec_x_00349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_x_00349","url":null,"abstract":"Bartz, Eric, and Khalid Momand, “Correspondence: Debating the Rule of Law in Afghanistan” [re: Swenson 42:1], 43:1 (Summer 2018), pp. 181–185. Beckley, Michael, “The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters,” 43:2 (Fall 2018), pp. 7–44. Beckley, Michael, “Correspondence: Will East Asia Balance against Beijing?” [reply to Sharp and Meyers], 43:3 (Winter 2018/19), pp. 194–197. Brands, Hal, see Feaver, Peter D., and Hal Brands. Brooks, Deborah Jordan, Stephen G. Brooks, Brian D. Greenhill, and Mark L. Haas, “The Demographic Transition Theory of War: Why Young Societies Are Conoict Prone and Old Societies Are the Most Peaceful,” 43:3 (Winter 2018/19), pp. 53–95. Brooks, Stephen G., see Brooks, Deborah Jordan, Stephen G. Brooks, Brian D. Greenhill, and Mark L. Haas.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"32 1","pages":"205-207"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87405593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The making of the international system from c. 1500 reflected distinctively maritime dynamics, especially “gunboat diplomacy,” or the use of naval force for commercial gain. Comparisons between civilizations and across time show, first, that gunboat diplomacy was peculiarly European and, second, that it evolved through stages. For the majority of the modern era, violence was central to the commercial strategies of European state, private, and hybrid actors alike in the wider world. In contrast, large and small non-Western polities almost never sought to advance mercantile aims through naval coercion. European exceptionalism reflected a structural trade deficit, regional systemic dynamics favoring armed trade, and mercantilist beliefs. Changes in international norms later restricted the practice of gunboat diplomacy to states, as private navies became illegitimate. More generally, a maritime perspective suggests the need for a reappraisal of fundamental conceptual divisions and shows how the capital- and technology-intensive nature of naval war allowed relatively small European powers to be global players. It also explains how European expansion and the creation of the first global international system was built on dominance at sea centuries before Europeans’ general military superiority on land.
{"title":"Power and Profit at Sea: The Rise of the West in the Making of the International System","authors":"J. Sharman","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00346","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The making of the international system from c. 1500 reflected distinctively maritime dynamics, especially “gunboat diplomacy,” or the use of naval force for commercial gain. Comparisons between civilizations and across time show, first, that gunboat diplomacy was peculiarly European and, second, that it evolved through stages. For the majority of the modern era, violence was central to the commercial strategies of European state, private, and hybrid actors alike in the wider world. In contrast, large and small non-Western polities almost never sought to advance mercantile aims through naval coercion. European exceptionalism reflected a structural trade deficit, regional systemic dynamics favoring armed trade, and mercantilist beliefs. Changes in international norms later restricted the practice of gunboat diplomacy to states, as private navies became illegitimate. More generally, a maritime perspective suggests the need for a reappraisal of fundamental conceptual divisions and shows how the capital- and technology-intensive nature of naval war allowed relatively small European powers to be global players. It also explains how European expansion and the creation of the first global international system was built on dominance at sea centuries before Europeans’ general military superiority on land.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"19 1","pages":"163-196"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87774163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Well before President Donald Trump began rhetorically attacking U.S. allies and the open international trading system, policy analysts worried about challenges to the liberal international order (LIO). A more fundamental issue, however, has received little attention: the analytic value of framing U.S. security in terms of the LIO. Systematic examination shows that this framing creates far more confusion than insight. Even worse, the LIO framing could lead the United States to adopt overly competitive policies and unnecessarily resist change in the face of China's growing power. The “LIO concept”—the logics that proponents identify as underpinning the LIO—is focused inward, leaving it ill equipped to address interactions between members of the LIO and states that lie outside the LIO. In addition, the LIO concept suffers theoretical flaws that further undermine its explanatory value. The behavior that the LIO concept claims to explain—including cooperation under anarchy, effective Western balancing against the Soviet Union, the Cold War peace, and the lack of balancing against the United States following the Cold War—is better explained by other theories, most importantly, defensive realism. Analysis of U.S. international policy would be improved by dropping the LIO terminology entirely and reframing analysis in terms of grand strategy.
{"title":"A Flawed Framework: Why the Liberal International Order Concept Is Misguided","authors":"Charles L. Glaser","doi":"10.1162/isec_a_00343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00343","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Well before President Donald Trump began rhetorically attacking U.S. allies and the open international trading system, policy analysts worried about challenges to the liberal international order (LIO). A more fundamental issue, however, has received little attention: the analytic value of framing U.S. security in terms of the LIO. Systematic examination shows that this framing creates far more confusion than insight. Even worse, the LIO framing could lead the United States to adopt overly competitive policies and unnecessarily resist change in the face of China's growing power. The “LIO concept”—the logics that proponents identify as underpinning the LIO—is focused inward, leaving it ill equipped to address interactions between members of the LIO and states that lie outside the LIO. In addition, the LIO concept suffers theoretical flaws that further undermine its explanatory value. The behavior that the LIO concept claims to explain—including cooperation under anarchy, effective Western balancing against the Soviet Union, the Cold War peace, and the lack of balancing against the United States following the Cold War—is better explained by other theories, most importantly, defensive realism. Analysis of U.S. international policy would be improved by dropping the LIO terminology entirely and reframing analysis in terms of grand strategy.","PeriodicalId":48667,"journal":{"name":"International Security","volume":"16 1","pages":"51-87"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72692676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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